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- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Ruth Chang (Oxford)
Department of Philosophy
Artificial Intelligence and Value Alignment Lecture Date: Thursday 30 October 2025 Time: 16.00 – 17.30 Location: D289 Abstract What might philosophers contribute to the 'value alignment' problem in artificial intelligence? This is the problem, roughly speaking, of aligning machine outputs with human values. In this talk, I outline a conceptual framework for making progress on this problem, diagnosing ways in which I believe technologists who confront the problem go wrong and offering a proposal for designing machine systems that I argue is a sine qua non for machine-human value alignment.
- Mike Schneider (University of Missouri)
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Higher Seminar in the Philosophy of Science: Orri Stefánsson and Joe Roussos (IFFS/SU)
Department of Philosophy
Continuity, Catastrophic Risk, and Severe Uncertainty The Continuity axiom implies that no catastrophe is so bad that one should not be willing to accept a gamble that might result in that catastrophe, as long as the gamble is sufficiently likely to instead result in some improvement on one's status quo. The axiom is implied by most normative decision theories, including risk averse alternatives to expected utility theory. We argue that Continuity should be abandoned when evaluating policy options where (a) there is sufficient uncertainty about the correct utilities and probabilities, and (b) some options could be catastrophic. However, unlike Bartha and DesRoches (2021) and Steel and Bartha (2023), we argue that there are examples of policy evaluation where although the outcome could be catastrophic, the relevant probabilities are sufficiently well-grounded such that Continuity should be satisfied.
- History of Philosophy seminar: Mikko Yrjönsuuri (Jyväskylä)
Department of Philosophy
The Good and the Bad in Democracy: Mill on Tocqueville Seminar Date: Friday 24 October 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: TBA
- Higher seminar in Philosophy of Science Jim Brown: (University of Toronto)
Department of Philosophy
More Things in Heaven Seminar Date: Wednesday 22 October 2025 Time: 13.00 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract I begin with the assumption of realism or Platonism in mathematics. This talk is about the epistemology of mathematics. The question is what are legitimate, best methods for learning mathematical truths. I introduced a thought experiment with the aim of showing that mathematics should not be dominated by traditional proof as the one and only source of knowledge. Much of the talk will be devoted to explaining this, giving examples, and drawing out some of the major consequences. The talk will be largely non-technical, but should be of interest to working mathematicians who have an interest in mathematical methodology. If there is time, one technical example will be given involving through continuum hypothesis. The talk is based on a book in progress with the tentative title: More Things in Heaven: Mathematics, Ethics, and the Platonic Imagination
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Simon Allzén
Department of Philosophy
Dark Matter Realism: How Referential Semantics Restricts Realism in Contemporary Fundamental Physics Seminar Date: Thursday 6 November 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Philosophers increasingly treat semantics as decisive for realism about dark matter. In this talk, I consider a recent proposal from Vaynberg (2024) anchored in the causal- descriptive theory of reference from Psillos (1999, 2012). I argue that the application of Psillos' general scientific realist framework in the local context of dark matter is misguided, partly because of the overlooked metaphysical commitments underpinning causal-descriptivism, and partly because the extension of 'dark matter' on this account includes entities we do not currently consider to be dark matter, and exclude entities that we currently consider could be dark matter. An upshot of this, I argue, is that the discord between scientific realism and dark matter should be regarded endemic in contexts where empirical evidence is scarce: the semantic details required by the proposed scientific realism is dependent on canonical empirical confirmation, because it is against that background that scientific realism has been formulated and developed.
- Crispin Wright (Stirling) Zoom only!
