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- Conference on Philosophy of Experiment
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Ingress
- At the Crossroads of Epistemic and Practical Rationality
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Funded by the Knowledge Resistance project Workshop Datum: fredag 26 april 2024 Tid: 09.30 – 18.30 Plats: Albano, Hörsal 19 (House 2) Program 09.30-10.00 Welcome and coffee 10.00-11.15 Andrew Reisner, “How the (perhaps surprising) continuity between theoretical and practical reason leads to first-order pluralism about reasons for belief” 11:30-12:45 Tricia Magalotti, “Do We Have Epistemic Blaming Emotions?” Lunch 14:30-15.45 Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini, “Epistemic Right? Epistemic Duties?” 15.45-17.00 Levi Spectre, TBA 17.15-18.30 Anne Meylan, “Diachronic Reasons to Suspend” Please send an email to tricia.magalotti@philosophy.su.se if you are interested in attending.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Michael Devitt (City University of New York)
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Reference Borrowing: The Case of Implement Terms Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 23 maj 2024 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D289 Abstract The paper reports on experiments testing the theory of reference for implement terms. According to the description theory, competent speakers must associate with an implement term a description of the referent’s function and, probably, the physical properties that enable it to perform its function. We tested this theory on t ‘fax machine’ and ‘abacus’, using the method of truth value judgments. Our experimental results count decisively against the Description Theory. We conclude, by inference to the best explanation, that the reference of these terms can be borrowed. Our results are inconsistent even with the descriptive-causal theory of borrowing, according to which these terms can be borrowed only if the borrower associates at least some accurate description of the referent. We conclude that the terms are covered by a pure causal-historical theory of borrowing, the central idea of the picture of reference presented by Kripke, Putnam, and other causal theorists in discussing proper names and “natural” kind terms. We emphasize that our findings do not support a causal theory of the initial reference fixing by the “experts” who introduce an implement term. Indeed, we think it highly plausible that reference is initially fixed by a description of the implement’s function and defining physical characteristics. If so, then implement terms are covered by a hybrid theory of reference, causal borrowing and descriptive fixing. Key Words implement terms; description theory of reference; causal-historical reference borrowing; descriptive-causal reference borrowing; causal reference fixing; descriptive reference fixing
- MAP-seminarium: Ane Engelstad (Bergen)
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Should Political Philosophers Attend to Victim Testimony Seminarium Datum: torsdag 8 februari 2024 Tid: 15.00 – 17.00 Plats: D734 ABSTRACT There is a growing recognition that victims of injustice may have privileged access to knowledge about the injustices they experience, and that injustices are perpetuated through silencing victims by taking them to be less credible, and through denying them the platform and capacity to speak. However, these are not ideas that political philosophers tend to engage with in a sustained manner, to the extent that they alter methodological approaches to be systematically attentive to victim testimony. In this article, I provide two arguments in favour of political philosophers attending to victim testimony, one moral, one epistemic, and demonstrate that the moral case has little purchase, but that the epistemic case is more successful. Then, I present the strongest case against including victim testimony in political philosophy, and I argue that it does not hold up to scrutiny. In so doing, I demonstrate how methodological practices in political philosophy could be improved through drawing on feminist social epistemology; attending to victim testimony can enrich political philosophy in epistemically acceptable ways, and it also corrects for a range of potential biases. Full paper WHAT IS MAP? MAP Stockholm is a chapter to the international organization MAP (Minorities and Philosophy) here at Stockholm University. In short, MAP's mission is to address structural injustices in academic philosophy and to remove barriers that impede participation in academic philosophy for members of marginalized groups. Through its international organizing team and graduate student-led network of autonomous chapters around the world, MAP aims to examine and dismantle mechanisms that prevent students from marginalized groups from participating in academic philosophy, as well as to promote philosophical work done from marginalized perspectives, and help improve working conditions for scholars from marginalized backgrounds. MAP Stockholm organizes reading groups, seminars and discussion sessions that are open to all students. Contact us via mapsthlm@philosophy.su.se
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Kevin Noone (Miljövetenskap)
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Augmenting the Grammar of Science Seminarium Datum: torsdag 21 mars 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 This lecture will explore the “hows and whys” of the scientific endeavor. We will start with a historical perspective going way back to the classical Greek roots of science, and examine some waypoints in how we have gone about doing science up to the present day. We will then shine a light on new(ish), transdisciplinary approaches to science, with a particular focus on Community Science. In doing so we will see how we may be able to improve science through augmenting its grammar; how adding things like prepositions (with, not just for or on), adverbs (such as collaboratively) and prefixes (like trans-, not just multi- or inter-) to our nouns (results) and verbs (methods) can make our scientific grammar a lot more readable.
