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- History of Philosophy Workshop: A discussion on Stoic metaphysics
Department of Philosophy
A discussion on Stoic metaphysics and its influence in medieval and early modern philosophy There is no talk but please join us to discuss the topic Workshop Date: Friday 4 October 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Literature Steven Strange and Jack Zupko (eds.). Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations (2004). A.A. Long and D.N Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers , vol. 1 (1987) under Stoicism, Physics, Mixture 48
- Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosphy: Jessica Pepp (Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Seminar Date: Thursday 5 December 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: TBA Abstract TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Hallvard Fossheim (Bergen)
Department of Philosophy
A Stoic and an Artistic Perspective on Worth in Nature Workshop Date: Friday 18 October 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Care for nature is typically grounded either in human beings as environmental dependents or in nature in its own right. In the latter case, nature is seen as an object of care irrespective of human welfare. I will argue that this latter kind of appreciation of nature can be gleaned from the Roman late Stoic philosophy of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. I will then discuss whether a non-verbal, pictorial work can convey some of the same meaning. We start from Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations . I will show that he is in dialogue with a topos more fully articulated in Aristotle’s Poetics , concerned with the relative status of mimetic representations and their real-life objects. With this framework in place, it can more readily be appreciated that Marcus is sketching an attitude to nature and the natural aspect of all things that is akin to an aesthetic delight. At the same time, it is crucial to see that this appreciative attitude towards nature does not come for free. In order to bring this complex fact to the fore, we turn to a major influence on Marcus, in that Epictetus’ Discourses suggests that such a non-instrumental attitude depends on high-end, strenuous paideia . The artwork in question is the fresco in the triclinium from the Villa of Livia (Rome, ca 29-20BC). I will argue that this fresco suggests an appreciation of nature that transcends purely instrumental value. To build this case, I include arguments concerning the function and materiality of the room which the fresco decorates; the fresco’s sophisticated interplay between appreciation of techne and appreciation of phusis in its very presence; and the considered manner in which this fresco sets up a contrast between curated and non-curated (or minimally curated) nature.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Åsa Carlsson
Department of Philosophy
Moral Motivation in Hume’s Treatise: The Perplexing Premise, Paragraph T 3.2.1.8, and the Circle Seminar Date: Tuesday 24 September 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Section 6, Internalism and the perplexing premise, is a discussion about whether or not Hume ought to have adopted motivational judgment internalism, that is, the view that moral judgments necessarily motivates an agent to perform an action, to some extent, if she believes it is the right one. Though a bit anachronistic, many Hume commentators think so. Without an internalistic interpretation of 'morals', Hume’s so-called Motivation Argument (T 3.1.1.6) is invalid, they argue. I discuss their claim and try to understand why they hold it. Since internalism is inconsistent with Hume's view of causation, I make an attempt to rescue the validity of the argument by analyzing the internalism claim as a claim about moral judgments as motivating by necessity and by themselves. After subtracting the necessity I arrive at an interpretation of 'morals' as a sentiment of approval of some virtuous action that motivates by itself, under some conditions, but not necessarily so.
- Andrea Asker (Stockholms Universitet) Final PhD seminar
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Sofia Jeppsson (Umeå)
Department of Philosophy
Blame: The fault and the sting Seminar Date: Tuesday 18 October 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Abstract: Philosophers take the practice of holding each other morally responsible for wrongful actions seriously. Hannah Pickard (2011), Andrea Westlund (2018), and Katrina Hutchison (2018) all talk about the sting of blame and resentment. Eugene Chislenko (forthcoming) further argues that some of that sting stems from being seen by others as “a source of badness” and “a disaster”. We can remove the sting from a bad situation if we show that the real source of badness was a non-agent; if we blame, e.g., some unforeseen natural disaster rather than an agent for what happened, no one is stung by it (ibid). However, we cannot similarly remove the sting by shifting blame to another agent who allegedly lacks moral responsibility for what they did. Agents suffer when others see them as sources of badness and disasters, even if people add the caveat that all this badness wasn’t their fault. This point was recognized by Bernard Williams (1981; 1993) in his discussions about agents who feel agent-regret or shame for things that were not their fault. Williams focused on situations in which, according to traditional moral responsibility theory, a morally responsible agent should be excused for the disaster he caused due to momentary lack of control or a lack of crucial information. According to Williams, it’s still natural and justified for this agent to suffer from knowing that he caused something terrible to happen, even if present-day moral philosophers insist that he is excused and shouldn’t feel guilty. Similarly, I argue, agents who are supposedly exempted from moral responsibility due to their young age and/or serious mental disorders, will feel stung and suffer when seen as the source of badness and disasters. I use real-life examples to illustrate this point (Luhrmann 2000: 284; 2007: 239-242; MacKinnon and Pies 2006). The sting of blame and resentment is not generally considered a reason to abandon our moral responsibility practices altogether; it is, however, considered a reason to take this practice seriously, and not throw blame around willy-nilly. I argue that we should be similarly cautious when attributing causal responsibility for some badness or disaster to the supposedly exempted, and discuss concrete implications for my previously mentioned real-life examples. References Chislenko, E. “Causal Blame”. Forthcoming in American Philosophical Quarterly Hutchison, K. 2018. “Moral responsibility, respect and social identity”. in Hutchison, Mackenzie, and Oshana (eds.) The Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press. MacKinnon, D. F., and Pies, R. 2006. “Affective instability as rapid cycling: theoretical and clinical implications for borderline personality and bipolar spectrum disorders.” Bipolar Disorders. 8: 1-14. Luhrmann, T. M. 2000. Of two minds: An anthropologist looks at American Psychiatry. New York: Knopf. Luhrmann, T. M. 2007. Social defeat and the culture of chronicity: Or, why schizophrenia does so well over there and so badly here. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry. 31: 135-172. Pickard, H. 2011. “Responsibility without Blame: Empathy and the Effective Treatment of Personality Disorder.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 13 (3): 209–224. Westlund, A. 2018. “Answerability without blame?” in Hutchison, Mackenzie, and Oshana (eds.) The Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press. Williams, B. 1981. Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, B. 1993. Shame and Necessity. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Hilary Greaves (Oxford, IFFS)
Department of Philosophy
Moral reasons to prevent wrongdoing Event Date: Thursday 10 November 2022 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D299 Abstract Non-consequentialist moral theories generally recognise deontic constraints. That is, they hold that certain actions are morally prohibited even if they bring about the best possible outcome. An open question is what such a theory should say about moral reasons to intervene to prevent another person from violating such a constraint. On one view, we have strong moral reasons to intervene in such cases. On another view, we have little or no distinctively non-consequentialist reason to intervene. An interesting feature of the latter view is that it seems to severely limit the reach of non-consequentialist considerations - on such a view, in many cases the applicable reasons go little beyond the consequentialist reasons, even on a view that fundamentally is non-consequentialist. I will try to make some progress on this issue.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Julia Mosquera (IFFS)
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Abstract TBA
- Higher Seminar in practical philosophy: Mark Budolfson (University of Texas at Austin)
Department of Philosophy
The Modern Predicament: Harm, Complicity, Compensation, Moral Debt Seminar Date: Tuesday 3 October 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract As participants in contemporary society, each of us is in some sense complicit in a wide variety of harms to others. We might call this the Modern Predicament. The question I focus on is what follows from this predicament about our duties to others as individuals, and why. I argue that the sort of complicity of which we are guilty is highly indirect and highly diffuse, and that the individual actions that make us complicit are not any part of the primary cause of the relevant harms (even when those individual actions are aggregated at the societal level), and that this means the canonical constraint against doing harm is not in fact violated in virtue of the particular kind of complicity in harm of which we are guilty. Nonetheless, I argue that what actually follows from our complicity in harm is, at the same time, a fairly demanding moral debt, far beyond a mere duty of beneficence, and each of us indeed has a genuine and demanding duty of justice as an individual to discharge this debt. But unlike the directed duty to improve the circumstances of particular people who are harmed that follows from violations of the canonical constraint against doing harm, the moral debt we have in light of the Modern Predicament is an undirected duty to improve the world that, while genuinely owed as a matter of justice, is not owed to any particular persons. As a result, this kind of undirected moral debt is of fundamental importance to understanding the distinctive reasons each of us has in virtue of the fraught relations we occupy in modern society, and for understanding the duties and reasons for action we have as individuals in virtue of our involvement in various collectives and collective action. The theoretical upshot is that a correct account of the ethics of the Modern Predicament requires untangling a web of ethical reasons related to collective action, harm, complicity, compensation, and moral debt – and that this requires, somewhat unsurprisingly, careful and at times subtle analysis. But the practical upshot can be stated clearly: Each of us has an obligation to make the world a better place that is much more demanding than it would be in the absence of our complicity in harm to others. However, we have leeway in how we discharge that debt, and many conscientious people succeed in discharging that debt without making the particular investments of money, time, or other sacrifices favored by advocates of the Complicity in Harm Argument, and without even being aware of the existence of the Modern Predicament.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Tara Nanavazadeh
Department of Philosophy
Plato’s theory of the source of evil in Laws 10: Reading the metaphysics of the Laws as a whole Seminar Date: Friday 12 May 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Tara Nanavazadeh (Stockholm) speaking about a chapter from her dissertation “Plato’s theory of the source of evil in Laws 10: Reading the metaphysics of the Laws as a whole” Zoom-link
- CLLAM Seminar: Nils Franzén (Umeå University)
Department of Philosophy
The Experience Requirement on Certain Mental States
- History seminar: Olof Petterson (Södertörn)
Department of Philosophy
Kan den antika grekiska filosofin hjälpa oss lösa samtida politiska problem?
- History seminar: Lars Nyberg (Lund)
Department of Philosophy
Georg Stiernhielms Filosofiska fragment
- CLLAM Seminar: Tricia Magalotti (SU)
Department of Philosophy
Good Reasoning and Evidential Sensivity
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Sophia Arbeiter (Bielefeld)
Department of Philosophy
Attitudes and Structural Rationality
- Workshop: Dualities, Emergence, and Realism
Department of Philosophy
The workshop explores the conceptual and philosophical relationships between dualities, emergence, final theories, realism, and ontology in contemporary physics. It brings together questions about whether apparently different theoretical descriptions represent the same underlying reality, how higher-level structures emerge from more fundamental theories, and what these features imply for our understanding of fundamental ontology and scientific realism.
- SCGG Seminar: Eszter Kollar (KU Leuven)
Department of Philosophy
On the Normative Significance of Colonial Legacies for Justice in Labour Migration
- Higher seminar in Practical Philosophy: Victor Moberger (Umeå University)
Department of Philosophy
Title and abstract TBA
- Higher seminar in Practical Philosophy: Petra Kosonen (Stockholm University)
Department of Philosophy
Title and abstract TBA
- Higher seminar in Practical Philosophy: Meradjuddin Khan Oidermaa (Stockholm University) and Mac Willners (Stockholm University)
Department of Philosophy
Title and abstract TBA