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- Conference: The Problems of Philosophy in Virtual Reality
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Cancelled: Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Cyril Holm (SU) & Anders Sandberg (Oxford)
Department of Philosophy
Law, Singletons, and Leviathan Seminar Date: Tuesday 14 March 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Anna Petronella Foultier
Department of Philosophy
Expression and emotion in dance Seminar Date: Thursday 1 June 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract It is commonly assumed that the art of dance is essentially concerned with the expression and arousal of emotion, at least in classical and modern western dance styles. However, although there are numerous philosophical studies on the role of emotion and expression in other arts, very little is written about this topic in relation to dance. At most, it is assumed that a theory of expression in, e.g., music, can be transferred to other art forms, such as dance. In this talk, I examine some recent theories on expression in abstract music in order to see, firstly, to what extent they are applicable to dance – more specifically to contemporary abstract dance – and secondly, whether they are plausible judged against the background of contemporary affective science. The focus on abstract music and dance – i.e., without words, narrative, or other referential components – is aimed at bracketing the contributions of linguistic or pictorial meaning, in order to clarify how emotions function specifically in dance.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Noa Shein (Ben-Gurion University)
Department of Philosophy
Henry More, Descartes and Spinoza and the Charge of Materialistic Atheism Workshop Date: Friday 29 September 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Henry More (1614 – 1687) corresponded with Descartes and devoted two books to the criticism of Spinoza’s philosophy. In his writings More argues that Cartesianism and Spinozism lead to atheism. At the same time, while he holds Descartes in high esteem, the same can not be said of his estimation of Spinoza. Why is his attitude toward each of these philosophers so different? I will argue that More perceived Spinoza’s views to be more threatening to his own than those of Descartes for the following reason; More articulated several important criticisms of Descartes’ metaphysics that Spinoza seems to be in a good position to answer. That is, Spinoza can be seen as amending Descartes in precisely the way that it would answer More’s key criticisms yet do so without requiring a God who creates. Not only that, but it does so by coming too close for comfort to key aspects of More’s own views. A broader claim I will hint at is that it is Spinoza’s foundation for a viable physics that does not require a creative God which was regarded by More (and Newton) as particularly worrisome.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Virpi Mäkinen (Helsinki)
Department of Philosophy
Necessitas urgeat: Limits of necessity in late medieval and early modern moral discourses Lecture Date: Thursday 14 September 2023 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 Abstract The presentation deals with the learned doctrine necessitas non habet legem (“necessity has no law”) and its use in late medieval and early modern moral discourse on the (foreign) poor. According to doctrine, in extreme necessity (e.g., in famine) a person can take a small amount of certain produce (e.g., five turnips) without being punish for a theft. The doctrine was perhaps developed to benefit paupers by the twelfth-century canon lawyers. Later it included in European legislation, also in medieval Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. I will briefly present, how the late medieval philosophers such as Godfrey of Fontaines and William Ockham used the doctrine when developing their ideas on individual rights everyone has in extreme need. When moving to early modern age, the doctrine of necessity right was discussed in relation to the increase of vagrant population and the development of municipal legislation and hospitality system. The Poor Laws distinguished between deserving and non-deserving poor, criminalize begging and closed the borders. Thus, foreign beggars were denied entry altogether. I will present Domingo de Soto’s ideas against the Poor Laws based on ius pergrinandi and the novel doctrine of twofold necessity right. Even though the discussion on the right of necessity led to the early development of subsistence rights, we still argue about the same questions. In addition, the environmental emergency forces us to face completely new issues of extreme necessity.
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Bryan Roberts (LSE)
Department of Philosophy
Seminar rescheduled to June 15. Seminar Date: Thursday 25 May 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Workshop: John Buridan on Knowledge and Norms
Department of Philosophy
Workshop: John Buridan on Knowledge and Norms Workshop Date: Wednesday 17 May 2023 Time: 09.30 – 17.15 Location: Campus Albano, Meeting Room 25 Program 9.30 Henrik Lagerlund (SU): “Buridan – an internalist?” Chair: Guido Alt (Stockholm) 10.45 Coffee and tee 11.00 Martin Pickavé (UofT),:“Buridan on the Value of Knowledge” Chair: Alexander Stöpfgeshoff (Stockholm) 12.15 Lunch at Proviant (Campus Albano). 13.15 Peter Hartman (Loyola): “Buridan on the Will” Chair: Tomas Ekenberg (Newman) Cancelled : 14.30 Sonja Schierbaum (Würzburg) “Pure pleasure seeker? – Ockham on pleasure (delectatio) and enjoyment (fruitio)” Chair: Joan Tello (Barcelona) !4:30: Juhana Toivanen (Jyväskyla) 15.45 Coffee and tee 17.15 Alexander Stöpfgeshoff (SU) “Buridan on Moral Knowledge.” Chair: Henrik Lagerlund (Stockholm) Conference Dinner
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Joachim Horvath (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
Department of Philosophy
The Mischaracterization Objection and Its Consequences Lecture Date: Thursday 28 September 2023 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 Abstract According to the mischaracterization objection mainly developed by Deutsch and Cappelen, philosophers do not appeal to intuitions as evidence for judgments about thought experiment cases, but rather argue for their case judgments. Although Deutsch and Cappelen present numerous case studies in support of this claim, the reception of the mischaracterization objection has been surprisingly negative so far. To challenge this consensus, I will first clarify and elaborate the mischaracterization objection, explain its metaphilosophical significance, and then argue that extant replies to it largely fail. The mischaracterization objection is thus much stronger than it is widely assumed, with potentially far-reaching metaphilosophical consequences for the experimental philosophy challenge and the philosophical relevance of intuitions about hypothetical cases. Still, I will caution against mischaracterization-extremism and intuition-extremism alike. This raises novel and underexplored metaphilosophical questions and shifts methodological work on argumentation to the foreground. Finally, I will briefly argue for the normative claim that we should always primarily argue for our case judgments.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Virpi Mäkinen (Helsinki)
Department of Philosophy
Necessitas urgeat: Limits of necessity in late medieval and early modern moral discourses Lecture Date: Monday 14 August 2023 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D734 Abstract TBA
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Bryan Roberts (LSE)
Department of Philosophy
The seminar postponed. More information later. Seminar Date: Thursday 15 June 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Guido Alt: PhD thesis defence
Department of Philosophy
Varieties of Necessity in John Buridan: Logic and Natural Philosophy in the Late Middle Ages Thesis defence Date: Wednesday 7 June 2023 Time: 15.00 – 18.00 Location: Online via Zoom Abstract and full text Attendance is open to the public To access the webinar, register in advance here
- CLLAM Seminar: Alice Damirjian
Department of Philosophy
A Puzzle about Words, Mental Lexikons, and Semantic Relatedness Seminar Date: Friday 5 May 2023 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: TBA Abstract I argue that the received view in the literature on polysemy representation, according to which the senses associated with a polyseme are stored together in a single lexical entry, is untenable. While the received view manages to account for parts of the data coming from empirical studies on ambiguity processing and resolution, it fails to account for an important part of it. As a result, the received view is caught up in an explanatory dilemma which I dub the continuum puzzle. The best way of escaping this puzzle, I then argue, is to give up the received view’s core thesis in favor of an alternative view that is consistent with the available data. Reaching such an alternative will require rejecting the following pervasive, but ill-motivated, assumption: Differences in ambiguity processing and resolution can only be explained by stipulating corresponding differences in the architecture of our mental lexicons Zoom-link
- SJWiP 2023
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Conference: Linguistic and Epistemological Perspectives on Testimony
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Inkeri Koskinen (Helsinki)
Department of Philosophy
Unifying the notion of objectivity Seminar Date: Thursday 16 March 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Several philosophers of science have recently attempted to bring some unity to the notion of scientific objectivity. These attempts typically start from the observation that there seem to be several distinct meanings of objectivity, but continue by arguing that these meanings have more in common than has yet been recognised. I will compare and contrast these attempts, focusing on two aspects. First, the attempts to capture the different meanings of objectivity within one account can be divided in three: positive accounts which refer to some advantageous elements that the things we call objective share (e.g. Zahle 2020), negative accounts that name harmful elements that are missing from what we call objective (e.g. Koskinen 2020), and contextual accounts where the meaning of objectivity stems from the context (e.g. Montuschi 2020; Cartwright et al. 2022). Second, while some of the proposed accounts are attempts to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for objectivity (e.g. Hoyningen-Huene 2023), most aim at something else (e.g. Wilholt 2022). In the light of my analysis of this ongoing discussion, I will defend a view of what this "something else" should be.
- CLLAM Seminar: Levi Spectre (Open University of Israel/SU)
Department of Philosophy
Doncaster pandas and Caesar's armadillo. Scepticism and via negativa knowledge. Seminar Date: Friday 3 March 2023 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract The external world sceptic tells some familiar narratives involving massive deception. Perhaps we are brains in vats. Perhaps we are the victim of a deceitful demon. The sceptic proceeds by observing first that victims of such deceptions know nothing about their external environment and that second, since we cannot rule out being a victim of such deceptions ourselves, our own external world beliefs fail to attain the status of knowledge. Discussions of global external world scepticism tend to focus on the second step, where a number of well-known lines of resistance have been offered. But there has been little attention to the first, seemingly innocuous step. That will be the focus of this talk. Part one explains why these standard narratives are not convincing examples of cases where there is no knowledge of the external world. Part two undertakes a useful case study. David Lewis’s “Elusive knowledge” (1996) is often thought of as presenting an epistemological vision that is friendly to external world scepticism: as Lewis himself presents things, there are contexts where external world knowledge ascriptions are uniformly false and where true knowledge ascriptions are limited to either axiomatic truths or truths about our inner life. An examination in the light of the preceding reflections shows that the framework he presents is not so concessionary to global external world scepticism after all. Zoom-link
- Postponed: Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Jan Sprenger (Torino)
Department of Philosophy
Title: TBA Seminar Date: Thursday 20 April 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- CLLAM Seminar: Dag Westerståhl
Department of Philosophy
An algebraic setting for the syntax-semantics interface Seminar Date: Friday 16 December 2022 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract I will talk about a draft of a chapter from Peter’s and my (still to be written) book on compositionality. This chapter presents an algebraic framework for discussing formal compositionality-related issues. The idea is for it to be general enough that most current linguistic accounts of the syntax-semantics interface fit into it, such as Montague Grammar, transformational accounts of syntax, Minimalism, Categorial (type-logical) Grammar, Sign-based grammars, and others. After giving some background from (universal) algebra, I will look at each of these approaches (or as many as there is time for) and see how they can be rendered in the algebraic setting. One ambition is that the average linguist or philosopher interested in formal semantics should be able to see that the way we talk (formally) about compositionality in the book actually concerns what (s)he is doing.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Jessica Keiser (Leeds)
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Chen Ziang (Jyväskylä)
Department of Philosophy
Title: TBA Seminar Date: Friday 14 April 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA