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- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Andrew Reisner (Uppsala)
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The metaphysics of the formal objects of photographs Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 24 april 2025 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D289 Abstract Typical photographs may be said to be 'of' something in two different senses. One sense is that of the photographic or artistic subject. For example, a photograph taken of a friend drinking a beer may have one's friend as its subject. However, the same photograph has 'captured' rather more than that. It records potentially many objects over a period of time. The thing that a photograph is of overall, rather than its subject per se, is what may be called its 'formal object'. This is the other sense in which a photograph may be said to be 'of' something. This paper (or rather paper in development) presents a theory of the formal object of simple photographs, photographs produced from a single actuation of the shutter. I suggest that the formal objects of simple photographs are events. I argue that this account cannot be straightforwardly extended to many photographs that combine multiple shutter actuations, both for double/multiple exposures of the same frame and for images produced from combining several distinct frames. I consider some consequences for the way we might want to understand or perhaps appreciate visually identical photographs produced through different capture and combination techniques. One interesting consequence is that some photographs may not be of anything at all.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Stefan Gosepath (Freie University Berlin)
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Why is inheritance unfair? Seminarium Datum: tisdag 7 oktober 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In this seminar, Gosepath addresses the fundamental question of whether the widespread social and legal practice of inheritance and bequests is fair. Gosepath argues that inheritance and bequests are unfair because they give beneficiaries an unfair advantage while disadvantaging society. To justify this view, Gosepath first presents the most important justice-based arguments against inheritance. He will then defend these positions against the most significant normative arguments in favor of inheritance, such as those related to property rights, comparisons with gifts, the value of family, and economic arguments.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Ruth Chang (Oxford)
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Artificial Intelligence and Value Alignment Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 30 oktober 2025 Tid: 16.00 – 17.30 Plats: D289 Abstract What might philosophers contribute to the 'value alignment' problem in artificial intelligence? This is the problem, roughly speaking, of aligning machine outputs with human values. In this talk, I outline a conceptual framework for making progress on this problem, diagnosing ways in which I believe technologists who confront the problem go wrong and offering a proposal for designing machine systems that I argue is a sine qua non for machine-human value alignment.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Philip Choi (KU Leuven)
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First Things First in Later Medieval Epistemology Workshop Datum: fredag 9 december 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract One of the most common skeptical arguments found in the history of epistemology runs as follows: (P1) We are unable to distinguish the Good Case (e.g., seeing an apple) from the Bad Case (e.g., having a non-veridical experience as of an apple). (P2) If we are unable to distinguish the Good Case from the Bad Case, then the Good Case cannot be a good basis for our knowledge of the external world. ( C ) Therefore, the Good Case cannot be a good basis for our knowledge of the external world. In this talk, I aim to show three different ways to deny (P2) suggested by 14th-century Latin philosophers in their theories of intuitive cognition (notitia intuitiva): (1) the perception-first approach (e.g., John Duns Scotus), (2) the appearance-first approach (e.g., Peter Auriol), and (3) the evidentness-first approach (e.g., William Ockham). The disagreement between these three approaches, as I will argue, gives a strong reason to think that the current, somewhat monotonic understanding of later medieval epistemology in general needs to be revised.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: David W. Shoemaker (Cornell)
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Games People Play: Blame without Desert Seminarium Datum: tisdag 10 oktober 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D734 Abstract Backwards-looking interpersonal blame, because ostensibly hurtful, is thought to require a moral justification. For most, this is found in either justice or fairness, moral values whose promotion or respect in these instances are themselves taken to require or consist in desert. Blame, as some say, is unjust unless deserved. This motto is false, however. I aim to show why by surveying all possible morally “problematic” forms of blame: mere attitudes, mockery, emotional expressions, punishment, and (most generally) sanctions. While some require moral justification of a sort, none require desert, or anything like the metaphysically robust capacities and conditions people in the free will debate have taken them to require. I reach this conclusion in part by interpreting the results of various behavioral economic games in a new light.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Virpi Mäkinen (Helsingfors)
