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- Inställt: CLLAM: Dag Westerståhl
Filosofiska institutionen
Nytt datum aviseras snart Seminarium Datum: fredag 10 december 2021 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: TBA Title TBA Abstract TBA
- Inställt: Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Harald Wiltsche (Linköping)
Filosofiska institutionen
Hermann Weyl on the nature of the coordinate system Seminariet ombokas till senare tillfälle Seminarium Datum: torsdag 16 december 2021 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: E420 Abstract While a towering figure in 20th century mathematics and theoretical physics, Hermann Weyl is still relatively unknown in philosophical circles. As I will argue in my talk, this is mainly due to the fact that Weyl’s thinking about science is deeply influenced by Husserlian phenomenology—a philosophical framework that isn’t usually a frame of reference for philosophers of science and physics. In my talk I will concentrate on Weyl’s claim according that “the coordinate system is the necessary residue of the annihilation of the Ego” and aim to show how phenomenological motives form the background of his scientific and philosophical thinking.
- Joint Stockholm/Uppsala Seminar in Practical Philosophy
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress
- Hylomorphism into Pieces. Elements, Atoms and Corpuscles in the Late Middle Ages
Filosofiska institutionen
Online conference on the history of atomism Konferens Startdatum: torsdag 7 april 2022 Tid: 09.00 Slutdatum: fredag 8 april 2022 Tid: 16.45 Plats: Zoom Details, updates and practical informations: Hylomorphism into pieces Zoom link Hylomorphism into Pieces. Elements, Atoms and Corpuscles in the Late Middle Ages 7–8 April 2022 Hosted by KU Leuven & Stockholm University – Online Program (CET) April 7 9.00–9.15: Foreword 9.15–10.20: A. Robert: “What is a natural point? Atoms and minima in the late Middle Ages” 10.20–10.30: Break 10.30–12.00: H. Lagerlund, “The changing view of successive entities in the 14th century: The case of Peter of Mantua” R. Zambiasi: “Julius Caesar Scaliger’s Doctrine of Minima Naturalia: A Reappraisal” 12.00–2.00pm: Lunch Break 2.00–3.30: C. Murphy: “Unity Out of Multiplicity: Nicholas of Cusa on the Elements” L. Burzelli: “A Self-Confesses Heresiarch. Pietro Pomponazzi and his Quaestio de remanentia elementorum in the XVI century debate” 3.30–3.40: Break 3.40–4.25: R. Friedman, “Late Scholastic Thomism into Pieces: Hylomorphism in Domingo Báñez’s commentary on De generatione et corruptione” April 8 9.30–11.00: E. Moreau, “Elements, Minima, and Particles in Sixteenth-Century Galenic Medicine” F. Bigotti: “An materia sit quanta per se. The Debate on the Extension of Prime Matter in Sixteenth-Century Padua” 11.00–11.10 Break 11.10–11.55: E. Åkerlund, “Rodrigo de Arriaga and the Pointlike Structure of Matter” 11.55–2pm: Lunch Break 2.00–3.30: W. Newman, “Chymical Atomism from the High Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century: An Overview” H. Hirai: “Jacob Schegk on the Myth of “Anaxagoras the Atomist”” 3.30–3.40: Break 3.40–4.45: C. Lüthy, “The Innocent Fragmentation of Forms in the Sixteenth Century: The Case of Nicolaus Biesius”
- Joint Stockholm/Uppsala Seminar in Practical Philosophy
Filosofiska institutionen
Joseph Bowen (Stockholm) & Marvin Backes (Uppsala) Seminarium Datum: tisdag 5 april 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 16.00 Plats: D700 Titlar 13:15-14:30: Marvin Backes: On Inferential Moral Knowledge: A Defence of Hume’s Law Kommentator: Håkan Salwén 14:45-16:00: Joseph Bowen: Directed and Undirected Duties to Rescue Kommentator: Jens Johansson
- Stockholm June Workshop in Philosophy 2022
Filosofiska institutionen
Metaphysics and Ethics Workshop Datum: tisdag 24 maj 2022 Tid: 10.00 – 17.00 Plats: E497 Gunnar Björnsson (Stockholm): ‘From distributive to retributive desert’ Commentator: Anna Nyman (Uppsala) Olle Risberg (Uppsala): ‘The Weight of Reasons’ Commentator: Krister Bykvist (Stockholm) Mark Schroeder (USC): ‘Narrative and Personal Identity’ Commentator: Nils Franzén (Umeå) Teemu Toppinen (Helsingfors): TBA Commentator: Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm) Caroline Torpe Touborg (Umeå): ‘Causation, Responsibility, and Norms: Re-evaluating Our Norms in the Face of Climate Change’ Commentator: Erik Carlson (Uppsala)
- INSTÄLLT: CLLAM Seminar: Fredrik Stjernberg (Linköping)
Filosofiska institutionen