Department of Philosophy
Kripke, Quine and the 'Adoption Problem' Seminar Date: Friday 28 November 2025 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: Zoom Abstract We'll focus on the "Two Dogmas" philosophy of logic and on Kripke’s reported claim in his 70s seminar that Quine’s position depends upon confusing logical belief and logical inferential practice. We’ll consider what Kripke seems to have had in mind as an adoption problem for Quine, note that it depends on a resistible assumption, and formulate a different “adoption problem” that finesses the need for that assumption. Then we’ll consider more generally the “anti-exceptionalism” strand in Quine about logic and offer arguments why it is unsustainable. There is a handout for this talk. If you would like to get it before the talk, please contact Kathrin ( kathrin.gluer@philosophy.su.se ). Zoom link: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/8938261027?omn=67736389403
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Katharina Berndt (Stockholm University)
Department of Philosophy
This paper explores some of the promises and pitfalls of #MeToo, through Cristina Bicchieri’s game-theoretical framework of social norms and studies on norm-nudging. Seminar Date: Tuesday 2 December 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract harassment. Suppose each male employee comes to prefer to follow this rule, on condition that he expects his colleagues both to follow it (empirical expectation) and to believe he in turn should follow it (normative expectation). The rule then functions as a social norm; it is upheld as long as the male employees’ (empirical and normative) expectations are upheld. Arguably, one of the functions of #MeToo was to make salient such a non-harassment norm. However, when norm violations – some male employees “slip back” into old macho habits – are observed by other male employees, their empirical expectations may falter. Moreover, when such violations are not met with protest, their normative expectations may falter. The social norm risks breaking down, bringing back the toxic work-environment. Yet protesting is costly for victims and bystanders, who are hence caught in a collective dilemma of their own. This dilemma can be solved, analogously, by a speaking-up norm. Arguably, another function of #MeToo was to make salient this norm, too. This game-theoretic analysis of the dynamics of #MeToo can be further enhanced by considering Bicchieri’s recent findings on norm-nudging: influencing expectations via (general) social information. By communicating widespread condemnation of sexual harassment, campaigns like #MeToo raise normative expectations of non-harassment. However, by simultaneously communicating frequent failures of norm-following, empirical expectations may be lowered. Yet when there is incongruence between normative and empirical information, studies show that the latter trumps the former. In other words, social information transmitted under hashtags like #YesAllWomen carries a risk of undermining the non-harassment norm. This analysis throws new light on criticised hashtags like #NotAllMen: by emphasising norm-following, they may counteract the incongruence, thereby contributing to the reinforcement of the norm. Further, regarding the speaking-up norm, a norm-nudging perspective reveals an interesting contrast: by showcasing widespread condemnation of sexual harassment, #MeToo raises empirical expectations of speaking up. However, the widespread backlash that followed (defamation suits, public victim shaming) communicated condemnation of speaking-up, lowering normative expectations. Given this incongruence, one should again expect empirical information to trump normative information. However, studies suggest that there may be another mechanism in play: when social information conflicts with people's self-interest, they may exploit any “wiggle-room” in the information, interpreting the social norm as weak, to avoid conforming to it. This analysis suggests that the backlash against #MeToo should not (only) be understood as raising the costs of speaking up, but (also) as undermining the speaking-up norm itself. The paper concludes by discussing some upshots of these analyses for addressing the persistent problem of sexual harassment.
- CANCELLED: CLLAM Seminar: Fredrik Stjernberg (Linköping)
Department of Philosophy
The seminar postponed to a later occasion TBA Seminar Date: Friday 25 March 2022 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: TBA Title: TBA Abstract: TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop/CLLAM
Department of Philosophy
Craige Roberts (Ohio State/Barnard College, NY) & Barbara Partee (UMass, Amherst) Workshop Date: Wednesday 13 November 2024 Time: 10.00 – 15.30 Location: Lärosal 14, Albano (Hus 2, zon H, våning 2) Special double-session in connection with the Rolf Schock Prize 2024: Craige Roberts (Ohio State/Barnard College, NY) & Barbara Partee (UMass, Amherst) 10.00-12.00 Craige Roberts (Ohio State/Barnard College, NY) Language and Logic: Ideas and Controversies in the History of Formal SemantiCompetence Ideas and Controversies in the History of Formal Semantics 13.30-15.30 Barbara Partee (UMass, Amherst): Attitudes de re: Semantics and dynamic pragmatics Map Venue ABSTRACTS Language and Logic: Ideas and Controversies in the History of Formal Semantics “Semantics” can mean quite different things in different contexts. There are many reasons to be interested in meaning, and it can be studied from many perspectives. The history of formal semantics over the last 60 years is a story of collaboration among linguists, logicians, and philosophers. One central figure was the logician and philosopher Richard Montague, a student of Tarski’s, whose seminal works on the formal semantics of natural language date from the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. Starting in the 1970s, philosophers and especially linguists worked to integrate Montague’s semantics with Chomskyan syntax. Substantive progress was rapid and has been successful, but there were foundational questions that have remained unresolved. While Chomsky and most linguists view linguistics as a cognitive science, the Fregean tradition in which Montague worked is strongly anti-psychologistic. Linguists who do formal semantics have generally also seen themselves as contributing to cognitive science, but this seems to require, at least implicitly, some rethinking of the traditional Chomskyan notion of “the competence of the native speaker”. The history of these foundational issues in formal semantics, including the question of whether meanings are “in the head” suggests, following work of the philosophers Robert Stalnaker and Tyler Burge, that semantics, unlike syntax, needs a less “narrowly psychological” view of what it is to know a language. Attitudes de re: Semantics and dynamic pragmatics I argue that de re interpretations arise quite regularly as a result of two types of presuppositions associated with utterances wherein a definite NP (pronoun, definite or demonstrative description, or proper name) occurs in the complement of an attitude predicate or some other intensional context. The first (similar to that in Maier 2019) is an anaphoric presupposition triggered by the use of the definite NP (Heim 1982, 1983, 1992). Though the NP remains in situ in the embedded clause, non-local satisfaction of this presupposition results in truth conditional effects akin to those that would result from giving the NP semantic wide scope over the attitude: presuppositionally triggered wide pseudo-scope. In the resulting interpretation, the triggering definite’s contribution to semantic content is simply the res which is the actual denotation of the wider scope antecedent of the definite, yielding interpretation de re without syntactically unmotivated NP movement at LF (Keshet & Schwarz 2019) or structured propositions (von Stechow & Cresswell 1982). The second presupposition is a background condition entailed by any de re attitude attribution: Epistemically limited humans can never know a res directly or completely, but only under some guise or other with which they are acquainted. So an agent can only hold an attitude toward a res under some guise reflecting their acquaintance. This captures the acquaintance requirement of Kaplan (1986), but here arises as an ontological precondition on the existence of a de re attitude, a non-anaphoric presupposition (Roberts & Simons 2024). Thus, acquaintance under a guise is an entailment of the triggering attitude in conjunction with the wide pseudo-scope of the definite, arising from our world knowledge of the corresponding type of situation. To model it, there is no need to stipulate silent existential operators or concept generators at LF, avoiding Lederman’s (2021) problems for Percus & Sauerland (2003). This account is straightforwardly realized using independently motivated tools in a dynamic pragmatics: presuppositionally triggered pseudo-scope for definites (including names), and the notion of presuppositional background content. Drawing on Aloní (2001), the notion of a guise is modeled as an individual concept in a conceptual cover, thereby inheriting her account’s advantages over previous accounts of the de re . In a de re attribution, the nature of the guise under which the agent is acquainted with the res is not semantically specified; the semantic content of the attitude report merely entails that there is some counterpart relation that maps the actual res to entities in the agent’s belief worlds which have the properties predicated of the embedded definite NP. But the nature of the entailed guise is often pragmatically evident from context, or even explicitly given by an appositive (Soames 2002). When this is the case, we can contextually enrich the meaning of the utterance by adding the presumption that the entailed guise of acquaintance is the particular contextually retrieved guise. Unlike with Aloní’s perspective shifting operator ℘ or Stalnaker’s (1979) diagonalization, on the present account we needn’t shift the NP’s semantic interpretation (Gluer & Pagin 2006, 2012); context merely pragmatically enriches that interpretation to make the presupposed guise more specific. All this sheds new light on a number of classic problems pertaining to the de re (Frege 1892; Quine 1956,1961; Geach 1967, etc.). Moreover, with the addition of centered worlds (Lewis 1979), the theory straightforwardly extends to account for de se interpretations, while avoiding problems of the de se, pointed out by Ninan (2016), for the classical doctrine of propositions. Rolf Schock Prize 2024
- History Seminar: Sara Heinämaa (University of Jyväskylä) and Felix Maier (Stockholm University)
Department of Philosophy
Erôs , Love and Desire: Plotinus and Husserl on Loving as an Activity
- Higher seminar in Philosophy of Science: Dunja Šešelja (Ruhr University Bochum)
Department of Philosophy
Title and abstract tba
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Richard Arneson (UC San Diego)
Department of Philosophy
Desert-Catering Prioritarianism: Amended, Extended, and Defended Abstract TBA
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Øystein Linnebo (Oslo)
Department of Philosophy
Constructional Hylomorphism (joint work with Riccardo Baratella)
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Ana Maria Mora Marquez (Lund)
Department of Philosophy
Medieval Aristotelian Logic: the syllogism according to Radulphus Brito (1290s) and John Buridan (1320s)
- Nature and Normativity in Fourteenth- to Seventeenth-century Thought
Department of Philosophy
More info tba
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Robert B. Talisse (Vanderbilt University)
Department of Philosophy
The Trouble with Civility
- Higher Seminar in Philosophy of Science: Subrena E. Smith (Linköping Universi)
Department of Philosophy
Title and abstract TBA
- Anandi Hattiangadi–On the Normativity of Meaning, Ought, and Scientific Realism
Department of Philosophy
- About the Phd Program and Placement Records
Department of Philosophy