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- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Isaac Taylor
Filosofiska institutionen
Just War Error Theory, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Pacifism Seminarium Datum: tisdag 21 maj 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Some of our most firmly held moral beliefs about war are, if a number of prominent philosophers are correct, illusions. The idea that soldiers do no wrong in fighting for an unjust case, for instance, cannot be justified as a correct account of the fundamental moral permissions, rights, and liabilities of individuals. What should members of the armed forces do in light of these claims? Jeff McMahan has argued that combatants should fall back on fundamental moral principles to guide their actions, while Henry Shue has maintained that they should continue to act as if the illusions were real. In this paper, I make a provisional case for a third option. Drawing on the existing debate, but also recent work in metaethics about the potentially undesirable effects of moralizing conflicts, I suggest that soldiers should foster a qualified skepticism about the morality of participating in any war. This may look very much like a pacifist theory, but I also demonstrate how it can avoid some of the standard objections that are levelled against pacifism.
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Mike Stuart (York)
Filosofiska institutionen
Scientific Understanding as Ability Seminarium Datum: torsdag 25 april 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract This talk has three goals. First, I’ll argue that the popular distinction between explanatory, objectual and pragmatic understanding is currently ambiguous concerning whether it refers to a distinction between states, modes or objects of understanding. I argue that this distinction is most fruitfully characterized as one between epistemic states, rather than modes or objects. Second, I address the question of fundamentality. What do we mean when we say that one of these kinds of understanding is more fundamental than the others? I distinguish between several possibilities, and focus on “humble reductionism” – where one kind of understanding is necessary but not sufficient for another kind (or kinds) of understanding. Then, I’ll argue that pragmatic understanding is the most fundamental kind of understanding, in this sense. Third, I’ll sketch an account of pragmatic understanding. Roughly, an agent S has pragmatic understanding of X when S has, and is responsible for having, the ability to reliably and successfully manipulate X, where those abilities come with the right dispositions; exist in the majority of nearby possible worlds; and are robust. I close by considering how this account informs the debate about scientific progress. Specifically, it allows us to capture what seems right about both the so-called noetic (understanding-based) and functional (ability-based) accounts of scientific progress, combining them into a single account of scientific progress.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Meradjuddin Khan Oidermaa & Saba Bazargan-Forward
Filosofiska institutionen
Accountability for Making Prior Wrongs Worse Seminarium Datum: tisdag 27 februari 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In this paper we introduce and defend an account of “ex post deontic influence” (EDI). According to this account, an agent can do something at T2 which makes them accountable for a wrongdoing committed by another agent at T1. We demonstrate how this account of EDI can illuminate and resolve a variety of seemingly disparate moral conundrums drawn from a diverse range of literatures.
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Richard Dawid
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Effective Realism Made Effective Seminarium Datum: torsdag 22 februari 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In recent years, the position of effective realism, first proposed by Porter Williams in 2019, has generated much interest and debate in the philosophy physics. While supporters of the position view it as the most promising form of realism in the context of modern physics, critics have raised doubts whether the position deserves to be called a genuine scientific realist position. In this talk, I argue that there is a clear sense in which effective realism reaches beyond empiricism and therefore can be called a form of realism. Moreover, I demonstrate that no stronger form of scientific realism than effective realism is defensible in the context of contemporary physics. In the second part of the talk, however, I claim that effective realism is itself an effective concept: its range of applicability ends at the Planck scale, where realist commitment, if meaningful at all, needs to be of a fundamental realist kind. The talk is based on joint work with Michael Stöltzner
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Erik Åkerlund (Newmaninstitutet)
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Titel aviseras senare Workshop Datum: fredag 23 februari 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Linguistic and Epistemological Perspectives on Testimony
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Ingress
- Graduate Student Discussion Session with Fiona Woollard
Filosofiska institutionen
All MA and PhD students are welcome! Handledning Datum: fredag 19 april 2024 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D734 There will be a graduate student discussion session at the department with Fiona Woollard, Professor of philosophy at the University of Southampton. We will discuss an extract from Professor Woollard’s upcoming book on maternal duties, which will be sent out before the session.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Fiona Woollard (Southampton)
Filosofiska institutionen