Seminariet ges vid senare tillfälle Seminarium Datum: fredag 25 mars 2022 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: Aviseras senare Titel: aviseras senare Abstract: aviseras senare
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Victor Moberger & Jonas Olson
Filosofiska institutionen
Moral Error Theory and Fictionalism Seminarium Datum: tisdag 8 mars 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Kommentator: Niklas Möller
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Kit Fine (NYU)
Filosofiska institutionen
Truthmaker Semantics and the Regimentation of Language Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 28 oktober 2021 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: Zoom Abstract I provide an outline of truthmaker semantics and explain how it may be helpful in the regimentation, and not merely the description, of natural language.
- Stockholm-Uppsala seminariet i teoretisk filosofi
Filosofiska institutionen
Sofia Bokros och Miira Tuominen Seminarium Datum: torsdag 25 november 2021 Tid: 10.15 – 13.00 Plats: Engelska Parken, hus 2, lokal K1028, Uppsala Talare Uppsala: Sofia Bokros. Kommentator: Sama Agahi. Talare Stockholm: Miira Tuominen. Kommentator: Ekrem Cetinkaya. Plats: Engelska Parken, hus 2, lokal K1028, Uppsala. Karta
- Workshop on Gratitude
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress
- Inställt: Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Helen Beebee (Leeds)
Filosofiska institutionen
Exceptionalism: Consensus and Belief in Philosophy Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 12 december 2024 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D315 According to me, philosophy aims to figure out which philosophical theories are tenable — as opposed to true — since there may be several theories of the same phenomenon between which there is no way to rationally decide. This position raises a question of ‘exceptionalism’: does philosophy differ from other disciplines, in particular the sciences, in this regard; and, if so, is that a problem? In this talk, I argue that the answer to the first question is ’yes and no’, depending on which other discipline philosophy is being compared to; and the answer to the second question is ’no’. So the threat of exceptionalism isn’t a problem for my view.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Daniel Fogal (NYU)
Filosofiska institutionen
The Nature of Good Reasoning Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 14 november 2024 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D289 Abstract The goal of the talk (based on joint work with Olle Risberg) is to offer a novel account of the nature of good reasoning, both practical and theoretical, where reasoning is understood to be a transition between attitudinal mental states such as beliefs and intentions. The basic idea is that good reasoning is a matter of “following the flow” of normative support between attitudes, whereas bad reasoning is a matter of failing to do so (in one way or another). Call this the support-based account of good reasoning. After introducing and motivating my preferred account of good reasoning, I critically evaluate its main competitors: the reasons-based account and the fittingness-based account. In doing so, I explain how the support-based account captures their strengths while avoiding their weaknesses. I conclude by explaining how the support-based account of good reasoning can explain both what's right and what's wrong with the view of reasons as premises of good reasoning.
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Jessica Pepp (Uppsala)
Filosofiska institutionen
Williamson on the lessons of Kripke’s puzzle Seminarium Datum: torsdag 5 december 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In his recent book, Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy (2024), Timothy Williamson argues that Saul Kripke’s (1979) puzzle about belief reveals no fundamental problem about our concept of belief. Instead, the puzzle shows that certain heuristics we rely upon in making judgments about belief are fallible. In this talk, I will explore some aspects of Williamson’s framework of heuristics as it relates to attitude reports. A general theme will be that Kripke’s puzzle does put pressure on a certain concept of belief as a relation to a proposition and that the appeal to heuristics does not fully release this pressure. As a result, when it comes to the semantics of attitude reports, Williamson’s anti-Fregean view may not be anti-Fregean enough.