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Necessitas urgeat: Limits of necessity in late medieval and early modern moral discourses Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 14 september 2023 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D289 Abstract The presentation deals with the learned doctrine necessitas non habet legem (“necessity has no law”) and its use in late medieval and early modern moral discourse on the (foreign) poor. According to doctrine, in extreme necessity (e.g., in famine) a person can take a small amount of certain produce (e.g., five turnips) without being punish for a theft. The doctrine was perhaps developed to benefit paupers by the twelfth-century canon lawyers. Later it included in European legislation, also in medieval Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. I will briefly present, how the late medieval philosophers such as Godfrey of Fontaines and William Ockham used the doctrine when developing their ideas on individual rights everyone has in extreme need. When moving to early modern age, the doctrine of necessity right was discussed in relation to the increase of vagrant population and the development of municipal legislation and hospitality system. The Poor Laws distinguished between deserving and non-deserving poor, criminalize begging and closed the borders. Thus, foreign beggars were denied entry altogether. I will present Domingo de Soto’s ideas against the Poor Laws based on ius pergrinandi and the novel doctrine of twofold necessity right. Even though the discussion on the right of necessity led to the early development of subsistence rights, we still argue about the same questions. In addition, the environmental emergency forces us to face completely new issues of extreme necessity.
- Conrad Bakka disputerar
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Debunking Debunked? Challenges, Prospects, and the Threat of Self-Defeat Disputation Datum: fredag 21 april 2023 Tid: 13.00 – 15.00 Plats: Hörsal 11 Södra huset F Vån 3 Abstract and full text
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: James Nguyen
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Understanding Philosophy Seminarium Datum: torsdag 24 november 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract What is the primary intellectual aim of philosophy? The standard view is that philosophy aims to provide true answers to philosophical questions. But if our aim is to settle controversy by answering such questions, our discipline is an embarrassing failure. Moreover, taking philosophy to aim at providing true answers to these questions leads to a variety of puzzles: How do we account for philosophical expertise? How is philosophical progress possible? Why do job search committees not care about the truth or falsity of a candidate’s philosophical views? We argue that philosophy does not aim at discovering true answers to philosophical questions. Instead, its primary intellectual aim is understanding. We argue that many familiar aspects of philosophy become intelligible once we accept this hypothesis. This talk is based on joint work with Michael Hannon (University of Nottingham).
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Pieta Päällysaho (Jyväskylä)
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Neoptolemos looks ugly – shame and ethical evaluation in Sophocles’ Philoctetes Workshop Datum: fredag 25 november 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In my presentation I will offer a philosophically informed reading of Sophocles’ last tragedy, the Philoctetes. More specifically, I will read the play as a study on the processes and problems of ethical evaluation, and how this evaluation is informed by the feeling of shame (aidôs/aischunê) and by the negative value of shameful or ugly (to aischron). The plot of the Philoctetes revolves around the question of whether one of its central characters, the young Neoptolemus, recognizes the shame involved in his actions – and whether this shame can inhibit shameful action. In this, Sophocles’ play seems to anticipate the later formulations of Plato and Aristotle who both maintain that a proper capacity for feeling shame (especially aidôs) is essential for the young, because shame has the power to keep them from committing shameful and ugly deeds. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in the Philoctetes (as well as in Plato and Aristotle) recognizing something as shameful is not only an emotionally charged ethical evaluation but also an aesthetic one – for aischron can mean, simply ‘ugly’. Therefore, I will argue that the Philoctetes presents a model of ethical evaluation that is at once emotive and aesthetic. This is a hybrid seminar. Please, find the zoom-link here: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/68653734427
- Konferens: Mekaniseringen av naturen
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Ingress
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Patrick Todd (Edinburgh/Lund)
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Strawsonian Responsibility, Response-Dependence, and the Possibility of Global Error Seminarium Datum: tisdag 28 februari 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Various philosophers have wanted to move from a “Strawsonian” understanding of the “practices of moral responsibility” to a compatibilist/non-skeptical result. In my 2016 paper, I criticized versions of this strategy that are based on what some have called Strawson's "reversal" thesis. In this talk, I focus on a closely related strategy moving from a “response-dependent” theory of responsibility. I argue that the response-dependent theory offers no response to the incompatibilist. More generally, I aim to show that a key analogy associated with this strategy fails to support a compatibilist result. In some sense, it seems clear that nothing could show that nothing we have been laughing at has really been funny. If "the funny" is similar to "the blameworthy", then perhaps it would follow that nothing could show that no one we have ever blamed has really been blameworthy. The comparison is interesting, but ultimately inconclusive: even if we grant that these properties are normatively similar, the latter has substantive empirical presuppositions, whereas the former does not. And this undermines the move to a non-skeptical conclusion.
