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- Higher seminar in practical philosophy: Daniel Ramöller
Department of Philosophy
On the possibility of limited trade-offs Seminar Date: Tuesday 21 September 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: Zoom: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/63490766775 Abstract Roughly, *limited trade-off* is the conjunction of, other things being equal, (1) you ought to benefit one person rather than slightly benefit each of any number of much better-off people, and (2) you ought to significantly benefit many people rather than slightly benefit one person. I show that all recent views that have been suggested (e.g. Carlson 2000, Fleurbaey et al. 2009, Voorhoeve 2014, and Brown 2020) to capture limited trade-offs face severe problems and I suggest a novel solution to these problems. Daniel will give an oral presentation, and there will be no paper to read in advance, and no commentator.
- MAP Stockholm event
Department of Philosophy
Discussion with Teresa Marques on the expression of hate in hate speech. Event Date: Friday 26 November 2021 Time: 15.15 – 16.45 Location: D734 Discussion session with the author present – an invitation! Dear friends, students and colleagues, We at MAP Stockholm are happy to invite you all to participate in a discussion session together with us and Professor Teresa Marques on November 26th! The topic of the discussion will be "the expression of hate in hate speech", and we will all have the pleasure of reading and discussing Teresa's forthcoming paper on the subject. The event is open to faculty members and students at all levels, and we hope to create an informal and accessible space for interesting discussions. We especially encourage students who are interested in meeting and talking with professional philosophers to join us! Important information: The session will take place in D734 between 15.15-16.45 (3.15-4.45 pm). Since our time is limited, participants will be expected to read Teresa's paper in advance (we hope to distribute it at least one week before the event). To get access to the paper, we ask that participants register for the event by sending an e-mail to mapsthlm@philosophy.su.se . About Professor Marques: From December 2021, Teresa Marques is an Associate Professor at the University of Barcelona. Until then, she is a Beatriz Galindo distinguished researcher with a grant of the Spanish Science Ministry at the same university, and a researcher with the LOGOS Group and the BIAP - Barcelona Institute for Analytic Philosophy. Her recent work focuses on disagreement and conflicts, evaluative and normative discourse, including pejoratives, hate speech, feminism, and on the interaction between language and social reality. About Teresa
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop : Eva Wahlberg Sandberg (Archeology, Stockholm)
Department of Philosophy
Galen’s Views on the Knowledge of Medical Treatment of Children Seminar Date: Friday 17 December 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 & Zoom https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/61730159135 Abstract In the context of the high morbidity and mortality of children in the ancient Roman society, the thesis has studied different interventions towards health in childhood during the second century AD. Its aim is to provide interpretations whether these interventions were specific towards children and if so in what way. 520 loci from 44 books by the physician and philosopher Galen (129-217? AD) have been analysed through several readings. The thesis is interdisciplinary and link together the research area of Ancient Graeco-Roman Medical History with that of Social History of Roman Childhood. The study also fills an analytic gap between these two fields. Furthermore it broadens the theorical perspective of the earlier studies of childhood health in the Ancient Roman Society, partly by its focus on epistemology and rhetorics. These questions will be discussed in the seminar: 1. Galen’s general views on knowledge 2. Galen’s general views on rhetorics 3. Galen’s views on the knowledge of the Art of Medicine 4. Galen’s views on the knowledge of the medical treatment of children: practice, theory and specificity of interventions in childhood Hybrid seminar. Zoom link
- Workshop on Gratitude
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- The harms beyond punishment?
Department of Philosophy
A work-in-progress online seminar series on collateral consequences of conviction. Seminar Date: Monday 21 June 2021 Time: 15.00 – 17.30 Location: Zoom June 21 Helen Brown Coverdale (UCL) Penal Collateral Consequences, Risk and the Moral Permissibility of Punishment Discussant: Andrei Poama (Leiden) Richard Lippke (Indiana) Collateral Consequences and Rational Assurance Discussant: Ambrose Lee (Surrey) Organisers William Bülow (Stockholm University) Zachary Hoskins (University of Nottingham) Registration Registration for this event is free. If you want to attend, please send an email with your name and affiliation to william.bulow@philosophy.su.se . Website The harms beyond punishment?
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop : Anders Sørensen (Copenhagen)
Department of Philosophy
Confronting the Superman: The Defense of Nomos in Anonymus Iamblichi Seminar Date: Friday 26 November 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: TBD Title Confronting the Superman: The Defense of Nomos in Anonymus Iamblichi
- CLLAM: Isidora Stojanovic (Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris)
Department of Philosophy
Exploring valence in aesthetic judgments Seminar Date: Friday 29 October 2021 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: Zoom Titel Exploring valence in aesthetic judgments Abstract The aim of this talk is twofold. First, I will be interested in adjectives that are neither clearly positive nor negative, such as 'intense' and 'surprising'. Such neutral adjectives can nevertheless be used in judgments of taste and in aesthetic judgments, and give rise to evaluations that can be positive or negative, depending on the context. Second, I will look at adjectives such as 'harrowing', 'disturbing', 'terrifying' and 'shocking', which have a negative valence, since they express emotions and experiences that are considered to be negative. Nevertheless, when used to assess works of art, they tend to express positive evaluations. I will explore different mechanisms, semantic and pragmatic, that allow neutral terms to acquire their valence in context, and negatively valenced terms to give expression to positive evaluations. Zoom meeting link
- Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy: Karl Nygren
Department of Philosophy
Logic and norms of inquiry
- Cancelled! Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Delia Belleri (Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
Conceptual engineering: can we be “critically conservative” about concepts? Lecture Date: Thursday 23 February 2023 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: E487 Abstract Conceptual engineering has been linked by Herman Cappelen to “representational skepticism”: the refusal to uncritically take over the concepts one is handed. Representational skepticism is not sustainable, though. Representational complacency, the opposite of skepticism, is even less advisable, plus, arguably, there is no reasonable “hybrid” position. I outline an alternative to these options, called “critical concept conservatism” (CCC). CCC is the conjunction of two attitudes: (i) one, meta-conceptual conservative attitude, stating that having a concept K makes it rational to retain K, and (ii) the other, meta-meta-conceptual critical attitude, stating that the attitude whereby it is rational to retain K may be questioned, were appropriate grounds to emerge. If the reasons for the conservative attitude are – at a certain context – stronger than the reasons for the critical attitude, then it will be rational for one to retain K. If the reasons for the critical attitude were to become – at a certain context – stronger than the reasons for the conservative attitude, then it will become appropriate to question whether it is rational to retain K. CCC – and especially its conservative component, are bolstered by both positive and negative considerations. On the positive side, there are pro tanto reasons to retain a concept that is adequately entrenched and has a reputable (epistemic or non-epistemic) career. On the negative side, it seems inconvenient, in normal circumstances and absent strong reasons to do so, to question an entrenched concept, as that would potentially jeopardize communication and inquiry. Unlike Cappelen’s representational skeptic, the CCC theorist does not doubt concepts from the very start of inquiry. Rather, they accept and retain those concepts, unless there are grounds for questioning them. Furthermore, because they endorse the “unless there are grounds to doubt…” condition, the CCC theorist is not a representationally complacent inquirer.
- Stockholm Colloqium in Philosophy: Jan von Plato (Helsinki)
Department of Philosophy
What kind of a philosopher was Gödel? Lecture Date: Thursday 26 September 2024 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D299 Abstract: Kurt Gödel (1906-1978) belonged to a university tradition that combined the exact sciences with a profound study of philosophy. Recent work on the enormous amount of shorthand manuscripts he left behind shows that his basic view of science and philosophy was formed already at the end of his last school year: a monistic philosophy that is far away from materialism and empiricism, but not thoroughly idealistic. Gödel's style was not one of extensive philosophical texts. He composed instead endless lists of remarks, typically less than a page in length; one example is his book-length 340 numbered remarks on the foundations of quantum mechanics that he took to show that "Kant was right." More generally, his work in logic, mathematics, physics, and theology was guided by his search of an "absolute philosophy" inspired by Leibniz.
