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- Carbon offsetting: 10 myths busted
Department of Philosophy
Carbon neutrality targets are often not as ambitious as they sound, relying on problematic carbon offsets and unproven technologies. Climate Home News
- Philosopher: economics can save the world
Department of Philosophy
Erik Angner has recently come out with the book How Economics Can Save the World. Philosopher: economics can save the world Review in Financial Times
- The 9th Stockholm Philosophy Graduate Conference 2025 4-5 Dec
Department of Philosophy
Find the program here!
- CLLAM seminar: Tricia Magalotti (Stockholm)
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Stockholm Colloqium in Philosophy: Anna Mahtani (LSE)
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Thesis defence Date: Saturday 23 November 2024 Time: 16.18 Location: D320 Abstract TBD
- Cancelled!! CLLAM Seminar: Julie Hunter (University of Texas at Austin)
Department of Philosophy
Cancelled!! Seminar Date: Friday 1 December 2023 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: Zoom Abstract TBA
- Workshop on Nihilism: Nihilism and its Implications
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy: Johannes Nyström
Department of Philosophy
Stability and success: on the soundness of the two-variable no-miracles argument Seminar Date: Thursday 2 November 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The no-miracles-argument (NMA) for scientific realism asserts that the only plausible explanation of the predictive and explanatory success demonstrated by mature scientific theories is that those theories are at least approximately true. Sprenger and Hartmann (2016, 2019) attempt a probabilistic reconstruction of the NMA to assess its status from a Bayesian perspective. Their reconstruction shows that the stability of scientific theory over time is a crucial factor when assessing the NMA in a given context. Periods of theoretical stability substantially improve the persuasive force of the argument in favour of the scientific realist. In this talk, I critically assess their reconstruction, which I call the 'two-variables NMA'. I argue that Sprenger and Hartmann assume that the predictive and explanatory success of a scientific theory is less correlated with its stability than what may be genuinely expected. I show that under more plausible assumptions about this correlation, the described improvement is not substantial.
- MAP-seminar: Ane Engelstad (Bergen)
Department of Philosophy
Should Political Philosophers Attend to Victim Testimony Seminar Date: Thursday 8 February 2024 Time: 15.00 – 17.00 Location: D734 ABSTRACT There is a growing recognition that victims of injustice may have privileged access to knowledge about the injustices they experience, and that injustices are perpetuated through silencing victims by taking them to be less credible, and through denying them the platform and capacity to speak. However, these are not ideas that political philosophers tend to engage with in a sustained manner, to the extent that they alter methodological approaches to be systematically attentive to victim testimony. In this article, I provide two arguments in favour of political philosophers attending to victim testimony, one moral, one epistemic, and demonstrate that the moral case has little purchase, but that the epistemic case is more successful. Then, I present the strongest case against including victim testimony in political philosophy, and I argue that it does not hold up to scrutiny. In so doing, I demonstrate how methodological practices in political philosophy could be improved through drawing on feminist social epistemology; attending to victim testimony can enrich political philosophy in epistemically acceptable ways, and it also corrects for a range of potential biases. Full paper WHAT IS MAP? MAP Stockholm is a chapter to the international organization MAP (Minorities and Philosophy) here at Stockholm University. In short, MAP's mission is to address structural injustices in academic philosophy and to remove barriers that impede participation in academic philosophy for members of marginalized groups. Through its international organizing team and graduate student-led network of autonomous chapters around the world, MAP aims to examine and dismantle mechanisms that prevent students from marginalized groups from participating in academic philosophy, as well as to promote philosophical work done from marginalized perspectives, and help improve working conditions for scholars from marginalized backgrounds. MAP Stockholm organizes reading groups, seminars and discussion sessions that are open to all students. Contact us via mapsthlm@philosophy.su.se
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Kevin Noone (Environmental Science)
Department of Philosophy
Augmenting the Grammar of Science Seminar Date: Thursday 21 March 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 This lecture will explore the “hows and whys” of the scientific endeavor. We will start with a historical perspective going way back to the classical Greek roots of science, and examine some waypoints in how we have gone about doing science up to the present day. We will then shine a light on new(ish), transdisciplinary approaches to science, with a particular focus on Community Science. In doing so we will see how we may be able to improve science through augmenting its grammar; how adding things like prepositions (with, not just for or on), adverbs (such as collaboratively) and prefixes (like trans-, not just multi- or inter-) to our nouns (results) and verbs (methods) can make our scientific grammar a lot more readable.
- Higher Seminar
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Jenny Pelletier (Leuven/Gothenburg)
Department of Philosophy
Ockham on Social Ends: Willing the “Common Good" Lecture Date: Thursday 15 February 2024 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 Abstract On my reading, Ockham holds that social groups are structured aggregates, being collections of many individual persons, at least some of which are constituted by persons who have chosen to order themselves relative to one another in some determinate way. A consequence of this view is that social groups are artifactual insofar as they, like complex material artifacts, are pluralities of natural substances (i.e., human beings) that are produced by means of voluntary – and in their case, joint – human action. I have already argued elsewhere that the purpose the human artisan had in mind when she decided to make an artifact fixes the function of that artifact. This is how I interpret the thought that the end of the human artisan is the end of the artifact. My presentation starts with the intuition that the members of a social group might analogously fix the function of that social group, that is to say the ends of group members might determine the end(s) of that social group. If this is right, then it would seem that the end of a social group is nothing more than an aggregate of member ends. Now, in his political writings, Ockham maintains the medieval status quo that the end of the political community is the common good. I will show how we can make sense of Ockham’s understanding of the common good as the end of the political community, even if that understanding is ultimately an aggregate of group member ends. To do so, I turn to Ockham’s account of final causes and their role as motivators in voluntary human action, particularly his take on the distinction between love of friendship (amor amiticiae) and love of desire (amor concupiscentiae). Moreover, I will attempt to argue that his understanding of the common good is less self-interested than it may appear at first glance if we consider it in light of his account of final causality.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Antoinette Schertz
Department of Philosophy
The legitimacy political climate institutions Lecture Date: Thursday 12 October 2023 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 The legitimacy political climate institutions: Rethinking the relationship between climate science, non-epistemic values and democracy Abstract Addressing global problems such as climate change requires national action and international collaboration. However, it is not clear under which circumstances national and international institution, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), that aim to politically regulate climate change, enjoy the necessary legitimacy to demand compliance from individuals and states. Initially, one might think that such institutions derive their legitimacy from the epistemic authority of well-established climate science. This view would be in alignment with a belief-based account of the grounds of political legitimacy. However, the ubiquity of non-epistemic values in climate science undermines grounding the UNFCCC’s legitimacy purely on a belief-based account. Thus, an alternative source of legitimacy needs to be found. In this paper, we argue that an adequacy-for-purpose framework can partly explain the UNFCCC’s legitimacy in the presence of non-epistemic values in climate science. However, the use of non-epistemic values in climate science also means that we need to rethink the relationship between science and politics for the legitimacy of political institutions and political climate institutions globally. Co-authored with Laura Garcia-Portela, Postdoctoral Researcher, Institute of Technology Assessment and System Analysis, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Tara Nanavazadeh
Department of Philosophy
The cause of evil in Plato’s Laws: God or the human soul as the origin of evil Workshop Date: Friday 8 March 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Eline Gerritsen (Hamburg)
Department of Philosophy
Questioning the Normative Status of Social Norms Seminar Date: Tuesday 17 October 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D734 Abstract Our everyday behaviour is constantly shaped and restricted by the unwritten rules of our society. In metanormative debates, it is taken for granted that these social norms are not normative in the authoritative sense. Indeed, they are used as the paradigmatic example of norms that are merely formally normative. In this paper, I go against this consensus, arguing that it is an open question whether (some) social norms have significant normative force. I consider and reject a range of potential defences of the idea that social norms could not be authoritative, from claims about the insignificance of conventional norms to worries about capturing the fugitive thought. Questioning unwarranted assumptions about the normative status of social norms opens up a promising area of metanormative inquiry.
- Higher seminar in Practical Philosophy: Fabian Lorentzon
Department of Philosophy
Moral worth: why Huckleberry Finn’s moral beliefs are (partly) correct! Seminar Date: Tuesday 23 April 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The literature about moral worth concerns what it takes for morally right actions to be morally praiseworthy. A much-discussed example is that of Huckleberry Finn, who acts rightly by helping a fugitive slave Jim, even though he believes that doing so is morally wrong. The case is interesting because Huck’s action seems to have moral worth even though he believes that he acts wrongly. This has prompted several attempts to explain how actions like Huck’s can have moral worth without correct moral beliefs. In this paper, my aim is to flesh out an underappriciated possibility, namely that Huck can implicitly believe that his action is morally right even though he explicitly believes that it is wrong. In doing so, I incidentally show that attempts to explain how Huck’s action can have moral worth without correct moral beliefs are unwarranted.
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Mike Stuart (York)
Department of Philosophy
Scientific Understanding as Ability Seminar Date: Thursday 25 April 2024 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract This talk has three goals. First, I’ll argue that the popular distinction between explanatory, objectual and pragmatic understanding is currently ambiguous concerning whether it refers to a distinction between states, modes or objects of understanding. I argue that this distinction is most fruitfully characterized as one between epistemic states, rather than modes or objects. Second, I address the question of fundamentality. What do we mean when we say that one of these kinds of understanding is more fundamental than the others? I distinguish between several possibilities, and focus on “humble reductionism” – where one kind of understanding is necessary but not sufficient for another kind (or kinds) of understanding. Then, I’ll argue that pragmatic understanding is the most fundamental kind of understanding, in this sense. Third, I’ll sketch an account of pragmatic understanding. Roughly, an agent S has pragmatic understanding of X when S has, and is responsible for having, the ability to reliably and successfully manipulate X, where those abilities come with the right dispositions; exist in the majority of nearby possible worlds; and are robust. I close by considering how this account informs the debate about scientific progress. Specifically, it allows us to capture what seems right about both the so-called noetic (understanding-based) and functional (ability-based) accounts of scientific progress, combining them into a single account of scientific progress.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Guido Melchior (Graz)
Department of Philosophy
Subjective Rationality and Responsibility Lecture Date: Thursday 30 November 2023 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 Abstract The discussion about deep disagreement has gained significant momentum in the last several years. Intuitively, two parties deeply disagree if they do not only disagree about particular propositions but, more generally, about how to settle the disagreement in general. I think that the notion of deep disagreement is too ambiguous and unclear for being useful. I suggest to theorize about rationally irresolvable disagreement instead, which occurs between subjectively rational parties who follow their own distinct views about rationality. In this paper, I reflect on the moralaspects of rationally irresolvable disagreement. In particular, I will discuss whether subjectively rational persons, who consequently follow their own standards of rationality, can be held responsible for not reaching agreement.
- CLLAM Seminar: Fredrik Stjernberg (Linköping)
Department of Philosophy
The essential openness of Waismann’snotion of analyticity Seminar Date: Friday 17 November 2023 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D734 Abstract We all remember Quine’s attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction in “Two Dogmas” (Quine 1951). Grice and Strawsons “In defence of a dogma” (1956) is also well known. There is another study of the distinction from the same period, which has been somewhat neglected in the debate, and that is the series of papers Waismann wrote between 1949 and 1953 (Waismann 1949, 1950, 1951a, 1951b, 1952, 1953). There are many similarities between Quine’s and Waismann’s views, butalso some important differences. Waismann shares some of Quine’s objections to analyticity, but he draws different conclusions from them. My talk examines Waismann’s notion of analyticity, and stresses how his views employ a conception of language and meaning as essentially open.There is no final determination of what analyticity amounts to, or of which truths that are analytic. At times, analyticity rests on a decision. Parallels with some current theories of meaning (Ludlow, Rayo, Richard, Wilson) are briefly discussed.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Pauliina Remes (Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
Plotinus on Dialectic: Narrow and Broad Conceptions Workshop Date: Friday 17 November 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In Platonism, a gulf between inquiry and knowledge, between discursive and noetic thinking, between fallibility and infallibility is always looming. The same - or related - gulf has sometimes been read inside the conception of dialectic: is dialectic a procedure and a method, or perhaps the aim or the final stage of this method in which there is no longer room for error? Plotinus short and incredibly condensed treatise On Dialectic I.3. would seem to separate these conceptions explicitly, and offers some ideas on what kinds of operations help moving from the former to the latter one. I will argue that he uses the term broadly, for operations that deal with even individuals and sensible items, and that his aim to lay out a procedure that helps arriving in dialectic understood narrowly. The gap does not disappear after working out Plotinus literary references, influences, and motivations, but it comes our significantly smaller than initially appeared. Ideal epistemology, then, does not need to mean that there is no interest and work put into thinking about inquiry and early phases of knowledge acquisition.