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- CLLAM Seminar: Agustin Vicente (Ikerbasque/University of the Basque Country)
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Speaking for thinking vs Thinking for Speaking Seminarium Datum: fredag 1 april 2022 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: Zoom Abstract Two connected questions that arise for anyone interested in inner speech are whether we tell ourselves something that we have already thought; and, if so, why we would tell ourselves something that we have already thought. In this contribution I focus on the first question, which is about the nature and the production of inner speech. While it is usually assumed that the content of what we tell ourselves is exactly the content of a non-linguistic thought, I argue that there can be a lot of transformation in the process of converting a thought into words. Thus, the content of what we tell ourselves, being intrinsically linguistic, is different from the content of the thought our speech transmits. Fleshing out this kind of approach.
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Uljana Feest (Hannover)
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Big Data and Machine Learning in the Measurement of Personality Traits Seminarium Datum: torsdag 19 januari 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In the last 15 years or so, the use of big data and machine learning has gained traction in some areas of personality psychology (Rauthmann 2020): While traditional personality research relies largely on self-reports and third-person assessments, the new area of “personality computing” (Vinciarelli & Mohammadi 2014) promises to be more unobtrusive and deliver data from subjects’ everyday behavior, such as cell-phone use and “likes” on social media, which are processed by machine learning algorithms to produce predictions about personality traits and behaviors. Some commentators have hailed this method as a new psychometric tool, which can compete with (and will perhaps replace) old-fashioned questionnaire-based personality tests (Boyd et al 2020) and which has the advantage of using naturally occurring behaviors (Furr 2009). If we view personality computing as a tool of psychometric measurement, the question is how it fares with regard to standard criteria of test evaluation, such as validity (Harari et al 2020; Phan & Rauthmann 2021; Bleidorn & Hopwood 2020). In my talk, I will pick up on some recent discussions about the construct validity of PC-models. I will begin by explaining the notion of construct validity as a property of both, tests and constructs. For example, if a test is claimed to measure the purported personality trait of introversion, it has construct validity if it in fact measures introversion, which in turn means that the construct (=concept) introversion has a legitimate referent. Within psychology, it is, however, highly controversial what standards of evidence have to be met in order for a test to have construct validity. Two opposing sides focus on either correlational or experimental evidence (Borsboom et al 2004). Advocates of the former approach look for correlations between different measures of the same thing, whereas advocates of the latter demand that the data produced by the test in fact be caused by the phenomenon under investigation. (Feest 2020) I will argue that while the outputs of PC models appear to be correlated with the outcomes of traditional personality measures, the precise targets of those traditional personality measures remain contested. Moreover, big data are typically “mobilized from a variety of sources” (Leonelli 2020), which means that the material circumstances of their production recede into the background and the data become decontextualized. In turn, this means that their quality as evidence for the phenomena in question (and thus the validity of the PC models that utilize them) cannot easily be established (Feest 2022). I will conclude that while all of this does not negate the potential heuristic fruitfulness of PC models, it strongly suggests that these models need to be supplemented with theoretical and experimental work, which should (a) articulate and develop the relevant constructs, and (b) establish the suitability of the data as evidence.
- Perspectives on Knowledge Resistance
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- CLLAM seminar: Paul Gorbow (Oslo/Stockholm)
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Development Processes Seminarium Datum: fredag 6 december 2024 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Throughout mathematics there are constructions where an object is obtained as a limit of an infinite sequence. Typically, the objects in the sequence improve as the sequence progresses, and the ideal is reached at the limit. I introduce a view that understands this as a process by which a single dynamic mathematical object develops toward a goal. This view is analogous to the endurantist position in the metaphysics of time, although it does not involve time; rather, it highlights a commonality between the temporal trajectory of an object and this type of mathematical construction. For example, just as a plant starts as a seed and then develops by adding and removing cells through time, so too does the approximation to pi obtained from the Leibniz series develop, starting at 4, then subtracting 4/3, adding 4/5, subtracting 4/7, and so on. In both cases, there is a strong intuition that we are dealing with a single object that maintains its identity throughout the process, because each change is naturally viewed as a modification of a single object, rather than the creation of an entirely new object. This view is supported by a general philosophical discussion, by a formal framework for dynamic mathematical objects that develop through processes, and by applications to a variety of mathematical processes where it has significant advantages, including the revision semantics of truth.
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Andreas Stephens (Lund)
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Knowledge as a natural phenomenon Seminarium Datum: torsdag 7 november 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract ‘What is knowledge?’ In intuition-based epistemology the question is often considered to concern how ‘knowledge’ is used linguistically or conceptually rather than what knowledge is. In addition, since intuitions are used as evidence despite empirical experiments indicating that people’s intuitions vary a great deal and that little conclusive systematicity can be found, it is argued that approaches with such a focus cannot provide a solid foundation to answer the initial question. By instead looking at naturalistic approaches, a pluralistic cognitive epistemological approach which accepts ontological naturalism, methodological cooperative naturalism, and evolutionary naturalism can be identified. Given this approach – close to that of Hilary Kornblith – it is possible to look at how various relevant sciences see the natural phenomenon of knowledge. This provides a complement to Kornblith’s sole focus on cognitive ethology. By also including the perspectives of cognitive psychology and evolutionary systems theory a new view of knowledge is made possible. The emerging picture indicates that the natural phenomenon of knowledge plausibly can be seen as consisting in dynamic internal survival-beneficial structures. For higher organisms, such structures importantly involve reflexive and reflective memory processes that (satisficingly) reliably produce (satisficingly) true beliefs.
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: John Dougherty (München)
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Instrumentalism and gauge theories Seminarium Datum: torsdag 24 oktober 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract On the usual philosophical story, gauge theories are puzzling because they seem to have "surplus structure": theoretical content that does not directly correspond to features of the world. Prima facie, this is only a puzzle for a scientific realist: the instrumentalist is indifferent to this sort of correspondence. Nevertheless, I argue, puzzles about gauge theories indeed arise for some contemporary versions of instrumentalism. In particular, there is a problem concerning the interpretation of the physicist's distinction between "gauge" and "physical" symmetries. I offer a new interpretation of this distinction that has payoffs for current debates in philosophy of physics.
- The Rolf Schock Prize Symposium in Logic and Philosophy 2024
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- History of Philosophy Workshop: A discussion on Stoic metaphysics
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A discussion on Stoic metaphysics and its influence in medieval and early modern philosophy There is no talk but please join us to discuss the topic. Workshop Datum: fredag 4 oktober 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Literature Steven Strange and Jack Zupko (eds.). Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations (2004). A.A. Long and D.N Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers , vol. 1 (1987) under Stoicism, Physics, Mixture 48
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Åsa Carlsson
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Moral Motivation in Hume’s Treatise: The Perplexing Premise, Paragraph T 3.2.1.8, and the Circle Seminarium Datum: tisdag 24 september 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Section 6, Internalism and the perplexing premise, is a discussion about whether or not Hume ought to have adopted motivational judgment internalism, that is, the view that moral judgments necessarily motivates an agent to perform an action, to some extent, if she believes it is the right one. Though a bit anachronistic, many Hume commentators think so. Without an internalistic interpretation of 'morals', Hume’s so-called Motivation Argument (T 3.1.1.6) is invalid, they argue. I discuss their claim and try to understand why they hold it. Since internalism is inconsistent with Hume's view of causation, I make an attempt to rescue the validity of the argument by analyzing the internalism claim as a claim about moral judgments as motivating by necessity and by themselves. After subtracting the necessity I arrive at an interpretation of 'morals' as a sentiment of approval of some virtuous action that motivates by itself, under some conditions, but not necessarily so.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Tomas Ekenberg (Newman)
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Ontological Arguments in Cicero and Others: On the History of the Proof Called Anselm's Workshop Datum: fredag 22 november 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Josefine Klingspor (Stanford)
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Conatus and Conservation Workshop Datum: fredag 13 december 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Forming the basis of his theory of human psychology, ethics, and political philosophy, Spinoza’s conatus doctrine, his view that all finite things strive to persevere in their being, is a cornerstone of his philosophy. Several issues have been raised concerning this doctrine. However, a feature that is generally regarded as relatively straightforward is Spinoza’s contention that the conatus is a causal power. In this talk, I will argue that this contention is in fact deeply puzzling. For it appears to be directly at odds with another core commitment of Spinoza’s, namely the view that all finite things depend on God not only for coming into being (for being created or produced) but also for remaining in being from one moment to the next (for being conserved), a view that is regarded as beyond question in the eyes not only of Spinoza but also of most early modern Cartesians and medieval Aristotelians. But if this is so, I will show, it appears by Spinoza’s lights that the conatus cannot be a causal power. There is thus a tension right at the heart of Spinoza’s philosophical project. The aim of this talk is to understand how Spinoza can resolve this tension and, with that, deepen our understanding of the conatus doctrine.
- Högre seminarium i Praktisk filosofi: Hossein Ayati (Universitetet i Teheran)
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Reasoning, Rationality, and Coherence Seminarium Datum: tisdag 10 september 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Although much ink has been spilled in discussing the relationship between rationality and normative reasons on the one hand and normative reasons and reasoning on the other, surprisingly, little has been said about whether we can understand rationality in terms of reasoning. In this paper, I propose a novel way to understand rationality in terms of good reasoning. I argue that structural rationality is best understood in terms of adherence to formal good reasoning and substantive rationality as adherence to non-formal good reasoning. I show how this can provide a unified account of structural and substantive dimensions of rationality that remain elusive on many other accounts. I also discuss several challenging cases for some prominent accounts of rationality and show how my account succeeds where they fail.
- Stockholm Colloqium in Philosophy: Jan von Plato (Helsingfors)
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What kind of a philosopher was Gödel? Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 26 september 2024 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D299 Abstract: Kurt Gödel (1906-1978) belonged to a university tradition that combined the exact sciences with a profound study of philosophy. Recent work on the enormous amount of shorthand manuscripts he left behind shows that his basic view of science and philosophy was formed already at the end of his last school year: a monistic philosophy that is far away from materialism and empiricism, but not thoroughly idealistic. Gödel's style was not one of extensive philosophical texts. He composed instead endless lists of remarks, typically less than a page in length; one example is his book-length 340 numbered remarks on the foundations of quantum mechanics that he took to show that "Kant was right." More generally, his work in logic, mathematics, physics, and theology was guided by his search of an "absolute philosophy" inspired by Leibniz.
- Craige Roberts (Ohio State/Barnard): Introduktion till dynamisk semantik
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- CLLAM: Tricia Magalotti (Stockholm)
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Title TBA Abstract TBA
- Stockholm Colloqium in Philosophy: Jan von Plato (Helsingfors)
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What kind of a philosopher was Gödel? Disputation Datum: torsdag 15 augusti 2024 Tid: 14.43 Plats: D289 Abstract: Kurt Gödel (1906-1978) belonged to a university tradition that combined the exact sciences with a profound study of philosophy. Recent work on the enormous amount of shorthand manuscripts he left behind shows that his basic view of science and philosophy was formed already at the end of his last school year: a monistic philosophy that is far away from materialism and empiricism, but not thoroughly idealistic. Gödel's style was not one of extensive philosophical texts. He composed instead endless lists of remarks, typically less than a page in length; one example is his book-length 340 numbered remarks on the foundations of quantum mechanics that he took to show that "Kant was right." More generally, his work in logic, mathematics, physics, and theology was guided by his search of an "absolute philosophy" inspired by Leibniz.
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Pablo Ruiz de Olano (Max Planck Institute for the History of)
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MEA and Theory Development: Lessons from the Development of the Standard Model of Particle Physics Seminarium Datum: torsdag 5 september 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In the last few years, interest in the concept of Meta-Empirical theory Assessment (MEA) has sharply increased. In this talk, I address an aspect of the MEA framework that has remained relatively unexplored in the literature and relates to the topic of theory development. The talk will be divided into three different parts. First, I introduce the MEA formalism and highlight some of the initial motivations behind its development. As I show, providing an account of theory development constituted an important goal of the framework, which has however received relatively little scholarly work. After that, I take a look at a historical episode that is of particular importance for MEA, namely the development of the Standard Model of Particle Physics. Building on previous work, I use this historical process to further emphasise the point that defenders of MEA are under pressure to provide a satisfactory account of theory development. Finally, in the third and last part of the talk, I discuss some of the strategies that one might follow to accomplish this goal.
- Disputation i praktisk filosofi
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Jimmy Goodriche disputerar Opponent: Theron Pummer (St Andrews) Disputation Datum: tisdag 28 maj 2024 Tid: 14.00 – 16.00 Plats: Hörsal 9, Södra huset D, Vån 3 James Goodrich försvarar avhandlingen: Self-Defense Without Deontology: Groundwork for a Consequentialist Ethics of Harm
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Marilù Papandreou (Bergen)
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Aristotle on the Ontology of Artefact Workshop Datum: torsdag 30 maj 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D892 Abstract It is commonly believed that Aristotle merely uses artefacts as examples or analogical cases. In this talk, however, I aim to show that Aristotle gives a specific, coherent account of artefacts that in various ways owes much to Plato. Moreover, I propose a new, definitive solution to the problem of artefacts' substantiality, which comprises two controversial positions: (i) that Aristotle holds a binary view of substantiality according to which artefacts are not substances at all; (ii) that artefacts fail to be substances because they exhibit less of a unity than natural wholes. Finally, responding to the contemporary debate on ordinary objects, I shall identify the main propositions for an ontology of artefacts that aspires to use Aristotle as its authority and can serve as a guideline for current metaphysical discussions.
- CLLAM seminarium: Sebastian Watzl (Universitetet i Oslo)
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Attention and Rational Choice Seminarium Datum: fredag 17 maj 2024 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D734 Abstract Formal models of decision making are widely employed in philosophy as well as microeconomics. They are variously described as rational choice theory or decision theory. The standard decision theoretic apparatus has no role for attention in its modelling. It treats rational agents as acting on the basis of preferences (desires) and credences (beliefs or expectations). At the same time, psychology and empirically informed philosophy of mind and action shows that attention plays essential and constructive roles in both belief revision and agency. In this paper, I sketch why attention should be included in decision-theoretic models, how to incorporate attention into them in a way that keeps what makes such models valuables, that is psychologically plausible, and theoretically and formally elegant and tractable. Agents, I argue, are informationally blind to issues they are not paying any attention to. All of an agent’s information gathering involves attention (at least, it won’t impact the agent’s beliefs without attention). Agents also are decisionally blind to options that don’t occupy their attention. The options an agent decides between at any time is limited by the issues the agent is paying attention to in making that decision. I will show that informational blindness and decisional blindness are two sides of the same coin. This, I suggest, in part, is what makes attention decision-theoretically and normatively interesting: its role in mind and action is theoretical and practical at the same time. I show when attention, treated in this way, allows agents to act in ways that are both epistemically and practically better than they could act without attention, and how the view sketched here affects recent discussions on the nature and aim of inquiry.