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- Nils Sylvan defends his thesis
Department of Philosophy
Nils Sylvan defends his thesis on December 17, 15:00–17:30 in Auditorium 8, Södra huset, hus D Dissertation Date: Friday 17 December 2021 Time: 15.00 – 17.30 Location: Auditorium 8, Södra huset, hus D Nils Sylvan Academic dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy at Stockholm University to be publicly defended on Friday 8 December 2021 at 13.00 in auditorium 8, hus D, Universitetsvägen 10 A. Faculty opponent : Graham Oddie (CU Boulder)
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Helen Frowe
Department of Philosophy
Negating the Costs of Assistance: An Argument In Favour of Refugee Discrimination Seminar Date: Tuesday 17 January 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Consider Refuge: Anna and Becky face equally grave harms in their own countries and can avoid these harms only by resettlement abroad. France is considering whether to resettle Anna or Becky. Anna speaks French and will be able to work. Her contributions to the French economy via taxation will offset any financial costs of her resettlement. Becky does not speak French, will struggle to learn, and will not be able to work. She will not offset the financial costs of her resettlement. In this paper, I argue that, other things being equal, the French government is morally required to discriminate between Anna and Becky on the basis of their ability to offset their resettlement costs. I do not argue that France must prioritise Anna’s resettlement over Becky’s. I argue, rather, that France has a prima facie duty to resettle Anna and its doing so has no bearing on whether it may exclude Becky. This holds even if France has already incurred the costs demanded by its duty to resettle refugees and any further resettlements are thus seemingly supererogatory. When refugees will offset the costs of their resettlement, those costs are illegitimate grounds for excluding those refugees.
- Anniversary: CLLAM-seminar 30 years with Øystein Linnebo (Oslo)
Department of Philosophy
Abstraction and grounding: between Aristotle and Plato Seminar Date: Friday 20 January 2023 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract Are there “thin objects” whose existence does not make any substantial demand on the world? In my Thin Objects (OUP 2018) I defend an affirmative answer based on a Fregean form of abstraction. This talk develops two central aspects of the resulting view in a new and alternative way, using the notion of grounding. First, every truth about some thin objects is grounded in a truth that does not involve these objects. Second, the notorious “bad company problem” for abstractionism can be solved by insisting that every truth about the desired abstracta be grounded in a truth that is solely about some prior and independently available ontology. I explain how the resulting view is a form of “soft platonism” with some broadly Aristotelian features. Zoom-link More about the centre
- The Rolf Schock Prize Symposium in Logic and Philosophy 2024
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- CLLAM seminar: Paul Gorbow (Oslo/Stockholm)
Department of Philosophy
Development Processes Seminar Date: Friday 6 December 2024 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract Throughout mathematics there are constructions where an object is obtained as a limit of an infinite sequence. Typically, the objects in the sequence improve as the sequence progresses, and the ideal is reached at the limit. I introduce a view that understands this as a process by which a single dynamic mathematical object develops toward a goal. This view is analogous to the endurantist position in the metaphysics of time, although it does not involve time; rather, it highlights a commonality between the temporal trajectory of an object and this type of mathematical construction. For example, just as a plant starts as a seed and then develops by adding and removing cells through time, so too does the approximation to pi obtained from the Leibniz series develop, starting at 4, then subtracting 4/3, adding 4/5, subtracting 4/7, and so on. In both cases, there is a strong intuition that we are dealing with a single object that maintains its identity throughout the process, because each change is naturally viewed as a modification of a single object, rather than the creation of an entirely new object. This view is supported by a general philosophical discussion, by a formal framework for dynamic mathematical objects that develop through processes, and by applications to a variety of mathematical processes where it has significant advantages, including the revision semantics of truth.
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: John Dougherty (Munich)
Department of Philosophy
Instrumentalism and gauge theories Seminar Date: Thursday 24 October 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract On the usual philosophical story, gauge theories are puzzling because they seem to have "surplus structure": theoretical content that does not directly correspond to features of the world. Prima facie, this is only a puzzle for a scientific realist: the instrumentalist is indifferent to this sort of correspondence. Nevertheless, I argue, puzzles about gauge theories indeed arise for some contemporary versions of instrumentalism. In particular, there is a problem concerning the interpretation of the physicist's distinction between "gauge" and "physical" symmetries. I offer a new interpretation of this distinction that has payoffs for current debates in philosophy of physics.
