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- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Pablo Ruiz de Olano (Max Planck Institute)
Department of Philosophy
MEA and Theory Development: Lessons from the Development of the Standard Model of Particle Physics Seminar Date: Thursday 5 September 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In the last few years, interest in the concept of Meta-Empirical theory Assessment (MEA) has sharply increased. In this talk, I address an aspect of the MEA framework that has remained relatively unexplored in the literature and relates to the topic of theory development. The talk will be divided into three different parts. First, I introduce the MEA formalism and highlight some of the initial motivations behind its development. As I show, providing an account of theory development constituted an important goal of the framework, which has however received relatively little scholarly work. After that, I take a look at a historical episode that is of particular importance for MEA, namely the development of the Standard Model of Particle Physics. Building on previous work, I use this historical process to further emphasise the point that defenders of MEA are under pressure to provide a satisfactory account of theory development. Finally, in the third and last part of the talk, I discuss some of the strategies that one might follow to accomplish this goal.
- From bits to qubits – learn quantum programming
Department of Computer and Systems Sciences
What is quantum computing and how can it be used? This emerging technology shows a lot of potential. A new course developed at DSV gives you a head start.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Marilù Papandreou (Bergen)
Department of Philosophy
Aristotle on the Ontology of Artefact Workshop Date: Thursday 30 May 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D892 Abstract It is commonly believed that Aristotle merely uses artefacts as examples or analogical cases. In this talk, however, I aim to show that Aristotle gives a specific, coherent account of artefacts that in various ways owes much to Plato. Moreover, I propose a new, definitive solution to the problem of artefacts' substantiality, which comprises two controversial positions: (i) that Aristotle holds a binary view of substantiality according to which artefacts are not substances at all; (ii) that artefacts fail to be substances because they exhibit less of a unity than natural wholes. Finally, responding to the contemporary debate on ordinary objects, I shall identify the main propositions for an ontology of artefacts that aspires to use Aristotle as its authority and can serve as a guideline for current metaphysical discussions.
- Thesis defence in Practical Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Jimmy Goodriche defends his thesis Oponent: Theron Pummer (St Andrews) Thesis defence Date: Tuesday 28 May 2024 Time: 14.00 – 16.00 Location: Auditorium 9, Södra huset D, 3rd floor James Goodrich defends his PhD thesis: Self-Defense Without Deontology: Groundwork for a Consequentialist Ethics of Harm
- CLLAM Seminar: Sebastian Watzl (University of Oslo)
Department of Philosophy
Attention and Rational Choice Seminar Date: Friday 17 May 2024 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract Formal models of decision making are widely employed in philosophy as well as microeconomics. They are variously described as rational choice theory or decision theory. The standard decision theoretic apparatus has no role for attention in its modelling. It treats rational agents as acting on the basis of preferences (desires) and credences (beliefs or expectations). At the same time, psychology and empirically informed philosophy of mind and action shows that attention plays essential and constructive roles in both belief revision and agency. In this paper, I sketch why attention should be included in decision-theoretic models, how to incorporate attention into them in a way that keeps what makes such models valuables, that is psychologically plausible, and theoretically and formally elegant and tractable. Agents, I argue, are informationally blind to issues they are not paying any attention to. All of an agent’s information gathering involves attention (at least, it won’t impact the agent’s beliefs without attention). Agents also are decisionally blind to options that don’t occupy their attention. The options an agent decides between at any time is limited by the issues the agent is paying attention to in making that decision. I will show that informational blindness and decisional blindness are two sides of the same coin. This, I suggest, in part, is what makes attention decision-theoretically and normatively interesting: its role in mind and action is theoretical and practical at the same time. I show when attention, treated in this way, allows agents to act in ways that are both epistemically and practically better than they could act without attention, and how the view sketched here affects recent discussions on the nature and aim of inquiry.
