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- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Tara Nanavazadeh
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Plato’s theory of the source of evil in Laws 10: Reading the metaphysics of the Laws as a whole Seminarium Datum: fredag 12 maj 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Tara Nanavazadeh (Stockholm) speaking about a chapter from her dissertation “Plato’s theory of the source of evil in Laws 10: Reading the metaphysics of the Laws as a whole” Zoom-link
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Anna Petronella Foultier
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Expression and emotion in dance Seminarium Datum: torsdag 1 juni 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract It is commonly assumed that the art of dance is essentially concerned with the expression and arousal of emotion, at least in classical and modern western dance styles. However, although there are numerous philosophical studies on the role of emotion and expression in other arts, very little is written about this topic in relation to dance. At most, it is assumed that a theory of expression in, e.g., music, can be transferred to other art forms, such as dance. In this talk, I examine some recent theories on expression in abstract music in order to see, firstly, to what extent they are applicable to dance – more specifically to contemporary abstract dance – and secondly, whether they are plausible judged against the background of contemporary affective science. The focus on abstract music and dance – i.e., without words, narrative, or other referential components – is aimed at bracketing the contributions of linguistic or pictorial meaning, in order to clarify how emotions function specifically in dance.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Knut Olav Skarsaune (INN University)
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Titel aviseras senare Seminarium Datum: tisdag 12 september 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D734 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Bryan Roberts (LSE)
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Seminaret uppskjutet. Mer information kommer senare. Seminarium Datum: torsdag 15 juni 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 13.50 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Monika Asztalos Murdoch (Oslo)
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Reference in Aristotle’s Categories and Topics A Workshop Datum: fredag 15 september 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In the course of preparing a critical edition of Boethius’s Latin commentary (ca. 510) on Aristotle’s Categories I have struggled to make sense of the verb sêmainein in Cat. 4-5 (1b25-2a4 and 3b10-23) and Topics A 7-9 (103a6-39 and 103b20-39). In the seminar I will discuss the four passages and argue for taking sêmainein in the sense of ’refer to’ rather than ’signify’ which is the prevalent translation.
- Workshop: John Buridan om kunskap och normer
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Ingress
- CLLAM Seminarium: Tricia Magalotti
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Emotions and the Phenomenal Grasping of Epistemic Blameworthiness Seminarium Datum: fredag 26 maj 2023 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Epistemic judgment seems to be less emotionally engaging than moral judgment. We are more prone to judge epistemic failures in an emotionally “cool” way than we are moral failures. In order to accommodate this observation, Boult (2020) has argued for a relationship-based account of epistemic blame that parallels Scanlon’s account of moral blame. The suggestion is that if one can give a non-emotion-based account of epistemic blame, then the coolness of epistemic judgment would not be a problem for the prospect of epistemic blameworthiness. In this talk I push back on the suggestion that the role of blaming emotions in judgments of epistemic failure can be so easily dismissed. Drawing on Bourget’s (2017) account of phenomenal grasping, I want to suggest that moral blaming emotions allow us to phenomenally grasp moral blameworthiness. This in turn allows us to appreciate the normative significance of moral blameworthiness in a way that we would otherwise be unable to do. I argue that if we do not have epistemic blaming emotions, then even if we are epistemically blameworthy and even if we engage in epistemic blame, we are not capable of phenomenally grasping that fact. This would, at the least, be a bizarre result for the defender of epistemic blameworthiness. Zoom-link
- Workshop on social and political philosophy of language
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Ingress
- Försening: Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: José Filipe da Silva (Helsingfors)
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Intentionality and Representation in Medieval Philosophy of Perception Försenad till 15:00 Seminarium Datum: fredag 10 februari 2023 Tid: 15.00 – 16.45 Plats: D700 OBS: Försening till 15:00 Abstract The topic of perception in medieval philosophy has been the focus of numerous scholarly contributions in the last decades, but this scholarly output has mostly focused on questions related to faculty psychology, metaphysics of cognitive change, epistemological ontology, etc. In my talk I want instead to focus on the question of whether in perception we are in direct contact with external things, resulting in our awareness of that external thing as having certain sensible features, or only with representations of those sensible properties. My aim is to show that the best way to answer this question is by reflecting on what kind of properties constitute or are included in the content of human perceptual experiences. My argument, which I substantiate with two case studies, is that in some instances – perhaps in all instances – the content of human perceptual experiences includes properties that are not immediately, directly, and causally made available from our contact with an external thing. Not only this commits the authors I will be examining to a version of representationalism, but it allows me to present a broader challenge to the traditional, direct realist interpretation of most medieval philosophy of perception. Zoom-link
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Stina Björkholm (IFFS)
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Error Theory of Race Seminarium Datum: tisdag 31 januari 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract When people think and talk about race, they seem to use race concepts such as ‘black’ and ‘white’ as if they refer to biologically real categories. However, there are not enough biological similarities (and differences) between groups of human beings that warrant dividing us into different biological races. In this paper, I defend an error theory of race. Error theories of race maintain that people purport to refer to biological categories when they use race concepts but that that these biological categories do not exist. I will distinguish between two different types error theory of race by drawing from the literature on moral error theory. Moral error theories standardly maintain that moral beliefs and assertions cannot be true since there are no moral properties; and in much the same way, the existing error theories about race contend that our beliefs and assertions about race cannot be true since there are no races. I will argue that for race, this type of error theory is too radical. Instead, we should accept moderate error theory according to which ordinary thought and discourse about race involves the false assumption that races are biological kinds, but that our beliefs and assertions about race can nevertheless be true since race is socially real.
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Olle Risberg (Uppsala) och Daniel Fogal (NYU)
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Coherence and Incoherence Seminarium Datum: torsdag 26 januari 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract The central thesis of this paper is that coherence is more than just the absence of incoherence. We argue that two recently popular accounts of coherence and rationality, based (respectively) on reasons and requirements, fail to accommodate this thesis. Instead, we defend an account of coherence that is based on support. In short, the basic idea is that a set of attitudes is coherent when some of the attitudes in the set support other attitudes in it; incoherent if some of the attitudes oppose other attitudes in it; and neither coherent nor incoherent if the attitudes involved neither support nor oppose other attitudes in it. As this illustrates, this approach—unlike reasons- and requirements-based ones—straightforwardly allows one to distinguish between coherence, incoherence, and the absence of each. Zoom-länk
- Jubileumseminarium: CLLAM 30 år med Øystein Linnebo (Oslo)
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Abstraction and grounding: between Aristotle and Plato Seminarium Datum: fredag 20 januari 2023 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Are there “thin objects” whose existence does not make any substantial demand on the world? In my Thin Objects (OUP 2018) I defend an affirmative answer based on a Fregean form of abstraction. This talk develops two central aspects of the resulting view in a new and alternative way, using the notion of grounding. First, every truth about some thin objects is grounded in a truth that does not involve these objects. Second, the notorious “bad company problem” for abstractionism can be solved by insisting that every truth about the desired abstracta be grounded in a truth that is solely about some prior and independently available ontology. I explain how the resulting view is a form of “soft platonism” with some broadly Aristotelian features. Zoom-link Mer om CLLAM
- INSTÄLLT!! Högre seminarium i vetenskapfilosofi: Simon Allzén
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INSTÄLLT!! Seminarium Datum: torsdag 15 december 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700
- Stina Björkholm disputerar
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The Duality of Moral Language: On Hybrid Theories in Metaethics Disputation Datum: onsdag 25 maj 2022 Tid: 13.00 – 16.00 Plats: Hörsal 7, Södra huset, hus D The Duality of Moral Language: On Hybrid Theories in Metaethics Faculty opponent: Professor Mark Schroeder (University of Southern California) Abstract Moral language displays a characteristic duality. On the one hand, moral claims seem to be similar to descriptive claims: To say that an act is right (or wrong) seems to be a matter of making an assertion, thus indicating that the speaker has a moral belief about which she can be correct or mistaken. On the other hand, moral claims seem to be different from descriptive claims: There is a sense in which, by claiming that an act is right (or wrong), a speaker indicates that she is inclined to perform (or not perform) the act, to want others to perform it (or not perform it), and to react with praise towards those who do it (or blame or resentment towards those who do not). Hybrid theories maintain that utterances of moral sentences have both a descriptive and a practical linguistic function. In this thesis, I investigate how a hybrid theory can best accommodate the descriptive and the practical aspects of moral language. I evaluate and criticize the way that existing hybrid theories have proposed to explain the duality of moral language. The main arguments against these views are that they either: fail to accommodate the way that the practical or attitudinal import of moral claims vary across different contexts and linguistic environments; or that they fail to show how the practical or attitudinal import is reliably inferred by interlocutors in virtue of general communicative principles. I develop and defend a new hybrid theory called ‘dynamic descriptivism’. This theory accommodates the duality of moral language by appeal to the way that moral utterances affect a dimension of communication which consists of the shared assumptions that interlocutors mutually assume to mutually accept. Moreover, I discuss a problem which has affected a wide range of theories of moral language – including existing hybrid theories – which is the problem of explaining what it is that interlocutors disagree about when they disagree about matters of morality. I argue that that dynamic descriptivism offers new resources for solving this problem.
- Romy Eskens disputerar
Filosofiska institutionen
Payback Time: Essays on Attitudes, Partiality, and Rescuing Disputation Datum: fredag 3 juni 2022 Tid: 13.00 – 15.00 Plats: Hörsal 11, Södra huset, hus F Abstract Does the moral quality of someone’s past treatment of us, or of other people, change how we are morally permitted or required to treat them? Many philosophers think so. They argue, for instance, that someone’s supererogatory or impermissible behaviour can permit or require certain positive or negative attitudinal responses, such as gratitude or resentment. They also argue that someone’s impermissible behaviour can justify harming the person, either defensively or punitively, and that someone who is imperilled as a result of impermissible behaviour might have a weaker claim to be aided than those who are innocently imperilled. This thesis has two aims. The first is to extend the scope of the idea that we can be morally required to have certain positive or negative attitudinal responses to someone’s supererogatory (or even obligatory) or impermissible behaviour; the second is to explore novel ways in which our required responses to such behaviour, or our failures to have these responses, can change what others owe to us when aiding. Papers 1-3 advance the first aim; papers 4-6 advance the second aim. In pursuing the two aims, the thesis brings together two philosophical domains that are not normally considered in conjunction: the philosophy of attitudes and deontological ethics.
- Wedberg Lectures 2026: Sally Haslanger (MIT)
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Understanding Structural Intersectionality at Micro, Meso, and Macro Levels of Social Analysis
- Wedberg Lectures 2026: Sally Haslanger (MIT)
Filosofiska institutionen
Carework: A Systems Approach
- Why Trust a Collaboration?
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Organizers: Haixin Dang, Siska De Baerdemaeker, Paula Muhr, Sophie Ritson This workshop will bring together leading and emerging scholars in social epistemology, the ethics of knowledge, collective moral responsibility, and scientists to develop a framework for trust in scientific collaborations. By treating collaborations as loci of epistemic agency, the workshop will clarify how well-placed and justified trust in scientific institutions and their outputs can sustain public confidence without collapsing into naïve deference or corrosive skepticism.
- CLLAM seminarium: Alice Damirjian (SU)
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Speaking in ideology
- CLLAM seminarium: Rebecca Wallbank (UU)
Filosofiska institutionen
On the Formation of Verdictive Aesthetic Beliefs