- Andrea Asker (Stockholm University): Final PhD seminar
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- CLLAM Seminar: Andrew Peet (Umeå)
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Seminar Date: Wednesday 24 January 2024 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: TBA Abstract TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Josefine Klingspor (Stanford)
Department of Philosophy
Conatus and Conservation Workshop Date: Friday 13 December 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Forming the basis of his theory of human psychology, ethics, and political philosophy, Spinoza’s conatus doctrine, his view that all finite things strive to persevere in their being, is a cornerstone of his philosophy. Several issues have been raised concerning this doctrine. However, a feature that is generally regarded as relatively straightforward is Spinoza’s contention that the conatus is a causal power. In this talk, I will argue that this contention is in fact deeply puzzling. For it appears to be directly at odds with another core commitment of Spinoza’s, namely the view that all finite things depend on God not only for coming into being (for being created or produced) but also for remaining in being from one moment to the next (for being conserved), a view that is regarded as beyond question in the eyes not only of Spinoza but also of most early modern Cartesians and medieval Aristotelians. But if this is so, I will show, it appears by Spinoza’s lights that the conatus cannot be a causal power. There is thus a tension right at the heart of Spinoza’s philosophical project. The aim of this talk is to understand how Spinoza can resolve this tension and, with that, deepen our understanding of the conatus doctrine.
- Craige Roberts (Ohio State/Barnard): Tutorial in Dynamic Semantics
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Jan von Plato (Helsinki)
Department of Philosophy
What kind of a philosopher was Gödel? Lecture Date: Thursday 26 September 2024 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 Abstract: Kurt Gödel (1906-1978) belonged to a university tradition that combined the exact sciences with a profound study of philosophy. Recent work on the enormous amount of shorthand manuscripts he left behind shows that his basic view of science and philosophy was formed already at the end of his last school year: a monistic philosophy that is far away from materialism and empiricism, but not thoroughly idealistic. Gödel's style was not one of extensive philosophical texts. He composed instead endless lists of remarks, typically less than a page in length; one example is his book-length 340 numbered remarks on the foundations of quantum mechanics that he took to show that "Kant was right." More generally, his work in logic, mathematics, physics, and theology was guided by his search of an "absolute philosophy" inspired by Leibniz.
- Linguistic and Epistemological Perspectives on Testimony
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Linguistic and Epistemological Perspectives on Testimony
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Meradjuddin Khan Oidermaa & Saba Bazargan-Forward
Department of Philosophy
Accountability for Making Prior Wrongs Worse Seminar Date: Tuesday 27 February 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In this paper we introduce and defend an account of “ex post deontic influence” (EDI). According to this account, an agent can do something at T2 which makes them accountable for a wrongdoing committed by another agent at T1. We demonstrate how this account of EDI can illuminate and resolve a variety of seemingly disparate moral conundrums drawn from a diverse range of literatures.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Judith Martens (Antwerp)
Department of Philosophy
A Sense of Normalcy: Habits and The Space of Reasons Seminar Date: Tuesday 7 May 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Although many find it easy to accept that we often act habitually, the philosophical debate is still out on what this means. Habitual actions do not fit well with traditional views of action where intentions play an important causal role in the explanation. In this talk I will argue that habits create a sense of normalcy. This sense can give us a connection to the space of reasons, albeit a different one from the route theories of intentional action have offered. I will explore similarities and dissimilarities between these two ways humans can act and explore the implications for our normative understanding of ourselves, both as individuals and as part of a collective.
- At the Crossroads of Epistemic and Practical Rationality
Department of Philosophy
Funded by the Knowledge Resistance project Workshop Date: Friday 26 April 2024 Time: 09.30 – 18.30 Location: Albano, Hörsal 19 (House 2) Program 09.30-10.00 Welcome and coffee 10.00-11.15 Andrew Reisner, “How the (perhaps surprising) continuity between theoretical and practical reason leads to first-order pluralism about reasons for belief” 11:30-12:45 Tricia Magalotti, “Do We Have Epistemic Blaming Emotions?” Lunch 14:30-15.45 Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini, “Epistemic Right? Epistemic Duties?” 15.45-17.00 Levi Spectre, TBA 17.15-18.30 Anne Meylan, “Diachronic Reasons to Suspend” Please send an email to tricia.magalotti@philosophy.su.se if you are interested in attending.
