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- Högre seminairum i vetenskapsfilosofi: Jim Brown: (University of Toronto)
Filosofiska institutionen
More Things in Heaven Seminarium Datum: onsdag 22 oktober 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract I begin with the assumption of realism or Platonism in mathematics. This talk is about the epistemology of mathematics. The question is what are legitimate, best methods for learning mathematical truths. I introduced a thought experiment with the aim of showing that mathematics should not be dominated by traditional proof as the one and only source of knowledge. Much of the talk will be devoted to explaining this, giving examples, and drawing out some of the major consequences. The talk will be largely non-technical, but should be of interest to working mathematicians who have an interest in mathematical methodology. If there is time, one technical example will be given involving through continuum hypothesis. The talk is based on a book in progress with the tentative title: More Things in Heaven: Mathematics, Ethics, and the Platonic Imagination
- CLLAM Seminarium: Dimitri Coelho Mollo (Umeå)
Filosofiska institutionen
Functional Ontologies for AI systems: Tasks, mechanisms, and capacities Seminarium Datum: fredag 7 november 2025 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 och Zoom Abstract The size and complexity of current Deep Artificial Neural Networks pose remarkable challenges to our attempts of explaining and understanding their workings. I put forward a proposal for complementing existing efforts to that aim, inspired by research on cognitive ontology in philosophy of cognitive science. I suggest that, as much as we need theoretically and empirically grounded categories for cognitive tasks, cognitive capacities, and cognitive mechanisms in cognitive science, we need theoretically and empirically grounded categories for functional tasks, capacities and mechanisms when studying AI systems. The resulting functional ontologies, I argue, can play crucial roles in informing further research in explainable and interpretable AI, and in refining our understanding of such systems. I illustrate this proposal by examining recent research on the computational mechanisms underlying specific capacities in Large Language Models, showing how appeal to functional ontologies can further enrich such research. Zoom-link
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Neil Dewar (University of Cambridge)
Filosofiska institutionen
Making Space: The Semantics of Geometrical Conventionalism Seminarium Datum: fredag 14 november 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D734 Abstract Geometrical conventionalism holds that the geometry of space, or of space-time, is not a matter of fact but rather a matter of convention. However, how exactly this view should be understood can be rather obscure. In this talk, I distinguish three ways that we might unpack the conventionalist slogan—which I call semantic, epistemic, and metaphysical conventionalism—and argue that the most interesting is semantic conventionalism. However, to avoid collapsing into triviality, the semantic conventionalist must belong to what Coffa calls “the semantic tradition”. Once we place the conventionalist in that tradition, we find that the conventionalist has two natural opponents: geometrical realism on the one hand, and geometrical functionalism on the other.
- CANCELLED: Colloquium: Justin Khoo (MIT)
Filosofiska institutionen
What is a film? Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 13 november 2025 Tid: 15.00 – 17.00 Plats: D289 Abstract Films (movies, tv shows, etc) are weird things. Two people can see the same film by watching different screenings of different physical things. In that sense, films are multiple artworks. But I argue that they are quite different from other, better studied, multiple artworks like plays or pieces of written music. I argue that existing views about what films are all fail, but each contains a part of the truth, which I draw on to develop my own view, which is that films are multiply constituted artifacts.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Greg Bognar (Stockholms universitet)
Filosofiska institutionen
Self-Ownership and the Moral Significance of Birth Seminarium Datum: tisdag 18 november 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract According to moderate permissive views, abortion becomes increasingly problematic as the pregnancy develops. Late-term abortions require more momentous moral justification. This, however, is thought to create a problem: other things being equal, some reasons that can justify late-term abortions can justify the killing of newborns as well. If the only difference between a late-term fetus and a newborn is their location, then the moral difference between abortion and infanticide cannot be maintained. This is a well-known problem for moderate permissive views. It is widely accepted that birth itself has no moral significance. In this paper, I challenge this consensus. I argue that there is a morally significant difference between the fetus and the newborn: the newborn acquires self-ownership at birth. This changes the balance of reasons: killing a newborn becomes morally more problematic than killing a fetus. Moderate permissive views can, after all, maintain the moral difference between abortion and infanticide.
- Historieseminarium: Juan Jose J.J. (Berlin)
Filosofiska institutionen
The Fragility of Absolute Certainty: John Buridan on Faith Seminarium Datum: fredag 14 november 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Zoom-link
- CLLAM seminarium: Crispin Wright (Stirling) Endast på Zoom!
Filosofiska institutionen
Kripke, Quine and the 'Adoption Problem' Seminarium Datum: fredag 28 november 2025 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: Zoom Abstract We'll focus on the "Two Dogmas" philosophy of logic and on Kripke’s reported claim in his 70s seminar that Quine’s position depends upon confusing logical belief and logical inferential practice. We’ll consider what Kripke seems to have had in mind as an adoption problem for Quine, note that it depends on a resistible assumption, and formulate a different “adoption problem” that finesses the need for that assumption. Then we’ll consider more generally the “anti-exceptionalism” strand in Quine about logic and offer arguments why it is unsustainable. There is a handout for this talk. If you would like to get it before the talk, please contact Kathrin ( kathrin.gluer@philosophy.su.se ). Zoom: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/8938261027?omn=67736389403
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Norm nudging and #MeToo
Filosofiska institutionen
This paper explores some of the promises and pitfalls of #MeToo, through Cristina Bicchieri’s game-theoretical framework of social norms and studies on norm-nudging. Seminarium Datum: tisdag 2 december 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract harassment. Suppose each male employee comes to prefer to follow this rule, on condition that he expects his colleagues both to follow it (empirical expectation) and to believe he in turn should follow it (normative expectation). The rule then functions as a social norm; it is upheld as long as the male employees’ (empirical and normative) expectations are upheld. Arguably, one of the functions of #MeToo was to make salient such a non-harassment norm. However, when norm violations – some male employees “slip back” into old macho habits – are observed by other male employees, their empirical expectations may falter. Moreover, when such violations are not met with protest, their normative expectations may falter. The social norm risks breaking down, bringing back the toxic work-environment. Yet protesting is costly for victims and bystanders, who are hence caught in a collective dilemma of their own. This dilemma can be solved, analogously, by a speaking-up norm. Arguably, another function of #MeToo was to make salient this norm, too. This game-theoretic analysis of the dynamics of #MeToo can be further enhanced by considering Bicchieri’s recent findings on norm-nudging: influencing expectations via (general) social information. By communicating widespread condemnation of sexual harassment, campaigns like #MeToo raise normative expectations of non-harassment. However, by simultaneously communicating frequent failures of norm-following, empirical expectations may be lowered. Yet when there is incongruence between normative and empirical information, studies show that the latter trumps the former. In other words, social information transmitted under hashtags like #YesAllWomen carries a risk of undermining the non-harassment norm. This analysis throws new light on criticised hashtags like #NotAllMen: by emphasising norm-following, they may counteract the incongruence, thereby contributing to the reinforcement of the norm. Further, regarding the speaking-up norm, a norm-nudging perspective reveals an interesting contrast: by showcasing widespread condemnation of sexual harassment, #MeToo raises empirical expectations of speaking up. However, the widespread backlash that followed (defamation suits, public victim shaming) communicated condemnation of speaking-up, lowering normative expectations. Given this incongruence, one should again expect empirical information to trump normative information. However, studies suggest that there may be another mechanism in play: when social information conflicts with people's self-interest, they may exploit any “wiggle-room” in the information, interpreting the social norm as weak, to avoid conforming to it. This analysis suggests that the backlash against #MeToo should not (only) be understood as raising the costs of speaking up, but (also) as undermining the speaking-up norm itself. The paper concludes by discussing some upshots of these analyses for addressing the persistent problem of sexual harassment.
