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- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Christian Barry (ANU)
Filosofiska institutionen
Offsetting and Accountable Harm Seminarium Datum: tisdag 27 september 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Under what conditions can we justify actions which impose risk on some group of people on the grounds that they belong to a set of actions that, together, do not impose risk on that same group of people? Answering this question is important for evaluating various practices, including the practice of offsetting carbon emissions. We've recently defended an answer to this question, which carries the practical implication that whether emitting and offsetting is permissible can depend on the form that the offsetting takes. If you offset by sequestering, such that you remove as much carbon from the atmosphere as you put in (for example by planting trees), then according to our view you can successfully offset. But when you offset by forestalling—preventing others from putting additional carbon into the atmosphere (for example by paying them not to emit, or providing them with more energy efficient stoves), you typically cannot. After explaining our view and considering some objections that others have presented to it, we introduce and discuss an important distinction between various harms to which your conduct can be causally related.
- CLLAM Seminar: Peter Pagin
Filosofiska institutionen
Assertion, assumption, and Deduction Seminarium Datum: fredag 23 september 2022 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 Abstract This talk concerns the connection between speech act theory, especially the theory of assertion, and deduction, especially Natural Deduction. From a very abstract point of view, an assertion of a content p can be described as the ascription of the property of being p to the actual index, or point of evaluation. This is the abstract characterization of assertoric force. Let’s assume that the actual index is a possible world, namely the actual world. Thus, the conclusion of a closed argument, as an act, is an assertion, and thereby characterized as the ascription of the conclusion content as a property to the actual world. The question that will concern us in this talk is how this idea extends to the status of other acts in the practice of Natural Deduction. In these terms, what is the force of an inference that depends on one or more open assumptions? What is the force of the assumption itself? What is the force of an assertion that uses an entire derivation as a premise? Do we need to ascribe a force to the derivation as a whole? Is there a coherent complete theory of act forces of Natural Deduction along these lines?
- CLLAM Seminar: Paul Gorbow (SU/UiO)
Filosofiska institutionen
A solution to the knower paradoxes with applications to common knowledge and iterated knowledge Seminarium Datum: fredag 13 maj 2022 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: Zoom Astract I present an untyped theory of knowledge and truth that solves the knower paradoxes of Kaplan and Montague from the 1960's. The underlying idea is (1) to formalize the principle of veracity (that whatever is known is true) more precisely, and (2) to embrace self-reference in the spirit of the Friedman-Sheard theory of truth and its associated revision semantics. It turns out that this facilitates expedient reasoning with common-knowledge predicates defined by self-referential formulas obtained by Gödel diagonalization. A generalization of the revision semantics to modalities (formalized as predicates) due to Johannes Stern is employed. Apart from answering questions of consistency, this opens up for philosophical insights on the meaning of sentences involving iterations of knowledge and truth, such as ' "Kim knows A" is true' and 'Kim knows "Kim knows A" '. Zoom-link
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Vili Lähteenmäki (Uleåborg)
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Cartesian Self-Relations Workshop Datum: fredag 13 maj 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract I will argue that accounting for our cognitive self-relation is subordinate to Descartes's aim of accounting for the mind and world relation. Accordingly, there is a single model, built for the mind and world relation, that is meant to account also for the mind’s cognitive relation to itself.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Erik Åkerlund (Newman)
Filosofiska institutionen
Suárez' Minimal Realism of Artifacts Workshop Datum: fredag 16 september 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract "In the Scholastic tradition, the two main positions when it came to the status of artifacts were realism and nominalism. Nominalism stated, briefly, that an artifact was nothing over and above the parts constituting it, while the realists denied this, while differing in what this "over and above" would be. This talk explores Francisco Suárez' (1548–1617) treatment of artifacts in his Disputationes metaphysicae (1597). As will be seen, Suárez basically follows the realist line of reasoning. However, with his novel take on the status of "one-ness" ('unum') as a transendental, and with the assigning of the "over and above" of the artifact to the status of a mode (rather than an accident in the proper sense), Suárez keeps the realism in his position to a minimum. Suárez account of the production of artifacts will also be briefly covered in the end." This seminar can be followed on zoom as well: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/67894532199
