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- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Matti Eklund (Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
Truth and Natural Language Metaphysics Lecture Date: Thursday 13 February 2025 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: B413 Abstract Some linguists and philosophers are engaged in a project of doing natural language metaphysics (”natural language ontology”). The underlying idea is that languages can and do have metaphysical assumptions somehow built into them. I discuss some problems with this idea, and some ways of responding to these problems.
- Simon Knutssons slutseminarium
Department of Philosophy
Opponent: Orri Stefansson Seminar Date: Tuesday 19 November 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Tore Vincents Olsen (Aarhus)
Department of Philosophy
The role of civil servants under democratic backsliding Seminar Date: Tuesday 17 December 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The article explores the role of civil servants under democratic backsliding, a process in which democratic institutions and rights are gradually undermined. It delves into the quandary faced by civil servants when a government, initially democratically elected, initiates policies that threaten democracy itself. Drawing on the literature on democratic backsliding, the article discusses two competing conceptions of the civil servant’s role: the instrumental and the value-based. The instrumental conception posits that civil servants should neutrally implement the directives of their superiors, almost regardless of the political implications. Conversely, the value-based conception argues that civil servants have a fundamental duty to uphold the state’s constitutional identity and values, defending these against any efforts to undermine them even those of their political superiors. This is particularly pertinent when changes include constitutional amendments or changes in basic political and legal structures, which carry signs of democratic backsliding. A main contention is that civil servants have a special obligation to resist democratic backsliding as their existence as civil servants hinges on valid laws, which can only result from democratic processes. Various strategies that civil servants might employ to this end are examined, suggesting that there might be a duty for civil servants to organize against backsliding governments consolidating their power while dismantling democracy. In conclusion, the article emphasizes the proactive and critical role that civil servants must play not only in defending democracy but also in securing their own survival as legitimate and necessary components of the political system. SCGG
- Cancelled: Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Helen Beebee (Leeds)
Department of Philosophy
Exceptionalism: Consensus and Belief in Philosophy Lecture Date: Thursday 12 December 2024 Time: 12.00 – 12.45 Location: D315 Abstract According to me, philosophy aims to figure out which philosophical theories are tenable — as opposed to true — since there may be several theories of the same phenomenon between which there is no way to rationally decide. This position raises a question of ‘exceptionalism’: does philosophy differ from other disciplines, in particular the sciences, in this regard; and, if so, is that a problem? In this talk, I argue that the answer to the first question is ’yes and no’, depending on which other discipline philosophy is being compared to; and the answer to the second question is ’no’. So the threat of exceptionalism isn’t a problem for my view.
- Simon Knutssons' final PhD seminar: The Weight of Evil
Department of Philosophy
Opponent: Orri Stefansson Seminar Date: Tuesday 19 November 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700
- Higher Seminar in Philosophy of Science: Marie Gueguen (University of Rennes 1)
Department of Philosophy
If you don't ask, the answer is already no - Modeling strategies in high uncertainty contexts Seminar Date: Thursday 28 November 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Abstract: In this talk, I analyze how different modeling strategies have been put to work in the computational models used to handle very complex targets in astrophysics and astrochemistry. The field of computational astronomy, for instance, has been shaped by a diversity of approaches, from first very simple structure simulations in the 1970's, numerical experiments performed by Efstathiou or Mellott , idealized scenario or semi-analytic models, to high resolution hydrodynamical simulations. My goal in this talk is to track the epistemological commitments and constraints of each of this strategy, and to show how the race to ever-more comprehensive models, in part encouraged by the funding landscape, has tend to blur what kind of questions can be addressed by each of these strategies. On this basis, I will distinguish predictive approaches from exploratory approaches for modeling complex systems and argue that many disagreements about how to solve discrepancies between observations and model's outputs actually stems from misinterpreting the kind of conclusions that the most complex and realistic simulations allow to draw. I will wrap up this presentation by highlighting how these considerations can inform the current debate about machine-learning techniques and their legitimate use.
- Cancelled: Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Alejandra Mancilla (Oslo University)
Department of Philosophy
Cancelled: From sovereignty to guardianship: Governing Antarctica, Governing the World Seminar Date: Tuesday 3 December 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The twin crises of climate change and biodiversity loss have shown humans our power to intervene and modify nature in ways that can end up threatening our own existence on earth. At the same time, and despite attempts to find technological fixes, they have shown us our limited knowledge and power to control the planet’s processes and systems. It is no accident that scientists who have theorized the need to remain within our “planetary boundaries” are advocating a new form of governance for the “planetary commons”; and that researchers mapping the world’s most valuable ecoregions are proposing the creation of a “Global Safety Net” of protected areas spanning across national jurisdictions. In this book, I look to Antarctica as an inspiration for creating modes of territorial governance that respond more adequately to these environmental challenges. Despite its colonial origins, for over 60 years the Antarctic Treaty has ruled over the continent preserving peace, science and—since the signature of the Environmental Protocol in 1991—the protection of the environment. Neither under the national regime of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources nor under the international regime of Common Heritage of Mankind , Antarctica has been jointly governed by a group of states with a focus on protection rather than exploitation of the nonhuman natural world. I argue that this regime of Joint Guardianship where business has not been conducted as usual and where states have shown restraint should serve as a blueprint for the governance of places beyond Antarctica, like ecoregions and arguably also the oceans and outer space. Having said this, I argue that what I call the “Antarctic political imagination” has not been wholly impervious to three biases that also inform international law more generally: methodological anthropocentrism, methodological extractivism, and methodological nationalism. I find in the Environmental Protocol some of the conceptual resources needed to move beyond them and suggest that, if reinterpreted along these lines, this could result in the first political system at the global level where not just humans, but also nonhumans are represented, and where the representatives are not just states, but also non-state actors. To conclude, I look at the “paradox of protection” that affects Antarctica as well as other Global Systemic Resources; namely, that to protect them it is not enough to act in them, but also beyond them. Unsurprisingly, the take-home message is that governing Antarctica requires to some extent governing the world … and vice versa.
- Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philsophy: Mikael Janvid
Department of Philosophy
Anti-Social Black Metal Epistemology: Forming Beliefs without Trust in an Evil Environment Seminar Date: Thursday 15 May 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract A grim picture of human existence and society is painted in the Norwegian Black Metal band Gorgoroth’s masterpiece album Quantos Possunt Ad Satanitatem Trahunt from 2009. Contrary to what has been preached to us and we have been indoctrinated in, Evil rules the world! Yet by embracing this dark outlook, the struggling subject gains a privileged epistemic insight freeing themselves from the hypocrisies of religion, political ideologies and other delusions. This highly distrustful outlook challenges the central role trust is claimed to play by current influential views in social epistemology of testimony where trust in fellow humans is considered essential for our epistemic practices. This paper starts out from the perspective conveyed by the lyrics in this album, and others in the same genre, to explore just how meager of a social basis testimony can survive on. How would such a distrustful seeker of truth go about forming their beliefs? The central theme to be investigated is what role trust, as well as its contrary, plays in testimonial exchange. The paper aims to find out how such a subject could still succeed epistemically while violating accounts of trust presented in the recent debate. Lastly the question is posed whether the reader knows they are not in this dire predicament.
- Higher Seminar in Philosophy of Science: Margherita Harris (SOCRATES Centre at Leibniz University)
Department of Philosophy
From Inductive Risk to Quantifauxcation Seminar Date: Thursday 20 February 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Debates on the role of values in science have remained surprisingly disconnected from debates on the role of probability in inference—the so-called “statistics wars.” This talk bridges these debates by arguing that the uncritical acceptance of probabilism—the view that probability's role is to quantify degrees of belief or support—often leads philosophers to conflate value-based concerns with deeper epistemic issues. Revisiting the Rudner–Jeffrey debate, I show how differing conceptions of probability shape the argument from inductive risk and why this matters for broader debates on values in science. I then introduce quantifauxation (Stark, 2021) and disguised quantifauxation to illustrate how probabilistic methods can obscure rather than clarify uncertainty. I conclude that distinguishing methodological concerns from value-based ones is essential for preserving the epistemic integrity of scientific inference.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Karsten Klint Jensen (IFFS)
Department of Philosophy
Moral Solutions to Many-person Prisoners Dilemmas – The Problem of Large-Scale Coordination Seminar Date: Tuesday 25 February 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit presents a number of Many-person Prisoner’s Dilemmas and explores how they can be solved. Of particular interest are Contributors’ Dilemmas, where each member of some group has a choice between two acts: contributing to some public good (available for all regardless of whether they have contributed or not), or defecting. The dilemma is this: even if someone contributes more to the good than what he pays, he may not himself benefit enough from his contribution to repay his costs. Thus, it may be better for each not to contribute; and this may be so whatever others do. But if fewer contribute, less good is available for each; and if none contribute, no good will be produced. Many environmental problems appear to pose this dilemma, climate change being one of them. A solution would be to get most, or better, everyone to contribute. Standard solutions are political; the choice situation is changed, such that the self-interested behavior no longer is the best option for each (by installing economic incentives) or becomes impossible (by legal prohibitions). However, Parfit suggests that moral solutions, where everyone’s motivation is changed into a suitable moral one, often would be better than political solutions, because unlike these they do not need enforcement and can thus be more effective; and in some cases, they may be the only attainable solutions. Parfit is particularly interested in the solution where everyone becomes more altruistic, i.e. choose out of concern for the good of everyone. If everyone became sufficiently altruistic, each would choose to contribute to the public good, he claims. But what exactly does an altruistic solution look like, and how could it be brought about? Parfit does not say much about that. The aim of this paper is to answer these questions. I shall proceed using climate change as an example. The public good is here avoidance of harm, and the solution of the dilemma, political as well as moral, must consist in achieving some form of self-restraint concerning activities that involve emissions of greenhouse gases.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Matti Eklund (Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Lecture Date: Thursday 13 February 2025 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Abstract TBA
- CLLAM Seminar: Andrew Peet (Umeå)
Department of Philosophy
Interpretation as Normative Sense-Making Seminar Date: Friday 24 January 2025 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract I present a new theory of utterance understanding – the target state of utterance interpretation. According to this theory, utterance understanding is a distinctively normative species of ‘objectual understanding’. Objectual understanding is the epistemic state we occupy when we understand a subject matter such as an event or process. On my view, utterance understanding consists in grasping the normative significance of an utterance qua event. I call the resultant picture of interpretation the ‘normative sense-making view’. The normative sense-making view stands in contrast to what I call the ‘interrogative inquiry’ approach. According to the interrogative inquiry view interpretation is inquiry targeted at the question ‘what does the utterance mean’. On standard pictures of inquiry the interrogative model entails that utterance understanding consists in knowledge of meaning. I will illustrate the normative sense-making view via a comparison to the interrogative view and its accompanying knowledge-based theory of understanding.
- CLLAM: Joulia Smortchkova: Grenoble
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Seminar Date: Friday 4 April 2025 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy: Åsa Carlson
Department of Philosophy
Hume on Identity of Objects: A Medium betwixt Unity and Number Seminar Date: Thursday 6 February 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: 700D Abstract In book one, section four of A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume aims at explaining why we – the vulgar – believe in the existence of external bodies: “What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?” (T 1.4.2.1). Such beliefs entail beliefs in bodies that continue to exist when unperceived, which in turn entail the idea of identity. Although Hume’s conception of identity comes closest to what we consider as numerical identity, he conceives of identity in the sense of x is identical to x as uninformative: It conveys the idea of unity. Several objects convey the idea of number, no matter how resembling they are, and so does adding a time difference to the identity statement. Either we have to think of x at both points of time at once, or in succession. Hence, on the one hand, to avoid unity there must be some difference between x and the idea with which x is identical. On the other hand, the introduction of a difference entails many objects. Hume concludes that he needs an impossible medium, “Betwixt unity and number” (T 1.4.2.28). Using a fiction, he solves the problem. But how, exactly, to understand his solution? What, exactly, is the fiction? In opposition to Donald Baxter’s influential interpretation of identity as a switching between unity and number, I argue that Hume defines identity as unity through time, and thereby formulates an idea that substitutes a medium between unity and number. This idea is a medium between epistemic attitudes: Between certainty (“unity”) and uncertainty (“number”) there is potential uncertainty (“identity”). When we know that x at t1 is the same object as x as at t2, but could have been unsure about it, then the proposition is informative and the idea of identity representable: x
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Orri Stefánsson & Mac Willners
Department of Philosophy
Does Global Justice Demand Solar Geoengineering? Seminar Date: Tuesday 28 January 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Does Global Justice Demand Solar Geoengineering? (412 Kb)
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Marion Kathe Godman (Aarhus)
Department of Philosophy
Inductive potential? Human categories in the cross-roads Lecture Date: Thursday 3 April 2025 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: B497 Abstract When we study and learn about people and especially by the use of statistical bureaus (e.g. Statistics Sweden/SCB) and social science we face a choice about what categories to use for data collection: should we for example collect data in terms of people’s ethnic or in terms of immigrant origin? I have previously argued (2020) that one important criterion is to choose categories which display inductive potential, i.e. they license multiple inductive generalizations over members of a group that can be used for comparisons between groups. Moreover, I argued that a prominent reason for social categories (or kinds of people) displaying such inductive potential is that they are historical kinds (Millikan 2000). Here I respond to some worries that have and can be raised about applying such criteria to categories for research and data collection. In the process I make the notion of inductive potential more precise and also discuss its application to some commonly used categories of social class.
- CLLAM: Joulia Smortchkova (Grenoble)
Department of Philosophy
First impressions and affect Workshop Date: Friday 4 April 2025 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract It has been recently argued that there is an affective aspect to perception. The intuitive claim is that, alongside sensory properties such as shapes, colors, orientations, we also perceptually experience affective valences. The relation between perception and affective valence is debated, however. Is affective valence a phenomenal quality of perceptual experiences? Is it represented in perceptual content on the model of the rich perceptual content view? Or is it rather a distinctive form of perceptual attitude? In my talk I will use the case study of first impressions, the phenomenon of vividly experiencing something for the first time, to suggest that the affective aspect of perception might be multi-level: both as a feature of perceptual experience and as a metacognitive feature of perceptual processing. The multi-level hypothesis can explain cases of affectively conflicting perceptual first impressions as well as how the affective tone of perception changes over time.
- CLLAM Seminar: Hana Möller Kalpak
Department of Philosophy
Decision rules for imprecise Lockeans Seminar Date: Friday 4 March 2022 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: Zoom https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/8938261027 Abstract: According to the Lockean thesis, rational belief corresponds to rational credence above a certain threshold. A version of the Lockean thesis can be derived from the assumption that rational agents maximize the expected utility of their beliefs, given their credences (Hempel 1962, Easwaran 2016, Dorst 2019). This talk presents parts of work aimed at generalizing the utility-theoretic Lockean thesis to cases where rational credences are imprecise, in the sense of being given by a set of (probability) functions (overview: Bradley, 2019). In these cases, beliefs are not guaranteed the type of precise expectation values required for maximization, but must be deemed rational on the grounds of conforming to some more general decision rule. I will formulate some basic desiderata for such decision rules, and use this in an assessment of two well-known rules from imprecise decision theory: E-admissbility (Levi 1980) and Gamma-maximin (Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989). I will also consider the prospects of using an aggregative decision rule (classic majority voting), after showing that the domains of the relevant decision problems are Arrow consistent.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Felix Lambrecht (LMU Munich)
Department of Philosophy
Diachronic Group Responsibility Seminar Date: Wednesday 9 April 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Most people endorse some form of the Diachronic Group Responsibility Thesis: Group agents can be responsible for actions committed in the past. For instance, contemporary Germany is responsible for the wrongs of the Holocaust. Contemporary Canada is responsible colonial wrongs committed in the 19th century. Contemporary Chiquita Brands International is responsible for brutality on its banana plantations in the 20th century. However, in many cases, the properties of most of the groups we hold responsible for past wrongs have changed since the time at which the wrongs occurred. For instance, nearly every property of Germany (members, territory, government structure, etc...) has undergone significant change since the time it committed its wrongs during World War Two. So, to vindicate the Diachronic Group Responsibility Thesis, we need an account that explains why a present group agent can be responsible for an action committed in the past by a past agent that appears not to share any properties with the present group agent. In this paper I provide such an account. On the account I construct, group G2 at t2 is responsible for an action committed by G1 at t1 if G2 does an action which commits G2 to being bound by G1’s actions. Call this the Commitment Account of Diachronic Group Responsibility. I argue that the Commitment Account is superior to the alternative accounts on offer by demonstrating that it better captures our intuitive judgments about cases and better coheres with accounts of group agency more broadly.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Olle Torpman (IFFS)
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Seminar Date: Tuesday 15 April 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA