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- Machina mundi: Hur medeltida tänkare föregrep modern vetenskap
Filosofiska institutionen
Henrik Lagerlund och Sylvain Roudaut om hur modern vetenskap föregreps i medeltida filosofi i tidskriften Aeon magazine. The predominant assumption about the rise of modern science is that it went hand in hand with the conception of nature as a universal mechanism. By viewing nature in this way, it could be studied, analysed and experimented upon with mathematical rigour, and its functioning could be elucidated by physicists harnessing empirical methods. Aeon magazine
- Ny bok av Åsa Wikforss: Därför demokrati
Filosofiska institutionen
I Därför demokrati reder Åsa Wikforss ut kunskapens roll i demokratin och förklarar varför och på vilka sätt hoten mot kunskapen också utgör ett hot mot demokratin.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Antoinette Schertz
Filosofiska institutionen
The legitimacy political climate institutions Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 12 oktober 2023 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D289 The legitimacy political climate institutions: Rethinking the relationship between climate science, non-epistemic values and democracy Abstract Addressing global problems such as climate change requires national action and international collaboration. However, it is not clear under which circumstances national and international institution, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), that aim to politically regulate climate change, enjoy the necessary legitimacy to demand compliance from individuals and states. Initially, one might think that such institutions derive their legitimacy from the epistemic authority of well-established climate science. This view would be in alignment with a belief-based account of the grounds of political legitimacy. However, the ubiquity of non-epistemic values in climate science undermines grounding the UNFCCC’s legitimacy purely on a belief-based account. Thus, an alternative source of legitimacy needs to be found. In this paper, we argue that an adequacy-for-purpose framework can partly explain the UNFCCC’s legitimacy in the presence of non-epistemic values in climate science. However, the use of non-epistemic values in climate science also means that we need to rethink the relationship between science and politics for the legitimacy of political institutions and political climate institutions globally. Co-authored with Laura Garcia-Portela, Postdoctoral Researcher, Institute of Technology Assessment and System Analysis, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Krister Bykvist
Filosofiska institutionen
Who should care about impossibility theorems in population ethics? Seminarium Datum: tisdag 16 maj 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract It is a well-known fact that various impossibility theorems show that there is no theory about the value of populations that can satisfy all of the conditions we want to set on such a theory. It is not all clear which condition we should give up, something which many think is especially worrying since in the face of climate change we need to make urgent decisions that will affect the size and composition of future populations. In my previous research, I have tried out two ways of responding to these theorems that do not involve a wholesale rejection of any of the conditions (the evaluative uncertainty approach and the degrees of satisfaction approach). Here I want to take a step back, for it turns out that not everyone is convinced that the impossibility theorems is anything to worry about unless you subscribe to a consequentialist welfarist moral framework. One recent example of this is Samuel Scheffler, who in his book Why worry about future generations (OUP, 2018) argues that in order to determine the reasons we have to care about future people there is no need to construct a population axiology and thus we can simply sidestep the accompanying impossibility theorems. I shall argue that this reflects a serious misunderstanding of population ethics and its impossibility theorems. These theorems are troubling for all reasonable moral views, including Scheffler’s own value of humanity axiology.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Katharina Berndt Rasmussen
Filosofiska institutionen
Bias of Crowds vs Wisdom of Crowds: New Perspectives Seminarium Datum: tisdag 4 april 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Individual implicit biases (automatic, typically uncontrollable, mainly unconscious attitudes towards social groups, which can be measured by, e.g., the IAT) have been shown to vary over time and to be poor predictors of discriminating behaviour. On the other hand, collective levels of implicit biases (e.g., average IAT-scores on regional or national levels) turn out to be quite stable, as well as quite good predictors of social inequities and vulnerabilities (e.g., unequal educational achievements, or health outcomes). The Bias of Crowds paradigm aims to reconcile these findings by analysing implicit bias as a collective phenomenon which reflects the accessibility of concepts that are linked to social groups (e.g., stereotypes). While this accessibility, on an individual level, varies considerably over time and context, on a collective level, such idiosyncratic random variations cancel out, such that the aggregate reveals an underlying systemic bias against certain social groups. This characterisation of the Bias of Crowds paradigm suggests a close connection to the Wisdom of Crowds paradigm, according to which aggregating judgments across individuals reduces error variance and reveals meaningful information in means. This paper explores the connection between the two paradigms, with an eye to what they can teach us if we want to overcome the pernicious effects of implicit biases. Under which conditions does a crowd’s aggregate bias turn into wisdom? And how can we translate these conditions into practical procedures for, e.g., hiring or health-care allocating decisions, which are prone to discrimination?
- Sveriges skakiga väg till NATO-medlemskap: Politiska processer och moraliska dilemman
Filosofiska institutionen
Moderator: Attila Mráz (Forskare på Stockholms universitet vid Centret för krig och fred) Evenemang Datum: torsdag 30 mars 2023 Tid: 16.30 – 18.00 Anmälan (fritt inträde): Anmäl dig här Abandoning its age-old doctrine of military non-alliance in the shadow of Putin’s full-on invasion of Ukraine, the Swedish government swiftly decided to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in May 2022. While some emphasized the broad multipartisan support for the decision in the Riksdag, others found the public deliberation preceding it deficient. Once Sweden had made its commitment, Turkey made its ratification of the Swedish membership application conditional on Sweden’s extraditing some Kurdish asylum-seekers to Turkey. The Hungarian Parliament professed to be too busy to deal with the ratification procedure, and recently sent a delegation to Sweden for further negotiations. While some underline the significance of each member state’s sovereign right to make its own decisions of supporting the accession, others emphasize the moral limits of exercising that right. What does Sweden owe its residents in terms of national defense? How should a democracy decide about joining a military alliance? How should we evaluate the process that led to the momentous decision of leaving alliansfrihet behind, and how should we characterize the roadblocks and moral dilemmas Sweden has faced on its way to NATO membership? In this panel discussion, we will bring ethical, political and historical perspectives to the table, and ask experts in democratic theory, international relations, and security policy to help us get the facts straight and address the tough moral questions and dilemmas head on. Panelists Hans Agné (Professor at Stockholm University, Department of Political Science) Lisa Bjurwald (Author and journalist, Bjurwald Communications) Magnus Petersson (Professor at Stockholm University, Department of Economic History and International Relations) Mike Winnerstig (Researcher at the Swedish Defence Research Agency, Security Policy Department) Moderated by Attila Mráz (Researcher at Stockholm University, Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace) This event is co-organized by the Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace and the Institute for Futures Studies. Event webpage
- Konferens: The Problems of Philosophy in Virtual Reality
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress
- Inställt: Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Cyril Holm (SU) & Anders Sandberg (Oxford)
Filosofiska institutionen
Law, Singletons, and Leviathan Seminarium Datum: tisdag 14 mars 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Jari Kaukua (Jyväskylä)
Filosofiska institutionen
Concepts, conceivability, and metaphysical possibility in Avicenna Seminarium Datum: fredag 10 mars 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In his theory of science, Avicenna seems to commit to a very demanding concept of concept (taṣawwur): only the intellect’s adequate conceptions of real essences are concepts in the strict sense. This lands him the task of explaining what it is that we are doing when we think of things that are never realised, such as phoenixes or counterfactual worlds. I suggest that his solution relies on a nuanced distinction, grounded in his psychology, between a descriptive and a normative concept of concept. Unrealised, and consequently impossible, things are not conceivable in the strict sense of the word (they do not have real concepts), but they may be conceived as conjunctions of real concepts that are instantiated in mental images construed by our imagination. Such conjunctions may be epistemically indistinct from real concepts, which raises interesting questions concerning the metaphysical or scientific consequences of conceivability. Thus, I conclude with the suggestion that Avicenna would not have appreciated conceivability as a sign of metaphysical possibility. https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/67954102384
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Åke Gafvelin (Uppsala) & Anandi Hattiangadi (SU)
Filosofiska institutionen
Titel aviseras senare Seminarium Datum: tisdag 24 oktober 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Samuel Lee (Linköping)
Filosofiska institutionen
What’s Really Wrong With Proportionality? Seminarium Datum: torsdag 31 augusti 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract A causal relationship is proportional just in case the cause is neither overly nor insufficiently detailed with respect to its effect. Two influential principles that appeal to this notion are: (i) all genuine causation is proportional, and (ii) causal explanations that appeal to proportional relationships are better than those that don’t. Both principles have featured fruitfully in the philosophy of science. The former has been used to argue that the sort of high-level causes identified by the special sciences are not ‘outcompeted’ by causes at the level of fundamental physics. The latter has been used to account for the scientific preference for explanations of high-level phenomena in terms of causes that are situated at a similarly high level. In spite of their successes, I identify several apparently disparate problems with both principles, some well-recognised in the literature, others novel to this paper, and tell a story that renders these problems legible as natural consequences of the structure of proportionality cases. I thus unify the seemingly independent threats these problems pose to principles (i) and (ii). On my view, the root of the problem with proportionality constraints is that they fail to take into account how both overly and insufficiently detailed events can cause their effects by way of the proportional causes of those effects. I close by drawing some lessons about the connection between explanatory grain and explanatory distance, and say something about how ‘close’ explainers should be to that which they explain.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Gunnar Björnsson
Filosofiska institutionen
Reason Judgments: Political or Motivational? Seminarium Datum: tisdag 9 maj 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract What is the relation between judgments of normative reason and motivation to act? On a plausible version of the so-called Enkratic Principle, if one (fully) accepts that one has conclusive normative reason to φ, one is motivated to φ or one is in that regard irrational. In this talk, building on joint work with Ragnar Francén at the University of Gothenburg, I first suggest that support for that principle naturally supports EnkrasiaPlus, a comprehensive enkratic principle requiring alignment between motivation and a wider range of reason judgments. While intuitions may support EnkrasiaPlus, I then argue that this support relies on a tacit empirical assumption, “the motivational hypothesis”, according to which the role of normative reason judgments is to ensure that one acts in accordance with normative reasons. This assumption contrasts with “the political hypothesis”, according to which their role is instead to justify one’s action to others, in order to present oneself as a suitable partner for cooperation. Drawing on Mercier and Sperber’s account of reasoning, I argue that the political hypothesis is empirically possible, and if true, necessitates a less demanding principle of rational motivation, EnkrasiaMinus. This reveals the contingency of principles of rational motivation, challenging standard armchair methodology. Furthermore, the truth of EnkrasiaMinus would make standard moral motivation internalism implausible and call for a rethinking of moral worth.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (Tufts)
Filosofiska institutionen
On Seeking Objective Grounds for Moral Evaluation Seminarium Datum: tisdag 2 maj 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract The paper argues that to do justice to questions of objectivity that arise within and about moral discourse, we must take into account that this discourse is embedded within a somewhat conventionally regimented practice that comprises attempts to guide attitude and action by way of justifying, criticizing, validating, or excusing them. The appropriate condition of objectivity rules out a specific narrow kind of response-dependence that would run counter to this kind of guiding role for moral verdicts. The relevant condition is identified (the discourse- and practice-independence condition or, for short, the DP-independence condition).
- Guido Alt disputerar
Filosofiska institutionen
Varieties of Necessity in John Buridan: Logic and Natural Philosophy in the Late Middle Ages Disputation Datum: onsdag 7 juni 2023 Tid: 15.00 – 18.00 Plats: Online via Zoom Abstract and full text To access the webinar, register in advance here
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Graham Oddie (Boulder)
Filosofiska institutionen
The Additivity Fetish: or How I Overcame It and Learned to Love Unified Complexity Seminarium Datum: tisdag 30 maj 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract The metaphor of weight runs deep in the theory of value and rationality. Under the weight of the metaphor, we are inclined to think that, like weights, reasons and values should add up. But additivity can become a fetish. I have spent a good chunk of the last forty years in the grip of this fetish. Like many fetishes, this one may serve a purpose, but it can easily become boring, pointless and even self-defeating. I chronicle my journey of release from the fetish and my slow embrace of the value of unified complexity.
- CLLAM Seminarium: Alice Damirjian
Filosofiska institutionen
A Puzzle about Words, Mental Lexikons, and Semantic Relatedness Seminarium Datum: fredag 5 maj 2023 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: Aviseras senare Abstract I argue that the received view in the literature on polysemy representation, according to which the senses associated with a polyseme are stored together in a single lexical entry, is untenable. While the received view manages to account for parts of the data coming from empirical studies on ambiguity processing and resolution, it fails to account for an important part of it. As a result, the received view is caught up in an explanatory dilemma which I dub the continuum puzzle. The best way of escaping this puzzle, I then argue, is to give up the received view’s core thesis in favor of an alternative view that is consistent with the available data. Reaching such an alternative will require rejecting the following pervasive, but ill-motivated, assumption: Differences in ambiguity processing and resolution can only be explained by stipulating corresponding differences in the architecture of our mental lexicons Zoom-link
- SJWiP 2023
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Inkeri Koskinen (Helsingfors)
Filosofiska institutionen
Unifying the notion of objectivity Seminarium Datum: torsdag 16 mars 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Several philosophers of science have recently attempted to bring some unity to the notion of scientific objectivity. These attempts typically start from the observation that there seem to be several distinct meanings of objectivity, but continue by arguing that these meanings have more in common than has yet been recognised. I will compare and contrast these attempts, focusing on two aspects. First, the attempts to capture the different meanings of objectivity within one account can be divided in three: positive accounts which refer to some advantageous elements that the things we call objective share (e.g. Zahle 2020), negative accounts that name harmful elements that are missing from what we call objective (e.g. Koskinen 2020), and contextual accounts where the meaning of objectivity stems from the context (e.g. Montuschi 2020; Cartwright et al. 2022). Second, while some of the proposed accounts are attempts to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for objectivity (e.g. Hoyningen-Huene 2023), most aim at something else (e.g. Wilholt 2022). In the light of my analysis of this ongoing discussion, I will defend a view of what this "something else" should be.
- CLLAM Seminarium: Levi Spectre (Open University of Israel/SU)
Filosofiska institutionen
Doncaster pandas and Caesar's armadillo. Scepticism and via negativa knowledge. Seminarium Datum: fredag 3 mars 2023 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 Abstract The external world sceptic tells some familiar narratives involving massive deception. Perhaps we are brains in vats. Perhaps we are the victim of a deceitful demon. The sceptic proceeds by observing first that victims of such deceptions know nothing about their external environment and that second, since we cannot rule out being a victim of such deceptions ourselves, our own external world beliefs fail to attain the status of knowledge. Discussions of global external world scepticism tend to focus on the second step, where a number of well-known lines of resistance have been offered. But there has been little attention to the first, seemingly innocuous step. That will be the focus of this talk. Part one explains why these standard narratives are not convincing examples of cases where there is no knowledge of the external world. Part two undertakes a useful case study. David Lewis’s “Elusive knowledge” (1996) is often thought of as presenting an epistemological vision that is friendly to external world scepticism: as Lewis himself presents things, there are contexts where external world knowledge ascriptions are uniformly false and where true knowledge ascriptions are limited to either axiomatic truths or truths about our inner life. An examination in the light of the preceding reflections shows that the framework he presents is not so concessionary to global external world scepticism after all. Zoom-link
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Sebastian Lutz (Uppsala)
Filosofiska institutionen
Choosing the Analytic Component of Theories Seminarium Datum: torsdag 30 mars 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract It has been argued, for instance based on a Quinean holism, that the same term occurring in competing scientific theories cannot refer to the same (theoretical) object or property. A popular response is that the causal theory of reference avoids this threat. I suggest that the causal theory of reference is inadequate as a rational reconstruction of scientific language and argue that Psillos's causal-descriptive theory of meaning is a special case of the descriptive theory of meaning. Assuming the descriptive theory, I show that intertheoretically shared terms can stand for the same concepts when the analytic and synthetic components of a theory fulfill Carnap's conditions of adequacy. To do so, I provide a compact reformulation of Carnap's conditions and show that, contrary to arguments by Winnie and Demopoulos, the conditions need not be supplemented. Specifically, the axiomatization and the observational vocabulary of a theory determine its synthetic component uniquely but leave some freedom in the choice of its analytic component. Besides throwing new light on the process of the rational reconstruction of theories, this result allows for analytic components of theories that provide fine control over which theories share which concepts.