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- CLLAM Seminar: Paul Gorbow (SU/UiO)
Department of Philosophy
A solution to the knower paradoxes with applications to common knowledge and iterated knowledge Seminar Date: Friday 13 May 2022 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: Zoom Astract I present an untyped theory of knowledge and truth that solves the knower paradoxes of Kaplan and Montague from the 1960's. The underlying idea is (1) to formalize the principle of veracity (that whatever is known is true) more precisely, and (2) to embrace self-reference in the spirit of the Friedman-Sheard theory of truth and its associated revision semantics. It turns out that this facilitates expedient reasoning with common-knowledge predicates defined by self-referential formulas obtained by Gödel diagonalization. A generalization of the revision semantics to modalities (formalized as predicates) due to Johannes Stern is employed. Apart from answering questions of consistency, this opens up for philosophical insights on the meaning of sentences involving iterations of knowledge and truth, such as ' "Kim knows A" is true' and 'Kim knows "Kim knows A" '. Zoom-link
- Higher seminar in practical philosophy: Joseph Bowen
Department of Philosophy
Making Others Go Further Beyond the Call Seminar Date: Tuesday 2 November 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Commentator : Isaac Taylor Title Making Others Go Further Beyond the Call Abstract TBA
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Karl Nygren
Department of Philosophy
Fine-grained semantics for deontic logic Seminar Date: Thursday 7 October 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: Zoom: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/63814403479?pwd=eGxxd051eEdOZzlyMWlwdEF1b2hKZz09 Abstract Deontic logic is concerned with the logical foundations of normative reasoning. Traditionally, deontic logic has been considered a branch of modal logic, with standard possible worlds semantics. In this talk, I aim to give an overview of my PhD project, which is concerned with non-standard semantics for deontic logic. In my thesis, I argue that the traditional picture of deontic logic is too coarse-grained to account for several important and interesting aspects of normative reasoning, and I propose new, more fine-grained, semantic frameworks to deal with these shortcomings. In the talk, I will focus on two particular problems. The first problem concerns the interaction between deontic modalities and disjunction, where the traditional account fails to explain various intuitions. The second problem concerns the role of norms in deontic logic. On the traditional account, norms are only considered implicitly. However, we typically do reason explicitly about norms, for example in legal contexts.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Richard Chappell (Miami)
Department of Philosophy
A new paradox of deontology Lecture Date: Thursday 2 September 2021 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: Zoom Abstract Deontologists hold that killing is so morally serious that it ought not to be done, even to prevent more killings. For such a constraint to matter, it must be that we should generally want it to be respected. That is, we should prefer Five Killings over One Killing to Prevent Five. But this verdict turns out to be incompatible with regarding it as a matter of great importance whether or not such a prevention attempt turns out to be successful. Since deontic constraints are incompatible with taking their violations seriously, we must reject them.
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Amanda Thorell
Department of Philosophy
Irrelevant Situations, Non-Physiological Functions, and Non-Beneficial Body Parts Seminar Date: Thursday 2 December 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 & Zoom Abstract The naturalistic debate about health and pathology has focused on trait tokens’ performances, or dispositions to perform, physiological functions in relevant situations. Roughly, the idea of health and pathology in naturalistic theories is the following: A trait token (e.g. an organ) is healthy if and only if it is disposed to perform all its trait type’s physiological functions well enough in relevant situations. Otherwise the trait token is pathological. Here, a trait is a body part with at least one physiological function. A physiological function is a function which is beneficial for survival and reproduction, or which has historically been so. A relevant situation is a situation in which the performance of a physiological function is, or has historically been, beneficial for survival or reproduction. I will argue that too little attention has been given (i) dispositions to perform physiological functions in irrelevant situations, (ii) dispositions to perform non-physiological functions, and (iii) dispositions of body parts with no physiological functions. Both (i), (ii), and (iii), I will argue, are important to consider in a sound theory of health and pathology.
- Cancelled: Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Hana Möller Kalpak
Department of Philosophy
Decision rules for imprecise Lockeans Seminar Date: Thursday 3 February 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: Zoom: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/63814403479?pwd=eGxxd051eEdOZzlyMWlwdEF1b2hKZz09 Abstract According to the Lockean thesis, rational belief corresponds to rational credence above a certain threshold. A version of the Lockean thesis can be derived from the assumption that rational agents maximize the expected utility of their beliefs, given their credences (Hempel 1962, Easwaran 2016, Dorst 2019). This talk presents parts of work aimed at generalizing the utility-theoretic Lockean thesis to cases where rational credences are imprecise, in the sense of being given by a set of (probability) functions (overview: Bradley, 2019). In these cases, beliefs are not guaranteed the type of precise expectation values required for maximization, but must be deemed rational on the grounds of conforming to some more general decision rule. I will formulate some basic desiderata for such decision rules, and use this in an assessment of two well-known rules from imprecise decision theory: E-admissbility (Levi 1980) and Gamma-maximin (Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989). I will also consider the prospects of using an aggregative decision rule (classic majority voting), after showing that the domains of the relevant decision problems are Arrow consistent.
