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- CLLAM Seminarium: Alexander Paseau (Oxford)
Department of Philosophy
Why Infinitary Logic is Genuinely Logical Seminar Date: Friday 6 October 2023 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: Zoom Abstract Just as one can distinguish pure geometry (roughly the study of what follows from some geometric axioms) from applied geometry (the geometry of our physical world or worlds like it), one can distinguish pure logic (the mathematical study of any logic) from applied logic (the study of what really follows from what). My talk will be an exercise in applied logic. A tenet of contemporary thought is that applied logic is finitary: any logically valid argument must be capturable in a finitary logic, e.g. first-order logic. Infinitary logics are a relatively minor area of mathematical study but are not generally regarded as correct, i.e. as genuinely logical in the applied logician’s sense. Against this, I shall give some reasons for thinking that infinitary logic is genuinely logical. The talk will overlap with Part II of my book One True Logic, co-authored with Owen Griffiths (Oxford UP 2022)
- CLLAM Seminar: Peter Fritz (Oslo/ACU)
Department of Philosophy
Prospects for Higher-Order Contingentism Seminar Date: Friday 15 September 2023 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D734 Abstract Contingentists hold that it is contingent what there is. Higher-order contingentists hold that it is contingent what propositions, properties and relations there are, when talk of such entities is regimented using higher-order quantifiers. Previous explorations of contingentism have for the most part assumed that having a property or standing in a relation requires at least possibly being something. However, there are good reasons to question this assumption. This paper explores a version of contingentism which rejects it. Doing so allows the contingentist to express generality with respect to what there is, what there could be, and what there could not be. This allows them to overcome some of the pressing problems for contingentism, including certain expressive power challenges. However, this form of generality gives rise to a new challenge concerning the metasemantics quantification. The contingentist cannot count generalizing with respect to what there is, what there could be, and what there could not be as a form of quantification. It is not clear how to motivate such a position.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Gunnar Björnsson
Department of Philosophy
Reason Judgments: Political or Motivational? Seminar Date: Tuesday 9 May 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract What is the relation between judgments of normative reason and motivation to act? On a plausible version of the so-called Enkratic Principle, if one (fully) accepts that one has conclusive normative reason to φ, one is motivated to φ or one is in that regard irrational. In this talk, building on joint work with Ragnar Francén at the University of Gothenburg, I first suggest that support for that principle naturally supports EnkrasiaPlus, a comprehensive enkratic principle requiring alignment between motivation and a wider range of reason judgments. While intuitions may support EnkrasiaPlus, I then argue that this support relies on a tacit empirical assumption, “the motivational hypothesis”, according to which the role of normative reason judgments is to ensure that one acts in accordance with normative reasons. This assumption contrasts with “the political hypothesis”, according to which their role is instead to justify one’s action to others, in order to present oneself as a suitable partner for cooperation. Drawing on Mercier and Sperber’s account of reasoning, I argue that the political hypothesis is empirically possible, and if true, necessitates a less demanding principle of rational motivation, EnkrasiaMinus. This reveals the contingency of principles of rational motivation, challenging standard armchair methodology. Furthermore, the truth of EnkrasiaMinus would make standard moral motivation internalism implausible and call for a rethinking of moral worth.