- CLLAM Seminarium: Fredrik Stjernberg (Linköping)
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The essential openness of Waismann’snotion of analyticity Seminarium Datum: fredag 17 november 2023 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D734 Abstract We all remember Quine’s attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction in “Two Dogmas” (Quine 1951). Grice and Strawsons “In defence of a dogma” (1956) is also well known. There is another study of the distinction from the same period, which has been somewhat neglected in the debate, and that is the series of papers Waismann wrote between 1949 and 1953 (Waismann 1949, 1950, 1951a, 1951b, 1952, 1953). There are many similarities between Quine’s and Waismann’s views, butalso some important differences. Waismann shares some of Quine’s objections to analyticity, but he draws different conclusions from them. My talk examines Waismann’s notion of analyticity, and stresses how his views employ a conception of language and meaning as essentially open.There is no final determination of what analyticity amounts to, or of which truths that are analytic. At times, analyticity rests on a decision. Parallels with some current theories of meaning (Ludlow, Rayo, Richard, Wilson) are briefly discussed.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Johan Brännmark
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Addressing Social Indeterminacy Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 14 mars 2024 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: OBS! B413 Abstract While there are some contemporary defenders of ontic vagueness or metaphysical indeterminacy, a quite common view is still that vagueness or indeterminacy are really semantic or epistemic in character. The exact borders of, say, Mount Kilimanjaro might be disputable, and there might not be a clear-cut answer as to whether a particular boulder on its slope is part of it, but this is just due to indeterminacy in how we conceptually carve some aspects of the world. But the basic structure of the world ultimately is what it is. Nothing indeterminate about it, at least not on a metaphysical level. If we turn to the social realm, things potentially become more complicated since the ways in which we conceptualize objects in the social world do not just carve up an already existing social landscape. Instead, our conceptualizations of these objects, beliefs about them, and actions in relation to them, are typically understood to play a constitutive role in grounding the existence of the relevant social objects. Yet if many of the relevant categories and ideas are indeterminate, should there then not also be widespread indeterminacy in the social realm? And what would recognizing such indeterminacy mean for how we should understand social objects? In this presentation it is argued that the best response to the endemic indeterminacy of the social realm is a form of fictionalism about social objects.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Katharina Berndt Rasmussen
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Structural Dimensions of Discrimination Seminarium Datum: tisdag 28 november 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In this paper, I put forth a theory of discrimination that captures several structural dimensions of the phenomenon, which are sometimes pushed to the periphery of analysis. I do this by outlining a concept of discrimination, which aims to capture what many of us are concerned with in real life cases, and by exploring the different forms it can take, as well as its relation to moral wrongness and to social injustice. I thus propose that we should see discrimination, in the relevant sense, as a bridge concept: between the personal and the political, between criteria of moral wrongness and of social (in)justice, between, indeed, individualist and structural analyses of harms and inequalities. I believe that it is this bridging feature which makes the concept distinctive and particularly useful, both within philosophy and more broadly in society (politics, law, civil society). My hope is that seeing discrimination in this way will allow for a more well-grounded and detailed understanding of our social world, by facilitating a more nuanced application of the concept to specific cases, and by allowing for a richer analysis of their moral and political-philosophical (and potentially even legal) status.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Sophia Connell (Birkbeck, University of London)
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Aristotle on female emotions: The character of women in the Historia Animalium Workshop Datum: fredag 26 april 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract The ninth book of the Historia animalium (Book VIII in Balme’s edition) is the only evidence that Aristotle thought women’s character to be connected to their biological make up. This paper will explore what exactly Aristotle claims about the affective capacities of female as opposed to male animals and particularly human females, women. While females within a kind are noted to be milder tempered and more thoughtful or intelligent, males tend to spiritedness, aggression and simple-mindedness (HA IX.1, 608a22-608b4). When it comes to women, they are ‘more prone to tears’ and also ‘more apt to scold and fight’, and ‘more shameless and lying’ (608b5-11). The pejoratives come thick and fast. However, while these observations might be important from a scientific point of view, they need not be an assessment of the inevitability of women’s behaviour. Aristotle insists on ensuring the most virtuous and happiest lives for all people in the community, including the female half the population (Pol. I.13, 1260b19-20; Rh. I.5, 1361a11-12). Because of this, the evidence from the HA IX must be broadened and more deeply analysed. The differences in character propensities come in degrees and range over animals in general as well as individuals within a kind (HA I.1, VIII.1). When these are not pathological, the differences within any given kind will be slight. And since the human-kind is in general spirited and intelligent, its female specimens will be this too, even if slightly more thoughtful and less spirited than male specimens. Women, and other female animals, are less prone to anger and aggression, tamer and more gentle. These ‘character’ tendencies have a physiological basis in a body that is slightly cooler and less tightly constructed and blood that is thinner and more watery. The descriptions of the bad behaviour of female humans must also be considered more carefully in the context of descriptive research, where conditions are not ideal for flourishing in the Aristotelian sense. How such tendencies could lead to a women being more shameless and lying must be explained with reference to the unique human way of life in the polis, where the control of more ‘spirited’ men can result in problematic behaviour patterns in response to a mismanagement of gender hierarchies. In these instances, when women’s abilities and desires have been undermined and thwarted (for example, if they are treated like slaves, which Aristotle objects to [Pol. I.1, 1252b1, I.12, 1259a37f.]) then their reactions will be negative, as here described. In examining this, the fact that women can and do feel anger and aggressive emotions is brought to light, undermining a widespread view that Aristotle is unable to accommodate such emotions in women (e.g. Harris 2001, ch. 5). Thus, the Historia animalium can be found to provide a broader and richer view of emotional responses in female animals, and certain resources toward explaining the ‘gender wars’ in human societies.
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Martina Fürst (Graz)
Filosofiska institutionen
Phenomenal Mismatch and Perceptual Justification Seminarium Datum: torsdag 30 november 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract On a popular view of perceptual justification, perceptual experiences provide prima facie justification for beliefs based upon them. This view, labelled phenomenal conservatism , is challenged by cases in which the experience has a bad basis. To explain the bad basis cases, some philosophers (e.g., Siegel 2017, McGrath 2013) develop an etiologically restricted conservatism . However, these accounts depart from the key tenets of phenomenal conservatism that etiology does not matter for an experience´s justificatory power. This motivates the search for a novel theory that explains the bad cases while staying true to the key tenets of phenomenal conservatism. In this talk, I propose a novel version of a restricted conservatism that meets the desideratum of explaining the bad cases by focusing only on intrinsic features of the experience, rather than on their etiology. I proceed as follows: Firstly, I provide an example of the bad case, namely a perceptual experience that has been shaped by racist prejudice. Secondly, I analyze the overall phenomenology of the target experiences in detail and I show that in the bad cases, the target experiences exhibit a mismatching overall phenomenology. Thirdly, I argue that phenomenal mismatch provides internal phenomenal defeat which explains why the target experience is epistemically deficient. I conclude that the resulting view, a phenomenally restricted conservatism , has the advantage of explaining the bad basis cases while staying true to the spirit of phenomenal conservatism.
- Andrea Asker (Stockholms universitet) slutseminarium
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Slutseminarium avhanding Seminarium Datum: tisdag 5 november 2024 Tid: 13.00 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Maté Veres (Genève)
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Wisdom and Expertise in Early Stoicism Workshop Datum: fredag 13 september 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Early Stoics subscribed to a version of the idea that it is on account of being a practitioner of a form of expertise concerned with the whole of human life that the wise can do well in all relevant respects. Furthermore, they conceived of this higher-order form of expertise as structurally analogous but epistemically superior to first-order forms of expertise. One corollary of the Stoic view is that, for any given first-order form of expertise, only the wise person can be a genuine expert. Indeed, there is evidence for the claim that at least some forms of expertise practiced by the wise are transformed into quasi-virtuous states of the soul. In this paper, I discuss three potential connections a Stoic might draw between first-order forms of expertise and the expertise concerned with the whole of human life. First, insofar as all forms of expertise involve knowledge-that and knowledge-how, the expertise in living well must involve actionable mastery of Stoic doctrine. Second, since virtue is a matter of dealing with indifferents, and forms of expertise are specialized forms of dealing with indifferents, the practice of the expertise in living well must involve some first-order forms of expertise. Third, the motivation and justification for acting on the demands of a specialized expertise ultimately derive from the judgement of the expertise in living well concerning the all-things-considered action to be done, calling into question the epistemic autonomy of first-order forms of expertise.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Hallvard Fossheim (Bergen)
Filosofiska institutionen
A Stoic and an Artistic Perspective on Worth in Nature Workshop Datum: fredag 18 oktober 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Care for nature is typically grounded either in human beings as environmental dependents or in nature in its own right. In the latter case, nature is seen as an object of care irrespective of human welfare. I will argue that this latter kind of appreciation of nature can be gleaned from the Roman late Stoic philosophy of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. I will then discuss whether a non-verbal, pictorial work can convey some of the same meaning. We start from Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations . I will show that he is in dialogue with a topos more fully articulated in Aristotle’s Poetics , concerned with the relative status of mimetic representations and their real-life objects. With this framework in place, it can more readily be appreciated that Marcus is sketching an attitude to nature and the natural aspect of all things that is akin to an aesthetic delight. At the same time, it is crucial to see that this appreciative attitude towards nature does not come for free. In order to bring this complex fact to the fore, we turn to a major influence on Marcus, in that Epictetus’ Discourses suggests that such a non-instrumental attitude depends on high-end, strenuous paideia . The artwork in question is the fresco in the triclinium from the Villa of Livia (Rome, ca 29-20BC). I will argue that this fresco suggests an appreciation of nature that transcends purely instrumental value. To build this case, I include arguments concerning the function and materiality of the room which the fresco decorates; the fresco’s sophisticated interplay between appreciation of techne and appreciation of phusis in its very presence; and the considered manner in which this fresco sets up a contrast between curated and non-curated (or minimally curated) nature.
- Stockholm Colloqium in Philosophy: Filip Radovic (Göteborg)
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How the unbelievable is believed Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 31 oktober 2024 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D289 Abstract It is well-known that irrational beliefs are part of a normal healthy life. Even so, some beliefs stand out as exceptionally odd because they do not reflect what people consider to be normal or acceptable. Conventional diagnostic systems in psychiatry habitually characterize extremely outlandish beliefs as delusional, that is, as being abnormal, morbid or pathological. Exactly why a belief is delusional is a matter of great controversy. Yet there seems to be a vital difference between delusions and other irrational ideas, for example, believing that one is God Almighty or that one is dead, on the one hand, and believing that Princess Diana faked her own death or that that “thirteen” is an unlucky number, on the other. In this presentation I will exemplify some typical delusions from the clinical literature and highlight a set of problems in contemporary philosophical debates, such as, how to define “delusion”, in what sense, if any, delusions are proper beliefs, and the complicated relation between delusion and mainstream religious beliefs.