Why not get rid of mothers (and other gendered personal roles)? Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 18 april 2024 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D289 Abstract In this talk, I will argue that to be a mother is not simply to be a parent who is a woman. To be a mother is to have a female gendered parental role. Motherhood, like other gendered roles, is implicated in gender injustice. Those seen as mothers are typically held to unreasonable ideals of self-sacrifice with bad effects on both individuals and the structure of society. So should we get rid of gendered parental roles and have only parents, no mothers and fathers? I compare gendered parental roles with other gendered personal roles (spouse, daughter) and with gendered professional roles (nurse/doctor, actor/actress). I argue that no one should have their personal roles gendered against their will: women should be able to be parents but not mothers. However, in contrast to many professional roles, gendered personal roles can be flexible enough for the people involved to negotiate individualised, and potentially emancipatory, understandings of how the role is gendered. We can resist the injustice in current influential understanding of motherhood, while honouring parents’ and children’s experiences of the parental role as gendered. Gender neutral parental roles should be an option – but should not be the only option. The same applies to other gendered personal roles.
- CLLAM seminarium: Katalin Farkas (Central European University)
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Title TBA Seminarium Datum: fredag 5 april 2024 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Romy Eskens
Filosofiska institutionen
Mental Wronging Seminarium Datum: tisdag 13 december 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Can one person wrong another through purely mental activity? There are some reasons to think so. For example, if A intentionally and non-compulsively fantasizes about raping B, it seems fitting for A to feel guilty over this with respect to B. And if B were to find out about the fantasizing, it seems they could fittingly resent A over it and demand an apology from them. Yet, the possibility of mental wronging seems ruled out by the basic and widely shared assumption that one person wrongs another only if they treat or affect them in some way. This presentation has two complementary aims. The first is to argue that the basic assumption does not in fact rule out the possibility of mental wronging. The second is to identify a sufficient ground for mental wronging: one person wrongs another through purely mental activity if the activity degrades this other person.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Sylvain Roudaut
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Luis Coronel on Impetus Workshop Datum: fredag 11 november 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract It is usually claimed that, beyond superficial similarities, there exists a substantial difference between the medieval theory of ‘impetus' and Galileo’s theory of ‘impeto’. Despite an obvious terminological resemblance, the meaning of these two terms is so different that they should not hide the epistemological break that happened between the late Middle Ages and the early Modern period. In this talk, I would like to reassess this claim by focusing on the theory of impetus proposed by Luis Coronel, who was active at the turn of the 16th century. The first part of the talk will be devoted to a brief recap of the main differences between medieval and modern theories of the impetus/impeto. Then I will show that Coronel’s theory may be regarded as a missing link between the medieval theories of the impetus and the modern theories of inertia. Finally, I will briefly discuss the possible influence of Coronel’s views on later authors up to Galileo.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Cesare Cuttica (Université Paris 8)
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Lessons from the Past: Anti-Democracy in Early Modern England Workshop Datum: fredag 28 oktober 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 or Zoom link: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/61245739584 Abstract Based on his recent monograph, Anti-democracy in England 1570-1642 (Oxford University Press, 2022), Cesare Cuttica’s talk will provide a sketch of anti-democratic ideas in early modern England with the goal of stimulating the audience of the Stockholm seminar to reflect on some key contemporary political issues such as populism, fake news, the role of religion in democracies. Cesare’s presentation will show that anti-democratic critiques were addressed at 'popular government' as a regime that empowered directly and fully the irrational, uneducated, dangerous multitude; will explain why and how criticism of democracy was articulated in England and in Europe at the time; and will argue that the early modern era is far more relevant to the development of democratic concepts and practices than has hitherto been acknowledged. Most importantly, Cesare’s paper will say something about the importance of re-evaluating the role of religion and cultural factors in the history of democracy and of political ideas more generally. Ultimately, Cesare’s talk intends to offer a novel analysis of a precious portion of Western political reflection and an ideal platform to discuss the legacy of principles that are still fundamental today. Cesare Cuttica is Lecturer in British History at the Université Paris 8 and a member of the Centre for Intellectual History at the University of Helsinki. He has published a monograph on John Locke’s main target Robert Filmer and patriarchalism; edited four volumes of essays on various topics (including the idea of crisis); and written articles in the field of the history of ideas in early modern Britain and Europe as well as essays about the practice of history-writing, notably about the methodology of intellectual history.
- Konferens om social ontologi
Filosofiska institutionen
Stockholms universitet värd för konferensen sommaren 2023 Konferens Startdatum: onsdag 16 augusti 2023 Tid: 10.00 Slutdatum: lördag 19 augusti 2023 Tid: 16.00 Plats: Stockholms universitet Social ontology 2023 Place and location: 16th to 19th of August, 2023, Stockholm University Campus Albano Conference theme: Social ontology and the social sciences Keynote speakers: Michael E. Bratman, Stanford University Katharine Jenkins, University of Glasgow Muhammad Ali Khalidi, City University of New York Emma Tieffenbach, University of Geneva Vanessa Wills, The George Washington University Panel on the method(s) of social ontology: Social ontology: What is it? What do we want it to be? Social events: There will be a tour and dinner at the City Hall (the place of the Nobel Prize dinner), and a trip to the Stockholm archipelago. The conference hotel is located in central Stockholm. Organizing committee: Erik Angner, Gunnar Björnsson, Åsa Burman, Staffan Carlshamre, Anandi Hattiangadi. Head of organizing committee and contact person: Åsa Burman Email: asa.burman@philosophy.su.se For more information and the call for papers see the official conference website . Arranged by: International Social Ontology Society (ISOS) and the Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University.
- Gemensamma Stockholm-Uppsala Seminariet i praktisk filosofi
Filosofiska institutionen
Stina Björkholm & Nicolas Olsson-Yaouzis (SU) Andrew Reisner (UU) Seminarium Datum: fredag 2 december 2022 Tid: 10.00 – 13.00 Plats: Eng2-K1028, Uppsala universitet Stina Björkholm (IF) & Nicolas Olsson-Yaouzis (SU): ‘Dynamic Pragmatics and Obscuring in Political Philosophy’. Kommentator: Jessica Pepp (UU) Andrew Reisner (UU): ‘An Attempt at a Dialectically Concessive Argument in Favour of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief’. Kommentator: Jonas Olson (SU)
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Joe Roussos (IFFS)
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Possibilities in climate science Seminarium Datum: torsdag 17 november 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract This paper examines how climate scientists use models to explore possibilities—so called “modal modelling.” I begin by distinguishing several senses of “possible” and considering how they might be relevant to the project of studying climate change. These include epistemic possibility, metaphysical possibility, and possibility according to a set of laws of nature—e.g., physical possibility. Determining whether a claim is possible in the relevant sense is a question of modal epistemology. I contrast this with the task of determining whether a claim is supported by a body of evidence, which is a matter of confirmation theory, a subset of ordinary epistemology. I then examine a debate about the interpretation and use of collections of climate models, for example in the IPCC assessment reports. One party argues that climate models don’t provide the right sort of information to allow us to make probabilistic claims about how the climate will be in future. They argue instead that climate models allow for only claims about possible futures rather than probable futures. I call these critics possibilists, and their more orthodox opponents probabilists. The possibilists think that climate models allow us to distinguish between which possible futures are “nearer” or “more relevant”, and that these distinctions reflect facts about our evidence. I argue that there isn’t a concept of “possibility” that can do the work these critics want: fitting the evidence from climate models, admitting of degrees, supporting decisions, and yet not amounting to probability.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Daniel Telech (Lund)
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Invitations: Their Structure, Normativity, and Value Seminarium Datum: tisdag 15 november 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In this talk I present an account of a philosophically underdiscussed speech act: invitation. I propose that, when A invites B to φ, A therein issues B with a permission-giving discretionary directive to engage in an activity that A is to host. As it is a sincerity condition of invitation, I maintain, that A i) desires φ-ing with B and ii) believes it to be (at least) possibly desirable for B to φ with A, A represents herself as possessing these attitudes in inviting B (though A might in fact lack them). My proposal satisfies a key desideratum for an adequate view of invitation, namely its being able to distinguish invitations from offers, on the one hand, and proposals for joint activity, on the other. This feature of my view is reflected in what I propose to be the distinctive value of the power to invite: our having a measure of creative autonomy over the relationships we cultivate.
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: James Nguyen
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Explanation, Accuracy, and Universality Seminarium Datum: torsdag 20 oktober 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract This talk has two main aims. First, I will argue against the currently popular idea that truth, or accurate representation, is unnecessary for explanation (or understanding), an idea primarily motivated by the prevalence of idealized models in science. I suggest that a proper understanding of the inferential patterns associated with model-based reasoning requires appreciating contextual aspects of such reasoning, and in doing so, paying appropriate attention to the worldly claims extracted from an idealized model. Second, I will explore explanations associated with ‘universality’ considerations. Such explanations are taken as exemplars of inaccurate, yet explanatory models. But the structure and nature of these explanations remain in need of explication. I will take some initial steps in this regard.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Sebastian Enqvist
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Extracting Herbrand disjunctions from cyclic proofs Evenemang Datum: torsdag 20 oktober 2022 Tid: 16.15 – 18.00 Plats: F389 Abstract Herbrand's theorem provides constructive content to classical logic. Given an existentially quantified and provable statement, the theorem provides a valid finite disjunction of formulas substituting ground terms for the bound variables. This can be seen as a weaker form of the existence property for intuitionistic logic, in which for any provable existentially quantified formula one can find concrete witnesses for the bound variables. The standard proof of Herbrand's theorem uses cut elimination. In recent work by Afshari, Hetzl and Leigh, a direct interpretation of classical sequent calculus proofs in terms of so-called higher-order recursion schemes is given, in order to directly compute a Herbrand disjunction from a given proof (cut-free or not). This can be seen as a model of the computational content of a proof in classical sequent calculus. As a model of computation, it is however rather weak in the sense that no actual recursion takes place - as expected, since first-order logic has no built-in means to make recursive definitions. In order to extend the expressive power of this computational interpretation of classical logic, we therefore propose to consider cyclic (or, non-wellfounded) sequent calculus proofs for first-order logic extended with inductively defined predicates in the style of Martin-Löf, following an approach of Brotherston and Simpson. In this talk I will sketch how this framework can be set up, and present some simple applications. The talk is based on ongoing joint work with Bahareh Afshari and Graham Leigh.
- Stockholm-Uppsala seminariet i praktisk filosofi
Filosofiska institutionen
Joseph Bowen (Stockholm) & Marvin Backes (Uppsala) Seminarium Datum: tisdag 5 april 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 16.00 Plats: D700 Filosofiska institutionen, Stockholms universitet Titlar Marvin Backes: aviseras senare Joseph Bowen: Directed and Undirected Duties to Rescue Kommentatorer: aviseras senare
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Isaac Taylor
Filosofiska institutionen
Collective Responsibility and Artificial Intelligence Seminarium Datum: tisdag 11 oktober 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract The use of artificial intelligence to make high-stakes decisions is sometimes thought to create a troubling responsibility gap – that is, a situation where nobody can be held morally responsible for the outcomes that are brought about. However, philosophers and practitioners have recently claimed that, although no individual can be held morally responsible, groups of individuals might be. Consequently, they think, we have less to fear from the use of AI than might appear to be the case. This paper assesses this claim. Drawing on existing philosophical models of collective responsibility, I consider whether changing focus from the individual to the collective level can help us identify a locus of responsibility in a greater range of cases of AI deployment. I ultimately find that appeal to collective responsibility will be of limited use in filling the responsibility gap.