- Higher seminar in practical philosophy: William Bülow O’Nils (SCEWP/CRB)
Department of Philosophy
Electronic Monitoring Seminar Date: Tuesday 25 January 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: Zoom Opponen t: Greg Bognar Title : Electronic Monitoring Abstract : TBA
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Teresa Marques (Barcelona)
Department of Philosophy
Misogyny is the hatred of women Lecture Date: Thursday 25 November 2021 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: B419 Abstract I defend the apparently trivial claim that misogyny is the hatred of women. Kate Manne has recently argued against this view, which she calls “naïve”. She argues that it faces an epistemic and an explanatory challenge and proposes to ameliorate what the term means. In this talk, I argue, first, that the challenges that Manne raises to the naïve view are not compelling to motivate a meaning revision. Second, insofar as the psychology of emotions can offer resources to account for long standing dispositional sentiments, it can offer the resources to account for the mistreatment of women and in accordance with the standard understanding of the meaning of the word. I conclude that this is a psychologically plausible explanation of misogyny and its social function.
- Amanda Thorell defends her thesis
Department of Philosophy
Public defense of the thesis ”Measuring health: Investigations into the theoretical foundations of health status evaluations Dissertation Date: Wednesday 8 September 2021 Time: 13.00 – 17.00 Location: Auditorium 2, Södra huset hus A Measuring Health On the Theoretical Foundations of Health Status Evaluations Amanda Thorell Academic dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy at Stockholm University to be publicly defended on Wednesday 8 September 2021 at 13.00 in auditorium 2, hus A, Universitetsvägen 10 A. Zoom meeting link
- Cancelled: CLLAM: Dag Westerståhl
Department of Philosophy
The seminar to be rescheduled soon Seminar Date: Friday 10 December 2021 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: TBA Title TBA Abstract TBA
- Cancelled! Higher seminar in the Philosophy of Science: Harald Wiltsche (Linköping)
Department of Philosophy
Hermann Weyl on the nature of the coordinate system The seminar to be rescheduled soon. Seminar Date: Sunday 12 December 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: E420 Abstract While a towering figure in 20th century mathematics and theoretical physics, Hermann Weyl is still relatively unknown in philosophical circles. As I will argue in my talk, this is mainly due to the fact that Weyl’s thinking about science is deeply influenced by Husserlian phenomenology—a philosophical framework that isn’t usually a frame of reference for philosophers of science and physics. In my talk I will concentrate on Weyl’s claim according that “the coordinate system is the necessary residue of the annihilation of the Ego” and aim to show how phenomenological motives form the background of his scientific and philosophical thinking.
- Joint Stockholm/Uppsala Seminar in Practical Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Stockholm Uppsala seminar in Theoretical Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Sofia Bokros and Miira Tuominen Seminar Date: Thursday 25 November 2021 Time: 10.00 – 13.00 Location: Engelska Parken, hus 2, lokal K1028, Uppsala Speaker Uppsala: Sofia Bokros. Commentator: Sama Agahi Speaker Stockholm: Miira Tuominen. Commentator: Ekrem Cetinkaya Venue: Engelska Parken, hus 2, lokal K1028, Uppsala. Map
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Oda Tvedt (Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
Kings and Tyrants and Those who Look at Them: Political self-knowledge in the Republic Seminar Date: Friday 25 March 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700
- CLLAM Seminar: Agustin Vicente (Ikerbasque/University of the Basque Country)
Department of Philosophy
Speaking for thinking vs Thinking for Speaking Seminar Date: Friday 1 April 2022 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: Zoom Abstract Two connected questions that arise for anyone interested in inner speech are whether we tell ourselves something that we have already thought; and, if so, why we would tell ourselves something that we have already thought. In this contribution I focus on the first question, which is about the nature and the production of inner speech. While it is usually assumed that the content of what we tell ourselves is exactly the content of a non-linguistic thought, I argue that there can be a lot of transformation in the process of converting a thought into words. Thus, the content of what we tell ourselves, being intrinsically linguistic, is different from the content of the thought our speech transmits. Fleshing out this kind of approach. Zoom-link
- Cancelled: Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Sebastian Enqvist
Department of Philosophy
Cyclic proofs for first order fixed-point logic Lecture Date: Thursday 24 March 2022 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: Zoom Zoom link
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Klaus Corcilius (Tübingen)
Department of Philosophy
Practical Reasoning and Participation in Plato’s Timaeus Seminar Date: Friday 11 March 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 & Zoom Zoom-link
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Sven-Ove Hansson (Royal Institute of Technology)
Department of Philosophy
Combining probabilistic and all-or-nothing beliefs Seminar Date: Thursday 3 March 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 & Zoom (hybrid) Abstract One of the major problems in formal epistemology is the difficulty of combining probabilistic and dichotomous (all-or-nothing) beliefs in one and the same formal framework. In this presentation I will begin with an epistemological discussion on how they should be combined, based on considerations of optimal use of our limited cognitive resources. This will be followed by a presentation of a formal model that serves as a proof of concept that the two types of beliefs can be adequately represented in one and the same formal framework. In this formal model, infinitesimal probabilities are used as carriers of memories of beliefs that have been given up. Empirical full beliefs can be given up, and their pattern of change constitutes a credible system of all-or-nothing belief change.
- Higher seminar in practical philosophy: Victor Moberger & Jonas Olson
Department of Philosophy
Moral Error Theory and Fictionalism Seminar Date: Tuesday 8 March 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.01 Location: D700 Commentator: Niklas Möller
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Kit Fine (NYU)
Department of Philosophy
Truthmaker Semantics and the Regimentation of Language Lecture Date: Thursday 28 October 2021 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: Zoom Abstract I provide an outline of truthmaker semantics and explain how it may be helpful in the regimentation, and not merely the description, of natural language.