CLLAM Seminar: Tricia Magalotti (SU)
Good Reasoning and Evidential Sensivity
Both Turri (2010) Goldman (2011) have argued that standard accounts of epistemic basing fail to account for the transition from possessing good evidence for a belief and coming to have a justified belief by using that evidence. Both authors, however, construe the problem as targeting the relation between propositional and doxastic justification. I argue here that the problem is deeper. There is a “wrong way problem,” as we might call it, that applies outside of the context of justification and knowledge. Indeed, I argue, anyone who wants to provide an account of good theoretical reasoning will find themselves face to face with the wrong way problem. There are three main aims of the talk. The first is to motivate the epistemological importance of providing an account of good reasoning (rather than justification or knowledge). The second is to argue that there is a wrong way problem that must be solved in order to give a successful account of good reasoning. And the third is to argue that the only viable option to solve the problem is to adopt a constraint that I call “evidential sensitivity.” Good reasoning, I will claim, takes place when a subject forms a belief that is caused by their possession of good evidence because of the supportiveness of the evidence.
Last updated: 2026-09-30
Source: Department of Philosophy