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- Högre seminariet i teoretisk filosofi: Mikael Janvid
Filosofiska institutionen
Anti-Social Black Metal Epistemology: Forming Beliefs without Trust in an Evil Environment Seminarium Datum: torsdag 15 maj 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract A grim picture of human existence and society is painted in the Norwegian Black Metal band Gorgoroth’s masterpiece album Quantos Possunt Ad Satanitatem Trahunt from 2009. Contrary to what has been preached to us and we have been indoctrinated in, Evil rules the world! Yet by embracing this dark outlook, the struggling subject gains a privileged epistemic insight freeing themselves from the hypocrisies of religion, political ideologies and other delusions. This highly distrustful outlook challenges the central role trust is claimed to play by current influential views in social epistemology of testimony where trust in fellow humans is considered essential for our epistemic practices. This paper starts out from the perspective conveyed by the lyrics in this album, and others in the same genre, to explore just how meager of a social basis testimony can survive on. How would such a distrustful seeker of truth go about forming their beliefs? The central theme to be investigated is what role trust, as well as its contrary, plays in testimonial exchange. The paper aims to find out how such a subject could still succeed epistemically while violating accounts of trust presented in the recent debate. Lastly the question is posed whether the reader knows they are not in this dire predicament.
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Margherita Harris (SOCRATES Centre at Leibniz University)
Filosofiska institutionen
From Inductive Risk to Quantifauxcation Seminarium Datum: torsdag 20 februari 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Debates on the role of values in science have remained surprisingly disconnected from debates on the role of probability in inference—the so-called “statistics wars.” This talk bridges these debates by arguing that the uncritical acceptance of probabilism—the view that probability's role is to quantify degrees of belief or support—often leads philosophers to conflate value-based concerns with deeper epistemic issues. Revisiting the Rudner–Jeffrey debate, I show how differing conceptions of probability shape the argument from inductive risk and why this matters for broader debates on values in science. I then introduce quantifauxation (Stark, 2021) and disguised quantifauxation to illustrate how probabilistic methods can obscure rather than clarify uncertainty. I conclude that distinguishing methodological concerns from value-based ones is essential for preserving the epistemic integrity of scientific inference.
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Siska de Baerdemaeker
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Dark matter realism reconsidered Seminarium Datum: torsdag 13 mars 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Several authors have recently argued against realism about dark matter due to it being empirically unconfirmed or too conceptually thin. In response, Vaynberg (2024) has convincingly argued in favor of dark matter realism based on Bullet Cluster observations. However, anti-realist concerns about conceptual thinness or future empirical detection may linger. I argue that these can be diffused by distinguishing between two different dark matter concepts, which I call astrophysical dark matter and fundamental dark matter. I submit that anti-realist concerns about future dark matter detection conflate empirical confirmation for fundamental dark matter with empirical confirmation for astrophysical dark matter. I further argue that the resulting realist commitment to astrophysical dark matter is more substantive than dark matter anti-realists recognize: it organizes a structured space of possibilities for fundamental dark matter, and it guide.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Carmen Pavel (Kings College London)
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Constitutional Codification Seminarium Datum: tisdag 11 mars 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract What is the value of constitutional codification? This question was alive recently in an unfamiliar context, that of the economic and political integration of the European Union, which tried unsuccessfully to convert the most important provisions of existing treaties into a new Constitutional Treaty for the European Union. The constitutional treaty failed to be ratified by France and Netherlands in 2005, marking the end of an effervescent effort of many years to codify a European constitution. More familiarly, the question is alive in the UK where the constitution is not written down in any one document which declares itself as ‘the constitution,’ unlike much of the rest of the world. In addition, this question matters in new democracies which struggle to make the transition from histories of oppression and discrimination like South Africa or authoritarian pasts like the countries of Eastern Europe after the fall of communism. And it is also alive in any constitutional system whether possessing a written constitution or not, for which certain constitutional rules are unwritten, or which considers amendments, i.e. adding or removing clauses to the constitution. What does putting constitutional rules together in a unitary documentary form add, that cannot be accomplished via regular statutes, common law, or other forms of law-making? This is the main question of this article. The unfamiliar context of postnational constitutional order such as the European Union are valuable because they help us appreciate with fresh eyes the features and functions of written constitutions which may be obscured by their embeddedness in national histories and traditional legal systems. State-based constitutions are now part of national narratives and civic cultures about shared histories, of values and principles negotiated