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- Higher seminar in practical philosophy: Knut Olav Skarsaune (INN University)
Department of Philosophy
Title TBA Seminar Date: Tuesday 12 September 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D734 Abstract TBA
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Krister Bykvist
Department of Philosophy
Who should care about impossibility theorems in population ethics? Seminar Date: Tuesday 16 May 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract It is a well-known fact that various impossibility theorems show that there is no theory about the value of populations that can satisfy all of the conditions we want to set on such a theory. It is not all clear which condition we should give up, something which many think is especially worrying since in the face of climate change we need to make urgent decisions that will affect the size and composition of future populations. In my previous research, I have tried out two ways of responding to these theorems that do not involve a wholesale rejection of any of the conditions (the evaluative uncertainty approach and the degrees of satisfaction approach). Here I want to take a step back, for it turns out that not everyone is convinced that the impossibility theorems is anything to worry about unless you subscribe to a consequentialist welfarist moral framework. One recent example of this is Samuel Scheffler, who in his book Why worry about future generations (OUP, 2018) argues that in order to determine the reasons we have to care about future people there is no need to construct a population axiology and thus we can simply sidestep the accompanying impossibility theorems. I shall argue that this reflects a serious misunderstanding of population ethics and its impossibility theorems. These theorems are troubling for all reasonable moral views, including Scheffler’s own value of humanity axiology.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Sigrun Svavarsdóttir (Tufts)
Department of Philosophy
Do Emotions Have Evaluative Content? Lecture Date: Thursday 27 April 2023 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: E487 Abstract In this lecture, I critically examine two approaches to defending the thesis that it is of the nature of emotion to have evaluative propositional content. The first argumentative strategy crucially relies on the observation that emotions are appraised as appropriately, or inappropriately, directed at an object on the grounds that the object in question does, or does not, have some specific evaluative property. The second argumentative strategy relies on the observation that emotional responses are, at times, taken to be supportive or corrective of evaluative judgments. An examination of how these two argumentative strategies fail serves to illuminate the relation between evaluative judgments and emotions. Indeed, what motivates me to undertake this project is not so much an interest in the nature of emotion per se as an interest in the relation between evaluative judgments and emotions, assuming cognitivism about the former.
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Tricia Magalotti
Department of Philosophy
Trusting One's Emotions: Emotional (Un)reliability and Epistemic Defeat Seminar Date: Thursday 27 April 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The claim that emotions are unreliable or, more colloquially, “untrustworthy” is sometimes offered as evidence of the epistemic illegitimacy of emotions. In this paper, I consider two initially plausible implications of the epistemic unreliability of emotions: first, that if emotions are epistemically unreliable, then beliefs or actions that are based on emotional reasons are irrational; and, second, that once we have evidence of emotional unreliability, we should not treat emotions as reasons for belief or action. In this talk, I attempt to show why one might want to resist these purported implications and how one might rationally do so. The overall aim is to provide support for the view that even if we have evidence that emotions are epistemically unreliable, that it can nonetheless be rational to form beliefs or perform actions on the basis of emotional reasons.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Daniel Ramöller
Department of Philosophy
Title: TBA Seminar Date: Tuesday 18 April 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Title: TBA
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Alexander Stöpfgeshoff
Department of Philosophy
Alain LeRoy Locke on Accounting for All Kinds of Human Value Seminar Date: Tuesday 28 March 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Alain LeRoy Locke (1885- 1954) is one of the few African-American philosophers active at the beginning of the 20th century. He also develops an early rejection of value realism. Locke aims to develop a middle ground between what he calls nihilism or anarchy and absolutism. For Locke, the nihilistic denial of all human value cannot account for the role of value in human life. We live by our values, and a proper account of human life needs to explain the role of imperatives. Absolutism, on the other hand, implies an unacceptable realist metaphysics about values. Locke states, “In de-throning our absolutes, we must take care not to exile our imperatives, for after all, we live by them.” (Values and Imperatives, 34) Values are not grounded in “types of realms of value, but are rooted in modes or kinds of valuing” (Values and Imperatives, 34). For LeRoy Locke, to value something is to have an attitude towards it and “the primary judgments of value are emotional judgments … and the initial reference for value predication is based on a form-quality revealed in feeling and efficacious in valuation through feeling.” (Values and Imperatives, 39) Locke’s account of value speaks directly to the contemporary problem how to explain the difference between kinds of value attitudes and judgments. What is special about moral attitudes? Moral attitudes cannot be mere forms of liking and disliking to explain the role morality places in our lives (Sturgeon, 1986; Miller, 2003). Locke addresses this problem explicitly. He attempts to explain all values (epistemic, moral, aesthetic, religious) and how they differ. Value feelings are not just primary forms of liking or disliking. Each value has its distinctive feeling, which explains the difference between kinds of values and value judgments. Locke argues against an account that the content of a value judgment explains the difference between kinds of values. He brings up the example of “this logical proof is beautiful.” For Locke, this is an aesthetic judgment because of the specific aesthetic feelings involved. Anything can be an object of aesthetic judgment as long as the right feeling is involved. It is possible to have, for example, both moral and aesthetic feelings towards the same object. What makes moral judgment different from any other normative judgment is the specific moral feeling of conflict between what Locke calls temptation and inner conscience. This gives rise to a specific imperative unique to moral attitudes in comparison to, for example, aesthetic attitudes.
