Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy: Karl Nygren
Logic and norms of inquiry
Consider a detective who is investigating a burglary and wants to find out who did it. In the course of investigating, she will naturally come to wonder about other things as well: which suspects had opportunity, whether a piece of evidence points to a particular tool being used, or whether anyone has a verifiable alibi. These questions seem like exactly what a good detective should consider, given that she is already pursuing the question of who committed the crime. But the detective might also just as naturally come to wonder whether it will rain tomorrow, or what her coworker had for breakfast, and these questions seem entirely beside the point.
This raises a general question: are there any structural, purely logical conditions that determine which questions are appropriate to pursue, given that one is already inquiring into some target question?
In this talk, I report on work in progress on developing such conditions within the framework of inquisitive semantics, in which logical relations between questions can be represented (for instance, one question fully resolving another, or merely narrowing down its possible answers without necessarily settling them). I use such relations between questions to state candidate bridge principles that link facts about a question's logical structure to normative claims about which further questions an inquiring agent should consider.
A central difficulty is that naive versions of such bridge principles are too permissive: for example, they can license inquiry into questions that are logically connected to the target question but still seem inappropriate to pursue, or they can generate redundant obligations. I consider a series of increasingly refined constraints designed to rule out such cases, and discuss to what extent purely logical resources can be used to single out which further questions an inquiring agent should consider.
As this is still work in early progress, I will focus on developing the framework and explore what can be said within it, rather than on technical results.
Last updated: 2026-09-17
Source: Department of Philosophy