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- Stockholm June Workshop in Philosophy 2022
Filosofiska institutionen
Metaphysics and Ethics Workshop Datum: tisdag 24 maj 2022 Tid: 10.00 – 17.00 Plats: E497 Gunnar Björnsson (Stockholm): ‘From distributive to retributive desert’ Commentator: Anna Nyman (Uppsala) Olle Risberg (Uppsala): ‘The Weight of Reasons’ Commentator: Krister Bykvist (Stockholm) Mark Schroeder (USC): ‘Narrative and Personal Identity’ Commentator: Nils Franzén (Umeå) Teemu Toppinen (Helsingfors): TBA Commentator: Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm) Caroline Torpe Touborg (Umeå): ‘Causation, Responsibility, and Norms: Re-evaluating Our Norms in the Face of Climate Change’ Commentator: Erik Carlson (Uppsala)
- INSTÄLLT: CLLAM Seminar: Fredrik Stjernberg (Linköping)
Filosofiska institutionen
Seminariet ges vid senare tillfälle Seminarium Datum: fredag 25 mars 2022 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: Aviseras senare Titel: aviseras senare Abstract: aviseras senare
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Victor Moberger & Jonas Olson
Filosofiska institutionen
Moral Error Theory and Fictionalism Seminarium Datum: tisdag 8 mars 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Kommentator: Niklas Möller
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Kit Fine (NYU)
Filosofiska institutionen
Truthmaker Semantics and the Regimentation of Language Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 28 oktober 2021 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: Zoom Abstract I provide an outline of truthmaker semantics and explain how it may be helpful in the regimentation, and not merely the description, of natural language.
- Stockholm-Uppsala seminariet i teoretisk filosofi
Filosofiska institutionen
Sofia Bokros och Miira Tuominen Seminarium Datum: torsdag 25 november 2021 Tid: 10.15 – 13.00 Plats: Engelska Parken, hus 2, lokal K1028, Uppsala Talare Uppsala: Sofia Bokros. Kommentator: Sama Agahi. Talare Stockholm: Miira Tuominen. Kommentator: Ekrem Cetinkaya. Plats: Engelska Parken, hus 2, lokal K1028, Uppsala. Karta
- Workshop on Gratitude
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress
- Inställt: Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Helen Beebee (Leeds)
Filosofiska institutionen
Exceptionalism: Consensus and Belief in Philosophy Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 12 december 2024 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D315 According to me, philosophy aims to figure out which philosophical theories are tenable — as opposed to true — since there may be several theories of the same phenomenon between which there is no way to rationally decide. This position raises a question of ‘exceptionalism’: does philosophy differ from other disciplines, in particular the sciences, in this regard; and, if so, is that a problem? In this talk, I argue that the answer to the first question is ’yes and no’, depending on which other discipline philosophy is being compared to; and the answer to the second question is ’no’. So the threat of exceptionalism isn’t a problem for my view.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Daniel Fogal (NYU)
Filosofiska institutionen
The Nature of Good Reasoning Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 14 november 2024 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D289 Abstract The goal of the talk (based on joint work with Olle Risberg) is to offer a novel account of the nature of good reasoning, both practical and theoretical, where reasoning is understood to be a transition between attitudinal mental states such as beliefs and intentions. The basic idea is that good reasoning is a matter of “following the flow” of normative support between attitudes, whereas bad reasoning is a matter of failing to do so (in one way or another). Call this the support-based account of good reasoning. After introducing and motivating my preferred account of good reasoning, I critically evaluate its main competitors: the reasons-based account and the fittingness-based account. In doing so, I explain how the support-based account captures their strengths while avoiding their weaknesses. I conclude by explaining how the support-based account of good reasoning can explain both what's right and what's wrong with the view of reasons as premises of good reasoning.
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Jessica Pepp (Uppsala)
Filosofiska institutionen
Williamson on the lessons of Kripke’s puzzle Seminarium Datum: torsdag 5 december 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In his recent book, Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy (2024), Timothy Williamson argues that Saul Kripke’s (1979) puzzle about belief reveals no fundamental problem about our concept of belief. Instead, the puzzle shows that certain heuristics we rely upon in making judgments about belief are fallible. In this talk, I will explore some aspects of Williamson’s framework of heuristics as it relates to attitude reports. A general theme will be that Kripke’s puzzle does put pressure on a certain concept of belief as a relation to a proposition and that the appeal to heuristics does not fully release this pressure. As a result, when it comes to the semantics of attitude reports, Williamson’s anti-Fregean view may not be anti-Fregean enough.