through time by well-established communities, and of patterns of injustice corrected through enduring local struggles. However, the postnational legal orders are much more recent, more fragile, and the commitment to shared goals and values less certain. Regional agreements such as the EU, the Caribbean Economic Community, or the East African Economic Community construct constitutional orders by endowing supranational courts authority over member states, and in more integrated legal orders such as the European one, they create institutions with legal supremacy and direct effect over national legal orders. Constitutional codification has been defended, at least in the EU case, on the grounds that it creates a charter of rights and liberties for EU citizens, it modifies decisions procedures from unanimity to qualified majority, and it further renders various rules belonging to disparate treaties more coherent and makes more explicit the core commitments and priorities of the member states. This article will investigate the case for a written constitution and also explore possible drawbacks for constitutional codification. It will make the case that most mature legal orders, including regional or international ones, would benefit from an explicit, unitary constitutional agreement, and explore the conditions under which codification is not desirable.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Marion Kathe Godman (Aarhus)
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Identity or Inductive potential? Human categories in the cross-roads. Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 3 april 2025 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: B497 Abstract When we study and learn about people and especially by the use of statistical bureaus (e.g. Statistics Sweden/SCB) and social science we face a choice about what categories to use for data collection: should we for example collect data in terms of people’s ethnic or in terms of immigrant origin? I have previously argued (2020) that one important criterion is to choose categories which display inductive potential, i.e. they license multiple inductive generalizations over members of a group that can be used for comparisons between groups. Moreover, I argued that a prominent reason for social categories (or kinds of people) displaying such inductive potential is that they are historical kinds (Millikan 2000). Here I respond to some worries that have and can be raised about applying such criteria to categories for research and data collection. In the process I make the notion of inductive potential more precise and also discuss its application to some commonly used categories of social class.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Felix Lambrecht (LMU Munich)
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Diachronic Group Responsibility Seminarium Datum: onsdag 9 april 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Most people endorse some form of the Diachronic Group Responsibility Thesis: Group agents can be responsible for actions committed in the past. For instance, contemporary Germany is responsible for the wrongs of the Holocaust. Contemporary Canada is responsible colonial wrongs committed in the 19th century. Contemporary Chiquita Brands International is responsible for brutality on its banana plantations in the 20th century. However, in many cases, the properties of most of the groups we hold responsible for past wrongs have changed since the time at which the wrongs occurred. For instance, nearly every property of Germany (members, territory, government structure, etc...) has undergone significant change since the time it committed its wrongs during World War Two. So, to vindicate the Diachronic Group Responsibility Thesis, we need an account that explains why a present group agent can be responsible for an action committed in the past by a past agent that appears not to share any properties with the present group agent. In this paper I provide such an account. On the account I construct, group G2 at t2 is responsible for an action committed by G1 at t1 if G2 does an action which commits G2 to being bound by G1’s actions. Call this the Commitment Account of Diachronic Group Responsibility. I argue that the Commitment Account is superior to the alternative accounts on offer by demonstrating that it better captures our intuitive judgments about cases and better coheres with accounts of group agency more broadly.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Stefan Gosepath (Freie University Berlin)
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Ingress
- Mike Schneider (University of Missouri)
Filosofiska institutionen
Deliberately Uncreative Seminarium Datum: torsdag 16 oktober 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Science depends on creativity. This talk is about material from my current book project, concerning how to understand the concept of creativity in science, such that the previous declaration is 1) true, but 2) noteworthy rather than trivial, and 3) in keeping with a philosopher's interest in methodology (studying the dynamics of the growth of scientific knowledge by means of studying the game that scientists play). The main claim of the book is that creativity in science may be understood fruitfully in terms of an intervention that occurs during scientific speculation within the course of research, which amounts to the scientists involved overcoming uncreativity in their speculating. This, in the first place, requires an answer to an unusual question: when does speculating count as uncreatively done? In this talk, I will focus on the argument contained in the linchpin middle chapter of the book, “An account of uncreativity”, where this crucial question gets answered. In this chapter, a case demonstrates the account: the unseriousness of the proposal in fundamental physics that spacetime might fail to be time-orientable. (As will be discussed, this case is selected specifically to further emphasize that sometimes, uncreativity is just fine.)
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Lukas Meyer (University of Graz)
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The Ethics of Expectations in Transitions to Climate Neutrality Seminarium Datum: tisdag 21 oktober 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abtract In his talk, Lukas Meyer outlines the evolving contours of EXPECT — a project in development that aims to construct a normative framework for understanding the ethics of expectations in climate transitions. Expectations are not mere predictions; they are socially embedded, normatively charged structures through which individuals and institutions relate to the future. Shaped by interpersonal commitments, social practices, and public institutions, expectations inform life plans, agency, and trust. When climate disruption unsettles these anticipatory claims, the resulting loss can be existential. EXPECT integrates three core dimensions: epistemic responsibility (what individuals must know or inquire into), epistemic justification (whether expectations are normatively legitimate), and temporal revisability (when expectations must be reconsidered). It examines how expectations acquire legitimacy through responsibility-based, political, and justice-oriented frameworks — and how epistemic failures, from testimonial injustice to role-based deficiency, compromise their moral standing. The project also addresses adjustment responsibility and burden assessment: what can reasonably be asked of individuals when expectations must be revised, and how should the costs of such revision be ethically evaluated? It argues that fairness depends both on the epistemic conditions under which expectations were formed, and on the nature and distribution of the burdens imposed by change. Expectations may warrant protection, adjustment, or relinquishment — but only through principled assessment. EXPECT offers a dual lens: clarifying individual responsibility for forming and revising expectations, and institutional obligations to respond to them — even when those expectations fall short of full legitimacy. It reframes justice as a matter not only of distribution, but of recognition, revision, and ethical responsiveness in times of transition.
- Mike Schneider (University of Missouri)
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Elena Castellani (Università degli Studi di Firenze)
Filosofiska institutionen
Titel aviseras senare Seminarium Datum: torsdag 27 november 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract aviseras senare
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosof: Gábor Szabó Hofer (Budapest)
Filosofiska institutionen
Operational equivalence and causal structure Seminarium Datum: fredag 16 maj 2025 Tid: 15.15 – 17.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In this talk, I will explore some consequences of abandoning operational equivalence in quantum mechanics. Two measurements are operationally equivalent if they yield the same distribution of outcomes in every quantum state and hence are represented by the same operator. I will show that the ontological models for quantum mechanics — and more generally, for any operational theory — sensitively depend on which measurement we choose from the class of operationally equivalent measurements. To this goal, I will take first three examples — a classical theory, the EPR-Bell scenario and the Popescu-Rochrlich box; then realize each example by two different operational theories — one with a trivial and another with a non-trivial compatibility structure; and finally compare the ontological models for the different theories with respect to their causal structure, contextuality, and fine-tuning.
- Inställt: Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Christina Thomsen Thörnqvist (Södertörn)
Filosofiska institutionen
Translating Descartes Meditations Workshop Datum: fredag 9 maj 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract TBA
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Stina Björkholm & Mats Ingelström (IFFS)
Filosofiska institutionen
Does Contextualism about ‘Well-Being’ Challenge a Philosophical Paradigm? Seminarium Datum: tisdag 20 maj 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract The concept of well-being plays a central role across a range of contexts, from empirical sciences and ethical theory to everyday discourse. Alexandrova has argued that the diversity of well-being discourse supports a semantic contextualist view – positing that the meaning of ‘well-being’ shifts depending on the context of use. This thesis has been taken to challenge a traditional philosophical way of theorizing about well-being. In this paper, we challenge that contention. We begin by outlining the contextualist approach and presenting reasons to take it seriously as a semantic thesis. We then address three ways of spelling out how this view might be at odds with a philosophical paradigm, demonstrating that neither succeeds in establishing that there is a genuine conflict. Our analysis suggests that recognizing the contextual nature of well-being discourse does not entail that philosophy of well-being is undermined or significantly limits the relevance of the field.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Sandra Lindblom (Cambridge)
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Lady Mary Shepherd’s Theory of Causality in Physics Workshop Datum: fredag 23 maj 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract TBA
- The Ethics of Deception
Filosofiska institutionen
Information aviseras senare Workshop Startdatum: onsdag 26 november 2025 Tid: 09.00 Slutdatum: torsdag 27 november 2025 Tid: 18.00 Plats: Gula Villan
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Jeremy Butterfield (Oxford) & Sebastian de Haro (Amsterdam)
Filosofiska institutionen
What are dualities in physics? A geometric view Seminarium Datum: torsdag 11 september 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In the last forty years, dualities have been a major topic of research and a driving force behind much of the work in theoretical physics, especially high-energy physics. In this talk, we will first explain what dualities are and give a schema for them, together with some examples. We will then go on to discuss one of the questions in the philosophy of science that dualities bear on, namely the formulation of scientific theories. We will argue that dualities, and their generalizations, quasi-dualities, suggest a generalization of the semantic conception of theories. On the traditional semantic conception, a physical theory is a collection of models. We will argue that dualities and quasi-dualities suggest that there is topological and geometric structure on the set of models, and we will make a proposal for a specific "shape" that physical theories take, which generalizes and subsumes the semantic conception.
- Historieseminarium: Sven-Olov Wallenstein (Södertörn)
Filosofiska institutionen
Prousts världar
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Jee Hyun Moon (Humboldt) och Marcel Jahn (Stockholm)
Filosofiska institutionen
Moral Neuroenhancement and the Discernibility Challenge Seminarium Datum: tisdag 4 november 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Both scientists and philosophers have increasingly focused on the prospect of moral neuroenhancement—the use of neurotechnologies or psychoactive substances to facilitate moral improvement. Recent scholarship distinguishes between two main approaches: direct moral neuroenhancement, which seeks to implant specific moral beliefs, motives, or behaviors, and indirect moral neuroenhancement, which aims to enhance capacities such as moral reasoning, conceptual understanding, or self-control, enabling individuals to arrive at better moral judgments through their own deliberation. Several philosophers have compellingly argued that the direct approach is ethically impermissible, as it risks undermining moral autonomy and suppressing valuable disagreement. The indirect approach, by contrast, avoids these concerns and is widely regarded as ethically permissible or even required. In this paper, we introduce a novel challenge for the project of moral neuroenhancement—the discernibility challenge: for any given intervention, it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether it truly qualifies as indirect rather than direct. We demonstrate this by examining a range of experimental designs to discern between these two types of interventions, arguing that the evidence they produce is ultimately insufficient for this task. The discernibility challenge, we suggest, exposes a profound epistemic uncertainty with notable implications for the ethical permissibility of moral neuroenhancement: if we cannot reliably distinguish between permissible (indirect) and impermissible (direct) interventions, we lack the epistemic assurance necessary to ethically justify their use.
- CLLAM seminarium: Sebastian Enquist
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Meaning-as-use and logical conventionalism Seminarium Datum: fredag 31 oktober 2025 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 & Zoom Abstract I will present a view of logic based on the notion that meaning is use. More precisely, I will argue that logic should be understood in terms of "problems and solutions" rather than "propositions and truth values". Although such ideas are traditionally connected with intuitionistic logic, my claim is that they are not only compatible with but in fact support a form of conventionalism about logic. In particular, the apparent conflict between intuitionistic and classical logic evaporates from this point of view. Finally, I will discuss to what extent Kripke's so called "adoption problem" poses a problem for this conventionalist view. Zoom länk och D700