- Higher Seminar in theoretical philosophy: Martina Fürst (Graz)
Department of Philosophy
Phenomenal Mismatch and Perceptual Justification Seminar Date: Thursday 30 November 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract On a popular view of perceptual justification, perceptual experiences provide prima facie justification for beliefs based upon them. This view, labelled phenomenal conservatism , is challenged by cases in which the experience has a bad basis. To explain the bad basis cases, some philosophers (e.g., Siegel 2017, McGrath 2013) develop an etiologically restricted conservatism . However, these accounts depart from the key tenets of phenomenal conservatism that etiology does not matter for an experience´s justificatory power. This motivates the search for a novel theory that explains the bad cases while staying true to the key tenets of phenomenal conservatism. In this talk, I propose a novel version of a restricted conservatism that meets the desideratum of explaining the bad cases by focusing only on intrinsic features of the experience, rather than on their etiology. I proceed as follows: Firstly, I provide an example of the bad case, namely a perceptual experience that has been shaped by racist prejudice. Secondly, I analyze the overall phenomenology of the target experiences in detail and I show that in the bad cases, the target experiences exhibit a mismatching overall phenomenology. Thirdly, I argue that phenomenal mismatch provides internal phenomenal defeat which explains why the target experience is epistemically deficient. I conclude that the resulting view, a phenomenally restricted conservatism , has the advantage of explaining the bad basis cases while staying true to the spirit of phenomenal conservatism.
- Higher Seminar in practical philosophy: David W. Shoemaker (Cornell)
Department of Philosophy
Games People Play: Blame without Desert Seminar Date: Tuesday 10 October 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D734 Abstract Backwards-looking interpersonal blame, because ostensibly hurtful, is thought to require a moral justification. For most, this is found in either justice or fairness, moral values whose promotion or respect in these instances are themselves taken to require or consist in desert. Blame, as some say, is unjust unless deserved. This motto is false, however. I aim to show why by surveying all possible morally “problematic” forms of blame: mere attitudes, mockery, emotional expressions, punishment, and (most generally) sanctions. While some require moral justification of a sort, none require desert, or anything like the metaphysically robust capacities and conditions people in the free will debate have taken them to require. I reach this conclusion in part by interpreting the results of various behavioral economic games in a new light.
- Romy Eskens: PhD thesis defence
Department of Philosophy
Payback Time: Essays on Attitudes, Partiality, and Rescuing Dissertation Date: Friday 3 June 2022 Time: 13.00 – 15.00 Location: Auditorium 11, Södra huset, hus F Abstract Does the moral quality of someone’s past treatment of us, or of other people, change how we are morally permitted or required to treat them? Many philosophers think so. They argue, for instance, that someone’s supererogatory or impermissible behaviour can permit or require certain positive or negative attitudinal responses, such as gratitude or resentment. They also argue that someone’s impermissible behaviour can justify harming the person, either defensively or punitively, and that someone who is imperilled as a result of impermissible behaviour might have a weaker claim to be aided than those who are innocently imperilled. This thesis has two aims. The first is to extend the scope of the idea that we can be morally required to have certain positive or negative attitudinal responses to someone’s supererogatory (or even obligatory) or impermissible behaviour; the second is to explore novel ways in which our required responses to such behaviour, or our failures to have these responses, can change what others owe to us when aiding. Papers 1-3 advance the first aim; papers 4-6 advance the second aim. In pursuing the two aims, the thesis brings together two philosophical domains that are not normally considered in conjunction: the philosophy of attitudes and deontological ethics.
- Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philsophy: Daniel Berntson (Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
Safety, Similarity, and Counterfactuals Seminar Date: Thursday 3 April 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Suppose that Socrates is five feet tall. We ordinarily think that had he been at least six feet, he need not have been exactly six feet. He might have been a little taller. Likewise for other heights. But while that may be, we also think that there are limits to how tall Socrates would have been. For example, had Socrates been at least six feet, he would have been less than a hundred feet. This paper is about a surprising puzzle. For as it turns out, given these seemingly obvious assumptions, we can prove a flat contradiction using natural rules of inference. So we have paradox. Something has to go. But what?
- Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy: Andreas Stephens (Lund)
Department of Philosophy
Knowledge as a natural phenomenon Seminar Date: Thursday 7 November 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract ‘What is knowledge?’ In intuition-based epistemology the question is often considered to concern how ‘knowledge’ is used linguistically or conceptually rather than what knowledge is. In addition, since intuitions are used as evidence despite empirical experiments indicating that people’s intuitions vary a great deal and that little conclusive systematicity can be found, it is argued that approaches with such a focus cannot provide a solid foundation to answer the initial question. By instead looking at naturalistic approaches, a pluralistic cognitive epistemological approach which accepts ontological naturalism, methodological cooperative naturalism, and evolutionary naturalism can be identified. Given this approach – close to that of Hilary Kornblith – it is possible to look at how various relevant sciences see the natural phenomenon of knowledge. This provides a complement to Kornblith’s sole focus on cognitive ethology. By also including the perspectives of cognitive psychology and evolutionary systems theory a new view of knowledge is made possible. The emerging picture indicates that the natural phenomenon of knowledge plausibly can be seen as consisting in dynamic internal survival-beneficial structures. For higher organisms, such structures importantly involve reflexive and reflective memory processes that (satisficingly) reliably produce (satisficingly) true beliefs.
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Casey McCoy (Yonsei U)
Department of Philosophy
Why are functions important in mathematics? Seminar Date: Thursday 25 January 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Mathematicians hold up the concept of function as the most important and central in all of mathematics. My question is, "why exactly is it so important?" There are many possible answers depending on how functions are conceptualized and depending on the point of view adopted. In this talk, I will consider historical and pragmatic conditions, but focus especially on comparing the foundational perspectives of set theory and category theory on the mathematical function.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: H. Orri Stefánsson
Department of Philosophy
State Dominance for Individual Prospects (co-authored with Richard Bradley) Seminar Date: Tuesday 7 November 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D734 Abstract We show that State Dominance for individual prospects has implausible implications given two seemingly innocuous assumptions. The first of these assumptions is that rational people can change their attitudes to risk. The second assumption is that there is a possible life and two points in time such that the life is made neither better nor worse when non-equivalent wellbeing levels at these two points in time are permuted. In the presence of these two assumptions, State Dominance implies that a person’s attitude to risk has no bearing on how preferable prospects are for her. So, we face an inconsistency between a set of prima facie plausible assumptions about attitudes to risk and how lifetime betterness relates to betterness at different times.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Åke Gafvelin (Uppsala) & Anandi Hattiangadi (SU)
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Seminar Date: Tuesday 24 October 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Monika Asztalos Murdoch (Oslo)
Department of Philosophy
Reference in Aristotle’s Categories and Topics A Workshop Date: Friday 15 September 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In the course of preparing a critical edition of Boethius’s Latin commentary (ca. 510) on Aristotle’s Categories I have struggled to make sense of the verb sêmainein in Cat. 4-5 (1b25-2a4 and 3b10-23) and Topics A 7-9 (103a6-39 and 103b20-39). In the seminar I will discuss the four passages and argue for taking sêmainein in the sense of ’refer to’ rather than ’signify’ which is the prevalent translation.
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Samuel Lee (Linköping)
Department of Philosophy
What’s Really Wrong With Proportionality? Seminar Date: Thursday 31 August 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract A causal relationship is proportional just in case the cause is neither overly nor insufficiently detailed with respect to its effect. Two influential principles that appeal to this notion are: (i) all genuine causation is proportional, and (ii) causal explanations that appeal to proportional relationships are better than those that don’t. Both principles have featured fruitfully in the philosophy of science. The former has been used to argue that the sort of high-level causes identified by the special sciences are not ‘outcompeted’ by causes at the level of fundamental physics. The latter has been used to account for the scientific preference for explanations of high-level phenomena in terms of causes that are situated at a similarly high level. In spite of their successes, I identify several apparently disparate problems with both principles, some well-recognised in the literature, others novel to this paper, and tell a story that renders these problems legible as natural consequences of the structure of proportionality cases. I thus unify the seemingly independent threats these problems pose to principles (i) and (ii). On my view, the root of the problem with proportionality constraints is that they fail to take into account how both overly and insufficiently detailed events can cause their effects by way of the proportional causes of those effects. I close by drawing some lessons about the connection between explanatory grain and explanatory distance, and say something about how ‘close’ explainers should be to that which they explain.