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- Dissertation: Alice Damirjian: The Ins and Outs of Meaning
Department of Philosophy
Opponent: Justin Khoo (MIT). Thesis defence Date: Wednesday 12 November 2025 Time: 13.00 – 15.00 Location: Hörsal D9 To the Disputation Party
- Canceled: Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Christina Thomsen Thörnqvist (Södertörn)
Department of Philosophy
Translating Descartes Meditations Workshop Date: Friday 9 May 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Sandra Lindblom (Cambridge)
Department of Philosophy
Lady Mary Shepherd’s Theory of Causality in Physics Workshop Date: Friday 23 May 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- SCEWP: The Ethics of Deterrence and Deontology
Department of Philosophy
More information TBA
- History seminar: Sven-Olov Wallenstein (Södertörn)
Department of Philosophy
Prousts världar Date: Friday 12 December 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 I seminariet presenterar jag grunderna för en kommande bok, Prousts världar (planerad till hösten 2026). Boken är en systematisk läsning av På spaning efter den tid som flytt , i vilken det gäller att följa medvetandets rörelser genom en serie ”världar” – barndomen, adolescensen, societeten, lasten, kärleken, döden och konsten, var och en med sina specifika strukturer, sina förhållanden mellan subjekt och objekt, sina fantasier, begär och horisonter, och sina motsvarande besvikelser och tillkortakommanden – fram till den ”återfunna tiden” i vilken helheten knyts samman.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Marcel Jahn (Stockholm University)&Jee Hyun Moon (Humboldt)
Department of Philosophy
Moral Neuroenhancement and the Discernibility Challenge Seminar Date: Tuesday 4 November 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Both scientists and philosophers have increasingly focused on the prospect of moral neuroenhancement—the use of neurotechnologies or psychoactive substances to facilitate moral improvement. Recent scholarship distinguishes between two main approaches: direct moral neuroenhancement, which seeks to implant specific moral beliefs, motives, or behaviors, and indirect moral neuroenhancement, which aims to enhance capacities such as moral reasoning, conceptual understanding, or self-control, enabling individuals to arrive at better moral judgments through their own deliberation. Several philosophers have compellingly argued that the direct approach is ethically impermissible, as it risks undermining moral autonomy and suppressing valuable disagreement. The indirect approach, by contrast, avoids these concerns and is widely regarded as ethically permissible or even required. In this paper, we introduce a novel challenge for the project of moral neuroenhancement—the discernibility challenge: for any given intervention, it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether it truly qualifies as indirect rather than direct. We demonstrate this by examining a range of experimental designs to discern between these two types of interventions, arguing that the evidence they produce is ultimately insufficient for this task. The discernibility challenge, we suggest, exposes a profound epistemic uncertainty with notable implications for the ethical permissibility of moral neuroenhancement: if we cannot reliably distinguish between permissible (indirect) and impermissible (direct) interventions, we lack the epistemic assurance necessary to ethically justify their use.
- CLLAM seminar: Sebastian Enquist
Department of Philosophy
Meaning-as-use and logical conventionalism Seminar Date: Friday 31 October 2025 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 & Zoom Link Abstract I will present a view of logic based on the notion that meaning is use. More precisely, I will argue that logic should be understood in terms of "problems and solutions" rather than "propositions and truth values". Although such ideas are traditionally connected with intuitionistic logic, my claim is that they are not only compatible with but in fact support a form of conventionalism about logic. In particular, the apparent conflict between intuitionistic and classical logic evaporates from this point of view. Finally, I will discuss to what extent Kripke's so called "adoption problem" poses a problem for this conventionalist view. Zoom-link
- CLLAM seminar: Dimitri Coelho Mollo (Umeå)
Department of Philosophy
Functional Ontologies for AI systems: Tasks, mechanisms, and capacities Seminar Date: Friday 7 November 2025 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 and Zoom-link Abstract The size and complexity of current Deep Artificial Neural Networks pose remarkable challenges to our attempts of explaining and understanding their workings. I put forward a proposal for complementing existing efforts to that aim, inspired by research on cognitive ontology in philosophy of cognitive science. I suggest that, as much as we need theoretically and empirically grounded categories for cognitive tasks, cognitive capacities, and cognitive mechanisms in cognitive science, we need theoretically and empirically grounded categories for functional tasks, capacities and mechanisms when studying AI systems. The resulting functional ontologies, I argue, can play crucial roles in informing further research in explainable and interpretable AI, and in refining our understanding of such systems. I illustrate this proposal by examining recent research on the computational mechanisms underlying specific capacities in Large Language Models, showing how appeal to functional ontologies can further enrich such research. Zoom-link
- CANCELLED: Colloquium: Justin Khoo (MIT)
Department of Philosophy
What is a film? Lecture Date: Thursday 13 November 2025 Time: 15.00 – 17.00 Location: D289 Abstract Films (movies, tv shows, etc) are weird things. Two people can see the same film by watching different screenings of different physical things. In that sense, films are multiple artworks. But I argue that they are quite different from other, better studied, multiple artworks like plays or pieces of written music. I argue that existing views about what films are all fail, but each contains a part of the truth, which I draw on to develop my own view, which is that films are multiply constituted artifacts.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Greg Bognar (Stockholm University)
Department of Philosophy
Self-Ownership and the Moral Significance of Birth Seminar Date: Tuesday 18 November 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract According to moderate permissive views, abortion becomes increasingly problematic as the pregnancy develops. Late-term abortions require more momentous moral justification. This, however, is thought to create a problem: other things being equal, some reasons that can justify late-term abortions can justify the killing of newborns as well. If the only difference between a late-term fetus and a newborn is their location, then the moral difference between abortion and infanticide cannot be maintained. This is a well-known problem for moderate permissive views. It is widely accepted that birth itself has no moral significance. In this paper, I challenge this consensus. I argue that there is a morally significant difference between the fetus and the newborn: the newborn acquires self-ownership at birth. This changes the balance of reasons: killing a newborn becomes morally more problematic than killing a fetus. Moderate permissive views can, after all, maintain the moral difference between abortion and infanticide.