- CLLAM Seminarium: Andrew Peet (Umeå)
Filosofiska institutionen
Interpretation as Normative Sense-Making Seminarium Datum: fredag 24 januari 2025 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 Abstract I present a new theory of utterance understanding – the target state of utterance interpretation. According to this theory, utterance understanding is a distinctively normative species of ‘objectual understanding’. Objectual understanding is the epistemic state we occupy when we understand a subject matter such as an event or process. On my view, utterance understanding consists in grasping the normative significance of an utterance qua event. I call the resultant picture of interpretation the ‘normative sense-making view’. The normative sense-making view stands in contrast to what I call the ‘interrogative inquiry’ approach. According to the interrogative inquiry view interpretation is inquiry targeted at the question ‘what does the utterance mean’. On standard pictures of inquiry the interrogative model entails that utterance understanding consists in knowledge of meaning. I will illustrate the normative sense-making view via a comparison to the interrogative view and its accompanying knowledge-based theory of understanding.
- Linguistic and Epistemological Perspectives on Testimony 2025
Filosofiska institutionen
Stockholm University 30–31 January 2025 Konferens Startdatum: torsdag 30 januari 2025 Tid: 10.15 Slutdatum: fredag 31 januari 2025 Tid: 12.30 Plats: Gula Villan, Minerva Room Program Thursday, 30. January: 10:15–10:30 Coffee/Tea 10:30–12:00: Joey Pollock: Testimonial Pessimism 12:00–13:00: Lunch 13:00–14:30: Kristina Rolin: Should research based advice be value neutral? 14:30–14:45: Break 14:45:16:15: Gabriel Contessa: Public Trust in Science and the Justified Trust Dilemma Friday, 31. January 09:00–9:15: Coffee/Teas 09:15:–10:45 Thomas Grundmann: Expert Authority and Thinking for Oneself 10:45–11:00: Break 11:00–12:30: Mikkel Gerken : Science skepticism and science selectivism 12:30–13:30: Lunch
- MAP-seminar: Marion Kathe Godman (Aarhus)
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress
- Högre seminarium i praktiskt filosofi: Justin Snedegar (University of Virginia)
Filosofiska institutionen
Setting Boundaries on Blame Seminarium Datum: tisdag 25 mars 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Blame is a central part of our moral practice, and blaming interactions can be very valuable. But despite the potential for reconciliation, edification, and more, wrongdoers often refuse to engage with blame. Rather than accepting blame, rejecting it by offering an excuse or justification, or taking the opportunity for a joint discussion of the relevant moral issues, they often simply dismiss blame. This raises important ethical questions. Discussions of this response in the literature on the ethics of blame tend to understand it primarily as a challenge to the blamer’s standing or authority to blame. However, wrongdoers dismiss blame for many reasons that do not involve any challenge to the blamer’s standing. I propose that we understand dismissing blame instead as setting a boundary on blame: invoking (supposed) norms that prohibit blaming in the circumstances, even assuming that the recipient is blameworthy. Familiar standing norms are among those that can serve as a wrongdoer’s basis for setting a boundary, but there are others. I argue that this more general conception of dismissing blame better captures the practice. It also brings out important questions in the ethics of blame, and especially the ethics of responding to blame, that go beyond questions of standing.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Lena Wahlberg (Lund)
Filosofiska institutionen
Den Medicinska Rätten och Etiken Seminarium Datum: tisdag 11 februari 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Den Medicinska Rätten och Etiken (410 Kb)
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Samuel Fletcher (Oxford)
Filosofiska institutionen
Models of Dependence Seminarium Datum: torsdag 24 april 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Scientific practice is replete with discussions of one thing, quantity, or phenomena depending on another. Sometimes this is causal dependence, but sometimes it denotes something more metaphysical: how the less fundamental depend on the more fundamental. Yet, unlike causal dependence, there has not been so much explicit formal modeling of dependence. This has led some philosophers to be skeptical that "fundamental" or "primitive" have any special interpretative significance at all. What difference does it make in scientific reasoning, in the end? I answer this question by developing such a formal model for the case of determination and show that it makes a difference to counterfactual reasoning with a theory. I then show how this illuminates a debate in the 2000s in the philosophy of physics about the time-reversal invariance of electromagnetism.
- Högre seminariet i teoretisk filosofi: Mikael Janvid
Filosofiska institutionen
Anti-Social Black Metal Epistemology: Forming Beliefs without Trust in an Evil Environment Seminarium Datum: torsdag 15 maj 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract A grim picture of human existence and society is painted in the Norwegian Black Metal band Gorgoroth’s masterpiece album Quantos Possunt Ad Satanitatem Trahunt from 2009. Contrary to what has been preached to us and we have been indoctrinated in, Evil rules the world! Yet by embracing this dark outlook, the struggling subject gains a privileged epistemic insight freeing themselves from the hypocrisies of religion, political ideologies and other delusions. This highly distrustful outlook challenges the central role trust is claimed to play by current influential views in social epistemology of testimony where trust in fellow humans is considered essential for our epistemic practices. This paper starts out from the perspective conveyed by the lyrics in this album, and others in the same genre, to explore just how meager of a social basis testimony can survive on. How would such a distrustful seeker of truth go about forming their beliefs? The central theme to be investigated is what role trust, as well as its contrary, plays in testimonial exchange. The paper aims to find out how such a subject could still succeed epistemically while violating accounts of trust presented in the recent debate. Lastly the question is posed whether the reader knows they are not in this dire predicament.