- CLLAM Seminarium: Andrew Peet (Umeå)
Filosofiska institutionen
Interpretation as Normative Sense-Making Seminarium Datum: fredag 24 januari 2025 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 Abstract I present a new theory of utterance understanding – the target state of utterance interpretation. According to this theory, utterance understanding is a distinctively normative species of ‘objectual understanding’. Objectual understanding is the epistemic state we occupy when we understand a subject matter such as an event or process. On my view, utterance understanding consists in grasping the normative significance of an utterance qua event. I call the resultant picture of interpretation the ‘normative sense-making view’. The normative sense-making view stands in contrast to what I call the ‘interrogative inquiry’ approach. According to the interrogative inquiry view interpretation is inquiry targeted at the question ‘what does the utterance mean’. On standard pictures of inquiry the interrogative model entails that utterance understanding consists in knowledge of meaning. I will illustrate the normative sense-making view via a comparison to the interrogative view and its accompanying knowledge-based theory of understanding.
- Linguistic and Epistemological Perspectives on Testimony 2025
Filosofiska institutionen
Stockholm University 30–31 January 2025 Konferens Startdatum: torsdag 30 januari 2025 Tid: 10.15 Slutdatum: fredag 31 januari 2025 Tid: 12.30 Plats: Gula Villan, Minerva Room Program Thursday, 30. January: 10:15–10:30 Coffee/Tea 10:30–12:00: Joey Pollock: Testimonial Pessimism 12:00–13:00: Lunch 13:00–14:30: Kristina Rolin: Should research based advice be value neutral? 14:30–14:45: Break 14:45:16:15: Gabriel Contessa: Public Trust in Science and the Justified Trust Dilemma Friday, 31. January 09:00–9:15: Coffee/Teas 09:15:–10:45 Thomas Grundmann: Expert Authority and Thinking for Oneself 10:45–11:00: Break 11:00–12:30: Mikkel Gerken : Science skepticism and science selectivism 12:30–13:30: Lunch
- MAP-seminar: Marion Kathe Godman (Aarhus)
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress
- Högre seminarium i praktiskt filosofi: Justin Snedegar (University of Virginia)
Filosofiska institutionen
Setting Boundaries on Blame Seminarium Datum: tisdag 25 mars 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Blame is a central part of our moral practice, and blaming interactions can be very valuable. But despite the potential for reconciliation, edification, and more, wrongdoers often refuse to engage with blame. Rather than accepting blame, rejecting it by offering an excuse or justification, or taking the opportunity for a joint discussion of the relevant moral issues, they often simply dismiss blame. This raises important ethical questions. Discussions of this response in the literature on the ethics of blame tend to understand it primarily as a challenge to the blamer’s standing or authority to blame. However, wrongdoers dismiss blame for many reasons that do not involve any challenge to the blamer’s standing. I propose that we understand dismissing blame instead as setting a boundary on blame: invoking (supposed) norms that prohibit blaming in the circumstances, even assuming that the recipient is blameworthy. Familiar standing norms are among those that can serve as a wrongdoer’s basis for setting a boundary, but there are others. I argue that this more general conception of dismissing blame better captures the practice. It also brings out important questions in the ethics of blame, and especially the ethics of responding to blame, that go beyond questions of standing.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Lena Wahlberg (Lund)
Filosofiska institutionen
Den Medicinska Rätten och Etiken Seminarium Datum: tisdag 11 februari 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Den Medicinska Rätten och Etiken (410 Kb)
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Samuel Fletcher (Oxford)
Filosofiska institutionen
Models of Dependence Seminarium Datum: torsdag 24 april 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Scientific practice is replete with discussions of one thing, quantity, or phenomena depending on another. Sometimes this is causal dependence, but sometimes it denotes something more metaphysical: how the less fundamental depend on the more fundamental. Yet, unlike causal dependence, there has not been so much explicit formal modeling of dependence. This has led some philosophers to be skeptical that "fundamental" or "primitive" have any special interpretative significance at all. What difference does it make in scientific reasoning, in the end? I answer this question by developing such a formal model for the case of determination and show that it makes a difference to counterfactual reasoning with a theory. I then show how this illuminates a debate in the 2000s in the philosophy of physics about the time-reversal invariance of electromagnetism.