- Higher seminar in Philosophy of science: Neil Dewar (University of Cambridge)
Department of Philosophy
Making Space: The Semantics of Geometrical Conventionalism Seminar Date: Friday 14 November 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D734 Abstract Geometrical conventionalism holds that the geometry of space, or of space-time, is not a matter of fact but rather a matter of convention. However, how exactly this view should be understood can be rather obscure. In this talk, I distinguish three ways that we might unpack the conventionalist slogan—which I call semantic, epistemic, and metaphysical conventionalism—and argue that the most interesting is semantic conventionalism. However, to avoid collapsing into triviality, the semantic conventionalist must belong to what Coffa calls “the semantic tradition”. Once we place the conventionalist in that tradition, we find that the conventionalist has two natural opponents: geometrical realism on the one hand, and geometrical functionalism on the other.
- History of Philosophy seminar: Juan Jose J.J. (Berlin)
Department of Philosophy
The Fragility of Absolute Certainty: John Buridan on Faith Seminar Date: Friday 14 November 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Zoom-link
- 9th Stockholm Philosophy Graduate Conference 2025
Department of Philosophy
Thursday 4 December 2025 and Friday 5 December 2025 Location: Stockholm University
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Jessica Keiser (Leeds)
Department of Philosophy
NonIdeal Metasemantics Lecture Date: Thursday 30 March 2023 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: Lärosal 10, Hus 2, Albano Abstract I argue that data about language change casts doubt on the following two theses of the Lewisian metasemantic picture: that the essential function of language is communication, and that people share a language in virtue of a common interest (namely, to achieve that particular function). I propose a novel metasemantic account which draws on Lewis’ insights by taking language to be a solution to a repeated strategy problem, while rejecting the idea that this strategy problem is always characterized by common interests. On this account, communication is a privileged function of language, but it is not unique; language also serves to establish and maintain social control and social identity.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Erik Åkerlund (Newman Institute)
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Workshop Date: Friday 23 February 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Knowledge Resistance in High-Choice Information Environments
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Higher seminar in practical philosophy: H. Orri Stefánsson
Department of Philosophy
Identified lives “bias” as decreasing marginal value of chances Seminar Date: Tuesday 3 May 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: Zoom Kommentator: Katharina Berndt Abstract According to a common intuition, we should use a lottery to decide who gets a good to which two persons have an equal claim but which only one person can get. According to a less common intuition, we should sometimes save identified lives even at the expense of saving a greater number of statistical lives. I defend a principled way of justifying both intuitions, namely, by appealing to the decreasing marginal moral value of survival chances. I identify four desiderata that, I contend, any such justification should satisfy, and explain how my account meets these desiderata, unlike some previous accounts.
- Higher seminar in practical philosophy: Joseph Bowen (SCEWP)
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Pablo Ruiz de Olano (Max Planck Institute)
Department of Philosophy
MEA and Theory Development: Lessons from the Development of the Standard Model of Particle Physics Seminar Date: Thursday 5 September 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In the last few years, interest in the concept of Meta-Empirical theory Assessment (MEA) has sharply increased. In this talk, I address an aspect of the MEA framework that has remained relatively unexplored in the literature and relates to the topic of theory development. The talk will be divided into three different parts. First, I introduce the MEA formalism and highlight some of the initial motivations behind its development. As I show, providing an account of theory development constituted an important goal of the framework, which has however received relatively little scholarly work. After that, I take a look at a historical episode that is of particular importance for MEA, namely the development of the Standard Model of Particle Physics. Building on previous work, I use this historical process to further emphasise the point that defenders of MEA are under pressure to provide a satisfactory account of theory development. Finally, in the third and last part of the talk, I discuss some of the strategies that one might follow to accomplish this goal.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Marilù Papandreou (Bergen)
Department of Philosophy
Aristotle on the Ontology of Artefact Workshop Date: Thursday 30 May 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D892 Abstract It is commonly believed that Aristotle merely uses artefacts as examples or analogical cases. In this talk, however, I aim to show that Aristotle gives a specific, coherent account of artefacts that in various ways owes much to Plato. Moreover, I propose a new, definitive solution to the problem of artefacts' substantiality, which comprises two controversial positions: (i) that Aristotle holds a binary view of substantiality according to which artefacts are not substances at all; (ii) that artefacts fail to be substances because they exhibit less of a unity than natural wholes. Finally, responding to the contemporary debate on ordinary objects, I shall identify the main propositions for an ontology of artefacts that aspires to use Aristotle as its authority and can serve as a guideline for current metaphysical discussions.