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- Higher seminar in the Philosophy of Science: Bram Vaassen (Umeå)
Department of Philosophy
Higher-Level Causes and Freaky Realizations Seminar Date: Thursday 24 February 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Building on observations by Fodor (1974, 1991), Schiffer (1991), and Hoefer (2004), Fenton-Glynn (2017) has recently argued that the possibility of thermodynamically abnormal realizations speaks in favour of probability-raising accounts of causation. Such ‘freaky’ realizations suggest that the main competitors of probability-raising accounts cannot allow for higher-level causes such as infections and hurricanes. By contrast, probability-raising accounts appear to have no problems allowing higher-level causation in the face of freaky realizations. In this talk, I push back against Fenton-Glynn’s case for probability-raising accounts and argue that sufficiency accounts (e.g., Mackie 1974, Bennett 2017, Vivhelin and Tomkow ms), counterfactual accounts (e.g., Lewis 1973, Loewer 2007, Albert 2015), and interventionist accounts (e.g., Woodward 2003) can all allow for higher-level causation in the face of freaky realizations. Contrary to appearances, such case will do little to help us decide between any of these accounts and a probability-raising view.
- Higher seminar in the Philosophy of Science: Peter Vickers (Durham)
Department of Philosophy
Identifying Future-Proof Science Seminar Date: Thursday 24 March 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract My forthcoming book Identifying Future-Proof Science argues that we can confidently identify many scientific claims that are future-proof: they will last forever (so long as science continues). Examples include the evolution of human beings from fish, and the fact that the Milky Way is a spiral galaxy. But how should we go about identifying future-proof science? This appears to be a new question for philosophers of science, and not an unimportant one. It is argued that the best way to identify future-proof science is to avoid any attempt to analyse the relevant first-order scientific evidence, instead focusing purely on second-order evidence. Specifically, a scientific claim is future-proof when the relevant scientific community is large, international, and diverse, and at least 95% of that community would describe the claim as an established scientific fact. In the entire history of science, no claim meeting these criteria has ever been overturned, despite enormous opportunity for that to happen (were it ever going to happen). There are important consequences for school education: If this is indeed the way to identify future-proof science, then the vast majority of school-leavers will have hardly any of the requisite skills, since schools systems around the world completely neglect to teach children how to judge the second-order evidence for scientific claims.
- Higher seminar in practical philosophy: Krister Bykvist & Joe Roussos (IF)
Department of Philosophy
A Plea for Modelling in Ethics Seminar Date: Tuesday 22 February 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: Zoom Commentator: Erik Angner Title: TBA Venue : Zoom
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Beate Krickel (TU Berlin)
Department of Philosophy
Where is the mind? – Why this question makes sense only if understood normatively Lecture Date: Thursday 21 April 2022 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D299 Beate Krickel (TU Berlin) - a joint paper with Birgit Beck (TU Berlin) Abstract Is the mind only in the brain, or can the body and the physical and social environment be part of the mind? The search for the location of the mind is often framed in terms of the distinction between causation and constitution : constituents are what the mind is made of, and thus determine where the mind is. In contrast, causes merely provide inputs to the mind. In this talk, we will argue that the search for the location of the mind is misguided. First, all existing accounts of constitution either fail to provide insights into the location of the mind, or they rely on pragmatic considerations. Second, the location of the mind is irrelevant for everyday concerns and scientific and medical questions. Still, we argue that a distinction between “mere causes” and “constituents” can play an important role for the sciences, psychiatry, and medicine if constitution is understood as a normative concept: whether something is a constituent of the mind or not depends on whether it should be considered a constituent. This normative dimension of constitution is spelled out in terms of importance in a given context .
- Joint Stockholm/Uppsala Seminar in Practical Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Joseph Bowen (Stockholm) & Marvin Backes (Uppsala) Seminar Date: Tuesday 5 April 2022 Time: 13.15 – 16.00 Location: D700, Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University Titles 13:15-14:30 : Marvin Backes: On Inferential Moral Knowledge: A Defence of Hume’s Law Commentator: Håkan Salwén 14:45-16:00 : Joseph Bowen: Directed and Undirected Duties to Rescue Commentator: Jens Johansson
- CLLAM Seminar: Dag Westerståhl
Department of Philosophy
Carnap, Categoricity, and Commas Seminar Date: Friday 7 February 2025 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D734 & Zoom Abstract A logic/consequence relation |– is Carnap Categorical (CC) if the only interpretation of the logical constants consistent with |– is the standard interpretation. Categoricity results have been obtained for first-order logic, modal logics, intuitionistic propositional logic, and many others. In all of these cases, the proof that the conjunction symbol must have its standard interpretation is almost trivial; it is the other logical constants that require some work. This triviality looks suspicious. In fact, it essentially comes from the definition of consistency. For example, in case of propositional logic with classical 2-valued semantics, the definition goes like this: an interpretation I is consistent with |–, if A1,…,An |– B implies that (for each assignment v of truth values to the propositional variables) if the value of A1 and … and A2 under I (and v) is 1, then the value of B under I (and v) is also 1. With an &-introduction rule of the form A,B |– A&B, it is no surprise that & has to mean ‘and’. In other words, the possible interpretations of & are biased by the fact that the commas to the left of |– are already taken to mean ‘and’. (Similarly, if we allow multiple conclusions; then commas to the right are taken to mean ‘or’.) How can we avoid this bias? In this talk I avoid it by disallowing commas altogether, considering only so-called binary logics: consequence relations with exactly one premise and one conclusion. Note that the &-introduction rule above is not in this format; it can be replaced by a conditional rule in the binary format: if A |– B and A|– C, then A |– B&C. I investigate what happens to the categoricity results when ‘and-bias’ is removed in this way. Categoricity of & (and other connectives) is no longer trivial: it still holds for (binary) classical propositional logic, but fails for some weaker logics when we impose the binary format. Results and counter-examples are presented in the setting of algebraic semantics, and of Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic; the technical machinery that I use will be explained. Zoom meeting link
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Matti Eklund (Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
Truth and Natural Language Metaphysics Lecture Date: Thursday 13 February 2025 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: B413 Abstract Some linguists and philosophers are engaged in a project of doing natural language metaphysics (”natural language ontology”). The underlying idea is that languages can and do have metaphysical assumptions somehow built into them. I discuss some problems with this idea, and some ways of responding to these problems.
- Simon Knutssons slutseminarium
Department of Philosophy
Opponent: Orri Stefansson Seminar Date: Tuesday 19 November 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Tore Vincents Olsen (Aarhus)
Department of Philosophy
The role of civil servants under democratic backsliding Seminar Date: Tuesday 17 December 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The article explores the role of civil servants under democratic backsliding, a process in which democratic institutions and rights are gradually undermined. It delves into the quandary faced by civil servants when a government, initially democratically elected, initiates policies that threaten democracy itself. Drawing on the literature on democratic backsliding, the article discusses two competing conceptions of the civil servant’s role: the instrumental and the value-based. The instrumental conception posits that civil servants should neutrally implement the directives of their superiors, almost regardless of the political implications. Conversely, the value-based conception argues that civil servants have a fundamental duty to uphold the state’s constitutional identity and values, defending these against any efforts to undermine them even those of their political superiors. This is particularly pertinent when changes include constitutional amendments or changes in basic political and legal structures, which carry signs of democratic backsliding. A main contention is that civil servants have a special obligation to resist democratic backsliding as their existence as civil servants hinges on valid laws, which can only result from democratic processes. Various strategies that civil servants might employ to this end are examined, suggesting that there might be a duty for civil servants to organize against backsliding governments consolidating their power while dismantling democracy. In conclusion, the article emphasizes the proactive and critical role that civil servants must play not only in defending democracy but also in securing their own survival as legitimate and necessary components of the political system. SCGG
- Cancelled: Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Helen Beebee (Leeds)
Department of Philosophy
Exceptionalism: Consensus and Belief in Philosophy Lecture Date: Thursday 12 December 2024 Time: 12.00 – 12.45 Location: D315 Abstract According to me, philosophy aims to figure out which philosophical theories are tenable — as opposed to true — since there may be several theories of the same phenomenon between which there is no way to rationally decide. This position raises a question of ‘exceptionalism’: does philosophy differ from other disciplines, in particular the sciences, in this regard; and, if so, is that a problem? In this talk, I argue that the answer to the first question is ’yes and no’, depending on which other discipline philosophy is being compared to; and the answer to the second question is ’no’. So the threat of exceptionalism isn’t a problem for my view.
- Simon Knutssons' final PhD seminar: The Weight of Evil
Department of Philosophy
Opponent: Orri Stefansson Seminar Date: Tuesday 19 November 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700
- Higher Seminar in Philosophy of Science: Marie Gueguen (University of Rennes 1)
Department of Philosophy
If you don't ask, the answer is already no - Modeling strategies in high uncertainty contexts Seminar Date: Thursday 28 November 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Abstract: In this talk, I analyze how different modeling strategies have been put to work in the computational models used to handle very complex targets in astrophysics and astrochemistry. The field of computational astronomy, for instance, has been shaped by a diversity of approaches, from first very simple structure simulations in the 1970's, numerical experiments performed by Efstathiou or Mellott , idealized scenario or semi-analytic models, to high resolution hydrodynamical simulations. My goal in this talk is to track the epistemological commitments and constraints of each of this strategy, and to show how the race to ever-more comprehensive models, in part encouraged by the funding landscape, has tend to blur what kind of questions can be addressed by each of these strategies. On this basis, I will distinguish predictive approaches from exploratory approaches for modeling complex systems and argue that many disagreements about how to solve discrepancies between observations and model's outputs actually stems from misinterpreting the kind of conclusions that the most complex and realistic simulations allow to draw. I will wrap up this presentation by highlighting how these considerations can inform the current debate about machine-learning techniques and their legitimate use.
- Cancelled: Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Alejandra Mancilla (Oslo University)
Department of Philosophy
Cancelled: From sovereignty to guardianship: Governing Antarctica, Governing the World Seminar Date: Tuesday 3 December 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The twin crises of climate change and biodiversity loss have shown humans our power to intervene and modify nature in ways that can end up threatening our own existence on earth. At the same time, and despite attempts to find technological fixes, they have shown us our limited knowledge and power to control the planet’s processes and systems. It is no accident that scientists who have theorized the need to remain within our “planetary boundaries” are advocating a new form of governance for the “planetary commons”; and that researchers mapping the world’s most valuable ecoregions are proposing the creation of a “Global Safety Net” of protected areas spanning across national jurisdictions. In this book, I look to Antarctica as an inspiration for creating modes of territorial governance that respond more adequately to these environmental challenges. Despite its colonial origins, for over 60 years the Antarctic Treaty has ruled over the continent preserving peace, science and—since the signature of the Environmental Protocol in 1991—the protection of the environment. Neither under the national regime of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources nor under the international regime of Common Heritage of Mankind , Antarctica has been jointly governed by a group of states with a focus on protection rather than exploitation of the nonhuman natural world. I argue that this regime of Joint Guardianship where business has not been conducted as usual and where states have shown restraint should serve as a blueprint for the governance of places beyond Antarctica, like ecoregions and arguably also the oceans and outer space. Having said this, I argue that what I call the “Antarctic political imagination” has not been wholly impervious to three biases that also inform international law more generally: methodological anthropocentrism, methodological extractivism, and methodological nationalism. I find in the Environmental Protocol some of the conceptual resources needed to move beyond them and suggest that, if reinterpreted along these lines, this could result in the first political system at the global level where not just humans, but also nonhumans are represented, and where the representatives are not just states, but also non-state actors. To conclude, I look at the “paradox of protection” that affects Antarctica as well as other Global Systemic Resources; namely, that to protect them it is not enough to act in them, but also beyond them. Unsurprisingly, the take-home message is that governing Antarctica requires to some extent governing the world … and vice versa.
- Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philsophy: Mikael Janvid
Department of Philosophy
Anti-Social Black Metal Epistemology: Forming Beliefs without Trust in an Evil Environment Seminar Date: Thursday 15 May 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract A grim picture of human existence and society is painted in the Norwegian Black Metal band Gorgoroth’s masterpiece album Quantos Possunt Ad Satanitatem Trahunt from 2009. Contrary to what has been preached to us and we have been indoctrinated in, Evil rules the world! Yet by embracing this dark outlook, the struggling subject gains a privileged epistemic insight freeing themselves from the hypocrisies of religion, political ideologies and other delusions. This highly distrustful outlook challenges the central role trust is claimed to play by current influential views in social epistemology of testimony where trust in fellow humans is considered essential for our epistemic practices. This paper starts out from the perspective conveyed by the lyrics in this album, and others in the same genre, to explore just how meager of a social basis testimony can survive on. How would such a distrustful seeker of truth go about forming their beliefs? The central theme to be investigated is what role trust, as well as its contrary, plays in testimonial exchange. The paper aims to find out how such a subject could still succeed epistemically while violating accounts of trust presented in the recent debate. Lastly the question is posed whether the reader knows they are not in this dire predicament.
- Higher Seminar in Philosophy of Science: Margherita Harris (SOCRATES Centre at Leibniz University)
Department of Philosophy
From Inductive Risk to Quantifauxcation Seminar Date: Thursday 20 February 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Debates on the role of values in science have remained surprisingly disconnected from debates on the role of probability in inference—the so-called “statistics wars.” This talk bridges these debates by arguing that the uncritical acceptance of probabilism—the view that probability's role is to quantify degrees of belief or support—often leads philosophers to conflate value-based concerns with deeper epistemic issues. Revisiting the Rudner–Jeffrey debate, I show how differing conceptions of probability shape the argument from inductive risk and why this matters for broader debates on values in science. I then introduce quantifauxation (Stark, 2021) and disguised quantifauxation to illustrate how probabilistic methods can obscure rather than clarify uncertainty. I conclude that distinguishing methodological concerns from value-based ones is essential for preserving the epistemic integrity of scientific inference.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Karsten Klint Jensen (IFFS)
Department of Philosophy
Moral Solutions to Many-person Prisoners Dilemmas – The Problem of Large-Scale Coordination Seminar Date: Tuesday 25 February 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit presents a number of Many-person Prisoner’s Dilemmas and explores how they can be solved. Of particular interest are Contributors’ Dilemmas, where each member of some group has a choice between two acts: contributing to some public good (available for all regardless of whether they have contributed or not), or defecting. The dilemma is this: even if someone contributes more to the good than what he pays, he may not himself benefit enough from his contribution to repay his costs. Thus, it may be better for each not to contribute; and this may be so whatever others do. But if fewer contribute, less good is available for each; and if none contribute, no good will be produced. Many environmental problems appear to pose this dilemma, climate change being one of them. A solution would be to get most, or better, everyone to contribute. Standard solutions are political; the choice situation is changed, such that the self-interested behavior no longer is the best option for each (by installing economic incentives) or becomes impossible (by legal prohibitions). However, Parfit suggests that moral solutions, where everyone’s motivation is changed into a suitable moral one, often would be better than political solutions, because unlike these they do not need enforcement and can thus be more effective; and in some cases, they may be the only attainable solutions. Parfit is particularly interested in the solution where everyone becomes more altruistic, i.e. choose out of concern for the good of everyone. If everyone became sufficiently altruistic, each would choose to contribute to the public good, he claims. But what exactly does an altruistic solution look like, and how could it be brought about? Parfit does not say much about that. The aim of this paper is to answer these questions. I shall proceed using climate change as an example. The public good is here avoidance of harm, and the solution of the dilemma, political as well as moral, must consist in achieving some form of self-restraint concerning activities that involve emissions of greenhouse gases.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Matti Eklund (Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Lecture Date: Thursday 13 February 2025 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Abstract TBA
- CLLAM Seminar: Andrew Peet (Umeå)
Department of Philosophy
Interpretation as Normative Sense-Making Seminar Date: Friday 24 January 2025 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract I present a new theory of utterance understanding – the target state of utterance interpretation. According to this theory, utterance understanding is a distinctively normative species of ‘objectual understanding’. Objectual understanding is the epistemic state we occupy when we understand a subject matter such as an event or process. On my view, utterance understanding consists in grasping the normative significance of an utterance qua event. I call the resultant picture of interpretation the ‘normative sense-making view’. The normative sense-making view stands in contrast to what I call the ‘interrogative inquiry’ approach. According to the interrogative inquiry view interpretation is inquiry targeted at the question ‘what does the utterance mean’. On standard pictures of inquiry the interrogative model entails that utterance understanding consists in knowledge of meaning. I will illustrate the normative sense-making view via a comparison to the interrogative view and its accompanying knowledge-based theory of understanding.
- CLLAM: Joulia Smortchkova: Grenoble
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Seminar Date: Friday 4 April 2025 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy: Åsa Carlson
Department of Philosophy
Hume on Identity of Objects: A Medium betwixt Unity and Number Seminar Date: Thursday 6 February 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: 700D Abstract In book one, section four of A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume aims at explaining why we – the vulgar – believe in the existence of external bodies: “What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?” (T 1.4.2.1). Such beliefs entail beliefs in bodies that continue to exist when unperceived, which in turn entail the idea of identity. Although Hume’s conception of identity comes closest to what we consider as numerical identity, he conceives of identity in the sense of x is identical to x as uninformative: It conveys the idea of unity. Several objects convey the idea of number, no matter how resembling they are, and so does adding a time difference to the identity statement. Either we have to think of x at both points of time at once, or in succession. Hence, on the one hand, to avoid unity there must be some difference between x and the idea with which x is identical. On the other hand, the introduction of a difference entails many objects. Hume concludes that he needs an impossible medium, “Betwixt unity and number” (T 1.4.2.28). Using a fiction, he solves the problem. But how, exactly, to understand his solution? What, exactly, is the fiction? In opposition to Donald Baxter’s influential interpretation of identity as a switching between unity and number, I argue that Hume defines identity as unity through time, and thereby formulates an idea that substitutes a medium between unity and number. This idea is a medium between epistemic attitudes: Between certainty (“unity”) and uncertainty (“number”) there is potential uncertainty (“identity”). When we know that x at t1 is the same object as x as at t2, but could have been unsure about it, then the proposition is informative and the idea of identity representable: x