- CLLAM Seminar: Tricia Magalotti
Department of Philosophy
Emotions and the Phenomenal Grasping of Epistemic Blameworthiness Seminar Date: Friday 26 May 2023 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract Epistemic judgment seems to be less emotionally engaging than moral judgment. We are more prone to judge epistemic failures in an emotionally “cool” way than we are moral failures. In order to accommodate this observation, Boult (2020) has argued for a relationship-based account of epistemic blame that parallels Scanlon’s account of moral blame. The suggestion is that if one can give a non-emotion-based account of epistemic blame, then the coolness of epistemic judgment would not be a problem for the prospect of epistemic blameworthiness. In this talk I push back on the suggestion that the role of blaming emotions in judgments of epistemic failure can be so easily dismissed. Drawing on Bourget’s (2017) account of phenomenal grasping, I want to suggest that moral blaming emotions allow us to phenomenally grasp moral blameworthiness. This in turn allows us to appreciate the normative significance of moral blameworthiness in a way that we would otherwise be unable to do. I argue that if we do not have epistemic blaming emotions, then even if we are epistemically blameworthy and even if we engage in epistemic blame, we are not capable of phenomenally grasping that fact. This would, at the least, be a bizarre result for the defender of epistemic blameworthiness. Zoom-link
- Sweden’s bumpy road to NATO membership: Political processes and moral dilemmas
Department of Philosophy
Moderated by Attila Mráz (Researcher at Stockholm University, Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace) Event Date: Thursday 30 March 2023 Time: 16.30 – 18.00 Location: Medelhavsmuseet, Fredsgatan 2, Stockholm, Hörsalen. Please register to get a seat (free entry): Register here Abandoning its age-old doctrine of military non-alliance in the shadow of Putin’s full-on invasion of Ukraine, the Swedish government swiftly decided to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in May 2022. While some emphasized the broad multipartisan support for the decision in the Riksdag, others found the public deliberation preceding it deficient. Once Sweden had made its commitment, Turkey made its ratification of the Swedish membership application conditional on Sweden’s extraditing some Kurdish asylum-seekers to Turkey. The Hungarian Parliament professed to be too busy to deal with the ratification procedure, and recently sent a delegation to Sweden for further negotiations. While some underline the significance of each member state’s sovereign right to make its own decisions of supporting the accession, others emphasize the moral limits of exercising that right. What does Sweden owe its residents in terms of national defense? How should a democracy decide about joining a military alliance? How should we evaluate the process that led to the momentous decision of leaving alliansfrihet behind, and how should we characterize the roadblocks and moral dilemmas Sweden has faced on its way to NATO membership? In this panel discussion, we will bring ethical, political and historical perspectives to the table, and ask experts in democratic theory, international relations, and security policy to help us get the facts straight and address the tough moral questions and dilemmas head on. Panelists Hans Agné (Professor at Stockholm University, Department of Political Science) Lisa Bjurwald (Author and journalist, Bjurwald Communications) Magnus Petersson (Professor at Stockholm University, Department of Economic History and International Relations) Mike Winnerstig (Researcher at the Swedish Defence Research Agency, Security Policy Department) Moderated by Attila Mráz (Researcher at Stockholm University, Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace) This event is co-organized by the Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace and the Institute for Futures Studies. Event webpage
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Krister Bykvist
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Abstract TBA
- Delayed: Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: José Filipe da Silva (Helsinki)
Department of Philosophy
Intentionality and Representation in Medieval Philosophy of Perception Delayed to 15:00 Seminar Date: Friday 10 February 2023 Time: 15.00 – 16.45 Location: D700 Attention: delayed to 15:00 Abstract The topic of perception in medieval philosophy has been the focus of numerous scholarly contributions in the last decades, but this scholarly output has mostly focused on questions related to faculty psychology, metaphysics of cognitive change, epistemological ontology, etc. In my talk I want instead to focus on the question of whether in perception we are in direct contact with external things, resulting in our awareness of that external thing as having certain sensible features, or only with representations of those sensible properties. My aim is to show that the best way to answer this question is by reflecting on what kind of properties constitute or are included in the content of human perceptual experiences. My argument, which I substantiate with two case studies, is that in some instances – perhaps in all instances – the content of human perceptual experiences includes properties that are not immediately, directly, and causally made available from our contact with an external thing. Not only this commits the authors I will be examining to a version of representationalism, but it allows me to present a broader challenge to the traditional, direct realist interpretation of most medieval philosophy of perception. Zoom-link
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Olle Risberg (Uppsala) and Daniel Fogal (NYU)
Department of Philosophy
Coherence and Incoherence Seminar Date: Thursday 26 January 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The central thesis of this paper is that coherence is more than just the absence of incoherence. We argue that two recently popular accounts of coherence and rationality, based (respectively) on reasons and requirements, fail to accommodate this thesis. Instead, we defend an account of coherence that is based on support. In short, the basic idea is that a set of attitudes is coherent when some of the attitudes in the set support other attitudes in it; incoherent if some of the attitudes oppose other attitudes in it; and neither coherent nor incoherent if the attitudes involved neither support nor oppose other attitudes in it. As this illustrates, this approach—unlike reasons- and requirements-based ones—straightforwardly allows one to distinguish between coherence, incoherence, and the absence of each. Zoom-link
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Uljana Feest (Hannover)
Department of Philosophy
Big Data and Machine Learning in the Measurement of Personality Traits Seminar Date: Thursday 19 January 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In the last 15 years or so, the use of big data and machine learning has gained traction in some areas of personality psychology (Rauthmann 2020): While traditional personality research relies largely on self-reports and third-person assessments, the new area of “personality computing” (Vinciarelli & Mohammadi 2014) promises to be more unobtrusive and deliver data from subjects’ everyday behavior, such as cell-phone use and “likes” on social media, which are processed by machine learning algorithms to produce predictions about personality traits and behaviors. Some commentators have hailed this method as a new psychometric tool, which can compete with (and will perhaps replace) old-fashioned questionnaire-based personality tests (Boyd et al 2020) and which has the advantage of using naturally occurring behaviors (Furr 2009). If we view personality computing as a tool of psychometric measurement, the question is how it fares with regard to standard criteria of test evaluation, such as validity (Harari et al 2020; Phan & Rauthmann 2021; Bleidorn & Hopwood 2020). In my talk, I will pick up on some recent discussions about the construct validity of PC-models. I will begin by explaining the notion of construct validity as a property of both, tests and constructs. For example, if a test is claimed to measure the purported personality trait of introversion, it has construct validity if it in fact measures introversion, which in turn means that the construct (=concept) introversion has a legitimate referent. Within psychology, it is, however, highly controversial what standards of evidence have to be met in order for a test to have construct validity. Two opposing sides focus on either correlational or experimental evidence (Borsboom et al 2004). Advocates of the former approach look for correlations between different measures of the same thing, whereas advocates of the latter demand that the data produced by the test in fact be caused by the phenomenon under investigation. (Feest 2020) I will argue that while the outputs of PC models appear to be correlated with the outcomes of traditional personality measures, the precise targets of those traditional personality measures remain contested. Moreover, big data are typically “mobilized from a variety of sources” (Leonelli 2020), which means that the material circumstances of their production recede into the background and the data become decontextualized. In turn, this means that their quality as evidence for the phenomena in question (and thus the validity of the PC models that utilize them) cannot easily be established (Feest 2022). I will conclude that while all of this does not negate the potential heuristic fruitfulness of PC models, it strongly suggests that these models need to be supplemented with theoretical and experimental work, which should (a) articulate and develop the relevant constructs, and (b) establish the suitability of the data as evidence.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Philip Choi (KU Leuven)
Department of Philosophy
First Things First in Later Medieval Epistemology Workshop Date: Friday 9 December 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract One of the most common skeptical arguments found in the history of epistemology runs as follows: (P1) We are unable to distinguish the Good Case (e.g., seeing an apple) from the Bad Case (e.g., having a non-veridical experience as of an apple). (P2) If we are unable to distinguish the Good Case from the Bad Case, then the Good Case cannot be a good basis for our knowledge of the external world. ( C ) Therefore, the Good Case cannot be a good basis for our knowledge of the external world. In this talk, I aim to show three different ways to deny (P2) suggested by 14th-century Latin philosophers in their theories of intuitive cognition (notitia intuitiva): (1) the perception-first approach (e.g., John Duns Scotus), (2) the appearance-first approach (e.g., Peter Auriol), and (3) the evidentness-first approach (e.g., William Ockham). The disagreement between these three approaches, as I will argue, gives a strong reason to think that the current, somewhat monotonic understanding of later medieval epistemology in general needs to be revised.
