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- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Inkeri Koskinen (Helsinki)
Department of Philosophy
Unifying the notion of objectivity Seminar Date: Thursday 16 March 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Several philosophers of science have recently attempted to bring some unity to the notion of scientific objectivity. These attempts typically start from the observation that there seem to be several distinct meanings of objectivity, but continue by arguing that these meanings have more in common than has yet been recognised. I will compare and contrast these attempts, focusing on two aspects. First, the attempts to capture the different meanings of objectivity within one account can be divided in three: positive accounts which refer to some advantageous elements that the things we call objective share (e.g. Zahle 2020), negative accounts that name harmful elements that are missing from what we call objective (e.g. Koskinen 2020), and contextual accounts where the meaning of objectivity stems from the context (e.g. Montuschi 2020; Cartwright et al. 2022). Second, while some of the proposed accounts are attempts to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for objectivity (e.g. Hoyningen-Huene 2023), most aim at something else (e.g. Wilholt 2022). In the light of my analysis of this ongoing discussion, I will defend a view of what this "something else" should be.
- CLLAM Seminar: Levi Spectre (Open University of Israel/SU)
Department of Philosophy
Doncaster pandas and Caesar's armadillo. Scepticism and via negativa knowledge. Seminar Date: Friday 3 March 2023 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract The external world sceptic tells some familiar narratives involving massive deception. Perhaps we are brains in vats. Perhaps we are the victim of a deceitful demon. The sceptic proceeds by observing first that victims of such deceptions know nothing about their external environment and that second, since we cannot rule out being a victim of such deceptions ourselves, our own external world beliefs fail to attain the status of knowledge. Discussions of global external world scepticism tend to focus on the second step, where a number of well-known lines of resistance have been offered. But there has been little attention to the first, seemingly innocuous step. That will be the focus of this talk. Part one explains why these standard narratives are not convincing examples of cases where there is no knowledge of the external world. Part two undertakes a useful case study. David Lewis’s “Elusive knowledge” (1996) is often thought of as presenting an epistemological vision that is friendly to external world scepticism: as Lewis himself presents things, there are contexts where external world knowledge ascriptions are uniformly false and where true knowledge ascriptions are limited to either axiomatic truths or truths about our inner life. An examination in the light of the preceding reflections shows that the framework he presents is not so concessionary to global external world scepticism after all. Zoom-link
- Postponed: Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Jan Sprenger (Torino)
Department of Philosophy
Title: TBA Seminar Date: Thursday 20 April 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- CLLAM Seminar: Dag Westerståhl
Department of Philosophy
An algebraic setting for the syntax-semantics interface Seminar Date: Friday 16 December 2022 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract I will talk about a draft of a chapter from Peter’s and my (still to be written) book on compositionality. This chapter presents an algebraic framework for discussing formal compositionality-related issues. The idea is for it to be general enough that most current linguistic accounts of the syntax-semantics interface fit into it, such as Montague Grammar, transformational accounts of syntax, Minimalism, Categorial (type-logical) Grammar, Sign-based grammars, and others. After giving some background from (universal) algebra, I will look at each of these approaches (or as many as there is time for) and see how they can be rendered in the algebraic setting. One ambition is that the average linguist or philosopher interested in formal semantics should be able to see that the way we talk (formally) about compositionality in the book actually concerns what (s)he is doing.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Jessica Keiser (Leeds)
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Chen Ziang (Jyväskylä)
Department of Philosophy
Title: TBA Seminar Date: Friday 14 April 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Nils Sylvan defends his thesis
Department of Philosophy
Nils Sylvan defends his thesis on December 17, 15:00–17:30 in Auditorium 8, Södra huset, hus D Dissertation Date: Friday 17 December 2021 Time: 15.00 – 17.30 Location: Auditorium 8, Södra huset, hus D Nils Sylvan Academic dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy at Stockholm University to be publicly defended on Friday 8 December 2021 at 13.00 in auditorium 8, hus D, Universitetsvägen 10 A. Faculty opponent : Graham Oddie (CU Boulder)
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Helen Frowe
Department of Philosophy
Negating the Costs of Assistance: An Argument In Favour of Refugee Discrimination Seminar Date: Tuesday 17 January 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Consider Refuge: Anna and Becky face equally grave harms in their own countries and can avoid these harms only by resettlement abroad. France is considering whether to resettle Anna or Becky. Anna speaks French and will be able to work. Her contributions to the French economy via taxation will offset any financial costs of her resettlement. Becky does not speak French, will struggle to learn, and will not be able to work. She will not offset the financial costs of her resettlement. In this paper, I argue that, other things being equal, the French government is morally required to discriminate between Anna and Becky on the basis of their ability to offset their resettlement costs. I do not argue that France must prioritise Anna’s resettlement over Becky’s. I argue, rather, that France has a prima facie duty to resettle Anna and its doing so has no bearing on whether it may exclude Becky. This holds even if France has already incurred the costs demanded by its duty to resettle refugees and any further resettlements are thus seemingly supererogatory. When refugees will offset the costs of their resettlement, those costs are illegitimate grounds for excluding those refugees.
- Anniversary: CLLAM-seminar 30 years with Øystein Linnebo (Oslo)
Department of Philosophy
Abstraction and grounding: between Aristotle and Plato Seminar Date: Friday 20 January 2023 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract Are there “thin objects” whose existence does not make any substantial demand on the world? In my Thin Objects (OUP 2018) I defend an affirmative answer based on a Fregean form of abstraction. This talk develops two central aspects of the resulting view in a new and alternative way, using the notion of grounding. First, every truth about some thin objects is grounded in a truth that does not involve these objects. Second, the notorious “bad company problem” for abstractionism can be solved by insisting that every truth about the desired abstracta be grounded in a truth that is solely about some prior and independently available ontology. I explain how the resulting view is a form of “soft platonism” with some broadly Aristotelian features. Zoom-link More about the centre
- The Rolf Schock Prize Symposium in Logic and Philosophy 2024
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- CLLAM seminar: Paul Gorbow (Oslo/Stockholm)
Department of Philosophy
Development Processes Seminar Date: Friday 6 December 2024 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract Throughout mathematics there are constructions where an object is obtained as a limit of an infinite sequence. Typically, the objects in the sequence improve as the sequence progresses, and the ideal is reached at the limit. I introduce a view that understands this as a process by which a single dynamic mathematical object develops toward a goal. This view is analogous to the endurantist position in the metaphysics of time, although it does not involve time; rather, it highlights a commonality between the temporal trajectory of an object and this type of mathematical construction. For example, just as a plant starts as a seed and then develops by adding and removing cells through time, so too does the approximation to pi obtained from the Leibniz series develop, starting at 4, then subtracting 4/3, adding 4/5, subtracting 4/7, and so on. In both cases, there is a strong intuition that we are dealing with a single object that maintains its identity throughout the process, because each change is naturally viewed as a modification of a single object, rather than the creation of an entirely new object. This view is supported by a general philosophical discussion, by a formal framework for dynamic mathematical objects that develop through processes, and by applications to a variety of mathematical processes where it has significant advantages, including the revision semantics of truth.
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: John Dougherty (Munich)
Department of Philosophy
Instrumentalism and gauge theories Seminar Date: Thursday 24 October 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract On the usual philosophical story, gauge theories are puzzling because they seem to have "surplus structure": theoretical content that does not directly correspond to features of the world. Prima facie, this is only a puzzle for a scientific realist: the instrumentalist is indifferent to this sort of correspondence. Nevertheless, I argue, puzzles about gauge theories indeed arise for some contemporary versions of instrumentalism. In particular, there is a problem concerning the interpretation of the physicist's distinction between "gauge" and "physical" symmetries. I offer a new interpretation of this distinction that has payoffs for current debates in philosophy of physics.
- Andrea Asker (Stockholm University): Final PhD seminar
Department of Philosophy
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- CLLAM Seminar: Andrew Peet (Umeå)
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Seminar Date: Wednesday 24 January 2024 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: TBA Abstract TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Josefine Klingspor (Stanford)
Department of Philosophy
Conatus and Conservation Workshop Date: Friday 13 December 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Forming the basis of his theory of human psychology, ethics, and political philosophy, Spinoza’s conatus doctrine, his view that all finite things strive to persevere in their being, is a cornerstone of his philosophy. Several issues have been raised concerning this doctrine. However, a feature that is generally regarded as relatively straightforward is Spinoza’s contention that the conatus is a causal power. In this talk, I will argue that this contention is in fact deeply puzzling. For it appears to be directly at odds with another core commitment of Spinoza’s, namely the view that all finite things depend on God not only for coming into being (for being created or produced) but also for remaining in being from one moment to the next (for being conserved), a view that is regarded as beyond question in the eyes not only of Spinoza but also of most early modern Cartesians and medieval Aristotelians. But if this is so, I will show, it appears by Spinoza’s lights that the conatus cannot be a causal power. There is thus a tension right at the heart of Spinoza’s philosophical project. The aim of this talk is to understand how Spinoza can resolve this tension and, with that, deepen our understanding of the conatus doctrine.
- Craige Roberts (Ohio State/Barnard): Tutorial in Dynamic Semantics
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Jan von Plato (Helsinki)
Department of Philosophy
What kind of a philosopher was Gödel? Lecture Date: Thursday 26 September 2024 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 Abstract: Kurt Gödel (1906-1978) belonged to a university tradition that combined the exact sciences with a profound study of philosophy. Recent work on the enormous amount of shorthand manuscripts he left behind shows that his basic view of science and philosophy was formed already at the end of his last school year: a monistic philosophy that is far away from materialism and empiricism, but not thoroughly idealistic. Gödel's style was not one of extensive philosophical texts. He composed instead endless lists of remarks, typically less than a page in length; one example is his book-length 340 numbered remarks on the foundations of quantum mechanics that he took to show that "Kant was right." More generally, his work in logic, mathematics, physics, and theology was guided by his search of an "absolute philosophy" inspired by Leibniz.
- Linguistic and Epistemological Perspectives on Testimony
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Linguistic and Epistemological Perspectives on Testimony
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Meradjuddin Khan Oidermaa & Saba Bazargan-Forward
Department of Philosophy
Accountability for Making Prior Wrongs Worse Seminar Date: Tuesday 27 February 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In this paper we introduce and defend an account of “ex post deontic influence” (EDI). According to this account, an agent can do something at T2 which makes them accountable for a wrongdoing committed by another agent at T1. We demonstrate how this account of EDI can illuminate and resolve a variety of seemingly disparate moral conundrums drawn from a diverse range of literatures.