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- Thesis defence in Practical Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Jimmy Goodriche defends his thesis Oponent: Theron Pummer (St Andrews) Thesis defence Date: Tuesday 28 May 2024 Time: 14.00 – 16.00 Location: Auditorium 9, Södra huset D, 3rd floor James Goodrich defends his PhD thesis: Self-Defense Without Deontology: Groundwork for a Consequentialist Ethics of Harm
- CLLAM Seminar: Sebastian Watzl (University of Oslo)
Department of Philosophy
Attention and Rational Choice Seminar Date: Friday 17 May 2024 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract Formal models of decision making are widely employed in philosophy as well as microeconomics. They are variously described as rational choice theory or decision theory. The standard decision theoretic apparatus has no role for attention in its modelling. It treats rational agents as acting on the basis of preferences (desires) and credences (beliefs or expectations). At the same time, psychology and empirically informed philosophy of mind and action shows that attention plays essential and constructive roles in both belief revision and agency. In this paper, I sketch why attention should be included in decision-theoretic models, how to incorporate attention into them in a way that keeps what makes such models valuables, that is psychologically plausible, and theoretically and formally elegant and tractable. Agents, I argue, are informationally blind to issues they are not paying any attention to. All of an agent’s information gathering involves attention (at least, it won’t impact the agent’s beliefs without attention). Agents also are decisionally blind to options that don’t occupy their attention. The options an agent decides between at any time is limited by the issues the agent is paying attention to in making that decision. I will show that informational blindness and decisional blindness are two sides of the same coin. This, I suggest, in part, is what makes attention decision-theoretically and normatively interesting: its role in mind and action is theoretical and practical at the same time. I show when attention, treated in this way, allows agents to act in ways that are both epistemically and practically better than they could act without attention, and how the view sketched here affects recent discussions on the nature and aim of inquiry.
- Higher seminar in Practical Philosophy: Isaac Taylor
Department of Philosophy
Just War Error Theory, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Pacifism Seminar Date: Tuesday 21 May 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Some of our most firmly held moral beliefs about war are, if a number of prominent philosophers are correct, illusions. The idea that soldiers do no wrong in fighting for an unjust case, for instance, cannot be justified as a correct account of the fundamental moral permissions, rights, and liabilities of individuals. What should members of the armed forces do in light of these claims? Jeff McMahan has argued that combatants should fall back on fundamental moral principles to guide their actions, while Henry Shue has maintained that they should continue to act as if the illusions were real. In this paper, I make a provisional case for a third option. Drawing on the existing debate, but also recent work in metaethics about the potentially undesirable effects of moralizing conflicts, I suggest that soldiers should foster a qualified skepticism about the morality of participating in any war. This may look very much like a pacifist theory, but I also demonstrate how it can avoid some of the standard objections that are levelled against pacifism.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Hossein Ayati (University in Tehran)
Department of Philosophy
Reasoning, Rationality, and Coherence Seminar Date: Tuesday 10 September 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Although much ink has been spilled in discussing the relationship between rationality and normative reasons on the one hand and normative reasons and reasoning on the other, surprisingly, little has been said about whether we can understand rationality in terms of reasoning. In this paper, I propose a novel way to understand rationality in terms of good reasoning. I argue that structural rationality is best understood in terms of adherence to formal good reasoning and substantive rationality as adherence to non-formal good reasoning. I show how this can provide a unified account of structural and substantive dimensions of rationality that remain elusive on many other accounts. I also discuss several challenging cases for some prominent accounts of rationality and show how my account succeeds where they fail.
- Summer break: Seminars, Colloquia, workshops, etc
Department of Philosophy
We'll be back Autumn term 2024 Event Start date: Friday 31 May 2024 Time: 00.00 End date: Thursday 15 August 2024 Time: 00.00
- Perspectives on Knowledge Resistance
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Higher Seminar in theoretical philosophy: Anna-Sofia Maurin (GU)
Department of Philosophy
The Value of Car(v)ing Seminar Date: Thursday 7 March 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In my presentation I plan to critically discuss an argument defended by Shamik Dasgupta (cf. esp. his 2018 and unpublished ms.) to the effect that, because reasons exist for thinking that objectivity—and so Realism—constitutively requires that some things that exist are (primitively) normative, and since this (primitive) normativity must but cannot be explained, nothing is objective, and hence Realism must be given up. In my presentation, I plan to argue: (1) …that Dasgupta’s argument—which I understand as an argument about explanation—rests on ideas about whatneeds explaining as well as what counts as an adequate explanation that can—I suspect ought to—be resisted. (2) …that the scope of Dasgupta’s argument may not be as wide as he wants it to be: that those who accept a ‘sparse’ conception of what there is most likely do not have to accept that objectivity—and so Realism—constitutively requires that some things that exist are (primitively) normative and so will not have to face the explanatory challenge in the first place. This is very much work in progress, which means that I don’t have a paper polished enough to warrant circulating. Those of you who want to prepare for the seminar can (but in no way need to) check out Dasgupta’s papers, which can be accessed via his website: https://shamik.net/
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Henrik Lagerlund
Department of Philosophy
Artifacts in the 14th Century: The Case of Blasius of Parma Workshop Date: Friday 15 December 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The 14th century saw remarkable philosophical developments. One such was the nature of artifacts. In this presentation, I will draw attention to Blasius of Parma’s treatment of artifacts in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. I will also put his contribution in context and then mention Ockham, Buridan as well as Descartes and Bacon.
