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- Historieseminarium: Juan Jose J.J. (Berlin)
Filosofiska institutionen
The Fragility of Absolute Certainty: John Buridan on Faith Seminarium Datum: fredag 14 november 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Zoom-link
- CLLAM seminarium: Crispin Wright (Stirling) Endast på Zoom!
Filosofiska institutionen
Kripke, Quine and the 'Adoption Problem' Seminarium Datum: fredag 28 november 2025 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: Zoom Abstract We'll focus on the "Two Dogmas" philosophy of logic and on Kripke’s reported claim in his 70s seminar that Quine’s position depends upon confusing logical belief and logical inferential practice. We’ll consider what Kripke seems to have had in mind as an adoption problem for Quine, note that it depends on a resistible assumption, and formulate a different “adoption problem” that finesses the need for that assumption. Then we’ll consider more generally the “anti-exceptionalism” strand in Quine about logic and offer arguments why it is unsustainable. There is a handout for this talk. If you would like to get it before the talk, please contact Kathrin ( kathrin.gluer@philosophy.su.se ). Zoom: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/8938261027?omn=67736389403
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Norm nudging and #MeToo
Filosofiska institutionen
This paper explores some of the promises and pitfalls of #MeToo, through Cristina Bicchieri’s game-theoretical framework of social norms and studies on norm-nudging. Seminarium Datum: tisdag 2 december 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract harassment. Suppose each male employee comes to prefer to follow this rule, on condition that he expects his colleagues both to follow it (empirical expectation) and to believe he in turn should follow it (normative expectation). The rule then functions as a social norm; it is upheld as long as the male employees’ (empirical and normative) expectations are upheld. Arguably, one of the functions of #MeToo was to make salient such a non-harassment norm. However, when norm violations – some male employees “slip back” into old macho habits – are observed by other male employees, their empirical expectations may falter. Moreover, when such violations are not met with protest, their normative expectations may falter. The social norm risks breaking down, bringing back the toxic work-environment. Yet protesting is costly for victims and bystanders, who are hence caught in a collective dilemma of their own. This dilemma can be solved, analogously, by a speaking-up norm. Arguably, another function of #MeToo was to make salient this norm, too. This game-theoretic analysis of the dynamics of #MeToo can be further enhanced by considering Bicchieri’s recent findings on norm-nudging: influencing expectations via (general) social information. By communicating widespread condemnation of sexual harassment, campaigns like #MeToo raise normative expectations of non-harassment. However, by simultaneously communicating frequent failures of norm-following, empirical expectations may be lowered. Yet when there is incongruence between normative and empirical information, studies show that the latter trumps the former. In other words, social information transmitted under hashtags like #YesAllWomen carries a risk of undermining the non-harassment norm. This analysis throws new light on criticised hashtags like #NotAllMen: by emphasising norm-following, they may counteract the incongruence, thereby contributing to the reinforcement of the norm. Further, regarding the speaking-up norm, a norm-nudging perspective reveals an interesting contrast: by showcasing widespread condemnation of sexual harassment, #MeToo raises empirical expectations of speaking up. However, the widespread backlash that followed (defamation suits, public victim shaming) communicated condemnation of speaking-up, lowering normative expectations. Given this incongruence, one should again expect empirical information to trump normative information. However, studies suggest that there may be another mechanism in play: when social information conflicts with people's self-interest, they may exploit any “wiggle-room” in the information, interpreting the social norm as weak, to avoid conforming to it. This analysis suggests that the backlash against #MeToo should not (only) be understood as raising the costs of speaking up, but (also) as undermining the speaking-up norm itself. The paper concludes by discussing some upshots of these analyses for addressing the persistent problem of sexual harassment.
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Jeremy Butterfield (Oxford) & Sebastian de Haro (Amsterdam)
Filosofiska institutionen
Titel aviseras senare Seminarium Datum: måndag 15 september 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- RJ project: Linguistic and Epistemological Perspectives on Testimony
Filosofiska institutionen
The theme of the workshop is indirect speech reports and testimony. The venue for the workshop is Gula Villa and it will feature five talks. You are all warmly invited to attend. Linguistic and Epistemological Perspectives on Testimony
- CLLAM Seminarium: Salvatore Florio (Oslo)
Filosofiska institutionen
Critical Plural Logic and Abstraction (joint work with Øystein Linnebo) Seminarium Datum: fredag 11 oktober 2024 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Cantor defined a set as the collection into a whole of determinate and well-distinguished objects, objects that can “exist together”. Although he recognized that not all objects can exist together in this sense, he did not provide a theory specifying when some objects can exist together. Without such a theory, his account of sets remains incomplete. We argue that a version of plural logic, Critical Plural Logic, fits the bill. As a logic of co-existence, Critical Plural Logic captures the essence of the familiar “stage theory” of set formation but is far more general and avoids a gratuitous reification of stages. We also argue that this plural logic can be of great aid to Frege and logicism, supporting a large class of abstraction principles. Critical Plural Logic emerges as a compelling and fruitful theory to develop key ideas of Cantor and Frege.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Josefine Klingspor (Stanford)
Filosofiska institutionen
Title TBA Abstract TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Maté Veres
Filosofiska institutionen
Title TBA Abstract TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Tara Nanavazadeh
Filosofiska institutionen
The cause of evil in Plato’s Laws: God or the human soul as the origin of evil Workshop Datum: fredag 8 mars 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Jan Sprenger (Turin)
Filosofiska institutionen
The Productive Model of Explanation in Psychology and Beyond Seminarium Datum: torsdag 30 maj 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract The explanation of psychological phenomena is a central aim of psychological science. However, the nature of explanation and the processes by which we evaluate whether a theory explains a phenomenon are often unclear. We address this shortcoming by characterizing the nature of explanation in psychology along the following lines: a theory explains a phenomenon if and only if a formal model of the theory produces the statistical pattern representing the phenomenon. Using this account, we outline a workable methodology of explanation: (a) explicating a verbal theory into a formal model, (b) representing phenomena as statistical patterns in data, and (c) assessing whether the formal model produces these statistical patterns. Finally, we compare our proposal to other models of explanation from philosophy of science.
- Stockholm Colloqium in Philosophy: Anna Mahtani (LSE)
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress
- Sommarpaus: seminarier, kollokvier, worskshops, etc.
Filosofiska institutionen
Vi återkommer hösten 2024 Evenemang Startdatum: fredag 31 maj 2024 Tid: 00.00 Slutdatum: torsdag 15 augusti 2024 Tid: 00.00
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Anna-Sofia Maurin (Göteborg)
Filosofiska institutionen
The Value of Car(v)ing Seminarium Datum: torsdag 7 mars 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In my presentation I plan to critically discuss an argument defended by Shamik Dasgupta (cf. esp. his 2018 and unpublished ms.) to the effect that, because reasons exist for thinking that objectivity—and so Realism—constitutively requires that some things that exist are (primitively) normative, and since this (primitive) normativity must but cannot be explained, nothing is objective, and hence Realism must be given up. In my presentation, I plan to argue: (1) …that Dasgupta’s argument—which I understand as an argument about explanation—rests on ideas about whatneeds explaining as well as what counts as an adequate explanation that can—I suspect ought to—be resisted. (2) …that the scope of Dasgupta’s argument may not be as wide as he wants it to be: that those who accept a ‘sparse’ conception of what there is most likely do not have to accept that objectivity—and so Realism—constitutively requires that some things that exist are (primitively) normative and so will not have to face the explanatory challenge in the first place. This is very much work in progress, which means that I don’t have a paper polished enough to warrant circulating. Those of you who want to prepare for the seminar can (but in no way need to) check out Dasgupta’s papers, which can be accessed via his website: https://shamik.net/
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Attila Mráz
Filosofiska institutionen
Voting as Resistance: A Theory of Protest Voting Seminarium Datum: tisdag 12 december 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D734 Abstract Since this is a pre-read, it would be great if you could add the following below the abstract on the website: This seminar will be a discussion of a pre-circulated paper. To receive a copy of the paper and/or to be added to the mailing list, please email the conveners: antoinette.scherz@philosophy.su.se or isaac.taylor@philosophy.su.se.