- Graduate Student Discussion Session with Fiona Woollard
Department of Philosophy
All MA and PhD students are welcome! Consultation Date: Friday 19 April 2024 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D734 There will be a graduate student discussion session at the department with Fiona Woollard, Professor of philosophy at the University of Southampton. We will discuss an extract from Professor Woollard’s upcoming book on maternal duties, which will be sent out before the session.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Sophia Connell (Birkbeck, University of London)
Department of Philosophy
Aristotle on female emotions: The character of women in the Historia Animalium Workshop Date: Friday 26 April 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Abstract The ninth book of the Historia animalium (Book VIII in Balme’s edition) is the only evidence that Aristotle thought women’s character to be connected to their biological make up. This paper will explore what exactly Aristotle claims about the affective capacities of female as opposed to male animals and particularly human females, women. While females within a kind are noted to be milder tempered and more thoughtful or intelligent, males tend to spiritedness, aggression and simple-mindedness (HA IX.1, 608a22-608b4). When it comes to women, they are ‘more prone to tears’ and also ‘more apt to scold and fight’, and ‘more shameless and lying’ (608b5-11). The pejoratives come thick and fast. However, while these observations might be important from a scientific point of view, they need not be an assessment of the inevitability of women’s behaviour. Aristotle insists on ensuring the most virtuous and happiest lives for all people in the community, including the female half the population (Pol. I.13, 1260b19-20; Rh. I.5, 1361a11-12). Because of this, the evidence from the HA IX must be broadened and more deeply analysed. The differences in character propensities come in degrees and range over animals in general as well as individuals within a kind (HA I.1, VIII.1). When these are not pathological, the differences within any given kind will be slight. And since the human-kind is in general spirited and intelligent, its female specimens will be this too, even if slightly more thoughtful and less spirited than male specimens. Women, and other female animals, are less prone to anger and aggression, tamer and more gentle. These ‘character’ tendencies have a physiological basis in a body that is slightly cooler and less tightly constructed and blood that is thinner and more watery. The descriptions of the bad behaviour of female humans must also be considered more carefully in the context of descriptive research, where conditions are not ideal for flourishing in the Aristotelian sense. How such tendencies could lead to a women being more shameless and lying must be explained with reference to the unique human way of life in the polis, where the control of more ‘spirited’ men can result in problematic behaviour patterns in response to a mismanagement of gender hierarchies. In these instances, when women’s abilities and desires have been undermined and thwarted (for example, if they are treated like slaves, which Aristotle objects to [Pol. I.1, 1252b1, I.12, 1259a37f.]) then their reactions will be negative, as here described. In examining this, the fact that women can and do feel anger and aggressive emotions is brought to light, undermining a widespread view that Aristotle is unable to accommodate such emotions in women (e.g. Harris 2001, ch. 5). Thus, the Historia animalium can be found to provide a broader and richer view of emotional responses in female animals, and certain resources toward explaining the ‘gender wars’ in human societies.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Vuko Andric (Linköping/IFFS)
Department of Philosophy
Is Rule Consequentialism Compatible with ‘Ought Implies Can’? Seminar Date: Tuesday 12 March 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Act consequentialism assesses actions in terms of their consequences, while rule consequentialism evaluates actions according to rules chosen for their good consequences. According to the ‘ought implies can principle, a person ought to perform an action only if the person can perform the action. While the compatibility of act consequentialism with ‘ought implies can’ has been extensively debated, the relationship between rule consequentialism and ‘ought implies can’ remains unexplored in the literature. In addressing this lacuna, the present paper contends that the currently most prevalent acceptance and teaching versions of rule consequentialism are incompatible with ‘ought implies can’. Furthermore, it contends that the more traditional compliance versions of rule consequentialism are compatible with ‘ought implies can’. The paper also examines how acceptance and teaching versions of rule consequentialism can be modified to achieve compatibility with ‘ought implies can’ and discusses the costs inherent to such modifications. Keywords Rule consequentialism; ought implies can; acceptance; teaching; compliance
- Higher Seminar in theoretical philosophy: Felix Maier
Department of Philosophy
Plotinus on Anger Seminar Date: Thursday 23 May 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Anger can be described from a cognitive side as a desire to retaliate for a perceived injustice and from a physiological side as certain bodily processes. But how do they go together? Both the belief, being in the soul, and the physiological conditions and changes, being in the body, seem to play a role for anger which poses a problem for body-soul dualism – a Platonic core theory. Plotinus addresses this issue in Enn. 4.4.28 presenting us a complex theory of anger which has been widely neglected by scholars. In my presentation, I am going to provide the first analysis of anger in Plotinus. Emotions involve the soul and the body in a way that raises important questions about how they interact, and those questions shed light on his analysis of soul and body more generally. I will argue for three main points: 1) The soul as well as the disposition of the body play a role in anger with some kind of appearances, the role and nature of which is a difficult issue, as an intermediary element, 2) Plotinus makes a sharp distinction between two notions, referring to one more strictly as anger and the other one as the spirited element that allows us to get angry. This distinction has been overlooked or misunderstood in translations as well as in the secondary literature. And 3) the analysis of the processes involved in anger has consequences on how we should understand the complex relation between the different levels of the soul, from thinking to sense-perception as well as from the vegetative soul to the soul-trace and the so-qualified body.