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- Cancelled! CLLAM Seminar: Fredrik Stjernberg (Linköping)
Department of Philosophy
Cancelled Seminar Date: Friday 25 November 2022 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: James Nguyen
Department of Philosophy
Explanation, Accuracy, and Universality Seminar Date: Thursday 20 October 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract This talk has two main aims. First, I will argue against the currently popular idea that truth, or accurate representation, is unnecessary for explanation (or understanding), an idea primarily motivated by the prevalence of idealized models in science. I suggest that a proper understanding of the inferential patterns associated with model-based reasoning requires appreciating contextual aspects of such reasoning, and in doing so, paying appropriate attention to the worldly claims extracted from an idealized model. Second, I will explore explanations associated with ‘universality’ considerations. Such explanations are taken as exemplars of inaccurate, yet explanatory models. But the structure and nature of these explanations remain in need of explication. I will take some initial steps in this regard.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Graham Oddie (Boulder)
Department of Philosophy
The Additivity Fetish: or How I Overcame It and Learned to Love Unified Complexity Seminar Date: Tuesday 30 May 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The metaphor of weight runs deep in the theory of value and rationality. Under the weight of the metaphor, we are inclined to think that, like weights, reasons and values should add up. But additivity can become a fetish. I have spent a good chunk of the last forty years in the grip of this fetish. Like many fetishes, this one may serve a purpose, but it can easily become boring, pointless and even self-defeating. I chronicle my journey of release from the fetish and my slow embrace of the value of unified complexity.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Máté Veres (University of Geneva)
Department of Philosophy
Revelation, trust, and expertise in the Stoic theory of inferential apprehension Seminar Date: Friday 24 March 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In his two compendia of arguments against theories of knowledge (PH 2, M 7-8), the Pyrrhonist Sceptic Sextus Empiricus targets an epistemological framework that recognizes two sources of apprehension. On this view, opposed by Sextus, evident matters are known directly, primarily through veridical sense-perception, while non-evident matters are known, if at all, through inference from signs and through demonstrative argument, i.e., proof. In this paper, I shall focus on the specifically Stoic view concerning inferential knowledge and argue for the following claims. On the Stoic view, proofs are revelatory: they create apprehension while also providing the explanatory connection between premisses and conclusion. In addition, Sextus provides support for the controversial claim that inferential apprehension involves non-sensory kataleptic impressions. At the same time, his report suggests that non-revelatory arguments proceeding through factive memory or through trust in authoritative testimony may in some sense qualify as probative. The distinction between these sorts of arguments prompts us to consider the role of expertise in the Stoic account. Zoom-link
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Anna Dreber (Stockholm School of Economics)
Department of Philosophy
Replication and generalizability of research analyses and designs Seminar Date: Thursday 28 September 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Abstract What share of results replicate in different literatures in some of the experimental social sciences? I will discuss several large replication projects in mainly psychology and economics, where my coauthors and I have redone experiments published in high impact journals with new and larger samples to see whether the main result replicates. The seminar will also cover our studies on “wisdom of crowds” mechanisms like prediction markets and forecasting surveys where researchers attempt to predict these replication outcomes as well as outcomes of new hypothesis tests, as well as recent work on multi-analyst projects and conceptual replications where we either ask researchers to test the same hypotheses on the same data or to design experiments testing the same hypothesis
- Higher Seminarium in Practical Philosophy: Jonas Haeg (King’s College London/Stockholm)
Department of Philosophy
Risks, Rights and Degrees of Wrongdoing Seminar Date: Tuesday 22 November 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Does the fact that a person voluntarily accepted a risk of being harmed make it less wrongful to unjustifiably inflict this harm on them than if they hadn't accepted the risk? I believe it doesn't, but the challenge in giving this answer is that it seems to conflict with another intuitively attractive claim. This is the claim that it’s easier to justify harming someone who voluntarily accepted a risk of being harmed than it is to justify harming someone who didn't accept such a risk. After outlining and criticising some attempts at resolving the (apparent) conflict between the ‘less wrongful’ and ‘easier to justify’ claims, I develop and defend a novel solution.
- CLLAM Seminar: Ethan Nowak (Umeå)
Department of Philosophy
Sociolinguistic variation, slurs, and speech acts Seminar Date: Friday 7 October 2022 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract In this paper, I argue that the ‘social meanings’ associated with sociolinguistic variation put pressure on the standard philosophical conception of language, according to which the foremost thing we do with words is exchange information. Drawing on parallels with the explanatory challenged posed by slurs and pejoratives, I argue that the best way to understand social meanings is to think of them in speech act theoretic terms, and I develop a distinctive form of pluralism about the performances realized by means of sociolinguistic variants.
- CLLAM Seminar: Hubert Hågemark (Lund)
Department of Philosophy
What We Mean as What We Said or Would Have Said Seminar Date: Friday 14 April 2023 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: TBA Abstract We normally mean what we say, but sometimes we don’t. When I ironically utter “What lovely weather” on a rainy day, or mistakenly utter “Jim is a barn door” instead of “Jim is a darn bore”, I say one thing and mean another. However, although utterances like these are not uncommon, they are greatly overshadowed by the volume of humdrum utterances of “There is wine in the fridge” or “I really like nachos” where we mean what we say. Since we normally mean what we say, the following simple thesis will be correct in normal situations. (N) S meant that p by uttering e iff S said that p by uttering e. This begs the question of whether (N) can be refined to also cover situations where we don’t mean what we say. In this seminar, I explore whether (N) can be refined modally, by offering an analysis where speaker meaning normally is identified with what is said, and in other situations with what the speaker would have said in certain counterfactual situations. The analysis constitutes a radical, but welcome, break with Gricean orthodoxy, where linguistic meaning, rather than speaker meaning, is ultimately used to explain other semantic notions.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Jessica Isserow (Leeds)
Department of Philosophy
What is self-esteem? Lecture Date: Thursday 3 February 2022 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: Zoom: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/68159697835 Abstract Self-esteem is an important and highly sought after human good. Yet academic philosophers have contributed curiously little to the study of self-esteem. Indeed, self-esteem is often treated in philosophical circles as the insignificant moral cousin of self-respect. To my mind, however, the project of identifying what self-esteem is—or, perhaps, what it ought to be—is indeed a project of moral importance. Many object to self-esteem initiatives on the grounds that they do little more than foster narcissism and a sense of entitlement. From this, it may be tempting to infer that we simply shouldn’t be promoting self-esteem. But another lesson we may draw is that these initiatives weren’t really promoting self-esteem at all—or not, in any event, self-esteem of the kind worth having. It is the philosopher’s task to find out what (if anything) the latter is; whether there is a concept of self-esteem capable of doing justice to our pre-theoretic idea that there is a sense of self-worth that is worth promoting in others and ourselves. It is precisely this task that I wish to undertake in this paper. My starting ambition is to develop desiderata for a plausible account of self-esteem. I arrive at these desiderata through a careful consideration of where extant accounts go wrong.
- Cancelled: Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop : Alexander Stöpfgeshoff (Stockholm/Toronto)
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Mikael Janvid
Department of Philosophy
Against Normative Defeat Seminar Date: Thursday 27 January 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract This paper argues against the existence of so-called normative defeaters, defeaters consisting of doubts or beliefs that a subject ought to have indicating that her belief that p is either false or unjustified. Despite typically not being in the possession of the subject, such defeaters still destroy her justification for that belief. In determining whether defeat occurs, the justificatory strength of the belief targeted by the defeater is often left out of consideration, as well as the epistemic strength of the defeater, which is a mistake, or so I shall argue. Once these parameters are specified, alleged cases of normative defeat either turn out not to provide genuine cases of defeat – the subject remains justified or was not justified to begin with – or can be subsumed under a uniform category of defeat. Incidentally, the same result is also reached for the contrast class to normative defeat: doxastic defeat. A more fruitful framework, where the epistemic strength is included in a uniform way for both justification and defeat, is suggested in terms of reliable indicators where their strength determines whether defeat occurs.
- Final PhD thesis seminar: Stina Björkholm
Department of Philosophy
The Duality of Moral Language Seminar Date: Tuesday 14 December 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Commentator : Teemu Toppinen (Helsinki) Abstract TBA
- Higher seminar in practical philosophy: Gunnar Björnsson
Department of Philosophy
Teleological reasons for and against contributing to collective benefits and harms Seminar Date: Tuesday 19 October 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: Zoom Commentator : Andrea Asker Svedberg Title TBA Abstract TBA
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Dag Prawitz
Department of Philosophy
Philosophical issues concerning the concept of valid inference Seminar Date: Thursday 23 September 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: Zoom Abstract Issues sometimes arise in deductive practice concerning whether an inference in an argument is really valid. They are usually resolved and the argument enriched with these simpler inferences is accepted as valid when the inference can be broken down into simpler inferences where it is obvious (or trivial, as mathematicians say) that the premisses of the inferences conclusively support the conclusions. Nevertheless a philosophical issue concerning valid inferences remains, namely to explicate the very concept of conclusive support. Clearly it is not sufficient for the inference to be valid that what the conclusion asserts is entailed by or is a logical consequence of what the premisses assert, although this has often been proposed in philosophy. We need to clarify a narrower concept than entailment. It seems to correspond to what Aristotle called perfect syllogism. Principles will be proposed that together explicate at least partially concepts of valid inference and valid argument.
- Higher seminar in the Philosophy of Science: Bram Vaassen (Umeå)
Department of Philosophy
Higher-Level Causes and Freaky Realizations Seminar Date: Thursday 24 February 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Building on observations by Fodor (1974, 1991), Schiffer (1991), and Hoefer (2004), Fenton-Glynn (2017) has recently argued that the possibility of thermodynamically abnormal realizations speaks in favour of probability-raising accounts of causation. Such ‘freaky’ realizations suggest that the main competitors of probability-raising accounts cannot allow for higher-level causes such as infections and hurricanes. By contrast, probability-raising accounts appear to have no problems allowing higher-level causation in the face of freaky realizations. In this talk, I push back against Fenton-Glynn’s case for probability-raising accounts and argue that sufficiency accounts (e.g., Mackie 1974, Bennett 2017, Vivhelin and Tomkow ms), counterfactual accounts (e.g., Lewis 1973, Loewer 2007, Albert 2015), and interventionist accounts (e.g., Woodward 2003) can all allow for higher-level causation in the face of freaky realizations. Contrary to appearances, such case will do little to help us decide between any of these accounts and a probability-raising view.
- Higher seminar in the Philosophy of Science: Peter Vickers (Durham)
Department of Philosophy
Identifying Future-Proof Science Seminar Date: Thursday 24 March 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract My forthcoming book Identifying Future-Proof Science argues that we can confidently identify many scientific claims that are future-proof: they will last forever (so long as science continues). Examples include the evolution of human beings from fish, and the fact that the Milky Way is a spiral galaxy. But how should we go about identifying future-proof science? This appears to be a new question for philosophers of science, and not an unimportant one. It is argued that the best way to identify future-proof science is to avoid any attempt to analyse the relevant first-order scientific evidence, instead focusing purely on second-order evidence. Specifically, a scientific claim is future-proof when the relevant scientific community is large, international, and diverse, and at least 95% of that community would describe the claim as an established scientific fact. In the entire history of science, no claim meeting these criteria has ever been overturned, despite enormous opportunity for that to happen (were it ever going to happen). There are important consequences for school education: If this is indeed the way to identify future-proof science, then the vast majority of school-leavers will have hardly any of the requisite skills, since schools systems around the world completely neglect to teach children how to judge the second-order evidence for scientific claims.
- Higher seminar in practical philosophy: Krister Bykvist & Joe Roussos (IF)
Department of Philosophy
A Plea for Modelling in Ethics Seminar Date: Tuesday 22 February 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: Zoom Commentator: Erik Angner Title: TBA Venue : Zoom
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Beate Krickel (TU Berlin)
Department of Philosophy
Where is the mind? – Why this question makes sense only if understood normatively Lecture Date: Thursday 21 April 2022 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D299 Beate Krickel (TU Berlin) - a joint paper with Birgit Beck (TU Berlin) Abstract Is the mind only in the brain, or can the body and the physical and social environment be part of the mind? The search for the location of the mind is often framed in terms of the distinction between causation and constitution : constituents are what the mind is made of, and thus determine where the mind is. In contrast, causes merely provide inputs to the mind. In this talk, we will argue that the search for the location of the mind is misguided. First, all existing accounts of constitution either fail to provide insights into the location of the mind, or they rely on pragmatic considerations. Second, the location of the mind is irrelevant for everyday concerns and scientific and medical questions. Still, we argue that a distinction between “mere causes” and “constituents” can play an important role for the sciences, psychiatry, and medicine if constitution is understood as a normative concept: whether something is a constituent of the mind or not depends on whether it should be considered a constituent. This normative dimension of constitution is spelled out in terms of importance in a given context .
- Joint Stockholm/Uppsala Seminar in Practical Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Joseph Bowen (Stockholm) & Marvin Backes (Uppsala) Seminar Date: Tuesday 5 April 2022 Time: 13.15 – 16.00 Location: D700, Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University Titles 13:15-14:30 : Marvin Backes: On Inferential Moral Knowledge: A Defence of Hume’s Law Commentator: Håkan Salwén 14:45-16:00 : Joseph Bowen: Directed and Undirected Duties to Rescue Commentator: Jens Johansson
- CLLAM Seminar: Dag Westerståhl
Department of Philosophy
Carnap, Categoricity, and Commas Seminar Date: Friday 7 February 2025 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D734 & Zoom Abstract A logic/consequence relation |– is Carnap Categorical (CC) if the only interpretation of the logical constants consistent with |– is the standard interpretation. Categoricity results have been obtained for first-order logic, modal logics, intuitionistic propositional logic, and many others. In all of these cases, the proof that the conjunction symbol must have its standard interpretation is almost trivial; it is the other logical constants that require some work. This triviality looks suspicious. In fact, it essentially comes from the definition of consistency. For example, in case of propositional logic with classical 2-valued semantics, the definition goes like this: an interpretation I is consistent with |–, if A1,…,An |– B implies that (for each assignment v of truth values to the propositional variables) if the value of A1 and … and A2 under I (and v) is 1, then the value of B under I (and v) is also 1. With an &-introduction rule of the form A,B |– A&B, it is no surprise that & has to mean ‘and’. In other words, the possible interpretations of & are biased by the fact that the commas to the left of |– are already taken to mean ‘and’. (Similarly, if we allow multiple conclusions; then commas to the right are taken to mean ‘or’.) How can we avoid this bias? In this talk I avoid it by disallowing commas altogether, considering only so-called binary logics: consequence relations with exactly one premise and one conclusion. Note that the &-introduction rule above is not in this format; it can be replaced by a conditional rule in the binary format: if A |– B and A|– C, then A |– B&C. I investigate what happens to the categoricity results when ‘and-bias’ is removed in this way. Categoricity of & (and other connectives) is no longer trivial: it still holds for (binary) classical propositional logic, but fails for some weaker logics when we impose the binary format. Results and counter-examples are presented in the setting of algebraic semantics, and of Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic; the technical machinery that I use will be explained. Zoom meeting link