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- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Sebastian Enqvist
Department of Philosophy
Extracting Herbrand disjunctions from cyclic proofs Event Date: Thursday 20 October 2022 Time: 16.15 – 18.00 Location: D289 Abstract Herbrand's theorem provides constructive content to classical logic. Given an existentially quantified and provable statement, the theorem provides a valid finite disjunction of formulas substituting ground terms for the bound variables. This can be seen as a weaker form of the existence property for intuitionistic logic, in which for any provable existentially quantified formula one can find concrete witnesses for the bound variables. The standard proof of Herbrand's theorem uses cut elimination. In recent work by Afshari, Hetzl and Leigh, a direct interpretation of classical sequent calculus proofs in terms of so-called higher-order recursion schemes is given, in order to directly compute a Herbrand disjunction from a given proof (cut-free or not). This can be seen as a model of the computational content of a proof in classical sequent calculus. As a model of computation, it is however rather weak in the sense that no actual recursion takes place - as expected, since first-order logic has no built-in means to make recursive definitions. In order to extend the expressive power of this computational interpretation of classical logic, we therefore propose to consider cyclic (or, non-wellfounded) sequent calculus proofs for first-order logic extended with inductively defined predicates in the style of Martin-Löf, following an approach of Brotherston and Simpson. In this talk I will sketch how this framework can be set up, and present some simple applications. The talk is based on ongoing joint work with Bahareh Afshari and Graham Leigh.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Michael McKenna (Arizona)
Department of Philosophy
Toward a Robust Theory of the Free Will Ability Seminar Date: Tuesday 4 October 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Philosophers working on the metaphysics of ability often suggest that their inquiry into the modality of abilities can provide insights into the nature of free will, and especially to the question as to whether it is compatible with determinism. I will argue that philosophers especially interested in the free will ability should instead examine the free will ability when it is actually exercised. This, it turns out, helps us to understand the nature of the ability at issue when it is claimed that free will requires—or just is—the ability to do otherwise. My aim here is not to defend a source-theoretic view of free will according to which free will does not require the ability to do otherwise but rather resides only in the actual causal sources of free actions. It is, instead, to explore a leeway-theoretic view according to which free will does after all require the ability to do otherwise.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Daniel Telech (Lund)
Department of Philosophy
TBA Seminar Date: Tuesday 15 November 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Christian Barry (ANU)
Department of Philosophy
Offsetting and Accountable Harm Seminar Date: Tuesday 27 September 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Under what conditions can we justify actions which impose risk on some group of people on the grounds that they belong to a set of actions that, together, do not impose risk on that same group of people? Answering this question is important for evaluating various practices, including the practice of offsetting carbon emissions. We've recently defended an answer to this question, which carries the practical implication that whether emitting and offsetting is permissible can depend on the form that the offsetting takes. If you offset by sequestering, such that you remove as much carbon from the atmosphere as you put in (for example by planting trees), then according to our view you can successfully offset. But when you offset by forestalling—preventing others from putting additional carbon into the atmosphere (for example by paying them not to emit, or providing them with more energy efficient stoves), you typically cannot. After explaining our view and considering some objections that others have presented to it, we introduce and discuss an important distinction between various harms to which your conduct can be causally related.
- CLLAM Seminar: Peter Pagin
Department of Philosophy
Assertion, assumption, and Deduction Seminar Date: Friday 23 September 2022 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract This talk concerns the connection between speech act theory, especially the theory of assertion, and deduction, especially Natural Deduction. From a very abstract point of view, an assertion of a content p can be described as the ascription of the property of being p to the actual index, or point of evaluation. This is the abstract characterization of assertoric force. Let’s assume that the actual index is a possible world, namely the actual world. Thus, the conclusion of a closed argument, as an act, is an assertion, and thereby characterized as the ascription of the conclusion content as a property to the actual world. The question that will concern us in this talk is how this idea extends to the status of other acts in the practice of Natural Deduction. In these terms, what is the force of an inference that depends on one or more open assumptions? What is the force of the assumption itself? What is the force of an assertion that uses an entire derivation as a premise? Do we need to ascribe a force to the derivation as a whole? Is there a coherent complete theory of act forces of Natural Deduction along these lines?
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Erik Åkerlund (Newman)
Department of Philosophy
Suárez' Minimal Realism of Artifacts Workshop Date: Friday 16 September 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract "In the Scholastic tradition, the two main positions when it came to the status of artifacts were realism and nominalism. Nominalism stated, briefly, that an artifact was nothing over and above the parts constituting it, while the realists denied this, while differing in what this "over and above" would be. This talk explores Francisco Suárez' (1548–1617) treatment of artifacts in his Disputationes metaphysicae (1597). As will be seen, Suárez basically follows the realist line of reasoning. However, with his novel take on the status of "one-ness" ('unum') as a transendental, and with the assigning of the "over and above" of the artifact to the status of a mode (rather than an accident in the proper sense), Suárez keeps the realism in his position to a minimum. Suárez account of the production of artifacts will also be briefly covered in the end." This seminar can be followed on zoom as well: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/67894532199
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Harald Wiltsche (Linköping)
Department of Philosophy
TBA Seminar Date: Thursday 22 September 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700
- Reassessing Realism: On the Ontology of the Unobservable
Department of Philosophy
Simon Allzén defends his thesis Dissertation Date: Tuesday 20 September 2022 Time: 13.00 – 15.00 Location: In 4204, building 3, plan 4, Albano, Hannes Alfvéns väg 11 Academic dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy at Stockholm University to be publicly defended on Tuesday 20 September 2022 at 13.00 in sal 4204, hus 3, plan 4, Albano, Hannes Alfvéns väg 11. Abstract It is widely believed that science is in the business of finding out what the world is really like. The philosophical version of this belief is scientific realism – a doctrine about science that tells us that we ought to believe that the best theories in science are true, and that the world is occupied with the objects that those theories contain. If scientific realism was not correct, the argument goes, the incredible success of science would be a miracle. The best explanation for the success of science however, is not that it is a miracle, but that scientific theories are true. This argument is an instance of inference to the best explanation, or IBE. Skeptics have questioned why scientific success must imply its truth given that there are so many abandoned, false scientific theories in the history of science that were nevertheless successful. One of the controversies in the debate between scientific realists and anti-realists surrounds the legitimacy of reasoning in accordance with IBE. Realists need IBE to be a justified and reliable guide to truth. In this compilation thesis, I address various questions related to IBE and scientific realism. Paper 1 argues that scientific realism without IBE loses too much of its epistemic optimism, and that it in some contexts even becomes more pessimistic than the most prominent rival philosophical doctrine about science – constructive empiricism. To avoid deflating realism, I argue, a defense of IBE is necessary. Paper 2 addresses whether methodological similarities between science and metaphysics force scientific realists to also be realists with respect to metaphysics. If IBE is legitimate, it should not only be valid in science, but also in metaphysics, effectively inflating the ontology that scientific realists are rationally bound to accept. I argue against this conclusion. Paper 3 offers a proof of concept regarding a novel way to justify inferences to unobservable objects. Paper 4 establishes a novel critique of nonprobabilistic versions of IBE in scientific realism. Keywords: Scientific Realism, Inference to the best explanation, Scientific Method. Reassessing Realism: On the Ontology of the Unobservable
- 8th Stockholm Graduate Conference 2023
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Daniel Ramöller
Department of Philosophy
Close Enough Theory X Seminar Date: Tuesday 14 November 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D734 Abstract The ethics of future generations is riddled by paradoxes. Ethical theorists have searched for an ethical theory of beneficience that avoids these paradoxes, what Derek Parfit has called “theory X”. Combining different ideas from the literature, this text begins to suggests a new theory to solve these paradoxes.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Katharina Berndt Rasmussen
Department of Philosophy
Structural Dimensions of Discrimination Seminar Date: Tuesday 28 November 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In this paper, I put forth a theory of discrimination that captures several structural dimensions of the phenomenon, which are sometimes pushed to the periphery of analysis. I do this by outlining a concept of discrimination, which aims to capture what many of us are concerned with in real life cases, and by exploring the different forms it can take, as well as its relation to moral wrongness and to social injustice. I thus propose that we should see discrimination, in the relevant sense, as a bridge concept: between the personal and the political, between criteria of moral wrongness and of social (in)justice, between, indeed, individualist and structural analyses of harms and inequalities. I believe that it is this bridging feature which makes the concept distinctive and particularly useful, both within philosophy and more broadly in society (politics, law, civil society). My hope is that seeing discrimination in this way will allow for a more well-grounded and detailed understanding of our social world, by facilitating a more nuanced application of the concept to specific cases, and by allowing for a richer analysis of their moral and political-philosophical (and potentially even legal) status.