- Joint Stockholm Uppsala Seminar in Practical Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Stina Björkholm & Nicolas Olsson-Yaouzis (SU) Andrew Reisner (UU) Seminar Date: Friday 2 December 2022 Time: 10.00 – 13.00 Location: Room Eng2-K1028, Uppsala University Stina Björkholm (IF) & Nicolas Olsson-Yaouzis (SU): ‘Dynamic Pragmatics and Obscuring in Political Philosophy’. Commentator: Jessica Pepp (UU) Andrew Reisner (UU): ‘An Attempt at a Dialectically Concessive Argument in Favour of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief’. Commentator: Jonas Olson (SU)
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson (Oslo)
Department of Philosophy
Plotinus and Aristotle on Motion and Activity Workshop Date: Friday 6 October 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Stina Björkholm: PhD thesis defence
Department of Philosophy
The Duality of Moral Language: On Hybrid Theories in Metaethics Dissertation Date: Wednesday 25 May 2022 Time: 13.00 – 16.00 Location: Auditorium 7, Södra huset, hus D Faculty opponent: Professor Mark Schroeder (University of Southern California) The Duality of Moral Language: On Hybrid Theories in Metaethics Abstract Moral language displays a characteristic duality. On the one hand, moral claims seem to be similar to descriptive claims: To say that an act is right (or wrong) seems to be a matter of making an assertion, thus indicating that the speaker has a moral belief about which she can be correct or mistaken. On the other hand, moral claims seem to be different from descriptive claims: There is a sense in which, by claiming that an act is right (or wrong), a speaker indicates that she is inclined to perform (or not perform) the act, to want others to perform it (or not perform it), and to react with praise towards those who do it (or blame or resentment towards those who do not). Hybrid theories maintain that utterances of moral sentences have both a descriptive and a practical linguistic function. In this thesis, I investigate how a hybrid theory can best accommodate the descriptive and the practical aspects of moral language. I evaluate and criticize the way that existing hybrid theories have proposed to explain the duality of moral language. The main arguments against these views are that they either: fail to accommodate the way that the practical or attitudinal import of moral claims vary across different contexts and linguistic environments; or that they fail to show how the practical or attitudinal import is reliably inferred by interlocutors in virtue of general communicative principles. I develop and defend a new hybrid theory called ‘dynamic descriptivism’. This theory accommodates the duality of moral language by appeal to the way that moral utterances affect a dimension of communication which consists of the shared assumptions that interlocutors mutually assume to mutually accept. Moreover, I discuss a problem which has affected a wide range of theories of moral language – including existing hybrid theories – which is the problem of explaining what it is that interlocutors disagree about when they disagree about matters of morality. I argue that that dynamic descriptivism offers new resources for solving this problem.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Katharina Berndt Rasmussen
Department of Philosophy
Bias of Crowds vs Wisdom of Crowds: New Perspectives Seminar Date: Tuesday 4 April 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Individual implicit biases (automatic, typically uncontrollable, mainly unconscious attitudes towards social groups, which can be measured by, e.g., the IAT) have been shown to vary over time and to be poor predictors of discriminating behaviour. On the other hand, collective levels of implicit biases (e.g., average IAT-scores on regional or national levels) turn out to be quite stable, as well as quite good predictors of social inequities and vulnerabilities (e.g., unequal educational achievements, or health outcomes). The Bias of Crowds paradigm aims to reconcile these findings by analysing implicit bias as a collective phenomenon which reflects the accessibility of concepts that are linked to social groups (e.g., stereotypes). While this accessibility, on an individual level, varies considerably over time and context, on a collective level, such idiosyncratic random variations cancel out, such that the aggregate reveals an underlying systemic bias against certain social groups. This characterisation of the Bias of Crowds paradigm suggests a close connection to the Wisdom of Crowds paradigm, according to which aggregating judgments across individuals reduces error variance and reveals meaningful information in means. This paper explores the connection between the two paradigms, with an eye to what they can teach us if we want to overcome the pernicious effects of implicit biases. Under which conditions does a crowd’s aggregate bias turn into wisdom? And how can we translate these conditions into practical procedures for, e.g., hiring or health-care allocating decisions, which are prone to discrimination?
