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- Higher seminar in Practical Philosophy: Krister Bykvist (Stockholm University)
Department of Philosophy
Title and abstract TBD
- History seminar: Robert Roreitner (Charles University, Prague)
Department of Philosophy
Aristotle on Perception of High-Level Properties
- History seminar: Charlotta Weigelt (Södertörn)
Department of Philosophy
Aristotle on Metaphysics
- History seminar: Nils Gilje (Bergen) CANCELLED
Department of Philosophy
CANCELLED
- History seminar: Nils Gilje (Bergen) CANCELLED
Department of Philosophy
CANCELLED
- History seminar: Joan Tello (Stockholm)
Department of Philosophy
Vives on Metaphysics
- History seminar: Erik Åkerlund (Newman/Stockholm)
Department of Philosophy
Suárez on Metaphysics
- History seminar: Pauliina Remes (Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
Title and abstract TBA
- History seminar: Henrik Lagerlund (Stockholm)
Department of Philosophy
Violence in Medieval Philosophy
- Higher seminar in Philosophy of Science: Jan Willem Romeijn
Department of Philosophy
Can a statistical model be true?
- Conference: Social Ontology
Department of Philosophy
Listen to the conference talks. Conference: Social Ontology
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (Tufts)
Department of Philosophy
On Seeking Objective Grounds for Moral Evaluation Seminar Date: Tuesday 2 May 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The paper argues that to do justice to questions of objectivity that arise within and about moral discourse, we must take into account that this discourse is embedded within a somewhat conventionally regimented practice that comprises attempts to guide attitude and action by way of justifying, criticizing, validating, or excusing them. The appropriate condition of objectivity rules out a specific narrow kind of response-dependence that would run counter to this kind of guiding role for moral verdicts. The relevant condition is identified (the discourse- and practice-independence condition or, for short, the DP-independence condition).
- Conrad Bakka defends his thesis
Department of Philosophy
Debunking Debunked? Challenges, Prospects, and the Threat of Self-Defeat Thesis defence Date: Friday 21 April 2023 Time: 13.00 – 15.00 Location: Auditorium 11, Södra huset, 3. floor Abstract Bakka (22 Kb)
- Workshop on social and political philosophy of language
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Antti Kauppinen (Helsinki)
Department of Philosophy
Perfectionism Lecture Date: Thursday 12 May 2022 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D299 Abstract Perfectionist views about well-being hold that what is in itself good for us is determined by what we are fundamentally like. Like objective list theories, they thus reject the idea that favourable subjective attitudes have the authority to determine our good, but unlike them, they also provide a unifying rationale for different welfare goods. In this paper, I outline what I think is the most promising version of perfectionism, which I call subjective nature telic perfectionism. It is telic, because it says that what is basically good for us is success in realizing the aims that built into the exercise of the capacities that define us, not just developing and exercising those capacities. It appeals to our nature as the kind of subjects we are, and not to the problematic notion of human nature. In the case of adult human beings, the capacities that define our subjective nature include at least the capacity of temporally extended rational agency, the capacity for affectively valenced experience, and the capacity to relate to other such subjects as fellow subjects. I argue (though only briefly here) that this type of view is superior to subjectivism when it comes to explaining the subject-relativity of well-being, and has a number of nice pay-offs, including explaining intuitions about ill-being as well as well-being and explaining shape-of-a-life intuitions.
- Stockholm June Workshop in Philosophy 2022
Department of Philosophy
Metaphysics and Ethics Workshop Date: Tuesday 24 May 2022 Time: 10.00 – 17.00 Location: E497 Gunnar Björnsson (Stockholm): ‘From distributive to retributive desert’ Commentator: Anna Nyman (Uppsala) Olle Risberg (Uppsala): ‘The Weight of Reasons’ Commentator: Krister Bykvist (Stockholm) Mark Schroeder (USC): ‘Narrative and Personal Identity’ Commentator: Nils Franzén (Umeå) Teemu Toppinen (Helsinki): TBA Commentator: Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm) Caroline Torpe Touborg (Umeå): ‘Causation, Responsibility, and Norms: Re-evaluating Our Norms in the Face of Climate Change’ Commentator: Erik Carlson (Uppsala)
- Causal Powers in Late Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Canceled: Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop : Guido Alt
Department of Philosophy
Buridan’s Reinterpretation of Natural Possibility and Necessity Seminar Date: Friday 15 October 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: Zoom Titel Buridan’s Reinterpretation of Natural Possibility and Necessity Abstract TBA
- Workshop
Department of Philosophy
The Role of Theory Confirmation in Science Workshop Start date: Thursday 5 May 2022 Time: 10.00 End date: Saturday 7 May 2022 Time: 18.00 Location: Stockholm University, Gula villan, Minerva Room There are two ways of viewing theory confirmation. At a formal level, a theory is taken to be confirmed when collected data agrees with the theory’s predictions. At a pragmatic level, confirmation provides the basis for scientists’ confidence that the confirmed theory provides a viable representation of a set of phenomena and its so far untested predictions in the given context are true. Though the two roles of confirmation are of course related, the precise connection between them is non-trivial. The workshop focuses on the trust-generating role of confirmation with the aim of shedding light on the stated connection. Specific questions to be addressed will include: what are the criteria that turn evidence into empirical confirmation? In which way and to what extent do non-empirical considerations play a role in assessing a theory? What is the role of non-epistemic considerations in theory assessment? To what extent and in which ways does the notion of theory confirmation depend on the research field? The workshop aims to compare perspectives from various scientific disciplines. Confirmed speakers Adrian Currie (University of Exeter) Siska De Baerdemaeker (Stockholm University) Karen Kovaka (Virginia Tech) Casey McCoy (Yonsei University) Hiranya Peiris (University College London / Oskar Klein Center) Chris Smeenk (Western University) James D. Wells (University of Michigan) Call for Papers We invite the submission of abstracts of up to 1,000 words and prepared for anonymous review. The submission deadline is November 30, 2021 . Submissions will be handled through EasyChair: https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=tcis22 Some travel funds will be available for contributing speakers. In case of the demand exceeding the available funds, preference will be given to early career scholars. Program Committee Richard Dawid (Stockholm University) Siska De Baerdemaeker (Stockholm University) Sören Häggqvist (Stockholm University) Casey McCoy (Yonsei University) Questions? Please contact Richard Dawid ( richard.dawid@philosophy.su.se ) or Siska De Baerdemaeker ( siska.debaerdemaeker@philosophy.su.se ) This event is made possible thanks to a grant on “Non-empirical Theory Confirmation in Fundamental Physics” provided by the Swedish Research Council (project number 1598801).
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Erik Åkerlund (Newman, Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
Arriaga on Matter Seminar Date: Friday 21 January 2022 Time: 13.00 – 15.00 Location: Zoom: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/66800514578 Abstract For Rodrigo de Arriaga (1592–1667), prime matter is unequivocally a substance. Further, there is no real difference between prime matter, on the one hand, and proximate matter, on the other, as is otherwise standard in the earlier Scholastic tradition. This puts the question of the relation between matter, on the one hand, and substantial form – that is also a substance –, on the other, into a new light. How are matter and form united to make composites, according to Arriaga? And how is matter structured in itself, considered apart from its union with form?