- CLLAM Seminar: Stina Björkholm (IFFS)
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Derogatory Content in the Discourse Structure Seminarium Datum: fredag 4 november 2022 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Several philosophers have argued that derogatory language can be analyzed by appeal to the linguistic frameworks by Stalnaker and Lewis, according to which utterances aim to update a shared body of information mutually accepted among the interlocutors. The thought is that by making a derogatory claim, the speaker aims to add derogatory or offensive content(s) to this shared body of information. However, a problem about this approach is that these frameworks are primarily designed to model mutual belief. This seems to make them ill-equipped to accommodate the normative dimensions of derogatory speech, which (roughly) has to do with the ways that derogatory speech condones mistreatment of certain groups of people. The challenge is to show how these frameworks can be expanded such that they can do justice to the way that derogatory and offensive language puts pressure on action or attitudes. I propose that this challenge can be met by appeal to an expanded version of Stalnaker’s pragmatic framework. I argue that this expanded framework offers a way to account for the way that language can enforce both offensive stereotypes and derogatory norms for action and offer a theory of how these contents are represented in the discourse structure.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Gunnar Björnsson
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Taking Responsibility Seminarium Datum: tisdag 1 november 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In her Descartes Lectures, Cheshire Calhoun argues that responsible person is a cross-temporal, valuable status that is default in social life. Much theorizing about moral responsibility, she claims, have focused too much on one particular aspect of this status: accountability responsibility. In addition, we should recognize as part of the default status that one is compliance responsible, or disposed to live up to minimal normative expectations, as well as a responsibility taker, capable of taking the initiative to do good things that one is not morally required to do. My presentation, in preparation of a commentary on one of Calhoun’s three lectures, focuses on what we should say about the nature of responsibility taking and its relation to (i) the status of being a responsible person, (ii) negative reactive attitudes as well as positive attitudes of praise and gratitude, and (iii) normative expectations and demands.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Sofia Jeppsson (Umeå)
Filosofiska institutionen
Blame: The fault and the sting Seminarium Datum: tisdag 18 oktober 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Abstract: Philosophers take the practice of holding each other morally responsible for wrongful actions seriously. Hannah Pickard (2011), Andrea Westlund (2018), and Katrina Hutchison (2018) all talk about the sting of blame and resentment. Eugene Chislenko (forthcoming) further argues that some of that sting stems from being seen by others as “a source of badness” and “a disaster”. We can remove the sting from a bad situation if we show that the real source of badness was a non-agent; if we blame, e.g., some unforeseen natural disaster rather than an agent for what happened, no one is stung by it (ibid). However, we cannot similarly remove the sting by shifting blame to another agent who allegedly lacks moral responsibility for what they did. Agents suffer when others see them as sources of badness and disasters, even if people add the caveat that all this badness wasn’t their fault. This point was recognized by Bernard Williams (1981; 1993) in his discussions about agents who feel agent-regret or shame for things that were not their fault. Williams focused on situations in which, according to traditional moral responsibility theory, a morally responsible agent should be excused for the disaster he caused due to momentary lack of control or a lack of crucial information. According to Williams, it’s still natural and justified for this agent to suffer from knowing that he caused something terrible to happen, even if present-day moral philosophers insist that he is excused and shouldn’t feel guilty. Similarly, I argue, agents who are supposedly exempted from moral responsibility due to their young age and/or serious mental disorders, will feel stung and suffer when seen as the source of badness and disasters. I use real-life examples to illustrate this point (Luhrmann 2000: 284; 2007: 239-242; MacKinnon and Pies 2006). The sting of blame and resentment is not generally considered a reason to abandon our moral responsibility practices altogether; it is, however, considered a reason to take this practice seriously, and not throw blame around willy-nilly. I argue that we should be similarly cautious when attributing causal responsibility for some badness or disaster to the supposedly exempted, and discuss concrete implications for my previously mentioned real-life examples. References Chislenko, E. “Causal Blame”. Forthcoming in American Philosophical Quarterly Hutchison, K. 2018. “Moral responsibility, respect and social identity”. in Hutchison, Mackenzie, and Oshana (eds.) The Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press. MacKinnon, D. F., and Pies, R. 2006. “Affective instability as rapid cycling: theoretical and clinical implications for borderline personality and bipolar spectrum disorders.” Bipolar Disorders. 8: 1-14. Luhrmann, T. M. 2000. Of two minds: An anthropologist looks at American Psychiatry. New York: Knopf. Luhrmann, T. M. 2007. Social defeat and the culture of chronicity: Or, why schizophrenia does so well over there and so badly here. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry. 31: 135-172. Pickard, H. 2011. “Responsibility without Blame: Empathy and the Effective Treatment of Personality Disorder.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 13 (3): 209–224. Westlund, A. 2018. “Answerability without blame?” in Hutchison, Mackenzie, and Oshana (eds.) The Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press. Williams, B. 1981. Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, B. 1993. Shame and Necessity. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Alice Damirjian
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Is ”Arsenal" a Rigid Designator? Rigidity and Names for Social Groups Seminarium Datum: torsdag 27 oktober 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In Naming and Necessity, Kripke (1980, [1972]) argued and convinced many that some terms are rigid designators. In particular, proper names. According to Kripke’s definition, a proper name N for an object a is a rigid designator if and only if N designates a in every possible world in which a exists, and N never designates any other object b such that a ≠ b. Some paradigmatic examples of such names are: ‘Hesperus’, ‘Phosphorus’, ‘Venus’, ‘Nixon’, ‘Aristotle’, ‘Gödel’, ‘Mt. Everest’, ‘London’, ‘England’, and ‘T’. In this paper, the thing I want to draw our attention to is the fact that ‘London’ and ‘England’ stand out from the rest of the names in our list. They stand out because cities and nations are social entities, whereas planets, individuals, mountains, and tables are not. They are, in a sense, entities that constitutively dependent on social factors (like human behavior, practices and beliefs). This observation is in itself a reason to wonder whether ‘England’ and ‘London’ really could be rigid designators, and what that would mean for the kripkean picture of proper names. For if we are fine with accepting that ‘England’ is a rigid designator, then it seems intuitively plausible that names for other social entities could be rigid too. Company names like ‘Apple’, ‘Google’ and ‘Facebook’, band names like ‘The Beatles’, ‘Queen’ and ‘Nirvana’, and team names like ‘Arsenal’ could all be rigid designators. This is something one might not be inclined to accept without proper consideration. In order to investigate this issue, we must turn our gaze towards social ontology and look at what has been said about the metaphysics of social entities, and we must ask: Within the kripkean framework, are social entities really the type of objects for which rigid designators can be introduced? My tentative answer will be: It appears so.
- Knowledge Resistance in High-Choice Information Environments
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Mark Budolfson (University of Texas at Austin)
Filosofiska institutionen
The Modern Predicament: Harm, Complicity, Compensation, Moral Debt Seminarium Datum: tisdag 3 oktober 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract As participants in contemporary society, each of us is in some sense complicit in a wide variety of harms to others. We might call this the Modern Predicament. The question I focus on is what follows from this predicament about our duties to others as individuals, and why. I argue that the sort of complicity of which we are guilty is highly indirect and highly diffuse, and that the individual actions that make us complicit are not any part of the primary cause of the relevant harms (even when those individual actions are aggregated at the societal level), and that this means the canonical constraint against doing harm is not in fact violated in virtue of the particular kind of complicity in harm of which we are guilty. Nonetheless, I argue that what actually follows from our complicity in harm is, at the same time, a fairly demanding moral debt, far beyond a mere duty of beneficence, and each of us indeed has a genuine and demanding duty of justice as an individual to discharge this debt. But unlike the directed duty to improve the circumstances of particular people who are harmed that follows from violations of the canonical constraint against doing harm, the moral debt we have in light of the Modern Predicament is an undirected duty to improve the world that, while genuinely owed as a matter of justice, is not owed to any particular persons. As a result, this kind of undirected moral debt is of fundamental importance to understanding the distinctive reasons each of us has in virtue of the fraught relations we occupy in modern society, and for understanding the duties and reasons for action we have as individuals in virtue of our involvement in various collectives and collective action. The theoretical upshot is that a correct account of the ethics of the Modern Predicament requires untangling a web of ethical reasons related to collective action, harm, complicity, compensation, and moral debt – and that this requires, somewhat unsurprisingly, careful and at times subtle analysis. But the practical upshot can be stated clearly: Each of us has an obligation to make the world a better place that is much more demanding than it would be in the absence of our complicity in harm to others. However, we have leeway in how we discharge that debt, and many conscientious people succeed in discharging that debt without making the particular investments of money, time, or other sacrifices favored by advocates of the Complicity in Harm Argument, and without even being aware of the existence of the Modern Predicament.