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Margherita Harris (SOCRATES Centre at Leibniz University)
Filosofiska institutionen
From Inductive Risk to Quantifauxcation Seminarium Datum: torsdag 20 februari 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Debates on the role of values in science have remained surprisingly disconnected from debates on the role of probability in inference—the so-called “statistics wars.” This talk bridges these debates by arguing that the uncritical acceptance of probabilism—the view that probability's role is to quantify degrees of belief or support—often leads philosophers to conflate value-based concerns with deeper epistemic issues. Revisiting the Rudner–Jeffrey debate, I show how differing conceptions of probability shape the argument from inductive risk and why this matters for broader debates on values in science. I then introduce quantifauxation (Stark, 2021) and disguised quantifauxation to illustrate how probabilistic methods can obscure rather than clarify uncertainty. I conclude that distinguishing methodological concerns from value-based ones is essential for preserving the epistemic integrity of scientific inference.
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Siska de Baerdemaeker
Filosofiska institutionen
Dark matter realism reconsidered Seminarium Datum: torsdag 13 mars 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Several authors have recently argued against realism about dark matter due to it being empirically unconfirmed or too conceptually thin. In response, Vaynberg (2024) has convincingly argued in favor of dark matter realism based on Bullet Cluster observations. However, anti-realist concerns about conceptual thinness or future empirical detection may linger. I argue that these can be diffused by distinguishing between two different dark matter concepts, which I call astrophysical dark matter and fundamental dark matter. I submit that anti-realist concerns about future dark matter detection conflate empirical confirmation for fundamental dark matter with empirical confirmation for astrophysical dark matter. I further argue that the resulting realist commitment to astrophysical dark matter is more substantive than dark matter anti-realists recognize: it organizes a structured space of possibilities for fundamental dark matter, and it guide.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Carmen Pavel (Kings College London)
Filosofiska institutionen
Constitutional Codification Seminarium Datum: tisdag 11 mars 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract What is the value of constitutional codification? This question was alive recently in an unfamiliar context, that of the economic and political integration of the European Union, which tried unsuccessfully to convert the most important provisions of existing treaties into a new Constitutional Treaty for the European Union. The constitutional treaty failed to be ratified by France and Netherlands in 2005, marking the end of an effervescent effort of many years to codify a European constitution. More familiarly, the question is alive in the UK where the constitution is not written down in any one document which declares itself as ‘the constitution,’ unlike much of the rest of the world. In addition, this question matters in new democracies which struggle to make the transition from histories of oppression and discrimination like South Africa or authoritarian pasts like the countries of Eastern Europe after the fall of communism. And it is also alive in any constitutional system whether possessing a written constitution or not, for which certain constitutional rules are unwritten, or which considers amendments, i.e. adding or removing clauses to the constitution. What does putting constitutional rules together in a unitary documentary form add, that cannot be accomplished via regular statutes, common law, or other forms of law-making? This is the main question of this article. The unfamiliar context of postnational constitutional order such as the European Union are valuable because they help us appreciate with fresh eyes the features and functions of written constitutions which may be obscured by their embeddedness in national histories and traditional legal systems. State-based constitutions are now part of national narratives and civic cultures about shared histories, of values and principles negotiated through time by well-established communities, and of patterns of injustice corrected through enduring local struggles. However, the postnational legal orders are much more recent, more fragile, and the commitment to shared goals and values less certain. Regional agreements such as the EU, the Caribbean Economic Community, or the East African Economic Community construct constitutional orders by endowing supranational courts authority over member states, and in more integrated legal orders such as the European one, they create institutions with legal supremacy and direct effect over national legal orders. Constitutional codification has been defended, at least in the EU case, on the grounds that it creates a charter of rights and liberties for EU citizens, it modifies decisions procedures from unanimity to qualified majority, and it further renders various rules belonging to disparate treaties more coherent and makes more explicit the core commitments and priorities of the member states. This article will investigate the case for a written constitution and also explore possible drawbacks for constitutional codification. It will make the case that most mature legal orders, including regional or international ones, would benefit from an explicit, unitary constitutional agreement, and explore the conditions under which codification is not desirable.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Marion Kathe Godman (Aarhus)
Filosofiska institutionen
Identity or Inductive potential? Human categories in the cross-roads. Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 3 april 2025 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: B497 Abstract When we study and learn about people and especially by the use of statistical bureaus (e.g. Statistics Sweden/SCB) and social science we face a choice about what categories to use for data collection: should we for example collect data in terms of people’s ethnic or in terms of immigrant origin? I have previously argued (2020) that one important criterion is to choose categories which display inductive potential, i.e. they license multiple inductive generalizations over members of a group that can be used for comparisons between groups. Moreover, I argued that a prominent reason for social categories (or kinds of people) displaying such inductive potential is that they are historical kinds (Millikan 2000). Here I respond to some worries that have and can be raised about applying such criteria to categories for research and data collection. In the process I make the notion of inductive potential more precise and also discuss its application to some commonly used categories of social class.