- Uppskjutet: Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Jan Sprenger (Turin)
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Titel aviseras senare Seminarium Datum: torsdag 20 april 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Inställt! Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Delia Belleri (Uppsala)
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Conceptual engineering: can we be “critically conservative” about concepts? Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 23 februari 2023 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: E487 Abstract Conceptual engineering has been linked by Herman Cappelen to “representational skepticism”: the refusal to uncritically take over the concepts one is handed. Representational skepticism is not sustainable, though. Representational complacency, the opposite of skepticism, is even less advisable, plus, arguably, there is no reasonable “hybrid” position. I outline an alternative to these options, called “critical concept conservatism” (CCC). CCC is the conjunction of two attitudes: (i) one, meta-conceptual conservative attitude, stating that having a concept K makes it rational to retain K, and (ii) the other, meta-meta-conceptual critical attitude, stating that the attitude whereby it is rational to retain K may be questioned, were appropriate grounds to emerge. If the reasons for the conservative attitude are – at a certain context – stronger than the reasons for the critical attitude, then it will be rational for one to retain K. If the reasons for the critical attitude were to become – at a certain context – stronger than the reasons for the conservative attitude, then it will become appropriate to question whether it is rational to retain K. CCC – and especially its conservative component, are bolstered by both positive and negative considerations. On the positive side, there are pro tanto reasons to retain a concept that is adequately entrenched and has a reputable (epistemic or non-epistemic) career. On the negative side, it seems inconvenient, in normal circumstances and absent strong reasons to do so, to question an entrenched concept, as that would potentially jeopardize communication and inquiry. Unlike Cappelen’s representational skeptic, the CCC theorist does not doubt concepts from the very start of inquiry. Rather, they accept and retain those concepts, unless there are grounds for questioning them. Furthermore, because they endorse the “unless there are grounds to doubt…” condition, the CCC theorist is not a representationally complacent inquirer.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Felix Maier
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Feelings and Emotions in Plotinus Seminarium Datum: fredag 30 september 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Plotinus theory of feelings and emotions is, compared to Plato’s, Aristotle’s and the Stoic account of affections, less known and widely underrated. While retaining central Platonic positions such as the soul being distinct and separate from the body, Plotinus adapts and implements Aristotelian and Stoic concepts into his Platonic framework with the purpose of solving problems encountered in his predecessor’s theories of emotions. But what are emotions and feelings according to Plotinus, what role do they play within his system and how is he using his sources – and why should we ask these questions? My plan is to write my PhD thesis on these topics. Hence, I will not be able to provide answers on these questions yet; instead, I would like to present and discuss the structure and main outline of the intended project in order to receive feedback at an early stage. Zoom link: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/68803139170
- INSTÄLLT!! Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Karl Nygren
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Deontic Logic as a Branch of Modal Logic: A Historical Perspective Seminarium Datum: fredag 27 januari 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 INSTÄLLT !! Abstract Aviseras senare
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Helen Frowe
