Sök
Letar du efter intern information?
Visar 28441-28460 av 49145 träffar
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Stefan Gosepath (Freie University Berlin)
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress
- Mike Schneider (University of Missouri)
Filosofiska institutionen
Deliberately Uncreative Seminarium Datum: torsdag 16 oktober 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Science depends on creativity. This talk is about material from my current book project, concerning how to understand the concept of creativity in science, such that the previous declaration is 1) true, but 2) noteworthy rather than trivial, and 3) in keeping with a philosopher's interest in methodology (studying the dynamics of the growth of scientific knowledge by means of studying the game that scientists play). The main claim of the book is that creativity in science may be understood fruitfully in terms of an intervention that occurs during scientific speculation within the course of research, which amounts to the scientists involved overcoming uncreativity in their speculating. This, in the first place, requires an answer to an unusual question: when does speculating count as uncreatively done? In this talk, I will focus on the argument contained in the linchpin middle chapter of the book, “An account of uncreativity”, where this crucial question gets answered. In this chapter, a case demonstrates the account: the unseriousness of the proposal in fundamental physics that spacetime might fail to be time-orientable. (As will be discussed, this case is selected specifically to further emphasize that sometimes, uncreativity is just fine.)
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Lukas Meyer (University of Graz)
Filosofiska institutionen
The Ethics of Expectations in Transitions to Climate Neutrality Seminarium Datum: tisdag 21 oktober 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abtract In his talk, Lukas Meyer outlines the evolving contours of EXPECT — a project in development that aims to construct a normative framework for understanding the ethics of expectations in climate transitions. Expectations are not mere predictions; they are socially embedded, normatively charged structures through which individuals and institutions relate to the future. Shaped by interpersonal commitments, social practices, and public institutions, expectations inform life plans, agency, and trust. When climate disruption unsettles these anticipatory claims, the resulting loss can be existential. EXPECT integrates three core dimensions: epistemic responsibility (what individuals must know or inquire into), epistemic justification (whether expectations are normatively legitimate), and temporal revisability (when expectations must be reconsidered). It examines how expectations acquire legitimacy through responsibility-based, political, and justice-oriented frameworks — and how epistemic failures, from testimonial injustice to role-based deficiency, compromise their moral standing. The project also addresses adjustment responsibility and burden assessment: what can reasonably be asked of individuals when expectations must be revised, and how should the costs of such revision be ethically evaluated? It argues that fairness depends both on the epistemic conditions under which expectations were formed, and on the nature and distribution of the burdens imposed by change. Expectations may warrant protection, adjustment, or relinquishment — but only through principled assessment. EXPECT offers a dual lens: clarifying individual responsibility for forming and revising expectations, and institutional obligations to respond to them — even when those expectations fall short of full legitimacy. It reframes justice as a matter not only of distribution, but of recognition, revision, and ethical responsiveness in times of transition.
- Mike Schneider (University of Missouri)
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Elena Castellani (Università degli Studi di Firenze)
Filosofiska institutionen
Titel aviseras senare Seminarium Datum: torsdag 27 november 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract aviseras senare
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosof: Gábor Szabó Hofer (Budapest)
Filosofiska institutionen
Operational equivalence and causal structure Seminarium Datum: fredag 16 maj 2025 Tid: 15.15 – 17.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In this talk, I will explore some consequences of abandoning operational equivalence in quantum mechanics. Two measurements are operationally equivalent if they yield the same distribution of outcomes in every quantum state and hence are represented by the same operator. I will show that the ontological models for quantum mechanics — and more generally, for any operational theory — sensitively depend on which measurement we choose from the class of operationally equivalent measurements. To this goal, I will take first three examples — a classical theory, the EPR-Bell scenario and the Popescu-Rochrlich box; then realize each example by two different operational theories — one with a trivial and another with a non-trivial compatibility structure; and finally compare the ontological models for the different theories with respect to their causal structure, contextuality, and fine-tuning.
- Inställt: Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Christina Thomsen Thörnqvist (Södertörn)
Filosofiska institutionen
Translating Descartes Meditations Workshop Datum: fredag 9 maj 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract TBA
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Stina Björkholm & Mats Ingelström (IFFS)
Filosofiska institutionen
Does Contextualism about ‘Well-Being’ Challenge a Philosophical Paradigm? Seminarium Datum: tisdag 20 maj 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract The concept of well-being plays a central role across a range of contexts, from empirical sciences and ethical theory to everyday discourse. Alexandrova has argued that the diversity of well-being discourse supports a semantic contextualist view – positing that the meaning of ‘well-being’ shifts depending on the context of use. This thesis has been taken to challenge a traditional philosophical way of theorizing about well-being. In this paper, we challenge that contention. We begin by outlining the contextualist approach and presenting reasons to take it seriously as a semantic thesis. We then address three ways of spelling out how this view might be at odds with a philosophical paradigm, demonstrating that neither succeeds in establishing that there is a genuine conflict. Our analysis suggests that recognizing the contextual nature of well-being discourse does not entail that philosophy of well-being is undermined or significantly limits the relevance of the field.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Sandra Lindblom (Cambridge)
Filosofiska institutionen
Lady Mary Shepherd’s Theory of Causality in Physics Workshop Datum: fredag 23 maj 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract TBA
- The Ethics of Deception
Filosofiska institutionen
Information aviseras senare Workshop Startdatum: onsdag 26 november 2025 Tid: 09.00 Slutdatum: torsdag 27 november 2025 Tid: 18.00 Plats: Gula Villan
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Jeremy Butterfield (Oxford) & Sebastian de Haro (Amsterdam)
Filosofiska institutionen
What are dualities in physics? A geometric view Seminarium Datum: torsdag 11 september 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In the last forty years, dualities have been a major topic of research and a driving force behind much of the work in theoretical physics, especially high-energy physics. In this talk, we will first explain what dualities are and give a schema for them, together with some examples. We will then go on to discuss one of the questions in the philosophy of science that dualities bear on, namely the formulation of scientific theories. We will argue that dualities, and their generalizations, quasi-dualities, suggest a generalization of the semantic conception of theories. On the traditional semantic conception, a physical theory is a collection of models. We will argue that dualities and quasi-dualities suggest that there is topological and geometric structure on the set of models, and we will make a proposal for a specific "shape" that physical theories take, which generalizes and subsumes the semantic conception.
- Historieseminarium: Sven-Olov Wallenstein (Södertörn)
Filosofiska institutionen
Prousts världar
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Jee Hyun Moon (Humboldt) och Marcel Jahn (Stockholm)
Filosofiska institutionen
Moral Neuroenhancement and the Discernibility Challenge Seminarium Datum: tisdag 4 november 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Both scientists and philosophers have increasingly focused on the prospect of moral neuroenhancement—the use of neurotechnologies or psychoactive substances to facilitate moral improvement. Recent scholarship distinguishes between two main approaches: direct moral neuroenhancement, which seeks to implant specific moral beliefs, motives, or behaviors, and indirect moral neuroenhancement, which aims to enhance capacities such as moral reasoning, conceptual understanding, or self-control, enabling individuals to arrive at better moral judgments through their own deliberation. Several philosophers have compellingly argued that the direct approach is ethically impermissible, as it risks undermining moral autonomy and suppressing valuable disagreement. The indirect approach, by contrast, avoids these concerns and is widely regarded as ethically permissible or even required. In this paper, we introduce a novel challenge for the project of moral neuroenhancement—the discernibility challenge: for any given intervention, it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether it truly qualifies as indirect rather than direct. We demonstrate this by examining a range of experimental designs to discern between these two types of interventions, arguing that the evidence they produce is ultimately insufficient for this task. The discernibility challenge, we suggest, exposes a profound epistemic uncertainty with notable implications for the ethical permissibility of moral neuroenhancement: if we cannot reliably distinguish between permissible (indirect) and impermissible (direct) interventions, we lack the epistemic assurance necessary to ethically justify their use.
