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- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Harald Wiltsche (Linköping)
Department of Philosophy
TBA Seminar Date: Thursday 22 September 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700
- Reassessing Realism: On the Ontology of the Unobservable
Department of Philosophy
Simon Allzén defends his thesis Dissertation Date: Tuesday 20 September 2022 Time: 13.00 – 15.00 Location: In 4204, building 3, plan 4, Albano, Hannes Alfvéns väg 11 Academic dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy at Stockholm University to be publicly defended on Tuesday 20 September 2022 at 13.00 in sal 4204, hus 3, plan 4, Albano, Hannes Alfvéns väg 11. Abstract It is widely believed that science is in the business of finding out what the world is really like. The philosophical version of this belief is scientific realism – a doctrine about science that tells us that we ought to believe that the best theories in science are true, and that the world is occupied with the objects that those theories contain. If scientific realism was not correct, the argument goes, the incredible success of science would be a miracle. The best explanation for the success of science however, is not that it is a miracle, but that scientific theories are true. This argument is an instance of inference to the best explanation, or IBE. Skeptics have questioned why scientific success must imply its truth given that there are so many abandoned, false scientific theories in the history of science that were nevertheless successful. One of the controversies in the debate between scientific realists and anti-realists surrounds the legitimacy of reasoning in accordance with IBE. Realists need IBE to be a justified and reliable guide to truth. In this compilation thesis, I address various questions related to IBE and scientific realism. Paper 1 argues that scientific realism without IBE loses too much of its epistemic optimism, and that it in some contexts even becomes more pessimistic than the most prominent rival philosophical doctrine about science – constructive empiricism. To avoid deflating realism, I argue, a defense of IBE is necessary. Paper 2 addresses whether methodological similarities between science and metaphysics force scientific realists to also be realists with respect to metaphysics. If IBE is legitimate, it should not only be valid in science, but also in metaphysics, effectively inflating the ontology that scientific realists are rationally bound to accept. I argue against this conclusion. Paper 3 offers a proof of concept regarding a novel way to justify inferences to unobservable objects. Paper 4 establishes a novel critique of nonprobabilistic versions of IBE in scientific realism. Keywords: Scientific Realism, Inference to the best explanation, Scientific Method. Reassessing Realism: On the Ontology of the Unobservable
- 8th Stockholm Graduate Conference 2023
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Daniel Ramöller
Department of Philosophy
Close Enough Theory X Seminar Date: Tuesday 14 November 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D734 Abstract The ethics of future generations is riddled by paradoxes. Ethical theorists have searched for an ethical theory of beneficience that avoids these paradoxes, what Derek Parfit has called “theory X”. Combining different ideas from the literature, this text begins to suggests a new theory to solve these paradoxes.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Katharina Berndt Rasmussen
Department of Philosophy
Structural Dimensions of Discrimination Seminar Date: Tuesday 28 November 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In this paper, I put forth a theory of discrimination that captures several structural dimensions of the phenomenon, which are sometimes pushed to the periphery of analysis. I do this by outlining a concept of discrimination, which aims to capture what many of us are concerned with in real life cases, and by exploring the different forms it can take, as well as its relation to moral wrongness and to social injustice. I thus propose that we should see discrimination, in the relevant sense, as a bridge concept: between the personal and the political, between criteria of moral wrongness and of social (in)justice, between, indeed, individualist and structural analyses of harms and inequalities. I believe that it is this bridging feature which makes the concept distinctive and particularly useful, both within philosophy and more broadly in society (politics, law, civil society). My hope is that seeing discrimination in this way will allow for a more well-grounded and detailed understanding of our social world, by facilitating a more nuanced application of the concept to specific cases, and by allowing for a richer analysis of their moral and political-philosophical (and potentially even legal) status.
- Conference on Philosophy of Experiment
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Hans Halvorson (Copenhagen/Princeton)
Department of Philosophy
Contextualism in Relativity and Quantum Theories Seminar Date: Thursday 19 October 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstrakt I review two accounts of global reference frames in spacetime theories (and Einstein's special theory of relativity in particular): 1. Absolutism: All fundamental facts are frame-independent, and the frame-relative facts are derivable from them. 2. Fragmentalism: All fundamental facts are frame-relative, and there are no non-trivial logical relations between the facts in one reference frame and the facts in another reference frame. I argue that both of these accounts are fatally flawed, and I develop an alternative account that builds on the intuitions behind these other accounts. (I also consider the relation between these accounts and methodological imperatives regarding "good physics".) Finally I consider whether this sharpened account of contextualism in relativity theory can shed light on the sort of contextualism that we encounter in quantum theories
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Johan Brännmark
Department of Philosophy
Addressing Social Indeterminacy Lecture Date: Thursday 14 March 2024 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: Attention! B413 Abstract While there are some contemporary defenders of ontic vagueness or metaphysical indeterminacy, a quite common view is still that vagueness or indeterminacy are really semantic or epistemic in character. The exact borders of, say, Mount Kilimanjaro might be disputable, and there might not be a clear-cut answer as to whether a particular boulder on its slope is part of it, but this is just due to indeterminacy in how we conceptually carve some aspects of the world. But the basic structure of the world ultimately is what it is. Nothing indeterminate about it, at least not on a metaphysical level. If we turn to the social realm, things potentially become more complicated since the ways in which we conceptualize objects in the social world do not just carve up an already existing social landscape. Instead, our conceptualizations of these objects, beliefs about them, and actions in relation to them, are typically understood to play a constitutive role in grounding the existence of the relevant social objects. Yet if many of the relevant categories and ideas are indeterminate, should there then not also be widespread indeterminacy in the social realm? And what would recognizing such indeterminacy mean for how we should understand social objects? In this presentation it is argued that the best response to the endemic indeterminacy of the social realm is a form of fictionalism about social objects.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Attila Mráz
Department of Philosophy
Voting as Resistance: A Theory of Protest Voting Seminar Date: Tuesday 12 December 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D734 Abstract Since this is a pre-read, it would be great if you could add the following below the abstract on the website: This seminar will be a discussion of a pre-circulated paper. To receive a copy of the paper and/or to be added to the mailing list, please email the conveners: antoinette.scherz@philosophy.su.se or isaac.taylor@philosophy.su.se.
- Cancelled!! Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Johan Brännmark
Department of Philosophy
Addressing Social Indeterminacy Lecture Date: Thursday 14 December 2023 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 Abstract While there are some contemporary defenders of ontic vagueness or metaphysical indeterminacy, a quite common view is still that vagueness or indeterminacy are really semantic or epistemic in character. The exact borders of, say, Mount Kilimanjaro might be disputable, and there might not be a clear-cut answer as to whether a particular boulder on its slope is part of it, but this is just due to indeterminacy in how we conceptually carve some aspects of the world. But the basic structure of the world ultimately is what it is. Nothing indeterminate about it, at least not on a metaphysical level. If we turn to the social realm, things potentially become more complicated since the ways in which we conceptualize objects in the social world do not just carve up an already existing social landscape. Instead, our conceptualizations of these objects, beliefs about them, and actions in relation to them, are typically understood to play a constitutive role in grounding the existence of the relevant social objects. Yet if many of the relevant categories and ideas are indeterminate, should there then not also be widespread indeterminacy in the social realm? And what would recognizing such indeterminacy mean for how we should understand social objects? In this presentation it is argued that the best response to the endemic indeterminacy of the social realm is a form of fictionalism about social objects.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy: Miira Tuominen
Department of Philosophy
Socrates and Alcibiades in Love – Self-Knowledge, Erôs and God in Alcibiades 1 and the Symposium’. Seminar Date: Friday 1 December 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In Plato’s Symposium and the Alcibiades I of a disputed origin, we find the mirroring declarations of erotic love (erôs and derivatives) by Alcibiades to Socrates and vice versa. In the Alcibiades I, Socrates announces that he is the only one who truly loves Alcibiades because he loves Alcibiades’ soul. Others have merely loved something that belongs to Alcibiades, his body, and deserted him when his full bloom has started to fade. The dialogue culminates in the famous account of self-knowledge in terms of an analogy of an eye seeing itself in the pupil of another eye. Puzzlingly, Socrates also states in the analogy that self-knowledge requires knowledge of god. I shall focus on this latter point and argue that it can be explained by reference to the well-known Platonic claim that the highest goal of human life is assimilation to god insofar as it is possible in bodily life. I consider this ideal with respect to Alcibiades’ description of the effects of his passion for Socrates in the Symposium and argue that even rather deficient kinds of self-knowledge require recognition of godlikeness. I also claim that the deficiency of Alcibiades’ self-knowledge is not merely in it being about changeable individuals as opposed to general and immutable Forms. This sheds new light on the question of whether or to what extent individuals can be known.
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Özlem Yılmaz Silverman (Stockholm)
Department of Philosophy
Organicism, Now and Then: Plant Biology in the Early Twentieth Century Seminar Date: Thursday 23 November 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: E210, Arrhenius Laboratoriet Abstract The concept of organism has gained renewed attention from the philosophers of biology in the last a few decades. In this talk, I will look at the concept in the early twentieth century, which is a crucial time for history and philosophy of biology, as well as consider the concept in today’s plant biology. Many contemporary scholars argue that, contrary to the widespread idea that there were two main perspectives in biology at the dawn of the twentieth century, mechanism and vitalism, there was actually a third way: organicism. While the tradition of organicism in that time is mostly remembered through prominent scientists' work on animals, I am interested in how it was present in work on plants as well. One of the plant biologists whom I will talk about is Agnes Arber (1879-1960), who is one of the most important plant biologists of the early and mid-twentieth century. She is known for her meticulous collection of morphological data and elaborated interpretation of this data in the light of both biology and philosophy literature. I will draw on her interpretation of plant morphology and her work's place in plant biology in the early twentieth century. I will examine how her work engages with these three perspectives. Additionally, I will talk about the relations between different branches of plant biology in her time.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Sylvain Roudaut
Department of Philosophy
Artifacts and the Mechanization of Nature in Late Medieval Philosophy Seminar Date: Friday 22 April 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 & Zoom Abstract: In The Advancement of Learning , Francis Bacon writes: “An opinion has long been prevalent, that art is something different from nature, and things artificial different from things natural […] whereas men ought on the contrary to be surely persuaded of this, that the artificial does not differ from the natural in form or essence.” Whereas in the Middle Ages artifacts were commonly defined as ontologically different from natural beings, one of the most salient features of early modern philosophy is the use of machines as theoretical models for understanding nature while denying any essential difference between natural things and artificial ones. This talk will be about explaining how this change of paradigm happened between the late Middle Ages and the early modern period (between ca. 1300 and 1600) by highlighting the key moments of this theoretical transition, with a special emphasis on how the status of artifacts was discussed in the context of Paduan Aristotelianism. For those that want to follow this on zoom, here is the link
- Stockholm/Uppsala-Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- CLLAM Seminar: Paul Gorbow (SU/UiO)
Department of Philosophy
A solution to the knower paradoxes with applications to common knowledge and iterated knowledge Seminar Date: Friday 13 May 2022 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: Zoom Astract I present an untyped theory of knowledge and truth that solves the knower paradoxes of Kaplan and Montague from the 1960's. The underlying idea is (1) to formalize the principle of veracity (that whatever is known is true) more precisely, and (2) to embrace self-reference in the spirit of the Friedman-Sheard theory of truth and its associated revision semantics. It turns out that this facilitates expedient reasoning with common-knowledge predicates defined by self-referential formulas obtained by Gödel diagonalization. A generalization of the revision semantics to modalities (formalized as predicates) due to Johannes Stern is employed. Apart from answering questions of consistency, this opens up for philosophical insights on the meaning of sentences involving iterations of knowledge and truth, such as ' "Kim knows A" is true' and 'Kim knows "Kim knows A" '. Zoom-link
- Higher seminar in practical philosophy: Joseph Bowen
Department of Philosophy
Making Others Go Further Beyond the Call Seminar Date: Tuesday 2 November 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Commentator : Isaac Taylor Title Making Others Go Further Beyond the Call Abstract TBA
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Karl Nygren
Department of Philosophy
Fine-grained semantics for deontic logic Seminar Date: Thursday 7 October 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: Zoom: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/63814403479?pwd=eGxxd051eEdOZzlyMWlwdEF1b2hKZz09 Abstract Deontic logic is concerned with the logical foundations of normative reasoning. Traditionally, deontic logic has been considered a branch of modal logic, with standard possible worlds semantics. In this talk, I aim to give an overview of my PhD project, which is concerned with non-standard semantics for deontic logic. In my thesis, I argue that the traditional picture of deontic logic is too coarse-grained to account for several important and interesting aspects of normative reasoning, and I propose new, more fine-grained, semantic frameworks to deal with these shortcomings. In the talk, I will focus on two particular problems. The first problem concerns the interaction between deontic modalities and disjunction, where the traditional account fails to explain various intuitions. The second problem concerns the role of norms in deontic logic. On the traditional account, norms are only considered implicitly. However, we typically do reason explicitly about norms, for example in legal contexts.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Richard Chappell (Miami)
Department of Philosophy
A new paradox of deontology Lecture Date: Thursday 2 September 2021 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: Zoom Abstract Deontologists hold that killing is so morally serious that it ought not to be done, even to prevent more killings. For such a constraint to matter, it must be that we should generally want it to be respected. That is, we should prefer Five Killings over One Killing to Prevent Five. But this verdict turns out to be incompatible with regarding it as a matter of great importance whether or not such a prevention attempt turns out to be successful. Since deontic constraints are incompatible with taking their violations seriously, we must reject them.
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Amanda Thorell
Department of Philosophy
Irrelevant Situations, Non-Physiological Functions, and Non-Beneficial Body Parts Seminar Date: Thursday 2 December 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 & Zoom Abstract The naturalistic debate about health and pathology has focused on trait tokens’ performances, or dispositions to perform, physiological functions in relevant situations. Roughly, the idea of health and pathology in naturalistic theories is the following: A trait token (e.g. an organ) is healthy if and only if it is disposed to perform all its trait type’s physiological functions well enough in relevant situations. Otherwise the trait token is pathological. Here, a trait is a body part with at least one physiological function. A physiological function is a function which is beneficial for survival and reproduction, or which has historically been so. A relevant situation is a situation in which the performance of a physiological function is, or has historically been, beneficial for survival or reproduction. I will argue that too little attention has been given (i) dispositions to perform physiological functions in irrelevant situations, (ii) dispositions to perform non-physiological functions, and (iii) dispositions of body parts with no physiological functions. Both (i), (ii), and (iii), I will argue, are important to consider in a sound theory of health and pathology.
- Cancelled: Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Hana Möller Kalpak
Department of Philosophy
Decision rules for imprecise Lockeans Seminar Date: Thursday 3 February 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: Zoom: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/63814403479?pwd=eGxxd051eEdOZzlyMWlwdEF1b2hKZz09 Abstract According to the Lockean thesis, rational belief corresponds to rational credence above a certain threshold. A version of the Lockean thesis can be derived from the assumption that rational agents maximize the expected utility of their beliefs, given their credences (Hempel 1962, Easwaran 2016, Dorst 2019). This talk presents parts of work aimed at generalizing the utility-theoretic Lockean thesis to cases where rational credences are imprecise, in the sense of being given by a set of (probability) functions (overview: Bradley, 2019). In these cases, beliefs are not guaranteed the type of precise expectation values required for maximization, but must be deemed rational on the grounds of conforming to some more general decision rule. I will formulate some basic desiderata for such decision rules, and use this in an assessment of two well-known rules from imprecise decision theory: E-admissbility (Levi 1980) and Gamma-maximin (Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989). I will also consider the prospects of using an aggregative decision rule (classic majority voting), after showing that the domains of the relevant decision problems are Arrow consistent.