- Conference on Philosophy of Experiment
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Hans Halvorson (Copenhagen/Princeton)
Department of Philosophy
Contextualism in Relativity and Quantum Theories Seminar Date: Thursday 19 October 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstrakt I review two accounts of global reference frames in spacetime theories (and Einstein's special theory of relativity in particular): 1. Absolutism: All fundamental facts are frame-independent, and the frame-relative facts are derivable from them. 2. Fragmentalism: All fundamental facts are frame-relative, and there are no non-trivial logical relations between the facts in one reference frame and the facts in another reference frame. I argue that both of these accounts are fatally flawed, and I develop an alternative account that builds on the intuitions behind these other accounts. (I also consider the relation between these accounts and methodological imperatives regarding "good physics".) Finally I consider whether this sharpened account of contextualism in relativity theory can shed light on the sort of contextualism that we encounter in quantum theories
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Johan Brännmark
Department of Philosophy
Addressing Social Indeterminacy Lecture Date: Thursday 14 March 2024 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: Attention! B413 Abstract While there are some contemporary defenders of ontic vagueness or metaphysical indeterminacy, a quite common view is still that vagueness or indeterminacy are really semantic or epistemic in character. The exact borders of, say, Mount Kilimanjaro might be disputable, and there might not be a clear-cut answer as to whether a particular boulder on its slope is part of it, but this is just due to indeterminacy in how we conceptually carve some aspects of the world. But the basic structure of the world ultimately is what it is. Nothing indeterminate about it, at least not on a metaphysical level. If we turn to the social realm, things potentially become more complicated since the ways in which we conceptualize objects in the social world do not just carve up an already existing social landscape. Instead, our conceptualizations of these objects, beliefs about them, and actions in relation to them, are typically understood to play a constitutive role in grounding the existence of the relevant social objects. Yet if many of the relevant categories and ideas are indeterminate, should there then not also be widespread indeterminacy in the social realm? And what would recognizing such indeterminacy mean for how we should understand social objects? In this presentation it is argued that the best response to the endemic indeterminacy of the social realm is a form of fictionalism about social objects.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Attila Mráz
Department of Philosophy
Voting as Resistance: A Theory of Protest Voting Seminar Date: Tuesday 12 December 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D734 Abstract Since this is a pre-read, it would be great if you could add the following below the abstract on the website: This seminar will be a discussion of a pre-circulated paper. To receive a copy of the paper and/or to be added to the mailing list, please email the conveners: antoinette.scherz@philosophy.su.se or isaac.taylor@philosophy.su.se.
- Cancelled!! Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Johan Brännmark
Department of Philosophy
Addressing Social Indeterminacy Lecture Date: Thursday 14 December 2023 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 Abstract While there are some contemporary defenders of ontic vagueness or metaphysical indeterminacy, a quite common view is still that vagueness or indeterminacy are really semantic or epistemic in character. The exact borders of, say, Mount Kilimanjaro might be disputable, and there might not be a clear-cut answer as to whether a particular boulder on its slope is part of it, but this is just due to indeterminacy in how we conceptually carve some aspects of the world. But the basic structure of the world ultimately is what it is. Nothing indeterminate about it, at least not on a metaphysical level. If we turn to the social realm, things potentially become more complicated since the ways in which we conceptualize objects in the social world do not just carve up an already existing social landscape. Instead, our conceptualizations of these objects, beliefs about them, and actions in relation to them, are typically understood to play a constitutive role in grounding the existence of the relevant social objects. Yet if many of the relevant categories and ideas are indeterminate, should there then not also be widespread indeterminacy in the social realm? And what would recognizing such indeterminacy mean for how we should understand social objects? In this presentation it is argued that the best response to the endemic indeterminacy of the social realm is a form of fictionalism about social objects.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy: Miira Tuominen
Department of Philosophy
Socrates and Alcibiades in Love – Self-Knowledge, Erôs and God in Alcibiades 1 and the Symposium’. Seminar Date: Friday 1 December 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In Plato’s Symposium and the Alcibiades I of a disputed origin, we find the mirroring declarations of erotic love (erôs and derivatives) by Alcibiades to Socrates and vice versa. In the Alcibiades I, Socrates announces that he is the only one who truly loves Alcibiades because he loves Alcibiades’ soul. Others have merely loved something that belongs to Alcibiades, his body, and deserted him when his full bloom has started to fade. The dialogue culminates in the famous account of self-knowledge in terms of an analogy of an eye seeing itself in the pupil of another eye. Puzzlingly, Socrates also states in the analogy that self-knowledge requires knowledge of god. I shall focus on this latter point and argue that it can be explained by reference to the well-known Platonic claim that the highest goal of human life is assimilation to god insofar as it is possible in bodily life. I consider this ideal with respect to Alcibiades’ description of the effects of his passion for Socrates in the Symposium and argue that even rather deficient kinds of self-knowledge require recognition of godlikeness. I also claim that the deficiency of Alcibiades’ self-knowledge is not merely in it being about changeable individuals as opposed to general and immutable Forms. This sheds new light on the question of whether or to what extent individuals can be known.
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Özlem Yılmaz Silverman (Stockholm)
Department of Philosophy
Organicism, Now and Then: Plant Biology in the Early Twentieth Century Seminar Date: Thursday 23 November 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: E210, Arrhenius Laboratoriet Abstract The concept of organism has gained renewed attention from the philosophers of biology in the last a few decades. In this talk, I will look at the concept in the early twentieth century, which is a crucial time for history and philosophy of biology, as well as consider the concept in today’s plant biology. Many contemporary scholars argue that, contrary to the widespread idea that there were two main perspectives in biology at the dawn of the twentieth century, mechanism and vitalism, there was actually a third way: organicism. While the tradition of organicism in that time is mostly remembered through prominent scientists' work on animals, I am interested in how it was present in work on plants as well. One of the plant biologists whom I will talk about is Agnes Arber (1879-1960), who is one of the most important plant biologists of the early and mid-twentieth century. She is known for her meticulous collection of morphological data and elaborated interpretation of this data in the light of both biology and philosophy literature. I will draw on her interpretation of plant morphology and her work's place in plant biology in the early twentieth century. I will examine how her work engages with these three perspectives. Additionally, I will talk about the relations between different branches of plant biology in her time.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Sylvain Roudaut
Department of Philosophy
Artifacts and the Mechanization of Nature in Late Medieval Philosophy Seminar Date: Friday 22 April 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 & Zoom Abstract: In The Advancement of Learning , Francis Bacon writes: “An opinion has long been prevalent, that art is something different from nature, and things artificial different from things natural […] whereas men ought on the contrary to be surely persuaded of this, that the artificial does not differ from the natural in form or essence.” Whereas in the Middle Ages artifacts were commonly defined as ontologically different from natural beings, one of the most salient features of early modern philosophy is the use of machines as theoretical models for understanding nature while denying any essential difference between natural things and artificial ones. This talk will be about explaining how this change of paradigm happened between the late Middle Ages and the early modern period (between ca. 1300 and 1600) by highlighting the key moments of this theoretical transition, with a special emphasis on how the status of artifacts was discussed in the context of Paduan Aristotelianism. For those that want to follow this on zoom, here is the link
- Stockholm/Uppsala-Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Ingress