- CLLAM seminarium: Sebastian Enquist
Filosofiska institutionen
Meaning-as-use and logical conventionalism Seminarium Datum: fredag 31 oktober 2025 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 & Zoom Abstract I will present a view of logic based on the notion that meaning is use. More precisely, I will argue that logic should be understood in terms of "problems and solutions" rather than "propositions and truth values". Although such ideas are traditionally connected with intuitionistic logic, my claim is that they are not only compatible with but in fact support a form of conventionalism about logic. In particular, the apparent conflict between intuitionistic and classical logic evaporates from this point of view. Finally, I will discuss to what extent Kripke's so called "adoption problem" poses a problem for this conventionalist view. Zoom länk och D700
- Högre seminairum i vetenskapsfilosofi: Jim Brown: (University of Toronto)
Filosofiska institutionen
More Things in Heaven Seminarium Datum: onsdag 22 oktober 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract I begin with the assumption of realism or Platonism in mathematics. This talk is about the epistemology of mathematics. The question is what are legitimate, best methods for learning mathematical truths. I introduced a thought experiment with the aim of showing that mathematics should not be dominated by traditional proof as the one and only source of knowledge. Much of the talk will be devoted to explaining this, giving examples, and drawing out some of the major consequences. The talk will be largely non-technical, but should be of interest to working mathematicians who have an interest in mathematical methodology. If there is time, one technical example will be given involving through continuum hypothesis. The talk is based on a book in progress with the tentative title: More Things in Heaven: Mathematics, Ethics, and the Platonic Imagination
- CLLAM Seminarium: Dimitri Coelho Mollo (Umeå)
Filosofiska institutionen
Functional Ontologies for AI systems: Tasks, mechanisms, and capacities Seminarium Datum: fredag 7 november 2025 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 och Zoom Abstract The size and complexity of current Deep Artificial Neural Networks pose remarkable challenges to our attempts of explaining and understanding their workings. I put forward a proposal for complementing existing efforts to that aim, inspired by research on cognitive ontology in philosophy of cognitive science. I suggest that, as much as we need theoretically and empirically grounded categories for cognitive tasks, cognitive capacities, and cognitive mechanisms in cognitive science, we need theoretically and empirically grounded categories for functional tasks, capacities and mechanisms when studying AI systems. The resulting functional ontologies, I argue, can play crucial roles in informing further research in explainable and interpretable AI, and in refining our understanding of such systems. I illustrate this proposal by examining recent research on the computational mechanisms underlying specific capacities in Large Language Models, showing how appeal to functional ontologies can further enrich such research. Zoom-link
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Neil Dewar (University of Cambridge)
Filosofiska institutionen
Making Space: The Semantics of Geometrical Conventionalism Seminarium Datum: fredag 14 november 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D734 Abstract Geometrical conventionalism holds that the geometry of space, or of space-time, is not a matter of fact but rather a matter of convention. However, how exactly this view should be understood can be rather obscure. In this talk, I distinguish three ways that we might unpack the conventionalist slogan—which I call semantic, epistemic, and metaphysical conventionalism—and argue that the most interesting is semantic conventionalism. However, to avoid collapsing into triviality, the semantic conventionalist must belong to what Coffa calls “the semantic tradition”. Once we place the conventionalist in that tradition, we find that the conventionalist has two natural opponents: geometrical realism on the one hand, and geometrical functionalism on the other.
- CANCELLED: Colloquium: Justin Khoo (MIT)
Filosofiska institutionen
What is a film? Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 13 november 2025 Tid: 15.00 – 17.00 Plats: D289 Abstract Films (movies, tv shows, etc) are weird things. Two people can see the same film by watching different screenings of different physical things. In that sense, films are multiple artworks. But I argue that they are quite different from other, better studied, multiple artworks like plays or pieces of written music. I argue that existing views about what films are all fail, but each contains a part of the truth, which I draw on to develop my own view, which is that films are multiply constituted artifacts.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Greg Bognar (Stockholms universitet)
Filosofiska institutionen
Self-Ownership and the Moral Significance of Birth Seminarium Datum: tisdag 18 november 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract According to moderate permissive views, abortion becomes increasingly problematic as the pregnancy develops. Late-term abortions require more momentous moral justification. This, however, is thought to create a problem: other things being equal, some reasons that can justify late-term abortions can justify the killing of newborns as well. If the only difference between a late-term fetus and a newborn is their location, then the moral difference between abortion and infanticide cannot be maintained. This is a well-known problem for moderate permissive views. It is widely accepted that birth itself has no moral significance. In this paper, I challenge this consensus. I argue that there is a morally significant difference between the fetus and the newborn: the newborn acquires self-ownership at birth. This changes the balance of reasons: killing a newborn becomes morally more problematic than killing a fetus. Moderate permissive views can, after all, maintain the moral difference between abortion and infanticide.
- Historieseminarium: Juan Jose J.J. (Berlin)
Filosofiska institutionen
The Fragility of Absolute Certainty: John Buridan on Faith Seminarium Datum: fredag 14 november 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Zoom-link