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- The harms beyond punishment?
Department of Philosophy
A work-in-progress online seminar series on collateral consequences of conviction Seminar Date: Monday 28 June 2021 Time: 15.00 – 17.30 Location: Zoom June 28 William Bülow (Stockholm) & Lars Lindblom (Linköping) Parental Imprisonment and the Right against Child-Parent Separation Discussant: Milena Tripkovic (Edinburgh) Antony Duff (Stirling) & Sandra Marshall (Stirling) Disqualification as a Collateral Consequence: From What Can We Be Disqualified? Discussant: Jeff Howard (UCL) Organisers William Bülow (Stockholm University) Zachary Hoskins (University of Nottingham) Registration Registration for this event is free. If you want to attend, please send an email with your name and affiliation to william.bulow@philosophy.su.se . Website The harms beyond punishment?
- The harms beyond punishment?
Department of Philosophy
A work-in-progress online seminar series on collateral consequences of conviction. Seminar Date: Monday 14 June 2021 Time: 15.00 – 17.30 Location: Zoom 14 June Zachary Hoskins (Nottingham) Punishment and the Harms Suffered by Innocent People Discussant: Andrew Cornford (Edinburgh) Rachel Condry (Oxford) & Shona Minson (Oxford) Exploring the Consequences of Punishment for Families; Symbiotic Harms and Breaches of Fundamental Rights Discussant: Nicola Carr (Nottingham) Organisers William Bülow (Stockholm University) Zachary Hoskins (University of Nottingham) Registration Registration for this event is free. If you want to attend, please send an email with your name and affiliation to william.bulow@philosophy.su.se . Website The harms beyond punishment?
- Parfit Memorial Lecture 2021 - Professor Orri Stefansson
Department of Philosophy
Should welfare equality be a global priority? Lecture Date: Monday 14 June 2021 Time: 17.30 – 19.30 Location: Zoom Parfit Memorial Lecture 2021 - Prof Orri Stefansson (Stockholm University and Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study) Website
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Daniel Fogal (NYU)
Department of Philosophy
The Nature of Good Reasoning Lecture Date: Thursday 14 November 2024 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 Abstract The goal of the talk (based on joint work with Olle Risberg) is to offer a novel account of the nature of good reasoning, both practical and theoretical, where reasoning is understood to be a transition between attitudinal mental states such as beliefs and intentions. The basic idea is that good reasoning is a matter of “following the flow” of normative support between attitudes, whereas bad reasoning is a matter of failing to do so (in one way or another). Call this the support-based account of good reasoning. After introducing and motivating my preferred account of good reasoning, I critically evaluate its main competitors: the reasons-based account and the fittingness-based account. In doing so, I explain how the support-based account captures their strengths while avoiding their weaknesses. I conclude by explaining how the support-based account of good reasoning can explain both what's right and what's wrong with the view of reasons as premises of good reasoning.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Klaus Corcilius (Tübingen)
Department of Philosophy
Compensating for Fragmentation. Plato’s Account of Human Cognition in the Timaeus Workshop Date: Friday 8 November 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Stephan Schmid (Hamburg)
Department of Philosophy
The Metaphysical Significance of Early Modern Skepticism Lecture Date: Thursday 22 May 2025 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: B413 Abstract While it is well recognized that early modern skepticism was epistemologically significant in prompting philosophers to re-examine the justification of knowledge claims in novel and profound ways, the metaphysical significance of early modern skepticism has often been overlooked. In this talk, I will contend that the radical doubts articulated and employed by influential thinkers like René Descartes and David Hume paved the way for unprecedented forms of metaphysical idealism in Western philosophy, according to which reality (at least as we can know it) is fundamentally dependent on our mind and its capacities, a view that is – in some form or another – still widely embraced today.
- Linguistic and Epistemological Perspectives on Testimony 2025
Department of Philosophy
Stockholm University 30–31 January 2025 Conference Start date: Thursday 30 January 2025 Time: 10.15 End date: Friday 31 January 2025 Time: 12.30 Location: Gula Villan, Minerva Room Program Thursday, 30. January: 10:15–10:30 Coffee/Tea 10:30–12:00: Joey Pollock: Testimonial Pessimism 12:00–13:00: Lunch 13:00–14:30: Kristina Rolin: Should research based advice be value neutral? 14:30–14:45: Break 14:45:16:15: Gabriel Contessa: Public Trust in Science and the Justified Trust Dilemma Friday, 31. January 09:00–9:15: Coffee/Teas 09:15:–10:45 Thomas Grundmann: Expert Authority and Thinking for Oneself 10:45–11:00: Break 11:00–12:30: Mikkel Gerken : Science skepticism and science selectivism 12:30–13:30: Lunch
- CLLAM: Anders Schoubye
Department of Philosophy
The Outputs of LLMs are Meaningless Seminar Date: Friday 25 April 2025 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D734 Abstract The recent success of transformer based large language systems has raised immediate and interesting questions as regards to what extent (if any) these systems can be conceived of as models of human language cognition. In this talk, we will present a very simple argument to the conclusion that the outputs of these systems are, perhaps surprisingly, fundamentally meaningless and, as such, not particularly interesting vis-a-vis models of human language cognition. Some arguments to a similar conclusion have been proposed, but unlike these prior arguments, our argument does not rely on assumptions about essential reference relations between words and external objects. For this reason, the conclusion of our argument cannot be resisted by appeal to various semantic externalist considerations. Moreover, despite the perhaps prima facie implausible conclusion of our argument, we contend that explaining why LLMs are nevertheless incredibly useful is not in fact a problem.
- Higher Seminar in Philosophy of Science: Samuel Fletcher (Oxford)
Department of Philosophy
Models of Dependence Seminar Date: Thursday 24 April 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Scientific practice is replete with discussions of one thing, quantity, or phenomena depending on another. Sometimes this is causal dependence, but sometimes it denotes something more metaphysical: how the less fundamental depend on the more fundamental. Yet, unlike causal dependence, there has not been so much explicit formal modeling of dependence. This has led some philosophers to be skeptical that "fundamental" or "primitive" have any special interpretative significance at all. What difference does it make in scientific reasoning, in the end? I answer this question by developing such a formal model for the case of determination and show that it makes a difference to counterfactual reasoning with a theory. I then show how this illuminates a debate in the 2000s in the philosophy of physics about the time-reversal invariance of electromagnetism.
- Wedberg Lectures 2026: Sally Haslanger (MIT)
Department of Philosophy
Explanations of Systemic Disadvantage: Discrimination and Social Formation
- Wedberg Lectures 2024
Department of Philosophy
Calvin G. Normore (UCLA) Lecture Start date: Monday 8 April 2024 Time: 14.30 End date: Wednesday 10 April 2024 Time: 16.30 Location: Attention: Pärlan, Albano Persons, Selves, and Souls: The 2024 Anders Wedberg Lectures: Calvin G. Normore (UCLA) Calvin G. Normore Brian P. Copenhaver Professor of Philosophy, UCLA William Macdonald Professor of Moral Philosophy (Emeritus), McGill University Honorary Professor, The University of Queensland Contemporary cultures are shaped by differing conceptions of person and of self, conceptions which raise questions important for both practical and theoretical philosophy. Should all or only beings, whether with human DNA or not, that we believe capable of consciousness and of agency be treated as persons? What of those beings incapable of one or the other? Are selves primitive ontological items? Are selves social constructs? Should reflective self-awareness be cultivated and if so, why? What of souls, are there other than theological reasons to posit them and what are the consequences of doing so? These questions and the concepts they involve invite both philosophical and historical reflection and these three lectures are essays in the History of Philosophy understood as a branch of both History and Philosophy. They examine some aspects of the evolution of the concepts of Person and Self and their relations to another concept, that of Soul, in an effort to understand how and why current conceptions of them have emerged, how and why they differ, and whether and why we should care. There will be three lectures, one on each day as follows Monday, April 8 at 14.30-16.30: Lecture by Calvin Normore: Person Commentator: Tomas Ekenberg (Uppsala University) Tuesday, April 9 at 14.30-16.30: Lecture by Calvin Normore: Self Commentator: Henrik Lagerlund (SU) Wednesday, April 10: at 14.30-16.30 Lecture by Calvin Normore: Soul and Life Commentator: Felix Maier (SU)
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Carmen Pavel (Kings College London)
Department of Philosophy
Ethical Expertise in Public Policy Seminar Date: Tuesday 11 March 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Andrew Reisner (Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
The metaphysics of the formal objects of photographs Lecture Date: Thursday 24 April 2025 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 Abstract Typical photographs may be said to be 'of' something in two different senses. One sense is that of the photographic or artistic subject. For example, a photograph taken of a friend drinking a beer may have one's friend as its subject. However, the same photograph has 'captured' rather more than that. It records potentially many objects over a period of time. The thing that a photograph is of overall, rather than its subject per se, is what may be called its 'formal object'. This is the other sense in which a photograph may be said to be 'of' something. This paper (or rather paper in development) presents a theory of the formal object of simple photographs, photographs produced from a single actuation of the shutter. I suggest that the formal objects of simple photographs are events. I argue that this account cannot be straightforwardly extended to many photographs that combine multiple shutter actuations, both for double/multiple exposures of the same frame and for images produced from combining several distinct frames. I consider some consequences for the way we might want to understand or perhaps appreciate visually identical photographs produced through different capture and combination techniques. One interesting consequence is that some photographs may not be of anything at all.
- Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy: Alice Damirijian
Department of Philosophy
Alice Damirijan presents her kappa Seminar Date: Tuesday 8 April 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Stefan Gosepath (Freie University Berlin)
Department of Philosophy
Titel aviseras senare Abstract Aviseras senare
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Ruth Chang (Oxford)
Department of Philosophy
Artificial Intelligence and Value Alignment Abstract: What might philosophers contribute to the 'value alignment' problem in artificial intelligence? This is the problem, roughly speaking, of aligning machine outputs with human values. In this talk, I outline a conceptual framework for making progress on this problem, diagnosing ways in which I believe technologists who confront the problem go wrong and offering a proposal for designing machine systems that I argue is a sine qua non for machine-human value alignment.
- Mike Schneider (University of Missouri)
Department of Philosophy
Deliberately Uncreative Seminar Date: Thursday 16 October 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Science depends on creativity. This talk is about material from my current book project, concerning how to understand the concept of creativity in science, such that the previous declaration is 1) true, but 2) noteworthy rather than trivial, and 3) in keeping with a philosopher's interest in methodology (studying the dynamics of the growth of scientific knowledge by means of studying the game that scientists play). The main claim of the book is that creativity in science may be understood fruitfully in terms of an intervention that occurs during scientific speculation within the course of research, which amounts to the scientists involved overcoming uncreativity in their speculating. This, in the first place, requires an answer to an unusual question: when does speculating count as uncreatively done? In this talk, I will focus on the argument contained in the linchpin middle chapter of the book, “An account of uncreativity”, where this crucial question gets answered. In this chapter, a case demonstrates the account: the unseriousness of the proposal in fundamental physics that spacetime might fail to be time-orientable. (As will be discussed, this case is selected specifically to further emphasize that sometimes, uncreativity is just fine.)
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Lukas Meyer (University of Graz)
Department of Philosophy
The Ethics of Expectations in Transitions to Climate Neutrality Seminar Date: Tuesday 21 October 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: Dtoo Abstract In his talk, Lukas Meyer outlines the evolving contours of EXPECT — a project in development that aims to construct a normative framework for understanding the ethics of expectations in climate transitions. Expectations are not mere predictions; they are socially embedded, normatively charged structures through which individuals and institutions relate to the future. Shaped by interpersonal commitments, social practices, and public institutions, expectations inform life plans, agency, and trust. When climate disruption unsettles these anticipatory claims, the resulting loss can be existential. EXPECT integrates three core dimensions: epistemic responsibility (what individuals must know or inquire into), epistemic justification (whether expectations are normatively legitimate), and temporal revisability (when expectations must be reconsidered). It examines how expectations acquire legitimacy through responsibility-based, political, and justice-oriented frameworks — and how epistemic failures, from testimonial injustice to role-based deficiency, compromise their moral standing. The project also addresses adjustment responsibility and burden assessment: what can reasonably be asked of individuals when expectations must be revised, and how should the costs of such revision be ethically evaluated? It argues that fairness depends both on the epistemic conditions under which expectations were formed, and on the nature and distribution of the burdens imposed by change. Expectations may warrant protection, adjustment, or relinquishment — but only through principled assessment. EXPECT offers a dual lens: clarifying individual responsibility for forming and revising expectations, and institutional obligations to respond to them — even when those expectations fall short of full legitimacy. It reframes justice as a matter not only of distribution, but of recognition, revision, and ethical responsiveness in times of transition.
- Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy: Simon Allzén
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Higher Seminar in the Philosophy of Science Elena Castellani (Università degli Studi di Firenze)
Department of Philosophy
Ingress