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- Reassessing Realism: On the Ontology of the Unobservable
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Simon Allzén disputerar Disputation Datum: tisdag 20 september 2022 Tid: 13.00 – 15.00 Plats: Sal 4204, hus 3, plan 4, Albano, Hannes Alfvéns väg 11 Akademisk avhandling som för avläggande av filosofie doktorsexamen vid Stockholms universitet offentligen försvaras i sal 4204, hus 3, plan 4, Albano, Hannes Alfvéns väg 11 Abstract It is widely believed that science is in the business of finding out what the world is really like. The philosophical version of this belief is scientific realism – a doctrine about science that tells us that we ought to believe that the best theories in science are true, and that the world is occupied with the objects that those theories contain. If scientific realism was not correct, the argument goes, the incredible success of science would be a miracle. The best explanation for the success of science however, is not that it is a miracle, but that scientific theories are true. This argument is an instance of inference to the best explanation, or IBE. Skeptics have questioned why scientific success must imply its truth given that there are so many abandoned, false scientific theories in the history of science that were nevertheless successful. One of the controversies in the debate between scientific realists and anti-realists surrounds the legitimacy of reasoning in accordance with IBE. Realists need IBE to be a justified and reliable guide to truth. In this compilation thesis, I address various questions related to IBE and scientific realism. Paper 1 argues that scientific realism without IBE loses too much of its epistemic optimism, and that it in some contexts even becomes more pessimistic than the most prominent rival philosophical doctrine about science – constructive empiricism. To avoid deflating realism, I argue, a defense of IBE is necessary. Paper 2 addresses whether methodological similarities between science and metaphysics force scientific realists to also be realists with respect to metaphysics. If IBE is legitimate, it should not only be valid in science, but also in metaphysics, effectively inflating the ontology that scientific realists are rationally bound to accept. I argue against this conclusion. Paper 3 offers a proof of concept regarding a novel way to justify inferences to unobservable objects. Paper 4 establishes a novel critique of nonprobabilistic versions of IBE in scientific realism. Reassessing Realism: On the Ontology of the Unobservable
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Joseph Bowen
Filosofiska institutionen
Making Others Go Further Beyond the Call Seminarium Datum: tisdag 2 november 2021 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Titel Making Others Go Further Beyond the Call Abstract Kommer senare Kommentator : Isaac Taylor
- Slutseminarium doktorsavhandling: Conrad Bakka
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Bram Vaassen (Umeå)
Filosofiska institutionen
Higher-Level Causes and Freaky Realizations Seminarium Datum: torsdag 24 februari 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Building on observations by Fodor (1974, 1991), Schiffer (1991), and Hoefer (2004), Fenton-Glynn (2017) has recently argued that the possibility of thermodynamically abnormal realizations speaks in favour of probability-raising accounts of causation. Such ‘freaky’ realizations suggest that the main competitors of probability-raising accounts cannot allow for higher-level causes such as infections and hurricanes. By contrast, probability-raising accounts appear to have no problems allowing higher-level causation in the face of freaky realizations. In this talk, I push back against Fenton-Glynn’s case for probability-raising accounts and argue that sufficiency accounts (e.g., Mackie 1974, Bennett 2017, Vivhelin and Tomkow ms), counterfactual accounts (e.g., Lewis 1973, Loewer 2007, Albert 2015), and interventionist accounts (e.g., Woodward 2003) can all allow for higher-level causation in the face of freaky realizations. Contrary to appearances, such case will do little to help us decide between any of these accounts and a probability-raising view.
- CLLAM Seminar: Hana Möller Kalpak
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Decision rules for imprecise Lockeans Seminarium Datum: fredag 4 mars 2022 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: Zoom https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/8938261027 Abstract According to the Lockean thesis, rational belief corresponds to rational credence above a certain threshold. A version of the Lockean thesis can be derived from the assumption that rational agents maximize the expected utility of their beliefs, given their credences (Hempel 1962, Easwaran 2016, Dorst 2019). This talk presents parts of work aimed at generalizing the utility-theoretic Lockean thesis to cases where rational credences are imprecise, in the sense of being given by a set of (probability) functions (overview: Bradley, 2019). In these cases, beliefs are not guaranteed the type of precise expectation values required for maximization, but must be deemed rational on the grounds of conforming to some more general decision rule. I will formulate some basic desiderata for such decision rules, and use this in an assessment of two well-known rules from imprecise decision theory: E-admissbility (Levi 1980) and Gamma-maximin (Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989). I will also consider the prospects of using an aggregative decision rule (classic majority voting), after showing that the domains of the relevant decision problems are Arrow consistent.
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Mikael Janvid
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Against Normative Defeat Seminarium Datum: torsdag 27 januari 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract This paper argues against the existence of so-called normative defeaters, defeaters consisting of doubts or beliefs that a subject ought to have indicating that her belief that p is either false or unjustified. Despite typically not being in the possession of the subject, such defeaters still destroy her justification for that belief. In determining whether defeat occurs, the justificatory strength of the belief targeted by the defeater is often left out of consideration, as well as the epistemic strength of the defeater, which is a mistake, or so I shall argue. Once these parameters are specified, alleged cases of normative defeat either turn out not to provide genuine cases of defeat – the subject remains justified or was not justified to begin with – or can be subsumed under a uniform category of defeat. Incidentally, the same result is also reached for the contrast class to normative defeat: doxastic defeat. A more fruitful framework, where the epistemic strength is included in a uniform way for both justification and defeat, is suggested in terms of reliable indicators where their strength determines whether defeat occurs.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Klaus Corcilius (Tübingen)
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Practical Reasoning and Participation in Plato’s Timaeus Seminarium Datum: fredag 11 mars 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 & Zoom Zoom-link
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Anna-Sara Malmgren (Inland Norway Uni of Applied Science)
Filosofiska institutionen
The Problems of Metaphilosophy Seminarium Datum: torsdag 7 april 2022 Tid: 14.15 – 16.00 Plats: D700 & Zoom Abstract In this talk I will revisit topics addressed in previous work on thought experiments, and seek to get more clarity on some metatheoretical (i.e. metametaphilosophical) questions. I will discuss what rides on the ‘content problem’ about intuitive judgments about hypothetical problem cases, and how to adjudicate between different solutions to that problem. And I will argue that such judgments belong to a wider class of judgments which challenge the widely taken-for-granted dichotomy between inferential and non-inferential justification (and knowledge). Zoom-link
- The nature and dangers of conspiracy theories
Filosofiska institutionen
Workshop med RJ-programmmet Kunskapsresistens och Institutet för framtidsstudier Workshop Datum: torsdag 7 april 2022 Tid: 10.00 – 16.00 Plats: Institutet för framtidsstudier Mer information aviseras senare. Inbjudna talare Gloria Origgi Daniel Cohnitz Kevin Reuter Karen Douglas Joseph Uscinski
- Cancelled: Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Sebastian Enqvist
Filosofiska institutionen
Cyclic proofs for first order fixed-point logic Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 24 mars 2022 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Zoom link
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Tore Vincents Olsen (Aarhus)
Filosofiska institutionen
The role of civil servants under democratic backsliding Seminarium Datum: tisdag 17 december 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract The article explores the role of civil servants under democratic backsliding, a process in which democratic institutions and rights are gradually undermined. It delves into the quandary faced by civil servants when a government, initially democratically elected, initiates policies that threaten democracy itself. Drawing on the literature on democratic backsliding, the article discusses two competing conceptions of the civil servant’s role: the instrumental and the value-based. The instrumental conception posits that civil servants should neutrally implement the directives of their superiors, almost regardless of the political implications. Conversely, the value-based conception argues that civil servants have a fundamental duty to uphold the state’s constitutional identity and values, defending these against any efforts to undermine them even those of their political superiors. This is particularly pertinent when changes include constitutional amendments or changes in basic political and legal structures, which carry signs of democratic backsliding. A main contention is that civil servants have a special obligation to resist democratic backsliding as their existence as civil servants hinges on valid laws, which can only result from democratic processes. Various strategies that civil servants might employ to this end are examined, suggesting that there might be a duty for civil servants to organize against backsliding governments consolidating their power while dismantling democracy. In conclusion, the article emphasizes the proactive and critical role that civil servants must play not only in defending democracy but also in securing their own survival as legitimate and necessary components of the political system. SCGG
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Alice Damirijian
Filosofiska institutionen
Alice Damirijan presenterar sin kappa Seminarium Datum: torsdag 8 maj 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 The Ins and Outs of Meaning. Essays on Polysemy, Proper Names and Slang
- Seminarium i filosofins historia: Mikko Yrjönsuuri (Jyväskylä)
Filosofiska institutionen
The Good and the Bad in Democracy: Mill on Tocqueville Seminarium Datum: fredag 24 oktober 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Henrik Lagerlund
Filosofiska institutionen
Artifacts in the 14th Century: The Case of Blasius of Parma Workshop Datum: fredag 15 december 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Abstract: The 14th century saw remarkable philosophical developments. One such was the nature of artifacts. In this presentation, I will draw attention to Blasius of Parma’s treatment of artifacts in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. I will also put his contribution in context and then mention Ockham, Buridan as well as Descartes and Bacon.
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Subrena E. Smith (Linköping)
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Title and abstract TBA
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Dunja Šešelja (Ruhr University Bochum)
Filosofiska institutionen
Titel aviseras senare
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Ana Maria Mora Marquez (Lund)
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Medieval Aristotelian Logic: the syllogism according to Radulphus Brito (1290s) and John Buridan (1320s)
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Øystein Linnebo (Oslo)
Filosofiska institutionen
Constructional hylomorphism (joint with Riccardo Baratella)
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Richard Arneson (UC San Diego)
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Desert-Catering Prioritarianism: Amended, Extended, and Defended Abstract aviseras senare
- Workshop on Induction (CLLAM och Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop)
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Induction from Aristotle to Present Time