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Gui Franzmann
Department of Philosophy
A tale of emergence Seminar Date: Thursday 18 April 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The question of what fundamentally is has never been straightforward in physics, yet there had always been a tentative answer for both theoretical and practical purposes. Everything shifted about a century ago with the advent of quantum mechanics, which challenged our traditional understanding of existence as suddenly we can also talk about things that are in quantum space*, not only in classical spacetime anymore. Nonetheless, were we to keep a strong reductionist position, then we would be left with no choice but to understand how classical spatiotemporal existence can emerge from the quantum mechanical one. This talk aims to be a pedagogical introduction to this discussion and an invitation for long-lasting collaboration between physicists and philosophers. *Known as Hilbert space.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Olle Torpman (IFFS)
Department of Philosophy
Transferred Outcome Responsibility and Climate Change Seminar Date: Tuesday 30 January 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract This paper explores the concept of outcome responsibility in general, and its relevance to issues of climate change in particular. It distinguishes outcome responsibility from moral and causal responsibility, emphasizing the features that make an agent outcome responsible. It argues against foreseeability being a condition for outcome responsibility, and proposes a definition that allows for degrees of responsibility. The paper also discusses the possibility of transferred outcome responsibility.
- Higher Seminar in theoretical philosophy: Richard Dawid
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Seminar Date: Thursday 22 February 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D600 Abstract TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Alexander Stöpfgeshoff & Frans Svensson (Göteborg)
Department of Philosophy
The Honorable, the Useful, and the Pleasurable: Buridan on Good and Goodness Workshop Date: Friday 5 April 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract How unified is the good? In 2.11 of his extensive commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, John Buridan considers a traditional division within the good between things that are honorable, useful, and pleasurable. Buridan argues that this division should be rejected. In his view, anything that belongs to the good is honorable as well as useful and pleasurable. The division is nevertheless important for our understanding of goodness (for our understanding of the nature of the good, if we will), according to Buridan. Several centuries before, for example, Franz Brentano, A. C. Ewing, and Roderick Chisholm, Buridan proposes a fitting attitude account of goodness. In its most general sense, he says, the good refers to the desirable, that is, to that which is (would be) a fitting object of desire. However, we can distinguish between three different ways in which things may be desirable: in themselves (in which case they are honorable), as means to some other good (in which case they are useful) and for ourselves (in which case they are pleasurable). On the substantive level, these always coincide. But that is arguably not something that follows from the account of goodness itself, according to Buridan. In this talk, we will critically examine both Buridan’s rejection of the division within the good between the honorable, the useful, and the pleasurable, and his fitting attitude account of goodness.
- All MA and PhD students are welcome!
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Graham Oddie (CU Boulder)
Department of Philosophy
Incomparability and the Logical Structure of Value Magnitudes Seminar Date: Tuesday 13 February 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D247 Abstract Bykvist (and some others) have recently argued that positing value magnitudes (analogues of physical magnitudes such as lengths, masses, temperatures and so on) throws considrable light on some problems in axiology. Here I foucs on problems concerning value incomparability and value incommensurability. Of how much value are value magnitudes in this cluster?
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Gunnar Björnsson
Department of Philosophy
Outcome luck and the nature of blame and praise Seminar Date: Tuesday 21 November 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D734 Abstract A central disagreement in the theory of responsibility concerns outcome luck. If someone unjustifiably risks harming, can their degree of blameworthiness be affected by whether anyone is actually harmed as a result? If someone does their best to help an important cause, can their degree of praiseworthiness be affected by whether they succeed? Some think so, but many have the strong intuition that the answer is negative: the agent would be equally blame- or praiseworthy whether or not the outcome materializes. I have previously argued against the reliability of such intuitions. In this talk, however, I suggest that attention to the nature of moral blame and praise should lead us to revise the questions themselves.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Máté Veres (Genève)
Department of Philosophy
Wisdom and Expertise in Early Stoicism Workshop Date: Friday 13 September 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Early Stoics subscribed to a version of the idea that it is on account of being a practitioner of a form of expertise concerned with the whole of human life that the wise can do well in all relevant respects. Furthermore, they conceived of this higher-order form of expertise as structurally analogous but epistemically superior to first-order forms of expertise. One corollary of the Stoic view is that, for any given first-order form of expertise, only the wise person can be a genuine expert. Indeed, there is evidence for the claim that at least some forms of expertise practiced by the wise are transformed into quasi-virtuous states of the soul. In this paper, I discuss three potential connections a Stoic might draw between first-order forms of expertise and the expertise concerned with the whole of human life. First, insofar as all forms of expertise involve knowledge-that and knowledge-how, the expertise in living well must involve actionable mastery of Stoic doctrine. Second, since virtue is a matter of dealing with indifferents, and forms of expertise are specialized forms of dealing with indifferents, the practice of the expertise in living well must involve some first-order forms of expertise. Third, the motivation and justification for acting on the demands of a specialized expertise ultimately derive from the judgement of the expertise in living well concerning the all-things-considered action to be done, calling into question the epistemic autonomy of first-order forms of expertise.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Tomas Ekenberg (Newman)
Department of Philosophy
Ontological Arguments in Cicero and Others: On the History of the Proof Called Anselm' Workshop Date: Friday 22 November 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700
- Stockholm Colloqium in Philosophy: Filip Radovic (Göteborg)
Department of Philosophy
How the unbelievable is believed Lecture Date: Thursday 31 October 2024 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 Abstract It is well-known that irrational beliefs are part of a normal healthy life. Even so, some beliefs stand out as exceptionally odd because they do not reflect what people consider to be normal or acceptable. Conventional diagnostic systems in psychiatry habitually characterize extremely outlandish beliefs as delusional, that is, as being abnormal, morbid or pathological. Exactly why a belief is delusional is a matter of great controversy. Yet there seems to be a vital difference between delusions and other irrational ideas, for example, believing that one is God Almighty or that one is dead, on the one hand, and believing that Princess Diana faked her own death or that that “thirteen” is an unlucky number, on the other. In this presentation I will exemplify some typical delusions from the clinical literature and highlight a set of problems in contemporary philosophical debates, such as, how to define “delusion”, in what sense, if any, delusions are proper beliefs, and the complicated relation between delusion and mainstream religious beliefs.
- CLLAM Seminar: Salvatore Florio (Oslo)
Department of Philosophy
Critical Plural Logic and Abstraction (joint work with Øystein Linnebo) Seminar Date: Friday 11 October 2024 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract Cantor defined a set as the collection into a whole of determinate and well-distinguished objects, objects that can “exist together”. Although he recognized that not all objects can exist together in this sense, he did not provide a theory specifying when some objects can exist together. Without such a theory, his account of sets remains incomplete. We argue that a version of plural logic, Critical Plural Logic, fits the bill. As a logic of co-existence, Critical Plural Logic captures the essence of the familiar “stage theory” of set formation but is far more general and avoids a gratuitous reification of stages. We also argue that this plural logic can be of great aid to Frege and logicism, supporting a large class of abstraction principles. Critical Plural Logic emerges as a compelling and fruitful theory to develop key ideas of Cantor and Frege.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Daniel Telech (Lund)
Department of Philosophy
Invitations: Their Structure, Normativity, and Value Seminar Date: Tuesday 15 November 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In this talk I present an account of a philosophically underdiscussed speech act: invitation. I propose that, when A invites B to φ, A therein issues B with a permission-giving discretionary directive to engage in an activity that A is to host. As it is a sincerity condition of invitation, I maintain, that A i) desires φ-ing with B and ii) believes it to be (at least) possibly desirable for B to φ with A, A represents herself as possessing these attitudes in inviting B (though A might in fact lack them). My proposal satisfies a key desideratum for an adequate view of invitation, namely its being able to distinguish invitations from offers, on the one hand, and proposals for joint activity, on the other. This feature of my view is reflected in what I propose to be the distinctive value of the power to invite: our having a measure of creative autonomy over the relationships we cultivate.