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- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Gunnar Björnsson
Department of Philosophy
Outcome luck and the nature of blame and praise Seminar Date: Tuesday 21 November 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D734 Abstract A central disagreement in the theory of responsibility concerns outcome luck. If someone unjustifiably risks harming, can their degree of blameworthiness be affected by whether anyone is actually harmed as a result? If someone does their best to help an important cause, can their degree of praiseworthiness be affected by whether they succeed? Some think so, but many have the strong intuition that the answer is negative: the agent would be equally blame- or praiseworthy whether or not the outcome materializes. I have previously argued against the reliability of such intuitions. In this talk, however, I suggest that attention to the nature of moral blame and praise should lead us to revise the questions themselves.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Máté Veres (Genève)
Department of Philosophy
Wisdom and Expertise in Early Stoicism Workshop Date: Friday 13 September 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Early Stoics subscribed to a version of the idea that it is on account of being a practitioner of a form of expertise concerned with the whole of human life that the wise can do well in all relevant respects. Furthermore, they conceived of this higher-order form of expertise as structurally analogous but epistemically superior to first-order forms of expertise. One corollary of the Stoic view is that, for any given first-order form of expertise, only the wise person can be a genuine expert. Indeed, there is evidence for the claim that at least some forms of expertise practiced by the wise are transformed into quasi-virtuous states of the soul. In this paper, I discuss three potential connections a Stoic might draw between first-order forms of expertise and the expertise concerned with the whole of human life. First, insofar as all forms of expertise involve knowledge-that and knowledge-how, the expertise in living well must involve actionable mastery of Stoic doctrine. Second, since virtue is a matter of dealing with indifferents, and forms of expertise are specialized forms of dealing with indifferents, the practice of the expertise in living well must involve some first-order forms of expertise. Third, the motivation and justification for acting on the demands of a specialized expertise ultimately derive from the judgement of the expertise in living well concerning the all-things-considered action to be done, calling into question the epistemic autonomy of first-order forms of expertise.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Tomas Ekenberg (Newman)
Department of Philosophy
Ontological Arguments in Cicero and Others: On the History of the Proof Called Anselm' Workshop Date: Friday 22 November 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700
- Stockholm Colloqium in Philosophy: Filip Radovic (Göteborg)
Department of Philosophy
How the unbelievable is believed Lecture Date: Thursday 31 October 2024 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 Abstract It is well-known that irrational beliefs are part of a normal healthy life. Even so, some beliefs stand out as exceptionally odd because they do not reflect what people consider to be normal or acceptable. Conventional diagnostic systems in psychiatry habitually characterize extremely outlandish beliefs as delusional, that is, as being abnormal, morbid or pathological. Exactly why a belief is delusional is a matter of great controversy. Yet there seems to be a vital difference between delusions and other irrational ideas, for example, believing that one is God Almighty or that one is dead, on the one hand, and believing that Princess Diana faked her own death or that that “thirteen” is an unlucky number, on the other. In this presentation I will exemplify some typical delusions from the clinical literature and highlight a set of problems in contemporary philosophical debates, such as, how to define “delusion”, in what sense, if any, delusions are proper beliefs, and the complicated relation between delusion and mainstream religious beliefs.
- CLLAM Seminar: Salvatore Florio (Oslo)
Department of Philosophy
Critical Plural Logic and Abstraction (joint work with Øystein Linnebo) Seminar Date: Friday 11 October 2024 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract Cantor defined a set as the collection into a whole of determinate and well-distinguished objects, objects that can “exist together”. Although he recognized that not all objects can exist together in this sense, he did not provide a theory specifying when some objects can exist together. Without such a theory, his account of sets remains incomplete. We argue that a version of plural logic, Critical Plural Logic, fits the bill. As a logic of co-existence, Critical Plural Logic captures the essence of the familiar “stage theory” of set formation but is far more general and avoids a gratuitous reification of stages. We also argue that this plural logic can be of great aid to Frege and logicism, supporting a large class of abstraction principles. Critical Plural Logic emerges as a compelling and fruitful theory to develop key ideas of Cantor and Frege.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Daniel Telech (Lund)
Department of Philosophy
Invitations: Their Structure, Normativity, and Value Seminar Date: Tuesday 15 November 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In this talk I present an account of a philosophically underdiscussed speech act: invitation. I propose that, when A invites B to φ, A therein issues B with a permission-giving discretionary directive to engage in an activity that A is to host. As it is a sincerity condition of invitation, I maintain, that A i) desires φ-ing with B and ii) believes it to be (at least) possibly desirable for B to φ with A, A represents herself as possessing these attitudes in inviting B (though A might in fact lack them). My proposal satisfies a key desideratum for an adequate view of invitation, namely its being able to distinguish invitations from offers, on the one hand, and proposals for joint activity, on the other. This feature of my view is reflected in what I propose to be the distinctive value of the power to invite: our having a measure of creative autonomy over the relationships we cultivate.
- Cancelled! CLLAM Seminar: Fredrik Stjernberg (Linköping)
Department of Philosophy
Cancelled Seminar Date: Friday 25 November 2022 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: James Nguyen
Department of Philosophy
Explanation, Accuracy, and Universality Seminar Date: Thursday 20 October 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract This talk has two main aims. First, I will argue against the currently popular idea that truth, or accurate representation, is unnecessary for explanation (or understanding), an idea primarily motivated by the prevalence of idealized models in science. I suggest that a proper understanding of the inferential patterns associated with model-based reasoning requires appreciating contextual aspects of such reasoning, and in doing so, paying appropriate attention to the worldly claims extracted from an idealized model. Second, I will explore explanations associated with ‘universality’ considerations. Such explanations are taken as exemplars of inaccurate, yet explanatory models. But the structure and nature of these explanations remain in need of explication. I will take some initial steps in this regard.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Graham Oddie (Boulder)
Department of Philosophy
The Additivity Fetish: or How I Overcame It and Learned to Love Unified Complexity Seminar Date: Tuesday 30 May 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The metaphor of weight runs deep in the theory of value and rationality. Under the weight of the metaphor, we are inclined to think that, like weights, reasons and values should add up. But additivity can become a fetish. I have spent a good chunk of the last forty years in the grip of this fetish. Like many fetishes, this one may serve a purpose, but it can easily become boring, pointless and even self-defeating. I chronicle my journey of release from the fetish and my slow embrace of the value of unified complexity.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Máté Veres (University of Geneva)
Department of Philosophy
Revelation, trust, and expertise in the Stoic theory of inferential apprehension Seminar Date: Friday 24 March 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In his two compendia of arguments against theories of knowledge (PH 2, M 7-8), the Pyrrhonist Sceptic Sextus Empiricus targets an epistemological framework that recognizes two sources of apprehension. On this view, opposed by Sextus, evident matters are known directly, primarily through veridical sense-perception, while non-evident matters are known, if at all, through inference from signs and through demonstrative argument, i.e., proof. In this paper, I shall focus on the specifically Stoic view concerning inferential knowledge and argue for the following claims. On the Stoic view, proofs are revelatory: they create apprehension while also providing the explanatory connection between premisses and conclusion. In addition, Sextus provides support for the controversial claim that inferential apprehension involves non-sensory kataleptic impressions. At the same time, his report suggests that non-revelatory arguments proceeding through factive memory or through trust in authoritative testimony may in some sense qualify as probative. The distinction between these sorts of arguments prompts us to consider the role of expertise in the Stoic account. Zoom-link
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Anna Dreber (Stockholm School of Economics)
Department of Philosophy
Replication and generalizability of research analyses and designs Seminar Date: Thursday 28 September 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Abstract What share of results replicate in different literatures in some of the experimental social sciences? I will discuss several large replication projects in mainly psychology and economics, where my coauthors and I have redone experiments published in high impact journals with new and larger samples to see whether the main result replicates. The seminar will also cover our studies on “wisdom of crowds” mechanisms like prediction markets and forecasting surveys where researchers attempt to predict these replication outcomes as well as outcomes of new hypothesis tests, as well as recent work on multi-analyst projects and conceptual replications where we either ask researchers to test the same hypotheses on the same data or to design experiments testing the same hypothesis
- Higher Seminarium in Practical Philosophy: Jonas Haeg (King’s College London/Stockholm)
Department of Philosophy
Risks, Rights and Degrees of Wrongdoing Seminar Date: Tuesday 22 November 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Does the fact that a person voluntarily accepted a risk of being harmed make it less wrongful to unjustifiably inflict this harm on them than if they hadn't accepted the risk? I believe it doesn't, but the challenge in giving this answer is that it seems to conflict with another intuitively attractive claim. This is the claim that it’s easier to justify harming someone who voluntarily accepted a risk of being harmed than it is to justify harming someone who didn't accept such a risk. After outlining and criticising some attempts at resolving the (apparent) conflict between the ‘less wrongful’ and ‘easier to justify’ claims, I develop and defend a novel solution.
- CLLAM Seminar: Ethan Nowak (Umeå)
Department of Philosophy
Sociolinguistic variation, slurs, and speech acts Seminar Date: Friday 7 October 2022 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract In this paper, I argue that the ‘social meanings’ associated with sociolinguistic variation put pressure on the standard philosophical conception of language, according to which the foremost thing we do with words is exchange information. Drawing on parallels with the explanatory challenged posed by slurs and pejoratives, I argue that the best way to understand social meanings is to think of them in speech act theoretic terms, and I develop a distinctive form of pluralism about the performances realized by means of sociolinguistic variants.
- CLLAM Seminar: Hubert Hågemark (Lund)
Department of Philosophy
What We Mean as What We Said or Would Have Said Seminar Date: Friday 14 April 2023 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: TBA Abstract We normally mean what we say, but sometimes we don’t. When I ironically utter “What lovely weather” on a rainy day, or mistakenly utter “Jim is a barn door” instead of “Jim is a darn bore”, I say one thing and mean another. However, although utterances like these are not uncommon, they are greatly overshadowed by the volume of humdrum utterances of “There is wine in the fridge” or “I really like nachos” where we mean what we say. Since we normally mean what we say, the following simple thesis will be correct in normal situations. (N) S meant that p by uttering e iff S said that p by uttering e. This begs the question of whether (N) can be refined to also cover situations where we don’t mean what we say. In this seminar, I explore whether (N) can be refined modally, by offering an analysis where speaker meaning normally is identified with what is said, and in other situations with what the speaker would have said in certain counterfactual situations. The analysis constitutes a radical, but welcome, break with Gricean orthodoxy, where linguistic meaning, rather than speaker meaning, is ultimately used to explain other semantic notions.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Jessica Isserow (Leeds)
Department of Philosophy
What is self-esteem? Lecture Date: Thursday 3 February 2022 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: Zoom: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/68159697835 Abstract Self-esteem is an important and highly sought after human good. Yet academic philosophers have contributed curiously little to the study of self-esteem. Indeed, self-esteem is often treated in philosophical circles as the insignificant moral cousin of self-respect. To my mind, however, the project of identifying what self-esteem is—or, perhaps, what it ought to be—is indeed a project of moral importance. Many object to self-esteem initiatives on the grounds that they do little more than foster narcissism and a sense of entitlement. From this, it may be tempting to infer that we simply shouldn’t be promoting self-esteem. But another lesson we may draw is that these initiatives weren’t really promoting self-esteem at all—or not, in any event, self-esteem of the kind worth having. It is the philosopher’s task to find out what (if anything) the latter is; whether there is a concept of self-esteem capable of doing justice to our pre-theoretic idea that there is a sense of self-worth that is worth promoting in others and ourselves. It is precisely this task that I wish to undertake in this paper. My starting ambition is to develop desiderata for a plausible account of self-esteem. I arrive at these desiderata through a careful consideration of where extant accounts go wrong.
- Cancelled: Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop : Alexander Stöpfgeshoff (Stockholm/Toronto)
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Mikael Janvid
Department of Philosophy
Against Normative Defeat Seminar Date: Thursday 27 January 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract This paper argues against the existence of so-called normative defeaters, defeaters consisting of doubts or beliefs that a subject ought to have indicating that her belief that p is either false or unjustified. Despite typically not being in the possession of the subject, such defeaters still destroy her justification for that belief. In determining whether defeat occurs, the justificatory strength of the belief targeted by the defeater is often left out of consideration, as well as the epistemic strength of the defeater, which is a mistake, or so I shall argue. Once these parameters are specified, alleged cases of normative defeat either turn out not to provide genuine cases of defeat – the subject remains justified or was not justified to begin with – or can be subsumed under a uniform category of defeat. Incidentally, the same result is also reached for the contrast class to normative defeat: doxastic defeat. A more fruitful framework, where the epistemic strength is included in a uniform way for both justification and defeat, is suggested in terms of reliable indicators where their strength determines whether defeat occurs.
- Final PhD thesis seminar: Stina Björkholm
Department of Philosophy
The Duality of Moral Language Seminar Date: Tuesday 14 December 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Commentator : Teemu Toppinen (Helsinki) Abstract TBA
- Higher seminar in practical philosophy: Gunnar Björnsson
Department of Philosophy
Teleological reasons for and against contributing to collective benefits and harms Seminar Date: Tuesday 19 October 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: Zoom Commentator : Andrea Asker Svedberg Title TBA Abstract TBA
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Dag Prawitz
Department of Philosophy
Philosophical issues concerning the concept of valid inference Seminar Date: Thursday 23 September 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: Zoom Abstract Issues sometimes arise in deductive practice concerning whether an inference in an argument is really valid. They are usually resolved and the argument enriched with these simpler inferences is accepted as valid when the inference can be broken down into simpler inferences where it is obvious (or trivial, as mathematicians say) that the premisses of the inferences conclusively support the conclusions. Nevertheless a philosophical issue concerning valid inferences remains, namely to explicate the very concept of conclusive support. Clearly it is not sufficient for the inference to be valid that what the conclusion asserts is entailed by or is a logical consequence of what the premisses assert, although this has often been proposed in philosophy. We need to clarify a narrower concept than entailment. It seems to correspond to what Aristotle called perfect syllogism. Principles will be proposed that together explicate at least partially concepts of valid inference and valid argument.