- Conference: The Problems of Philosophy in Virtual Reality
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Cancelled: Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Cyril Holm (SU) & Anders Sandberg (Oxford)
Department of Philosophy
Law, Singletons, and Leviathan Seminar Date: Tuesday 14 March 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Anna Petronella Foultier
Department of Philosophy
Expression and emotion in dance Seminar Date: Thursday 1 June 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract It is commonly assumed that the art of dance is essentially concerned with the expression and arousal of emotion, at least in classical and modern western dance styles. However, although there are numerous philosophical studies on the role of emotion and expression in other arts, very little is written about this topic in relation to dance. At most, it is assumed that a theory of expression in, e.g., music, can be transferred to other art forms, such as dance. In this talk, I examine some recent theories on expression in abstract music in order to see, firstly, to what extent they are applicable to dance – more specifically to contemporary abstract dance – and secondly, whether they are plausible judged against the background of contemporary affective science. The focus on abstract music and dance – i.e., without words, narrative, or other referential components – is aimed at bracketing the contributions of linguistic or pictorial meaning, in order to clarify how emotions function specifically in dance.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Noa Shein (Ben-Gurion University)
Department of Philosophy
Henry More, Descartes and Spinoza and the Charge of Materialistic Atheism Workshop Date: Friday 29 September 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Henry More (1614 – 1687) corresponded with Descartes and devoted two books to the criticism of Spinoza’s philosophy. In his writings More argues that Cartesianism and Spinozism lead to atheism. At the same time, while he holds Descartes in high esteem, the same can not be said of his estimation of Spinoza. Why is his attitude toward each of these philosophers so different? I will argue that More perceived Spinoza’s views to be more threatening to his own than those of Descartes for the following reason; More articulated several important criticisms of Descartes’ metaphysics that Spinoza seems to be in a good position to answer. That is, Spinoza can be seen as amending Descartes in precisely the way that it would answer More’s key criticisms yet do so without requiring a God who creates. Not only that, but it does so by coming too close for comfort to key aspects of More’s own views. A broader claim I will hint at is that it is Spinoza’s foundation for a viable physics that does not require a creative God which was regarded by More (and Newton) as particularly worrisome.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Virpi Mäkinen (Helsinki)
Department of Philosophy
Necessitas urgeat: Limits of necessity in late medieval and early modern moral discourses Lecture Date: Thursday 14 September 2023 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 Abstract The presentation deals with the learned doctrine necessitas non habet legem (“necessity has no law”) and its use in late medieval and early modern moral discourse on the (foreign) poor. According to doctrine, in extreme necessity (e.g., in famine) a person can take a small amount of certain produce (e.g., five turnips) without being punish for a theft. The doctrine was perhaps developed to benefit paupers by the twelfth-century canon lawyers. Later it included in European legislation, also in medieval Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. I will briefly present, how the late medieval philosophers such as Godfrey of Fontaines and William Ockham used the doctrine when developing their ideas on individual rights everyone has in extreme need. When moving to early modern age, the doctrine of necessity right was discussed in relation to the increase of vagrant population and the development of municipal legislation and hospitality system. The Poor Laws distinguished between deserving and non-deserving poor, criminalize begging and closed the borders. Thus, foreign beggars were denied entry altogether. I will present Domingo de Soto’s ideas against the Poor Laws based on ius pergrinandi and the novel doctrine of twofold necessity right. Even though the discussion on the right of necessity led to the early development of subsistence rights, we still argue about the same questions. In addition, the environmental emergency forces us to face completely new issues of extreme necessity.
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Bryan Roberts (LSE)
Department of Philosophy
Seminar rescheduled to June 15. Seminar Date: Thursday 25 May 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Workshop: John Buridan on Knowledge and Norms
Department of Philosophy
Workshop: John Buridan on Knowledge and Norms Workshop Date: Wednesday 17 May 2023 Time: 09.30 – 17.15 Location: Campus Albano, Meeting Room 25 Program 9.30 Henrik Lagerlund (SU): “Buridan – an internalist?” Chair: Guido Alt (Stockholm) 10.45 Coffee and tee 11.00 Martin Pickavé (UofT),:“Buridan on the Value of Knowledge” Chair: Alexander Stöpfgeshoff (Stockholm) 12.15 Lunch at Proviant (Campus Albano). 13.15 Peter Hartman (Loyola): “Buridan on the Will” Chair: Tomas Ekenberg (Newman) Cancelled : 14.30 Sonja Schierbaum (Würzburg) “Pure pleasure seeker? – Ockham on pleasure (delectatio) and enjoyment (fruitio)” Chair: Joan Tello (Barcelona) !4:30: Juhana Toivanen (Jyväskyla) 15.45 Coffee and tee 17.15 Alexander Stöpfgeshoff (SU) “Buridan on Moral Knowledge.” Chair: Henrik Lagerlund (Stockholm) Conference Dinner
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Joachim Horvath (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
Department of Philosophy
The Mischaracterization Objection and Its Consequences Lecture Date: Thursday 28 September 2023 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 Abstract According to the mischaracterization objection mainly developed by Deutsch and Cappelen, philosophers do not appeal to intuitions as evidence for judgments about thought experiment cases, but rather argue for their case judgments. Although Deutsch and Cappelen present numerous case studies in support of this claim, the reception of the mischaracterization objection has been surprisingly negative so far. To challenge this consensus, I will first clarify and elaborate the mischaracterization objection, explain its metaphilosophical significance, and then argue that extant replies to it largely fail. The mischaracterization objection is thus much stronger than it is widely assumed, with potentially far-reaching metaphilosophical consequences for the experimental philosophy challenge and the philosophical relevance of intuitions about hypothetical cases. Still, I will caution against mischaracterization-extremism and intuition-extremism alike. This raises novel and underexplored metaphilosophical questions and shifts methodological work on argumentation to the foreground. Finally, I will briefly argue for the normative claim that we should always primarily argue for our case judgments.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Virpi Mäkinen (Helsinki)
Department of Philosophy
Necessitas urgeat: Limits of necessity in late medieval and early modern moral discourses Lecture Date: Monday 14 August 2023 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D734 Abstract TBA
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Bryan Roberts (LSE)
Department of Philosophy
The seminar postponed. More information later. Seminar Date: Thursday 15 June 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Guido Alt: PhD thesis defence
Department of Philosophy
Varieties of Necessity in John Buridan: Logic and Natural Philosophy in the Late Middle Ages Thesis defence Date: Wednesday 7 June 2023 Time: 15.00 – 18.00 Location: Online via Zoom Abstract and full text Attendance is open to the public To access the webinar, register in advance here
- CLLAM Seminar: Alice Damirjian
Department of Philosophy
A Puzzle about Words, Mental Lexikons, and Semantic Relatedness Seminar Date: Friday 5 May 2023 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: TBA Abstract I argue that the received view in the literature on polysemy representation, according to which the senses associated with a polyseme are stored together in a single lexical entry, is untenable. While the received view manages to account for parts of the data coming from empirical studies on ambiguity processing and resolution, it fails to account for an important part of it. As a result, the received view is caught up in an explanatory dilemma which I dub the continuum puzzle. The best way of escaping this puzzle, I then argue, is to give up the received view’s core thesis in favor of an alternative view that is consistent with the available data. Reaching such an alternative will require rejecting the following pervasive, but ill-motivated, assumption: Differences in ambiguity processing and resolution can only be explained by stipulating corresponding differences in the architecture of our mental lexicons Zoom-link
- SJWiP 2023
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Conference: Linguistic and Epistemological Perspectives on Testimony
Department of Philosophy
Ingress