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Negating the Costs of Assistance: An Argument In Favour of Refugee Discrimination Seminarium Datum: tisdag 17 januari 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Consider Refuge: Anna and Becky face equally grave harms in their own countries and can avoid these harms only by resettlement abroad. France is considering whether to resettle Anna or Becky. Anna speaks French and will be able to work. Her contributions to the French economy via taxation will offset any financial costs of her resettlement. Becky does not speak French, will struggle to learn, and will not be able to work. She will not offset the financial costs of her resettlement. In this paper, I argue that, other things being equal, the French government is morally required to discriminate between Anna and Becky on the basis of their ability to offset their resettlement costs. I do not argue that France must prioritise Anna’s resettlement over Becky’s. I argue, rather, that France has a prima facie duty to resettle Anna and its doing so has no bearing on whether it may exclude Becky. This holds even if France has already incurred the costs demanded by its duty to resettle refugees and any further resettlements are thus seemingly supererogatory. When refugees will offset the costs of their resettlement, those costs are illegitimate grounds for excluding those refugees.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Siska De Baerdemaeker
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Cosmology and Empire (Joint work with Mike D. Schneider) Evenemang Datum: torsdag 8 december 2022 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D289 Abstract What is the link between the discovery of the expanding universe and British imperialism? In September 1931, the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) convened a panel discussion on the subject of the ‘Evolution of the Universe’. We argue that this event constitutes a watershed moment in the development of relativistic cosmology: it is the first time that relativistic cosmology as an authoritative science is presented to the general public. But speakers at the debate also include various humanist scholars who drew connections between the evolving universe and the evolution of life and mind. We argue that these contributions, especially those of then-president of the BAAS Jan-Christiaan Smuts, show how the newly developing science was repurposed to justify British imperialistic narratives. This historical episode serves as a cautionary tale: even in disciplines seemingly far removed from day-to-day human life or practical applications, ongoing scientific research runs real-time risks of being repurposed for political ends.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Jonas Haeg (King’s College London/Stockholm)
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Risks, Rights and Degrees of Wrongdoing Seminarium Datum: tisdag 22 november 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Does the fact that a person voluntarily accepted a risk of being harmed make it less wrongful to unjustifiably inflict this harm on them than if they hadn't accepted the risk? I believe it doesn't, but the challenge in giving this answer is that it seems to conflict with another intuitively attractive claim. This is the claim that it’s easier to justify harming someone who voluntarily accepted a risk of being harmed than it is to justify harming someone who didn't accept such a risk. After outlining and criticising some attempts at resolving the (apparent) conflict between the ‘less wrongful’ and ‘easier to justify’ claims, I develop and defend a novel solution.
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Saul Kripke
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Is Mathematics the Handmaiden of Physics? Attention! Seminar at 19:00–20:45 Seminarium Datum: torsdag 2 juni 2022 Tid: 19.00 – 20.45 Plats: Zoom Abstract: Starting with Quine, and followed by Putnam, Feferman, Field and others, it has been argued that the only justification for mathematics is that it is used in physics (even though a great deal of mathematics has no use in physics). My own view, in agreement with David Lewis, is that mathematics needs no such justification. But if it does, it cannot be its uses in physics, which sometimes uses ‘mathematics’ that is mathematically false. Zoom-link
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Harald Wiltsche (Linköping)
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Hermann Weyl on the nature of the coordinate system Seminarium Datum: torsdag 22 september 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 While a towering figure in 20th century mathematics and theoretical physics, Hermann Weyl is still relatively unknown in philosophical circles. As I will argue in my talk, this is mainly due to the fact that Weyl’s thinking about science is deeply influenced by Husserlian phenomenology—a philosophical framework that isn’t usually a frame of reference for philosophers of science and physics. In my talk I will concentrate on Weyl’s claim according that “the coordinate system is the necessary residue of the annihilation of the Ego” and aim to show how phenomenological motives form the background of his scientific and philosophical thinking.