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Jeremy Butterfield (Oxford) & Sebastian de Haro (Amsterdam)
Filosofiska institutionen
Titel aviseras senare Seminarium Datum: måndag 15 september 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- RJ project: Linguistic and Epistemological Perspectives on Testimony
Filosofiska institutionen
The theme of the workshop is indirect speech reports and testimony. The venue for the workshop is Gula Villa and it will feature five talks. You are all warmly invited to attend. Linguistic and Epistemological Perspectives on Testimony
- CLLAM Seminarium: Salvatore Florio (Oslo)
Filosofiska institutionen
Critical Plural Logic and Abstraction (joint work with Øystein Linnebo) Seminarium Datum: fredag 11 oktober 2024 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Cantor defined a set as the collection into a whole of determinate and well-distinguished objects, objects that can “exist together”. Although he recognized that not all objects can exist together in this sense, he did not provide a theory specifying when some objects can exist together. Without such a theory, his account of sets remains incomplete. We argue that a version of plural logic, Critical Plural Logic, fits the bill. As a logic of co-existence, Critical Plural Logic captures the essence of the familiar “stage theory” of set formation but is far more general and avoids a gratuitous reification of stages. We also argue that this plural logic can be of great aid to Frege and logicism, supporting a large class of abstraction principles. Critical Plural Logic emerges as a compelling and fruitful theory to develop key ideas of Cantor and Frege.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Josefine Klingspor (Stanford)
Filosofiska institutionen
Title TBA Abstract TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Maté Veres
Filosofiska institutionen
Title TBA Abstract TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Tara Nanavazadeh
Filosofiska institutionen
The cause of evil in Plato’s Laws: God or the human soul as the origin of evil Workshop Datum: fredag 8 mars 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Jan Sprenger (Turin)
Filosofiska institutionen
The Productive Model of Explanation in Psychology and Beyond Seminarium Datum: torsdag 30 maj 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract The explanation of psychological phenomena is a central aim of psychological science. However, the nature of explanation and the processes by which we evaluate whether a theory explains a phenomenon are often unclear. We address this shortcoming by characterizing the nature of explanation in psychology along the following lines: a theory explains a phenomenon if and only if a formal model of the theory produces the statistical pattern representing the phenomenon. Using this account, we outline a workable methodology of explanation: (a) explicating a verbal theory into a formal model, (b) representing phenomena as statistical patterns in data, and (c) assessing whether the formal model produces these statistical patterns. Finally, we compare our proposal to other models of explanation from philosophy of science.
- Stockholm Colloqium in Philosophy: Anna Mahtani (LSE)
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress
- Sommarpaus: seminarier, kollokvier, worskshops, etc.
Filosofiska institutionen
Vi återkommer hösten 2024 Evenemang Startdatum: fredag 31 maj 2024 Tid: 00.00 Slutdatum: torsdag 15 augusti 2024 Tid: 00.00
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Anna-Sofia Maurin (Göteborg)
Filosofiska institutionen
The Value of Car(v)ing Seminarium Datum: torsdag 7 mars 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In my presentation I plan to critically discuss an argument defended by Shamik Dasgupta (cf. esp. his 2018 and unpublished ms.) to the effect that, because reasons exist for thinking that objectivity—and so Realism—constitutively requires that some things that exist are (primitively) normative, and since this (primitive) normativity must but cannot be explained, nothing is objective, and hence Realism must be given up. In my presentation, I plan to argue: (1) …that Dasgupta’s argument—which I understand as an argument about explanation—rests on ideas about whatneeds explaining as well as what counts as an adequate explanation that can—I suspect ought to—be resisted. (2) …that the scope of Dasgupta’s argument may not be as wide as he wants it to be: that those who accept a ‘sparse’ conception of what there is most likely do not have to accept that objectivity—and so Realism—constitutively requires that some things that exist are (primitively) normative and so will not have to face the explanatory challenge in the first place. This is very much work in progress, which means that I don’t have a paper polished enough to warrant circulating. Those of you who want to prepare for the seminar can (but in no way need to) check out Dasgupta’s papers, which can be accessed via his website: https://shamik.net/
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Attila Mráz
Filosofiska institutionen
Voting as Resistance: A Theory of Protest Voting Seminarium Datum: tisdag 12 december 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D734 Abstract Since this is a pre-read, it would be great if you could add the following below the abstract on the website: This seminar will be a discussion of a pre-circulated paper. To receive a copy of the paper and/or to be added to the mailing list, please email the conveners: antoinette.scherz@philosophy.su.se or isaac.taylor@philosophy.su.se.
- 8th Stockholm Graduate Conference 2023
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress