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- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Orri Stefánsson & Mac Willners
Department of Philosophy
Does Global Justice Demand Solar Geoengineering? Seminar Date: Tuesday 28 January 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Does Global Justice Demand Solar Geoengineering? (412 Kb)
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Marion Kathe Godman (Aarhus)
Department of Philosophy
Inductive potential? Human categories in the cross-roads Lecture Date: Thursday 3 April 2025 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: B497 Abstract When we study and learn about people and especially by the use of statistical bureaus (e.g. Statistics Sweden/SCB) and social science we face a choice about what categories to use for data collection: should we for example collect data in terms of people’s ethnic or in terms of immigrant origin? I have previously argued (2020) that one important criterion is to choose categories which display inductive potential, i.e. they license multiple inductive generalizations over members of a group that can be used for comparisons between groups. Moreover, I argued that a prominent reason for social categories (or kinds of people) displaying such inductive potential is that they are historical kinds (Millikan 2000). Here I respond to some worries that have and can be raised about applying such criteria to categories for research and data collection. In the process I make the notion of inductive potential more precise and also discuss its application to some commonly used categories of social class.
- CLLAM: Joulia Smortchkova (Grenoble)
Department of Philosophy
First impressions and affect Workshop Date: Friday 4 April 2025 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract It has been recently argued that there is an affective aspect to perception. The intuitive claim is that, alongside sensory properties such as shapes, colors, orientations, we also perceptually experience affective valences. The relation between perception and affective valence is debated, however. Is affective valence a phenomenal quality of perceptual experiences? Is it represented in perceptual content on the model of the rich perceptual content view? Or is it rather a distinctive form of perceptual attitude? In my talk I will use the case study of first impressions, the phenomenon of vividly experiencing something for the first time, to suggest that the affective aspect of perception might be multi-level: both as a feature of perceptual experience and as a metacognitive feature of perceptual processing. The multi-level hypothesis can explain cases of affectively conflicting perceptual first impressions as well as how the affective tone of perception changes over time.
- CLLAM Seminar: Hana Möller Kalpak
Department of Philosophy
Decision rules for imprecise Lockeans Seminar Date: Friday 4 March 2022 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: Zoom https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/8938261027 Abstract: According to the Lockean thesis, rational belief corresponds to rational credence above a certain threshold. A version of the Lockean thesis can be derived from the assumption that rational agents maximize the expected utility of their beliefs, given their credences (Hempel 1962, Easwaran 2016, Dorst 2019). This talk presents parts of work aimed at generalizing the utility-theoretic Lockean thesis to cases where rational credences are imprecise, in the sense of being given by a set of (probability) functions (overview: Bradley, 2019). In these cases, beliefs are not guaranteed the type of precise expectation values required for maximization, but must be deemed rational on the grounds of conforming to some more general decision rule. I will formulate some basic desiderata for such decision rules, and use this in an assessment of two well-known rules from imprecise decision theory: E-admissbility (Levi 1980) and Gamma-maximin (Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989). I will also consider the prospects of using an aggregative decision rule (classic majority voting), after showing that the domains of the relevant decision problems are Arrow consistent.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Felix Lambrecht (LMU Munich)
Department of Philosophy
Diachronic Group Responsibility Seminar Date: Wednesday 9 April 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Most people endorse some form of the Diachronic Group Responsibility Thesis: Group agents can be responsible for actions committed in the past. For instance, contemporary Germany is responsible for the wrongs of the Holocaust. Contemporary Canada is responsible colonial wrongs committed in the 19th century. Contemporary Chiquita Brands International is responsible for brutality on its banana plantations in the 20th century. However, in many cases, the properties of most of the groups we hold responsible for past wrongs have changed since the time at which the wrongs occurred. For instance, nearly every property of Germany (members, territory, government structure, etc...) has undergone significant change since the time it committed its wrongs during World War Two. So, to vindicate the Diachronic Group Responsibility Thesis, we need an account that explains why a present group agent can be responsible for an action committed in the past by a past agent that appears not to share any properties with the present group agent. In this paper I provide such an account. On the account I construct, group G2 at t2 is responsible for an action committed by G1 at t1 if G2 does an action which commits G2 to being bound by G1’s actions. Call this the Commitment Account of Diachronic Group Responsibility. I argue that the Commitment Account is superior to the alternative accounts on offer by demonstrating that it better captures our intuitive judgments about cases and better coheres with accounts of group agency more broadly.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Olle Torpman (IFFS)
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Seminar Date: Tuesday 15 April 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Siska de Baerdemaeker
Department of Philosophy
Dark matter realism reconsidered Seminar Date: Thursday 13 March 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Several authors have recently argued against realism about dark matter due to it being empirically unconfirmed or too conceptually thin. In response, Vaynberg (2024) has convincingly argued in favor of dark matter realism based on Bullet Cluster observations. However, anti-realist concerns about conceptual thinness or future empirical detection may linger. I argue that these can be diffused by distinguishing between two different dark matter concepts, which I call astrophysical dark matter and fundamental dark matter. I submit that anti-realist concerns about future dark matter detection conflate empirical confirmation for fundamental dark matter with empirical confirmation for astrophysical dark matter. I further argue that the resulting realist commitment to astrophysical dark matter is more substantive than dark matter anti-realists recognize: it organizes a structured space of possibilities for fundamental dark matter, and it guide.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Jonathan Shaheen (Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
Tertium non datur: Early Modern Rejections of Middle Distinction Seminar Date: Friday 21 March 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700
- MAP-seminar: Marion Kathe Godman (Aarhus)
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Sanja Särman (Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
Essence, Existence, Being: Spinoza at the Crossroads between Platonism and Eleaticism Workshop Date: Wednesday 11 June 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Justin Snedegar (University of Virginia)
Department of Philosophy
Setting Boundaries on Blame Seminar Date: Tuesday 25 March 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Blame is a central part of our moral practice, and blaming interactions can be very valuable. But despite the potential for reconciliation, edification, and more, wrongdoers often refuse to engage with blame. Rather than accepting blame, rejecting it by offering an excuse or justification, or taking the opportunity for a joint discussion of the relevant moral issues, they often simply dismiss blame. This raises important ethical questions. Discussions of this response in the literature on the ethics of blame tend to understand it primarily as a challenge to the blamer’s standing or authority to blame. However, wrongdoers dismiss blame for many reasons that do not involve any challenge to the blamer’s standing. I propose that we understand dismissing blame instead as setting a boundary on blame: invoking (supposed) norms that prohibit blaming in the circumstances, even assuming that the recipient is blameworthy. Familiar standing norms are among those that can serve as a wrongdoer’s basis for setting a boundary, but there are others. I argue that this more general conception of dismissing blame better captures the practice. It also brings out important questions in the ethics of blame, and especially the ethics of responding to blame, that go beyond questions of standing.
- CLLAM: Stina Björkholm (IFFS)
Department of Philosophy
Fixing Contexts: A Conversational Engineering Project Seminar Date: Friday 28 March 2025 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract Projects in conceptual engineering investigate how our representational devices, or the things they represent, might be defective and therefore ought to be ameliorated, replaced or abolished. A fundamental question in this field concerns what the object of our engineering projects should be. Although much of the literature assumes that concepts are the objects of inquiry (partly by virtue of the label ‘conceptual’ engineering), Cappelen’s influential work within the field introduces three options: words, the world, or concepts. The purpose of this paper is to propose a fourth option which breaks away from the tradition of focusing on individual representational devices or the things that they represent. I will argue that engineering projects can, and often should, be about the context of conversations. I thus propose that a project of conversational engineering is well-worth exploring – thereby aiming to establish a systematic study of what it is for a context to be defective, whether such defects should be ameliorated, and if so how to do so. I propose that contexts can be both internally and externally defective, where the former includes discrepancies between what interlocutors presuppose and the latter includes cases when interlocutors make false, immoral, or irrational presuppositions.
- PhD defence: Andrea Asker Svedberg
Department of Philosophy
Puzzles of Harm: Essays on Collective Action, Death, and Non-Existence Thesis defence Date: Thursday 5 June 2025 Time: 13.00 – 15.00 Location: Hörsal 9. Södra huset D Opponent: Julia Nefsky (University of Toronto)
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Erik Åkerlund (Stockholm/Newman)
Department of Philosophy
John Mair's Political Philosophy Workshop Date: Friday 25 April 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA Zoom link
- Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy: Alice Damirijian
Department of Philosophy
Alice Damirijan presents her kappa Seminar Date: Thursday 8 May 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 The Ins and Outs of Meaning. Essays on Polysemy, Proper Names and Slang
- The Ethics of Deception
Department of Philosophy
More information TBA Workshop Start date: Wednesday 26 November 2025 Time: 09.00 End date: Thursday 27 November 2025 Time: 18.00 Location: Gula Villan
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Stina Björkholm & Mats Ingelström (IFFS)
Department of Philosophy
Does Contextualism about ‘Well-Being’ Challenge a Philosophical Paradigm? Seminar Date: Tuesday 20 May 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The concept of well-being plays a central role across a range of contexts, from empirical sciences and ethical theory to everyday discourse. Alexandrova has argued that the diversity of well-being discourse supports a semantic contextualist view – positing that the meaning of ‘well-being’ shifts depending on the context of use. This thesis has been taken to challenge a traditional philosophical way of theorizing about well-being. In this paper, we challenge that contention. We begin by outlining the contextualist approach and presenting reasons to take it seriously as a semantic thesis. We then address three ways of spelling out how this view might be at odds with a philosophical paradigm, demonstrating that neither succeeds in establishing that there is a genuine conflict. Our analysis suggests that recognizing the contextual nature of well-being discourse does not entail that philosophy of well-being is undermined or significantly limits the relevance of the field.
- Higher Seminar in Philosophy of Science: Gábor Szabó Hofer (Budapest)
Department of Philosophy
Operational equivalence and causal structure Seminar Date: Friday 16 May 2025 Time: 15.15 – 17.00 Location: D700 Abstract In this talk, I will explore some consequences of abandoning operational equivalence in quantum mechanics. Two measurements are operationally equivalent if they yield the same distribution of outcomes in every quantum state and hence are represented by the same operator. I will show that the ontological models for quantum mechanics — and more generally, for any operational theory — sensitively depend on which measurement we choose from the class of operationally equivalent measurements. To this goal, I will take first three examples — a classical theory, the EPR-Bell scenario and the Popescu-Rochrlich box; then realize each example by two different operational theories — one with a trivial and another with a non-trivial compatibility structure; and finally compare the ontological models for the different theories with respect to their causal structure, contextuality, and fine-tuning.
- Optimism: A Duty? | Erik Angner | TEDxKI
Department of Philosophy
Professor Erik Agner Optimism: A Duty? | Erik Angner | TEDxKI
- Higher Seminar in Philosophy of Science: Jeremy Butterfield (Oxford) & Sebastian de Haro (Amsterdam)
Department of Philosophy
Title: What are dualities in physics? A geometric view Seminar Date: Thursday 11 September 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In the last forty years, dualities have been a major topic of research and a driving force behind much of the work in theoretical physics, especially high-energy physics. In this talk, we will first explain what dualities are and give a schema for them, together with some examples. We will then go on to discuss one of the questions in the philosophy of science that dualities bear on, namely the formulation of scientific theories. We will argue that dualities, and their generalizations, quasi-dualities, suggest a generalization of the semantic conception of theories. On the traditional semantic conception, a physical theory is a collection of models. We will argue that dualities and quasi-dualities suggest that there is topological and geometric structure on the set of models, and we will make a proposal for a specific "shape" that physical theories take, which generalizes and subsumes the semantic conception.