- Norms and Alternatives: Logical Aspects of Normative Reasoning
Filosofiska institutionen
Karl Nygren disputerar Disputation Datum: måndag 26 september 2022 Tid: 13.00 – 15.00 Plats: Lärosal 17, Albano hus 2, Albanovägen 18 Akademisk avhandling som för avläggande av filosofie doktorsexamen vid Stockholms universitet offentligen försvaras i lärosal 17, Albano hus 2, Albanovägen 18. Abstract In this thesis, I develop and investigate various novel semantic frameworks for deontic logic. Deontic logic concerns the logical aspects of normative reasoning. In particular, it concerns reasoning about what is required, allowed and forbidden. I focus on two main issues: free-choice reasoning and the role of norms in deontic logic. Free-choice reasoning concerns permissions and obligations that offer choices between different actions. Such permissions and obligations are typically expressed by a disjunctive clause in the scope of a deontic operator. For instance, the sentence "Jane may take an apple or a pear" intuitively offers Jane a choice between two permitted courses of action: she may take an apple, and she may take a pear. In the first part of the thesis, I develop semantic frameworks for deontic logic that account for free-choice reasoning. I show that the resulting logics avoid problems that arise for other logical accounts of free-choice reasoning. The main technical contributions are completeness results for axiomatizations of the different logics. Semantic frameworks for deontic logic typically only talk about norms implicitly. In the second part of the thesis, I clarify the role of norms in deontic logic. I develop a formal model of normative systems where norms are represented explicitly. The model takes into account both the hierarchical structure of normative systems, and the function of norms to regulate agent behavior. I show how the model can be used to clarify issues in the study of normative systems. I also develop a norm-based semantics for deontic action logic based on the model. Norms and Alternatives: Logical Aspects of Normative Reasoning
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Olle Torpman (IFFS)
Filosofiska institutionen
Transferred Outcome Responsibility and Climate Change Seminarium Datum: tisdag 30 januari 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract This paper explores the concept of outcome responsibility in general, and its relevance to issues of climate change in particular. It distinguishes outcome responsibility from moral and causal responsibility, emphasizing the features that make an agent outcome responsible. It argues against foreseeability being a condition for outcome responsibility, and proposes a definition that allows for degrees of responsibility. The paper also discusses the possibility of transferred outcome responsibility.
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Johannes Nyström
Filosofiska institutionen
Stability and success: on the soundness of the two-variable no-miracles argument Seminarium Datum: torsdag 2 november 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract The no-miracles-argument (NMA) for scientific realism asserts that the only plausible explanation of the predictive and explanatory success demonstrated by mature scientific theories is that those theories are at least approximately true. Sprenger and Hartmann (2016, 2019) attempt a probabilistic reconstruction of the NMA to assess its status from a Bayesian perspective. Their reconstruction shows that the stability of scientific theory over time is a crucial factor when assessing the NMA in a given context. Periods of theoretical stability substantially improve the persuasive force of the argument in favour of the scientific realist. In this talk, I critically assess their reconstruction, which I call the 'two-variables NMA'. I argue that Sprenger and Hartmann assume that the predictive and explanatory success of a scientific theory is less correlated with its stability than what may be genuinely expected. I show that under more plausible assumptions about this correlation, the described improvement is not substantial.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: H. Orri Stefánsson
Filosofiska institutionen
State Dominance for Individual Prospects (co-authored with Richard Bradley) Seminarium Datum: tisdag 7 november 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D734 Abstract We show that State Dominance for individual prospects has implausible implications given two seemingly innocuous assumptions. The first of these assumptions is that rational people can change their attitudes to risk. The second assumption is that there is a possible life and two points in time such that the life is made neither better nor worse when non-equivalent wellbeing levels at these two points in time are permuted. In the presence of these two assumptions, State Dominance implies that a person’s attitude to risk has no bearing on how preferable prospects are for her. So, we face an inconsistency between a set of prima facie plausible assumptions about attitudes to risk and how lifetime betterness relates to betterness at different times.
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Hans Halvorson (Princeton)
Filosofiska institutionen
Contextualism in Relativity and Quantum Theories Seminarium Datum: torsdag 19 oktober 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstrakt I review two accounts of global reference frames in spacetime theories (and Einstein's special theory of relativity in particular): 1. Absolutism: All fundamental facts are frame-independent, and the frame-relative facts are derivable from them. 2. Fragmentalism: All fundamental facts are frame-relative, and there are no non-trivial logical relations between the facts in one reference frame and the facts in another reference frame. I argue that both of these accounts are fatally flawed, and I develop an alternative account that builds on the intuitions behind these other accounts. (I also consider the relation between these accounts and methodological imperatives regarding "good physics".) Finally I consider whether this sharpened account of contextualism in relativity theory can shed light on the sort of contextualism that we encounter in quantum theories
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Jenny Pelletier (Leuven/Gothenburg)
Filosofiska institutionen
Ockham on Social Ends: Willing the “Common Good" Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 15 februari 2024 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D289 Abstract On my reading, Ockham holds that social groups are structured aggregates, being collections of many individual persons, at least some of which are constituted by persons who have chosen to order themselves relative to one another in some determinate way. A consequence of this view is that social groups are artifactual insofar as they, like complex material artifacts, are pluralities of natural substances (i.e., human beings) that are produced by means of voluntary – and in their case, joint – human action. I have already argued elsewhere that the purpose the human artisan had in mind when she decided to make an artifact fixes the function of that artifact. This is how I interpret the thought that the end of the human artisan is the end of the artifact. My presentation starts with the intuition that the members of a social group might analogously fix the function of that social group, that is to say the ends of group members might determine the end(s) of that social group. If this is right, then it would seem that the end of a social group is nothing more than an aggregate of member ends. Now, in his political writings, Ockham maintains the medieval status quo that the end of the political community is the common good. I will show how we can make sense of Ockham’s understanding of the common good as the end of the political community, even if that understanding is ultimately an aggregate of group member ends. To do so, I turn to Ockham’s account of final causes and their role as motivators in voluntary human action, particularly his take on the distinction between love of friendship (amor amiticiae) and love of desire (amor concupiscentiae). Moreover, I will attempt to argue that his understanding of the common good is less self-interested than it may appear at first glance if we consider it in light of his account of final causality.
- Inställt!! Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Johan Brännmark
Filosofiska institutionen
Addressing Social Indeterminacy Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 14 december 2023 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D289 Abstract While there are some contemporary defenders of ontic vagueness or metaphysical indeterminacy, a quite common view is still that vagueness or indeterminacy are really semantic or epistemic in character. The exact borders of, say, Mount Kilimanjaro might be disputable, and there might not be a clear-cut answer as to whether a particular boulder on its slope is part of it, but this is just due to indeterminacy in how we conceptually carve some aspects of the world. But the basic structure of the world ultimately is what it is. Nothing indeterminate about it, at least not on a metaphysical level. If we turn to the social realm, things potentially become more complicated since the ways in which we conceptualize objects in the social world do not just carve up an already existing social landscape. Instead, our conceptualizations of these objects, beliefs about them, and actions in relation to them, are typically understood to play a constitutive role in grounding the existence of the relevant social objects. Yet if many of the relevant categories and ideas are indeterminate, should there then not also be widespread indeterminacy in the social realm? And what would recognizing such indeterminacy mean for how we should understand social objects? In this presentation it is argued that the best response to the endemic indeterminacy of the social realm is a form of fictionalism about social objects.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Miira Tuominen
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Socrates and Alcibiades in Love – Self-Knowledge, Erôs and God in Alcibiades 1 and the Symposium’. Seminarium Datum: fredag 1 december 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In Plato’s Symposium and the Alcibiades I of a disputed origin, we find the mirroring declarations of erotic love (erôs and derivatives) by Alcibiades to Socrates and vice versa. In the Alcibiades I, Socrates announces that he is the only one who truly loves Alcibiades because he loves Alcibiades’ soul. Others have merely loved something that belongs to Alcibiades, his body, and deserted him when his full bloom has started to fade. The dialogue culminates in the famous account of self-knowledge in terms of an analogy of an eye seeing itself in the pupil of another eye. Puzzlingly, Socrates also states in the analogy that self-knowledge requires knowledge of god. I shall focus on this latter point and argue that it can be explained by reference to the well-known Platonic claim that the highest goal of human life is assimilation to god insofar as it is possible in bodily life. I consider this ideal with respect to Alcibiades’ description of the effects of his passion for Socrates in the Symposium and argue that even rather deficient kinds of self-knowledge require recognition of godlikeness. I also claim that the deficiency of Alcibiades’ self-knowledge is not merely in it being about changeable individuals as opposed to general and immutable Forms. This sheds new light on the question of whether or to what extent individuals can be known.
- Inställt! CLLAM Seminarium: Julie Hunter (University of Texas at Austin)
Filosofiska institutionen
Inställt! Seminarium Datum: fredag 1 december 2023 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: Zoom Abstract Aviseras senare
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Gunnar Björnsson
Filosofiska institutionen
Outcome luck and the nature of blame and praise Seminarium Datum: tisdag 21 november 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D734 Abstract A central disagreement in the theory of responsibility concerns outcome luck. If someone unjustifiably risks harming, can their degree of blameworthiness be affected by whether anyone is actually harmed as a result? If someone does their best to help an important cause, can their degree of praiseworthiness be affected by whether they succeed? Some think so, but many have the strong intuition that the answer is negative: the agent would be equally blame- or praiseworthy whether or not the outcome materializes. I have previously argued against the reliability of such intuitions. In this talk, however, I suggest that attention to the nature of moral blame and praise should lead us to revise the questions themselves.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Daniel Ramöller
Filosofiska institutionen
Close Enough Theory X Seminarium Datum: tisdag 14 november 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Abstract The ethics of future generations is riddled by paradoxes. Ethical theorists have searched for an ethical theory of beneficience that avoids these paradoxes, what Derek Parfit has called “theory X”. Combining different ideas from the literature, this text begins to suggests a new theory to solve these paradoxes.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Pauliina Remes (Uppsala)
Filosofiska institutionen
Plotinus on Dialectic: Narrow and Broad Conceptions Workshop Datum: fredag 17 november 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In Platonism, a gulf between inquiry and knowledge, between discursive and noetic thinking, between fallibility and infallibility is always looming. The same - or related - gulf has sometimes been read inside the conception of dialectic: is dialectic a procedure and a method, or perhaps the aim or the final stage of this method in which there is no longer room for error? Plotinus short and incredibly condensed treatise On Dialectic I.3. would seem to separate these conceptions explicitly, and offers some ideas on what kinds of operations help moving from the former to the latter one. I will argue that he uses the term broadly, for operations that deal with even individuals and sensible items, and that his aim to lay out a procedure that helps arriving in dialectic understood narrowly. The gap does not disappear after working out Plotinus literary references, influences, and motivations, but it comes our significantly smaller than initially appeared. Ideal epistemology, then, does not need to mean that there is no interest and work put into thinking about inquiry and early phases of knowledge acquisition.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Eline Gerritsen (Hamburg)
Filosofiska institutionen
Questioning the Normative Status of Social Norms Seminarium Datum: tisdag 17 oktober 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D734 Abstract Our everyday behaviour is constantly shaped and restricted by the unwritten rules of our society. In metanormative debates, it is taken for granted that these social norms are not normative in the authoritative sense. Indeed, they are used as the paradigmatic example of norms that are merely formally normative. In this paper, I go against this consensus, arguing that it is an open question whether (some) social norms have significant normative force. I consider and reject a range of potential defences of the idea that social norms could not be authoritative, from claims about the insignificance of conventional norms to worries about capturing the fugitive thought. Questioning unwarranted assumptions about the normative status of social norms opens up a promising area of metanormative inquiry.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson (Oslo)
Filosofiska institutionen
Plotinus and Aristotle on Motion and Activity Workshop Datum: fredag 6 oktober 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Graham Oddie (CU Boulder)
Filosofiska institutionen
Incomparability and the Logical Structure of Value Magnitudes Seminarium Datum: tisdag 13 februari 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D247 Abstract Bykvist (and some others) have recently argued that positing value magnitudes (analogues of physical magnitudes such as lengths, masses, temperatures and so on) throws considrable light on some problems in axiology. Here I foucs on problems concerning value incomparability and value incommensurability. Of how much value are value magnitudes in this cluster?