- Conference: Mechanization of Nature
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Jari Kaukua (Jyväskylä)
Department of Philosophy
Concepts, conceivability, and metaphysical possibility in Avicenna Seminar Date: Friday 10 March 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In his theory of science, Avicenna seems to commit to a very demanding concept of concept (taṣawwur): only the intellect’s adequate conceptions of real essences are concepts in the strict sense. This lands him the task of explaining what it is that we are doing when we think of things that are never realised, such as phoenixes or counterfactual worlds. I suggest that his solution relies on a nuanced distinction, grounded in his psychology, between a descriptive and a normative concept of concept. Unrealised, and consequently impossible, things are not conceivable in the strict sense of the word (they do not have real concepts), but they may be conceived as conjunctions of real concepts that are instantiated in mental images construed by our imagination. Such conjunctions may be epistemically indistinct from real concepts, which raises interesting questions concerning the metaphysical or scientific consequences of conceivability. Thus, I conclude with the suggestion that Avicenna would not have appreciated conceivability as a sign of metaphysical possibility. https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/67954102384
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Sebastian Lutz (Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
Choosing the Analytic Component of Theories Seminar Date: Thursday 30 March 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract It has been argued, for instance based on a Quinean holism, that the same term occurring in competing scientific theories cannot refer to the same (theoretical) object or property. A popular response is that the causal theory of reference avoids this threat. I suggest that the causal theory of reference is inadequate as a rational reconstruction of scientific language and argue that Psillos's causal-descriptive theory of meaning is a special case of the descriptive theory of meaning. Assuming the descriptive theory, I show that intertheoretically shared terms can stand for the same concepts when the analytic and synthetic components of a theory fulfill Carnap's conditions of adequacy. To do so, I provide a compact reformulation of Carnap's conditions and show that, contrary to arguments by Winnie and Demopoulos, the conditions need not be supplemented. Specifically, the axiomatization and the observational vocabulary of a theory determine its synthetic component uniquely but leave some freedom in the choice of its analytic component. Besides throwing new light on the process of the rational reconstruction of theories, this result allows for analytic components of theories that provide fine control over which theories share which concepts.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Patrick Todd (Edinburgh/Lund)
Department of Philosophy
Strawsonian Responsibility, Response-Dependence, and the Possibility of Global Error Seminar Date: Tuesday 28 February 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Various philosophers have wanted to move from a “Strawsonian” understanding of the “practices of moral responsibility” to a compatibilist/non-skeptical result. In my 2016 paper, I criticized versions of this strategy that are based on what some have called Strawson's "reversal" thesis. In this talk, I focus on a closely related strategy moving from a “response-dependent” theory of responsibility. I argue that the response-dependent theory offers no response to the incompatibilist. More generally, I aim to show that a key analogy associated with this strategy fails to support a compatibilist result. In some sense, it seems clear that nothing could show that nothing we have been laughing at has really been funny. If "the funny" is similar to "the blameworthy", then perhaps it would follow that nothing could show that no one we have ever blamed has really been blameworthy. The comparison is interesting, but ultimately inconclusive: even if we grant that these properties are normatively similar, the latter has substantive empirical presuppositions, whereas the former does not. And this undermines the move to a non-skeptical conclusion.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Stina Björkholm (IFFS)
Department of Philosophy
Error Theory of Race Seminar Date: Tuesday 31 January 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract When people think and talk about race, they seem to use race concepts such as ‘black’ and ‘white’ as if they refer to biologically real categories. However, there are not enough biological similarities (and differences) between groups of human beings that warrant dividing us into different biological races. In this paper, I defend an error theory of race. Error theories of race maintain that people purport to refer to biological categories when they use race concepts but that that these biological categories do not exist. I will distinguish between two different types error theory of race by drawing from the literature on moral error theory. Moral error theories standardly maintain that moral beliefs and assertions cannot be true since there are no moral properties; and in much the same way, the existing error theories about race contend that our beliefs and assertions about race cannot be true since there are no races. I will argue that for race, this type of error theory is too radical. Instead, we should accept moderate error theory according to which ordinary thought and discourse about race involves the false assumption that races are biological kinds, but that our beliefs and assertions about race can nevertheless be true since race is socially real.
- Cancelled!! Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Karl Nygren
Department of Philosophy
Cancelled!! Deontic Logic as a Branch of Modal Logic: A Historical Perspective Seminar Date: Friday 27 January 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA