Search
Are you looking for internal information?
Showing 26641-26660 of 35038 hits
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Fiona Woollard (Southampton)
Department of Philosophy
Why not get rid of mothers (and other gendered personal roles)? Lecture Date: Thursday 18 April 2024 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 Abstract In this talk, I will argue that to be a mother is not simply to be a parent who is a woman. To be a mother is to have a female gendered parental role. Motherhood, like other gendered roles, is implicated in gender injustice. Those seen as mothers are typically held to unreasonable ideals of self-sacrifice with bad effects on both individuals and the structure of society. So should we get rid of gendered parental roles and have only parents, no mothers and fathers? I compare gendered parental roles with other gendered personal roles (spouse, daughter) and with gendered professional roles (nurse/doctor, actor/actress). I argue that no one should have their personal roles gendered against their will: women should be able to be parents but not mothers. However, in contrast to many professional roles, gendered personal roles can be flexible enough for the people involved to negotiate individualised, and potentially emancipatory, understandings of how the role is gendered. We can resist the injustice in current influential understanding of motherhood, while honouring parents’ and children’s experiences of the parental role as gendered. Gender neutral parental roles should be an option – but should not be the only option. The same applies to other gendered personal roles.
- CLLAM seminarium: Katalin Farkas (Central European University)
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Seminar Date: Friday 5 April 2024 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- CLLAM Seminar: Peter Pagin
Department of Philosophy
Propaganda and assertion Seminar Date: Friday 22 March 2024 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract This talk will be about two philosophical approaches to propaganda. About half of the talk will concern Jason Stanley's book How Propaganda Works, from 2015. I criticize Stanley's account and argue that the normative character of his approach to propaganda and, relatedly, to assertion, is to blame. I also argue that several known features of propaganda can be derived from a descriptive account of assertion, but not all, specifically not those that crucially depend on the mass character of the audience. The second half of the talk is about this topic, where I also briefly sketch my own account of assertion.
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Jan Sprenger (Torino)
Department of Philosophy
The Productive Model of Explanation in Psychology and Beyond Seminar Date: Thursday 30 May 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The explanation of psychological phenomena is a central aim of psychological science. However, the nature of explanation and the processes by which we evaluate whether a theory explains a phenomenon are often unclear. We address this shortcoming by characterizing the nature of explanation in psychology along the following lines: a theory explains a phenomenon if and only if a formal model of the theory produces the statistical pattern representing the phenomenon. Using this account, we outline a workable methodology of explanation: (a) explicating a verbal theory into a formal model, (b) representing phenomena as statistical patterns in data, and (c) assessing whether the formal model produces these statistical patterns. Finally, we compare our proposal to other models of explanation from philosophy of science.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Michael Devitt (City University of New York)
Department of Philosophy
Reference Borrowing: The Case of Implement Terms Lecture Date: Thursday 23 May 2024 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 Abstract The paper reports on experiments testing the theory of reference for implement terms. According to the description theory, competent speakers must associate with an implement term a description of the referent’s function and, probably, the physical properties that enable it to perform its function. We tested this theory on t ‘fax machine’ and ‘abacus’, using the method of truth value judgments. Our experimental results count decisively against the Description Theory. We conclude, by inference to the best explanation, that the reference of these terms can be borrowed. Our results are inconsistent even with the descriptive-causal theory of borrowing, according to which these terms can be borrowed only if the borrower associates at least some accurate description of the referent. We conclude that the terms are covered by a pure causal-historical theory of borrowing, the central idea of the picture of reference presented by Kripke, Putnam, and other causal theorists in discussing proper names and “natural” kind terms. We emphasize that our findings do not support a causal theory of the initial reference fixing by the “experts” who introduce an implement term. Indeed, we think it highly plausible that reference is initially fixed by a description of the implement’s function and defining physical characteristics. If so, then implement terms are covered by a hybrid theory of reference, causal borrowing and descriptive fixing. Key Words implement terms; description theory of reference; causal-historical reference borrowing; descriptive-causal reference borrowing; causal reference fixing; descriptive reference fixing
- CANCELLED!! Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Simon Allzén
Department of Philosophy
CANCELLED!! Seminar Date: Thursday 15 December 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Sylvain Roudaut
Department of Philosophy
Luis Coronel on Impetus Workshop Date: Friday 11 November 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract It is usually claimed that, beyond superficial similarities, there exists a substantial difference between the medieval theory of ‘impetus' and Galileo’s theory of ‘impeto’. Despite an obvious terminological resemblance, the meaning of these two terms is so different that they should not hide the epistemological break that happened between the late Middle Ages and the early Modern period. In this talk, I would like to reassess this claim by focusing on the theory of impetus proposed by Luis Coronel, who was active at the turn of the 16th century. The first part of the talk will be devoted to a brief recap of the main differences between medieval and modern theories of the impetus/impeto. Then I will show that Coronel’s theory may be regarded as a missing link between the medieval theories of the impetus and the modern theories of inertia. Finally, I will briefly discuss the possible influence of Coronel’s views on later authors up to Galileo.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Gunnar Björnsson
Department of Philosophy
Taking Responsibility Seminar Date: Tuesday 1 November 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In her Descartes Lectures, Cheshire Calhoun argues that responsible person is a cross-temporal, valuable status that is default in social life. Much theorizing about moral responsibility, she claims, have focused too much on one particular aspect of this status: accountability responsibility. In addition, we should recognize as part of the default status that one is compliance responsible, or disposed to live up to minimal normative expectations, as well as a responsibility taker, capable of taking the initiative to do good things that one is not morally required to do. My presentation, in preparation of a commentary on one of Calhoun’s three lectures, focuses on what we should say about the nature of responsibility taking and its relation to (i) the status of being a responsible person, (ii) negative reactive attitudes as well as positive attitudes of praise and gratitude, and (iii) normative expectations and demands.
- CLLAM Seminar: Stina Björkholm (IFFS)
Department of Philosophy
Derogatory Content in the Discourse Structure Seminar Date: Friday 4 November 2022 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract Several philosophers have argued that derogatory language can be analyzed by appeal to the linguistic frameworks by Stalnaker and Lewis, according to which utterances aim to update a shared body of information mutually accepted among the interlocutors. The thought is that by making a derogatory claim, the speaker aims to add derogatory or offensive content(s) to this shared body of information. However, a problem about this approach is that these frameworks are primarily designed to model mutual belief. This seems to make them ill-equipped to accommodate the normative dimensions of derogatory speech, which (roughly) has to do with the ways that derogatory speech condones mistreatment of certain groups of people. The challenge is to show how these frameworks can be expanded such that they can do justice to the way that derogatory and offensive language puts pressure on action or attitudes. I propose that this challenge can be met by appeal to an expanded version of Stalnaker’s pragmatic framework. I argue that this expanded framework offers a way to account for the way that language can enforce both offensive stereotypes and derogatory norms for action and offer a theory of how these contents are represented in the discourse structure.
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Joe Roussos (IFFS)
Department of Philosophy
Possibilities in climate science Seminar Date: Thursday 17 November 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract This paper examines how climate scientists use models to explore possibilities—so called “modal modelling.” I begin by distinguishing several senses of “possible” and considering how they might be relevant to the project of studying climate change. These include epistemic possibility, metaphysical possibility, and possibility according to a set of laws of nature—e.g., physical possibility. Determining whether a claim is possible in the relevant sense is a question of modal epistemology. I contrast this with the task of determining whether a claim is supported by a body of evidence, which is a matter of confirmation theory, a subset of ordinary epistemology. I then examine a debate about the interpretation and use of collections of climate models, for example in the IPCC assessment reports. One party argues that climate models don’t provide the right sort of information to allow us to make probabilistic claims about how the climate will be in future. They argue instead that climate models allow for only claims about possible futures rather than probable futures. I call these critics possibilists, and their more orthodox opponents probabilists. The possibilists think that climate models allow us to distinguish between which possible futures are “nearer” or “more relevant”, and that these distinctions reflect facts about our evidence. I argue that there isn’t a concept of “possibility” that can do the work these critics want: fitting the evidence from climate models, admitting of degrees, supporting decisions, and yet not amounting to probability.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Cesare Cuttica (Université Paris 8)
Department of Philosophy
Lessons from the Past: Anti-Democracy in Early Modern England Workshop Date: Friday 28 October 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 or Zoom link: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/61245739584 Abstract Based on his recent monograph, Anti-democracy in England 1570-1642 (Oxford University Press, 2022), Cesare Cuttica’s talk will provide a sketch of anti-democratic ideas in early modern England with the goal of stimulating the audience of the Stockholm seminar to reflect on some key contemporary political issues such as populism, fake news, the role of religion in democracies. Cesare’s presentation will show that anti-democratic critiques were addressed at 'popular government' as a regime that empowered directly and fully the irrational, uneducated, dangerous multitude; will explain why and how criticism of democracy was articulated in England and in Europe at the time; and will argue that the early modern era is far more relevant to the development of democratic concepts and practices than has hitherto been acknowledged. Most importantly, Cesare’s paper will say something about the importance of re-evaluating the role of religion and cultural factors in the history of democracy and of political ideas more generally. Ultimately, Cesare’s talk intends to offer a novel analysis of a precious portion of Western political reflection and an ideal platform to discuss the legacy of principles that are still fundamental today. Cesare Cuttica is Lecturer in British History at the Université Paris 8 and a member of the Centre for Intellectual History at the University of Helsinki. He has published a monograph on John Locke’s main target Robert Filmer and patriarchalism; edited four volumes of essays on various topics (including the idea of crisis); and written articles in the field of the history of ideas in early modern Britain and Europe as well as essays about the practice of history-writing, notably about the methodology of intellectual history.
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: James Nguyen
Department of Philosophy
Understanding Philosophy Seminar Date: Thursday 24 November 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: TBA Abstract What is the primary intellectual aim of philosophy? The standard view is that philosophy aims to provide true answers to philosophical questions. But if our aim is to settle controversy by answering such questions, our discipline is an embarrassing failure. Moreover, taking philosophy to aim at providing true answers to these questions leads to a variety of puzzles: How do we account for philosophical expertise? How is philosophical progress possible? Why do job search committees not care about the truth or falsity of a candidate’s philosophical views? We argue that philosophy does not aim at discovering true answers to philosophical questions. Instead, its primary intellectual aim is understanding. We argue that many familiar aspects of philosophy become intelligible once we accept this hypothesis. This talk is based on joint work with Michael Hannon (University of Nottingham).
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Pieta Päällysaho (Jyväskylä)
Department of Philosophy
Neoptolemos looks ugly – shame and ethical evaluation in Sophocles’ Philoctetes Workshop Date: Friday 25 November 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In my presentation I will offer a philosophically informed reading of Sophocles’ last tragedy, the Philoctetes. More specifically, I will read the play as a study on the processes and problems of ethical evaluation, and how this evaluation is informed by the feeling of shame (aidôs/aischunê) and by the negative value of shameful or ugly (to aischron). The plot of the Philoctetes revolves around the question of whether one of its central characters, the young Neoptolemus, recognizes the shame involved in his actions – and whether this shame can inhibit shameful action. In this, Sophocles’ play seems to anticipate the later formulations of Plato and Aristotle who both maintain that a proper capacity for feeling shame (especially aidôs) is essential for the young, because shame has the power to keep them from committing shameful and ugly deeds. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in the Philoctetes (as well as in Plato and Aristotle) recognizing something as shameful is not only an emotionally charged ethical evaluation but also an aesthetic one – for aischron can mean, simply ‘ugly’. Therefore, I will argue that the Philoctetes presents a model of ethical evaluation that is at once emotive and aesthetic. This is a hybrid seminar. Please, find the zoom-link here: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/68653734427
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Alice Damirjian
Department of Philosophy
Is ”Arsenal" a Rigid Designator? Rigidity and Names for Social Groups Seminar Date: Thursday 27 October 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In Naming and Necessity, Kripke (1980, [1972]) argued and convinced many that some terms are rigid designators. In particular, proper names. According to Kripke’s definition, a proper name N for an object a is a rigid designator if and only if N designates a in every possible world in which a exists, and N never designates any other object b such that a ≠ b. Some paradigmatic examples of such names are: ‘Hesperus’, ‘Phosphorus’, ‘Venus’, ‘Nixon’, ‘Aristotle’, ‘Gödel’, ‘Mt. Everest’, ‘London’, ‘England’, and ‘T’. In this paper, the thing I want to draw our attention to is the fact that ‘London’ and ‘England’ stand out from the rest of the names in our list. They stand out because cities and nations are social entities, whereas planets, individuals, mountains, and tables are not. They are, in a sense, entities that constitutively dependent on social factors (like human behavior, practices and beliefs). This observation is in itself a reason to wonder whether ‘England’ and ‘London’ really could be rigid designators, and what that would mean for the kripkean picture of proper names. For if we are fine with accepting that ‘England’ is a rigid designator, then it seems intuitively plausible that names for other social entities could be rigid too. Company names like ‘Apple’, ‘Google’ and ‘Facebook’, band names like ‘The Beatles’, ‘Queen’ and ‘Nirvana’, and team names like ‘Arsenal’ could all be rigid designators. This is something one might not be inclined to accept without proper consideration. In order to investigate this issue, we must turn our gaze towards social ontology and look at what has been said about the metaphysics of social entities, and we must ask: Within the kripkean framework, are social entities really the type of objects for which rigid designators can be introduced? My tentative answer will be: It appears so.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Sebastian Enqvist
Department of Philosophy
Extracting Herbrand disjunctions from cyclic proofs Event Date: Thursday 20 October 2022 Time: 16.15 – 18.00 Location: D289 Abstract Herbrand's theorem provides constructive content to classical logic. Given an existentially quantified and provable statement, the theorem provides a valid finite disjunction of formulas substituting ground terms for the bound variables. This can be seen as a weaker form of the existence property for intuitionistic logic, in which for any provable existentially quantified formula one can find concrete witnesses for the bound variables. The standard proof of Herbrand's theorem uses cut elimination. In recent work by Afshari, Hetzl and Leigh, a direct interpretation of classical sequent calculus proofs in terms of so-called higher-order recursion schemes is given, in order to directly compute a Herbrand disjunction from a given proof (cut-free or not). This can be seen as a model of the computational content of a proof in classical sequent calculus. As a model of computation, it is however rather weak in the sense that no actual recursion takes place - as expected, since first-order logic has no built-in means to make recursive definitions. In order to extend the expressive power of this computational interpretation of classical logic, we therefore propose to consider cyclic (or, non-wellfounded) sequent calculus proofs for first-order logic extended with inductively defined predicates in the style of Martin-Löf, following an approach of Brotherston and Simpson. In this talk I will sketch how this framework can be set up, and present some simple applications. The talk is based on ongoing joint work with Bahareh Afshari and Graham Leigh.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Michael McKenna (Arizona)
Department of Philosophy
Toward a Robust Theory of the Free Will Ability Seminar Date: Tuesday 4 October 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Philosophers working on the metaphysics of ability often suggest that their inquiry into the modality of abilities can provide insights into the nature of free will, and especially to the question as to whether it is compatible with determinism. I will argue that philosophers especially interested in the free will ability should instead examine the free will ability when it is actually exercised. This, it turns out, helps us to understand the nature of the ability at issue when it is claimed that free will requires—or just is—the ability to do otherwise. My aim here is not to defend a source-theoretic view of free will according to which free will does not require the ability to do otherwise but rather resides only in the actual causal sources of free actions. It is, instead, to explore a leeway-theoretic view according to which free will does after all require the ability to do otherwise.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Daniel Telech (Lund)
Department of Philosophy
TBA Seminar Date: Tuesday 15 November 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Christian Barry (ANU)
Department of Philosophy
Offsetting and Accountable Harm Seminar Date: Tuesday 27 September 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Under what conditions can we justify actions which impose risk on some group of people on the grounds that they belong to a set of actions that, together, do not impose risk on that same group of people? Answering this question is important for evaluating various practices, including the practice of offsetting carbon emissions. We've recently defended an answer to this question, which carries the practical implication that whether emitting and offsetting is permissible can depend on the form that the offsetting takes. If you offset by sequestering, such that you remove as much carbon from the atmosphere as you put in (for example by planting trees), then according to our view you can successfully offset. But when you offset by forestalling—preventing others from putting additional carbon into the atmosphere (for example by paying them not to emit, or providing them with more energy efficient stoves), you typically cannot. After explaining our view and considering some objections that others have presented to it, we introduce and discuss an important distinction between various harms to which your conduct can be causally related.
- CLLAM Seminar: Peter Pagin
Department of Philosophy
Assertion, assumption, and Deduction Seminar Date: Friday 23 September 2022 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract This talk concerns the connection between speech act theory, especially the theory of assertion, and deduction, especially Natural Deduction. From a very abstract point of view, an assertion of a content p can be described as the ascription of the property of being p to the actual index, or point of evaluation. This is the abstract characterization of assertoric force. Let’s assume that the actual index is a possible world, namely the actual world. Thus, the conclusion of a closed argument, as an act, is an assertion, and thereby characterized as the ascription of the conclusion content as a property to the actual world. The question that will concern us in this talk is how this idea extends to the status of other acts in the practice of Natural Deduction. In these terms, what is the force of an inference that depends on one or more open assumptions? What is the force of the assumption itself? What is the force of an assertion that uses an entire derivation as a premise? Do we need to ascribe a force to the derivation as a whole? Is there a coherent complete theory of act forces of Natural Deduction along these lines?
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Erik Åkerlund (Newman)
Department of Philosophy
Suárez' Minimal Realism of Artifacts Workshop Date: Friday 16 September 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract "In the Scholastic tradition, the two main positions when it came to the status of artifacts were realism and nominalism. Nominalism stated, briefly, that an artifact was nothing over and above the parts constituting it, while the realists denied this, while differing in what this "over and above" would be. This talk explores Francisco Suárez' (1548–1617) treatment of artifacts in his Disputationes metaphysicae (1597). As will be seen, Suárez basically follows the realist line of reasoning. However, with his novel take on the status of "one-ness" ('unum') as a transendental, and with the assigning of the "over and above" of the artifact to the status of a mode (rather than an accident in the proper sense), Suárez keeps the realism in his position to a minimum. Suárez account of the production of artifacts will also be briefly covered in the end." This seminar can be followed on zoom as well: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/67894532199