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- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Siska de Baerdemaeker
Department of Philosophy
Dark matter realism reconsidered Seminar Date: Thursday 13 March 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Several authors have recently argued against realism about dark matter due to it being empirically unconfirmed or too conceptually thin. In response, Vaynberg (2024) has convincingly argued in favor of dark matter realism based on Bullet Cluster observations. However, anti-realist concerns about conceptual thinness or future empirical detection may linger. I argue that these can be diffused by distinguishing between two different dark matter concepts, which I call astrophysical dark matter and fundamental dark matter. I submit that anti-realist concerns about future dark matter detection conflate empirical confirmation for fundamental dark matter with empirical confirmation for astrophysical dark matter. I further argue that the resulting realist commitment to astrophysical dark matter is more substantive than dark matter anti-realists recognize: it organizes a structured space of possibilities for fundamental dark matter, and it guide.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Jonathan Shaheen (Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
Tertium non datur: Early Modern Rejections of Middle Distinction Seminar Date: Friday 21 March 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700
- MAP-seminar: Marion Kathe Godman (Aarhus)
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Sanja Särman (Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
Essence, Existence, Being: Spinoza at the Crossroads between Platonism and Eleaticism Workshop Date: Wednesday 11 June 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Justin Snedegar (University of Virginia)
Department of Philosophy
Setting Boundaries on Blame Seminar Date: Tuesday 25 March 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Blame is a central part of our moral practice, and blaming interactions can be very valuable. But despite the potential for reconciliation, edification, and more, wrongdoers often refuse to engage with blame. Rather than accepting blame, rejecting it by offering an excuse or justification, or taking the opportunity for a joint discussion of the relevant moral issues, they often simply dismiss blame. This raises important ethical questions. Discussions of this response in the literature on the ethics of blame tend to understand it primarily as a challenge to the blamer’s standing or authority to blame. However, wrongdoers dismiss blame for many reasons that do not involve any challenge to the blamer’s standing. I propose that we understand dismissing blame instead as setting a boundary on blame: invoking (supposed) norms that prohibit blaming in the circumstances, even assuming that the recipient is blameworthy. Familiar standing norms are among those that can serve as a wrongdoer’s basis for setting a boundary, but there are others. I argue that this more general conception of dismissing blame better captures the practice. It also brings out important questions in the ethics of blame, and especially the ethics of responding to blame, that go beyond questions of standing.
- CLLAM: Stina Björkholm (IFFS)
Department of Philosophy
Fixing Contexts: A Conversational Engineering Project Seminar Date: Friday 28 March 2025 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract Projects in conceptual engineering investigate how our representational devices, or the things they represent, might be defective and therefore ought to be ameliorated, replaced or abolished. A fundamental question in this field concerns what the object of our engineering projects should be. Although much of the literature assumes that concepts are the objects of inquiry (partly by virtue of the label ‘conceptual’ engineering), Cappelen’s influential work within the field introduces three options: words, the world, or concepts. The purpose of this paper is to propose a fourth option which breaks away from the tradition of focusing on individual representational devices or the things that they represent. I will argue that engineering projects can, and often should, be about the context of conversations. I thus propose that a project of conversational engineering is well-worth exploring – thereby aiming to establish a systematic study of what it is for a context to be defective, whether such defects should be ameliorated, and if so how to do so. I propose that contexts can be both internally and externally defective, where the former includes discrepancies between what interlocutors presuppose and the latter includes cases when interlocutors make false, immoral, or irrational presuppositions.
- PhD defence: Andrea Asker Svedberg
Department of Philosophy
Puzzles of Harm: Essays on Collective Action, Death, and Non-Existence Thesis defence Date: Thursday 5 June 2025 Time: 13.00 – 15.00 Location: Hörsal 9. Södra huset D Opponent: Julia Nefsky (University of Toronto)
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Erik Åkerlund (Stockholm/Newman)
Department of Philosophy
John Mair's Political Philosophy Workshop Date: Friday 25 April 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA Zoom link
- Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy: Alice Damirijian
Department of Philosophy
Alice Damirijan presents her kappa Seminar Date: Thursday 8 May 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 The Ins and Outs of Meaning. Essays on Polysemy, Proper Names and Slang
- The Ethics of Deception
Department of Philosophy
More information TBA Workshop Start date: Wednesday 26 November 2025 Time: 09.00 End date: Thursday 27 November 2025 Time: 18.00 Location: Gula Villan
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Stina Björkholm & Mats Ingelström (IFFS)
Department of Philosophy
Does Contextualism about ‘Well-Being’ Challenge a Philosophical Paradigm? Seminar Date: Tuesday 20 May 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The concept of well-being plays a central role across a range of contexts, from empirical sciences and ethical theory to everyday discourse. Alexandrova has argued that the diversity of well-being discourse supports a semantic contextualist view – positing that the meaning of ‘well-being’ shifts depending on the context of use. This thesis has been taken to challenge a traditional philosophical way of theorizing about well-being. In this paper, we challenge that contention. We begin by outlining the contextualist approach and presenting reasons to take it seriously as a semantic thesis. We then address three ways of spelling out how this view might be at odds with a philosophical paradigm, demonstrating that neither succeeds in establishing that there is a genuine conflict. Our analysis suggests that recognizing the contextual nature of well-being discourse does not entail that philosophy of well-being is undermined or significantly limits the relevance of the field.
- Higher Seminar in Philosophy of Science: Gábor Szabó Hofer (Budapest)
Department of Philosophy
Operational equivalence and causal structure Seminar Date: Friday 16 May 2025 Time: 15.15 – 17.00 Location: D700 Abstract In this talk, I will explore some consequences of abandoning operational equivalence in quantum mechanics. Two measurements are operationally equivalent if they yield the same distribution of outcomes in every quantum state and hence are represented by the same operator. I will show that the ontological models for quantum mechanics — and more generally, for any operational theory — sensitively depend on which measurement we choose from the class of operationally equivalent measurements. To this goal, I will take first three examples — a classical theory, the EPR-Bell scenario and the Popescu-Rochrlich box; then realize each example by two different operational theories — one with a trivial and another with a non-trivial compatibility structure; and finally compare the ontological models for the different theories with respect to their causal structure, contextuality, and fine-tuning.
- Optimism: A Duty? | Erik Angner | TEDxKI
Department of Philosophy
Professor Erik Agner Optimism: A Duty? | Erik Angner | TEDxKI
- Higher Seminar in Philosophy of Science: Jeremy Butterfield (Oxford) & Sebastian de Haro (Amsterdam)
Department of Philosophy
Title: What are dualities in physics? A geometric view Seminar Date: Thursday 11 September 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In the last forty years, dualities have been a major topic of research and a driving force behind much of the work in theoretical physics, especially high-energy physics. In this talk, we will first explain what dualities are and give a schema for them, together with some examples. We will then go on to discuss one of the questions in the philosophy of science that dualities bear on, namely the formulation of scientific theories. We will argue that dualities, and their generalizations, quasi-dualities, suggest a generalization of the semantic conception of theories. On the traditional semantic conception, a physical theory is a collection of models. We will argue that dualities and quasi-dualities suggest that there is topological and geometric structure on the set of models, and we will make a proposal for a specific "shape" that physical theories take, which generalizes and subsumes the semantic conception.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Christopher Lee Kutz (Berkeley)
Department of Philosophy
Jazz not Math: Education and Incarceration Lecture Date: Thursday 18 September 2025 Time: 15.00 – 16.30 Location: D289 Abstract Professor Kutz will discuss his new book, Publics in Action (Oxford, 2025). The book makes the claim that we should center liberal-democratic political philosophy around the idea of an "active public." This means understanding the public as the agent and not the passive beneficiary of state action. The book elaborates a metaphor of active publics as a kind of improvisatory music ensemble, responding to traditional patterns and taking cues from an embracing audience, while ringing changes on those standards. It does so through an innovative method of combining abstract philosophical argument with detailed case studies of the publics, and public institutions in liberal democracies around the world. In this talk, I'll look at two different case studies: public education and public safety. I will argue that we can understand the successes and failures of different models (in the US, France, and Scandinavia) by how active the imagined "publics" behind these institutions can be.
- Dissertation: Merajuddin Khan Oidermaa
Department of Philosophy
Academic dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy at Stockholm University to be publicly defended on Friday 19 September 2025 at 10.00 in Hörsal 4, Hus B, Opponent: Christopher Lee Kutz (UC Berkeley Law) Thesis defence Date: Friday 19 September 2025 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: Location: Auditorium: 4, Hus B Universitetsvägen 10B University to be publicly defended on Friday 19 September 2025 at 10.00 in Hörsal 4, Hus B,
- Dissertation: Alice Damirjian
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Carina Fourie (University of Washington)
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Date: Tuesday 16 December 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Stefan Gosepath (Freie University Berlin)
Department of Philosophy
Why is inheritance unfair? Seminar Date: Tuesday 7 October 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In this seminar, Gosepath addresses the fundamental question of whether the widespread social and legal practice of inheritance and bequests is fair. Gosepath argues that inheritance and bequests are unfair because they give beneficiaries an unfair advantage while disadvantaging society. To justify this view, Gosepath first presents the most important justice-based arguments against inheritance. He will then defend these positions against the most significant normative arguments in favor of inheritance, such as those related to property rights, comparisons with gifts, the value of family, and economic arguments.
- CLLAM seminar: Joey Pollock (Oslo)
Department of Philosophy
Global testimonial pessimism and the division of epistemic labour Abstract In the epistemology of testimony, there is a strong presumption in favour of optimism: the evident utility of our testimonial practices is taken to support the idea that individual testimonial exchanges often succeed in communicating knowledge. This optimism is central to an image of knowledge as a communal resource, often produced through a division of epistemic labour that involves collaboration between diverse specialists, yet accessible to the broader community regardless of expertise. In the literature, the denial of optimism (except within some local domains) is often quickly dismissed as a form of scepticism. In this talk, my aim is to defend the idea that global testimonial pessimism is a reasonable, non-sceptical position to hold. I will argue that we can provide a satisfactory explanation of the general utility of our testimonial practices, while maintaining that the beliefs that we form through testimony are often false, unreliable, and based on serious misinterpretations of a speaker’s testimony. For the pessimist, our epistemic reliance on others is critical, not because it enables us to share knowledge within a community, but precisely because knowledge is so hard to share. Zoom link