- Higher seminar in Practical Philosophy: Isaac Taylor
Department of Philosophy
Just War Error Theory, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Pacifism Seminar Date: Tuesday 21 May 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Some of our most firmly held moral beliefs about war are, if a number of prominent philosophers are correct, illusions. The idea that soldiers do no wrong in fighting for an unjust case, for instance, cannot be justified as a correct account of the fundamental moral permissions, rights, and liabilities of individuals. What should members of the armed forces do in light of these claims? Jeff McMahan has argued that combatants should fall back on fundamental moral principles to guide their actions, while Henry Shue has maintained that they should continue to act as if the illusions were real. In this paper, I make a provisional case for a third option. Drawing on the existing debate, but also recent work in metaethics about the potentially undesirable effects of moralizing conflicts, I suggest that soldiers should foster a qualified skepticism about the morality of participating in any war. This may look very much like a pacifist theory, but I also demonstrate how it can avoid some of the standard objections that are levelled against pacifism.
- Hello Katie, what happens next?
Department of Computer and Systems Sciences
Katie Berns successfully defended her PhD thesis on September 22, 2023, at the Department of Computer and Systems Sciences (DSV). What has her PhD journey been like, and what will she do now? We decided to ask her.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Hossein Ayati (University in Tehran)
Department of Philosophy
Reasoning, Rationality, and Coherence Seminar Date: Tuesday 10 September 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Although much ink has been spilled in discussing the relationship between rationality and normative reasons on the one hand and normative reasons and reasoning on the other, surprisingly, little has been said about whether we can understand rationality in terms of reasoning. In this paper, I propose a novel way to understand rationality in terms of good reasoning. I argue that structural rationality is best understood in terms of adherence to formal good reasoning and substantive rationality as adherence to non-formal good reasoning. I show how this can provide a unified account of structural and substantive dimensions of rationality that remain elusive on many other accounts. I also discuss several challenging cases for some prominent accounts of rationality and show how my account succeeds where they fail.
- DSV success at CHI 2023
Department of Computer and Systems Sciences
One best paper award and three honorable mentions. DSV proved its strong position in the Human–Computer Interaction research field at this year’s CHI conference in Germany.
- Summer break: Seminars, Colloquia, workshops, etc
Department of Philosophy
We'll be back Autumn term 2024 Event Start date: Friday 31 May 2024 Time: 00.00 End date: Thursday 15 August 2024 Time: 00.00
- Perspectives on Knowledge Resistance
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Students from DSV invited to present their work on prestigious conference in Portugal
Department of Computer and Systems Sciences
Melina Bernsland and Arvin Moshfegh moved beyond course requirements and led the authoring of a work-in-progress submission that eventually got accepted to the ACM Interactive Conference on Interactive Media Experience (IMX). They also received travel grants to attend the conference in person and present their work in Aveiro, Portugal June 22–24, 2022. “Melina and Arvin's work brings together the fields of cybersecurity education, extended reality as well as human–computer interaction. I’m very proud of them”, says their teacher Asreen Rostami. At the conference, Melina Bernsland and Arvin Moshfegh will present “CS:NO” which is an XR experience for cyber security education. They have created a game-like environment where users get the feeling of being in cyberspace, dealing with various security threats. I hope to see more student initiatives like this “It’s always fun to work with students who are motivated to go beyond their schoolwork and deliver high quality work. It’s exciting to see that we can support them in preparing and presenting their projects in high ranking international conferences. I hope to see more student initiatives like this”, Asreen Rostami continues.
- Higher Seminar in theoretical philosophy: Anna-Sofia Maurin (GU)
Department of Philosophy
The Value of Car(v)ing Seminar Date: Thursday 7 March 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In my presentation I plan to critically discuss an argument defended by Shamik Dasgupta (cf. esp. his 2018 and unpublished ms.) to the effect that, because reasons exist for thinking that objectivity—and so Realism—constitutively requires that some things that exist are (primitively) normative, and since this (primitive) normativity must but cannot be explained, nothing is objective, and hence Realism must be given up. In my presentation, I plan to argue: (1) …that Dasgupta’s argument—which I understand as an argument about explanation—rests on ideas about whatneeds explaining as well as what counts as an adequate explanation that can—I suspect ought to—be resisted. (2) …that the scope of Dasgupta’s argument may not be as wide as he wants it to be: that those who accept a ‘sparse’ conception of what there is most likely do not have to accept that objectivity—and so Realism—constitutively requires that some things that exist are (primitively) normative and so will not have to face the explanatory challenge in the first place. This is very much work in progress, which means that I don’t have a paper polished enough to warrant circulating. Those of you who want to prepare for the seminar can (but in no way need to) check out Dasgupta’s papers, which can be accessed via his website: https://shamik.net/
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Henrik Lagerlund
Department of Philosophy
Artifacts in the 14th Century: The Case of Blasius of Parma Workshop Date: Friday 15 December 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The 14th century saw remarkable philosophical developments. One such was the nature of artifacts. In this presentation, I will draw attention to Blasius of Parma’s treatment of artifacts in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. I will also put his contribution in context and then mention Ockham, Buridan as well as Descartes and Bacon.
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Gui Franzmann
Department of Philosophy
A tale of emergence Seminar Date: Thursday 18 April 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The question of what fundamentally is has never been straightforward in physics, yet there had always been a tentative answer for both theoretical and practical purposes. Everything shifted about a century ago with the advent of quantum mechanics, which challenged our traditional understanding of existence as suddenly we can also talk about things that are in quantum space*, not only in classical spacetime anymore. Nonetheless, were we to keep a strong reductionist position, then we would be left with no choice but to understand how classical spatiotemporal existence can emerge from the quantum mechanical one. This talk aims to be a pedagogical introduction to this discussion and an invitation for long-lasting collaboration between physicists and philosophers. *Known as Hilbert space.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Olle Torpman (IFFS)
Department of Philosophy
Transferred Outcome Responsibility and Climate Change Seminar Date: Tuesday 30 January 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract This paper explores the concept of outcome responsibility in general, and its relevance to issues of climate change in particular. It distinguishes outcome responsibility from moral and causal responsibility, emphasizing the features that make an agent outcome responsible. It argues against foreseeability being a condition for outcome responsibility, and proposes a definition that allows for degrees of responsibility. The paper also discusses the possibility of transferred outcome responsibility.
- Higher Seminar in theoretical philosophy: Richard Dawid
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Seminar Date: Thursday 22 February 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D600 Abstract TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Alexander Stöpfgeshoff & Frans Svensson (Göteborg)
Department of Philosophy
The Honorable, the Useful, and the Pleasurable: Buridan on Good and Goodness Workshop Date: Friday 5 April 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract How unified is the good? In 2.11 of his extensive commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, John Buridan considers a traditional division within the good between things that are honorable, useful, and pleasurable. Buridan argues that this division should be rejected. In his view, anything that belongs to the good is honorable as well as useful and pleasurable. The division is nevertheless important for our understanding of goodness (for our understanding of the nature of the good, if we will), according to Buridan. Several centuries before, for example, Franz Brentano, A. C. Ewing, and Roderick Chisholm, Buridan proposes a fitting attitude account of goodness. In its most general sense, he says, the good refers to the desirable, that is, to that which is (would be) a fitting object of desire. However, we can distinguish between three different ways in which things may be desirable: in themselves (in which case they are honorable), as means to some other good (in which case they are useful) and for ourselves (in which case they are pleasurable). On the substantive level, these always coincide. But that is arguably not something that follows from the account of goodness itself, according to Buridan. In this talk, we will critically examine both Buridan’s rejection of the division within the good between the honorable, the useful, and the pleasurable, and his fitting attitude account of goodness.
- All MA and PhD students are welcome!
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Graham Oddie (CU Boulder)
Department of Philosophy
Incomparability and the Logical Structure of Value Magnitudes Seminar Date: Tuesday 13 February 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D247 Abstract Bykvist (and some others) have recently argued that positing value magnitudes (analogues of physical magnitudes such as lengths, masses, temperatures and so on) throws considrable light on some problems in axiology. Here I foucs on problems concerning value incomparability and value incommensurability. Of how much value are value magnitudes in this cluster?