- 8th Stockholm Graduate Conference 2023
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress
- Conference on Philosophy of Experiment
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress
- At the Crossroads of Epistemic and Practical Rationality
Filosofiska institutionen
Funded by the Knowledge Resistance project Workshop Datum: fredag 26 april 2024 Tid: 09.30 – 18.30 Plats: Albano, Hörsal 19 (House 2) Program 09.30-10.00 Welcome and coffee 10.00-11.15 Andrew Reisner, “How the (perhaps surprising) continuity between theoretical and practical reason leads to first-order pluralism about reasons for belief” 11:30-12:45 Tricia Magalotti, “Do We Have Epistemic Blaming Emotions?” Lunch 14:30-15.45 Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini, “Epistemic Right? Epistemic Duties?” 15.45-17.00 Levi Spectre, TBA 17.15-18.30 Anne Meylan, “Diachronic Reasons to Suspend” Please send an email to tricia.magalotti@philosophy.su.se if you are interested in attending.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Michael Devitt (City University of New York)
Filosofiska institutionen
Reference Borrowing: The Case of Implement Terms Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 23 maj 2024 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D289 Abstract The paper reports on experiments testing the theory of reference for implement terms. According to the description theory, competent speakers must associate with an implement term a description of the referent’s function and, probably, the physical properties that enable it to perform its function. We tested this theory on t ‘fax machine’ and ‘abacus’, using the method of truth value judgments. Our experimental results count decisively against the Description Theory. We conclude, by inference to the best explanation, that the reference of these terms can be borrowed. Our results are inconsistent even with the descriptive-causal theory of borrowing, according to which these terms can be borrowed only if the borrower associates at least some accurate description of the referent. We conclude that the terms are covered by a pure causal-historical theory of borrowing, the central idea of the picture of reference presented by Kripke, Putnam, and other causal theorists in discussing proper names and “natural” kind terms. We emphasize that our findings do not support a causal theory of the initial reference fixing by the “experts” who introduce an implement term. Indeed, we think it highly plausible that reference is initially fixed by a description of the implement’s function and defining physical characteristics. If so, then implement terms are covered by a hybrid theory of reference, causal borrowing and descriptive fixing. Key Words implement terms; description theory of reference; causal-historical reference borrowing; descriptive-causal reference borrowing; causal reference fixing; descriptive reference fixing
- MAP-seminarium: Ane Engelstad (Bergen)
Filosofiska institutionen
Should Political Philosophers Attend to Victim Testimony Seminarium Datum: torsdag 8 februari 2024 Tid: 15.00 – 17.00 Plats: D734 ABSTRACT There is a growing recognition that victims of injustice may have privileged access to knowledge about the injustices they experience, and that injustices are perpetuated through silencing victims by taking them to be less credible, and through denying them the platform and capacity to speak. However, these are not ideas that political philosophers tend to engage with in a sustained manner, to the extent that they alter methodological approaches to be systematically attentive to victim testimony. In this article, I provide two arguments in favour of political philosophers attending to victim testimony, one moral, one epistemic, and demonstrate that the moral case has little purchase, but that the epistemic case is more successful. Then, I present the strongest case against including victim testimony in political philosophy, and I argue that it does not hold up to scrutiny. In so doing, I demonstrate how methodological practices in political philosophy could be improved through drawing on feminist social epistemology; attending to victim testimony can enrich political philosophy in epistemically acceptable ways, and it also corrects for a range of potential biases. Full paper WHAT IS MAP? MAP Stockholm is a chapter to the international organization MAP (Minorities and Philosophy) here at Stockholm University. In short, MAP's mission is to address structural injustices in academic philosophy and to remove barriers that impede participation in academic philosophy for members of marginalized groups. Through its international organizing team and graduate student-led network of autonomous chapters around the world, MAP aims to examine and dismantle mechanisms that prevent students from marginalized groups from participating in academic philosophy, as well as to promote philosophical work done from marginalized perspectives, and help improve working conditions for scholars from marginalized backgrounds. MAP Stockholm organizes reading groups, seminars and discussion sessions that are open to all students. Contact us via mapsthlm@philosophy.su.se
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Kevin Noone (Miljövetenskap)
Filosofiska institutionen
Augmenting the Grammar of Science Seminarium Datum: torsdag 21 mars 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 This lecture will explore the “hows and whys” of the scientific endeavor. We will start with a historical perspective going way back to the classical Greek roots of science, and examine some waypoints in how we have gone about doing science up to the present day. We will then shine a light on new(ish), transdisciplinary approaches to science, with a particular focus on Community Science. In doing so we will see how we may be able to improve science through augmenting its grammar; how adding things like prepositions (with, not just for or on), adverbs (such as collaboratively) and prefixes (like trans-, not just multi- or inter-) to our nouns (results) and verbs (methods) can make our scientific grammar a lot more readable.