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- Ny grundbok i metaetik
Filosofiska institutionen
Victor Moberger, Olle Risberg och Nils Franzén har skrivit en ny bok, Grundbok i metaetik på Studentlitteratur. Metaetiken behandlar filosofiska frågor om hur moraliska påståenden, moraliska uppfattningar, moraliska fakta och moralisk kunskap är beskaffade - liksom frågan om sådana fakta och sådan kunskap överhuvudtaget finns. Läs mer på förlagets hemsida .
- Ny bok om matens filosofi
Filosofiska institutionen
Henrik Lagerlund publicerar Matens filosofi–Hur du blir en filosofisk foodie.
- Hur många snedsteg tål vi? Om moral och omoral i politiken
Filosofiska institutionen
Medverkande bl a Jonas Olson, professor i praktisk filosofi, Stockholms universitet. Hur många snedsteg tål vi? Om moral och omoral i politiken
- Kathrin Glüer-Pagin är invald i Vetenskapsakademien
Filosofiska institutionen
Klassen för humaniora och framstående förtjänst om vetenskap Kathrin Glüer-Pagin är professor i teoretisk filosofi vid Filosofiska institutionen, Stockholms universitet. Hennes forskning rör sig inom framförallt språk- och medvetandefilosofi. Hon disputerade med en avhandling om centrala språkfilosofiska frågor om mening och normer. I den argumenterade hon mot det vedertagna antagandet att språklig mening är bestämd av normer; enligt henne kan språklig mening redogöras för utan hänvisning till normer, regler eller konventioner. Glüer är en av världens främsta experter på den amerikanske filosofen Donald Davidson. I sina diskussioner av Davidsons filosofi fokuserar hon främst på grundläggande semantiska frågor om mening och tankeinnehåll, men hon är också intresserad av semantiska grundvalsfrågor och formell semantik i största allmänhet. Tillsammans med kolleger har hon utvecklat en ny semantisk teori för naturliga språk, växelsemantik, och visat hur den kan bidra till att lösa flera av de tyngsta utmaningarna i samtida språkfilosofi. Ett annat område som Glüer har lämnat bidrag till är perceptionsfilosofi. Hennes variant av den doxastiska teorin är en ny filosofisk teori för visuell perception vars redogörelse för varseblivningars natur och semantiska innehåll förklarar deras speciella kunskapsteoretiska roll på ett mycket naturligt sätt. Kungliga vetenskapsakademien
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Sophia Connell (Birkbeck, University of London)
Filosofiska institutionen
Titel aviseras senare Workshop Datum: fredag 26 april 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Alexander Stöpfgeshoff
Filosofiska institutionen
Alain LeRoy Locke on Accounting for All Kinds of Human Value Seminarium Datum: tisdag 28 mars 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Alain LeRoy Locke (1885- 1954) is one of the few African-American philosophers active at the beginning of the 20th century. He also develops an early rejection of value realism. Locke aims to develop a middle ground between what he calls nihilism or anarchy and absolutism. For Locke, the nihilistic denial of all human value cannot account for the role of value in human life. We live by our values, and a proper account of human life needs to explain the role of imperatives. Absolutism, on the other hand, implies an unacceptable realist metaphysics about values. Locke states, “In de-throning our absolutes, we must take care not to exile our imperatives, for after all, we live by them.” (Values and Imperatives, 34) Values are not grounded in “types of realms of value, but are rooted in modes or kinds of valuing” (Values and Imperatives, 34). For LeRoy Locke, to value something is to have an attitude towards it and “the primary judgments of value are emotional judgments … and the initial reference for value predication is based on a form-quality revealed in feeling and efficacious in valuation through feeling.” (Values and Imperatives, 39) Locke’s account of value speaks directly to the contemporary problem how to explain the difference between kinds of value attitudes and judgments. What is special about moral attitudes? Moral attitudes cannot be mere forms of liking and disliking to explain the role morality places in our lives (Sturgeon, 1986; Miller, 2003). Locke addresses this problem explicitly. He attempts to explain all values (epistemic, moral, aesthetic, religious) and how they differ. Value feelings are not just primary forms of liking or disliking. Each value has its distinctive feeling, which explains the difference between kinds of values and value judgments. Locke argues against an account that the content of a value judgment explains the difference between kinds of values. He brings up the example of “this logical proof is beautiful.” For Locke, this is an aesthetic judgment because of the specific aesthetic feelings involved. Anything can be an object of aesthetic judgment as long as the right feeling is involved. It is possible to have, for example, both moral and aesthetic feelings towards the same object. What makes moral judgment different from any other normative judgment is the specific moral feeling of conflict between what Locke calls temptation and inner conscience. This gives rise to a specific imperative unique to moral attitudes in comparison to, for example, aesthetic attitudes.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Chen Ziang (Jyväskylä)
Filosofiska institutionen
Titel aviseras senare Seminarium Datum: fredag 14 april 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- CLLAM Seminar: Dag Westerståhl
Filosofiska institutionen
An algebraic setting for the syntax-semantics interface Seminarium Datum: fredag 16 december 2022 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 Abstract I will talk about a draft of a chapter from Peter’s and my (still to be written) book on compositionality. This chapter presents an algebraic framework for discussing formal compositionality-related issues. The idea is for it to be general enough that most current linguistic accounts of the syntax-semantics interface fit into it, such as Montague Grammar, transformational accounts of syntax, Minimalism, Categorial (type-logical) Grammar, Sign-based grammars, and others. After giving some background from (universal) algebra, I will look at each of these approaches (or as many as there is time for) and see how they can be rendered in the algebraic setting. One ambition is that the average linguist or philosopher interested in formal semantics should be able to see that the way we talk (formally) about compositionality in the book actually concerns what (s)he is doing.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Alexander Stöpfgeshoff & Frans Svensson (Göteborg)
Filosofiska institutionen
The Honorable, the Useful, and the Pleasurable: Buridan on Good and Goodness Workshop Datum: fredag 5 april 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract How unified is the good? In 2.11 of his extensive commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, John Buridan considers a traditional division within the good between things that are honorable, useful, and pleasurable. Buridan argues that this division should be rejected. In his view, anything that belongs to the good is honorable as well as useful and pleasurable. The division is nevertheless important for our understanding of goodness (for our understanding of the nature of the good, if we will), according to Buridan. Several centuries before, for example, Franz Brentano, A. C. Ewing, and Roderick Chisholm, Buridan proposes a fitting attitude account of goodness. In its most general sense, he says, the good refers to the desirable, that is, to that which is (would be) a fitting object of desire. However, we can distinguish between three different ways in which things may be desirable: in themselves (in which case they are honorable), as means to some other good (in which case they are useful) and for ourselves (in which case they are pleasurable). On the substantive level, these always coincide. But that is arguably not something that follows from the account of goodness itself, according to Buridan. In this talk, we will critically examine both Buridan’s rejection of the division within the good between the honorable, the useful, and the pleasurable, and his fitting attitude account of goodness.
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Gui Franzmann
Filosofiska institutionen
A tale of emergence Seminarium Datum: torsdag 18 april 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract The question of what fundamentally is has never been straightforward in physics, yet there had always been a tentative answer for both theoretical and practical purposes. Everything shifted about a century ago with the advent of quantum mechanics, which challenged our traditional understanding of existence as suddenly we can also talk about things that are in quantum space*, not only in classical spacetime anymore. Nonetheless, were we to keep a strong reductionist position, then we would be left with no choice but to understand how classical spatiotemporal existence can emerge from the quantum mechanical one. This talk aims to be a pedagogical introduction to this discussion and an invitation for long-lasting collaboration between physicists and philosophers. *Known as Hilbert space.
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Felix Maier
Filosofiska institutionen
Plotinus on Anger Seminarium Datum: torsdag 23 maj 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Anger can be described from a cognitive side as a desire to retaliate for a perceived injustice and from a physiological side as certain bodily processes. But how do they go together? Both the belief, being in the soul, and the physiological conditions and changes, being in the body, seem to play a role for anger which poses a problem for body-soul dualism – a Platonic core theory. Plotinus addresses this issue in Enn. 4.4.28 presenting us a complex theory of anger which has been widely neglected by scholars. In my presentation, I am going to provide the first analysis of anger in Plotinus. Emotions involve the soul and the body in a way that raises important questions about how they interact, and those questions shed light on his analysis of soul and body more generally. I will argue for three main points: 1) The soul as well as the disposition of the body play a role in anger with some kind of appearances, the role and nature of which is a difficult issue, as an intermediary element, 2) Plotinus makes a sharp distinction between two notions, referring to one more strictly as anger and the other one as the spirited element that allows us to get angry. This distinction has been overlooked or misunderstood in translations as well as in the secondary literature. And 3) the analysis of the processes involved in anger has consequences on how we should understand the complex relation between the different levels of the soul, from thinking to sense-perception as well as from the vegetative soul to the soul-trace and the so-qualified body.
- CLLAM seminarium: Peter Pagin
Filosofiska institutionen
Propaganda and assertion Seminarium Datum: fredag 22 mars 2024 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 Abstract This talk will be about two philosophical approaches to propaganda. About half of the talk will concern Jason Stanley's book How Propaganda Works, from 2015. I criticize Stanley's account and argue that the normative character of his approach to propaganda and, relatedly, to assertion, is to blame. I also argue that several known features of propaganda can be derived from a descriptive account of assertion, but not all, specifically not those that crucially depend on the mass character of the audience. The second half of the talk is about this topic, where I also briefly sketch my own account of assertion.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Hilary Greaves (Oxford, IFFS)
Filosofiska institutionen
Moral reasons to prevent wrongdoing Evenemang Datum: torsdag 10 november 2022 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D299 Abstract Non-consequentialist moral theories generally recognise deontic constraints. That is, they hold that certain actions are morally prohibited even if they bring about the best possible outcome. An open question is what such a theory should say about moral reasons to intervene to prevent another person from violating such a constraint. On one view, we have strong moral reasons to intervene in such cases. On another view, we have little or no distinctively non-consequentialist reason to intervene. An interesting feature of the latter view is that it seems to severely limit the reach of non-consequentialist considerations - on such a view, in many cases the applicable reasons go little beyond the consequentialist reasons, even on a view that fundamentally is non-consequentialist. I will try to make some progress on this issue.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop/CLLAM
Filosofiska institutionen
Craige Roberts (Ohio State/Barnard College, NY) & Barbara Partee (UMass, Amherst) Workshop Datum: onsdag 13 november 2024 Tid: 10.00 – 15.30 Plats: Lärosal 14, Albano (Hus 2, zon H, våning 2) Special double-session in connection with the Rolf Schock Prize 2024: 10.00-12.00 Craige Roberts (Ohio State/Barnard College, NY): Attitudes de re : Semantics and dynamic pragmatics 13.30-15.30 Barbara Partee (UMass, Amherst): Language and Logic: Ideas and Controversies in the History of Formal Semantics Map Venue ABSTRACTS Attitudes de re: Semantics and dynamic pragmatics I argue that de re interpretations arise quite regularly as a result of two types of presuppositions associated with utterances wherein a definite NP (pronoun, definite or demonstrative description, or proper name) occurs in the complement of an attitude predicate or some other intensional context. The first (similar to that in Maier 2019) is an anaphoric presupposition triggered by the use of the definite NP (Heim 1982, 1983, 1992). Though the NP remains in situ in the embedded clause, non-local satisfaction of this presupposition results in truth conditional effects akin to those that would result from giving the NP semantic wide scope over the attitude: presuppositionally triggered wide pseudo-scope. In the resulting interpretation, the triggering definite’s contribution to semantic content is simply the res which is the actual denotation of the wider scope antecedent of the definite, yielding interpretation de re without syntactically unmotivated NP movement at LF (Keshet & Schwarz 2019) or structured propositions (von Stechow & Cresswell 1982). The second presupposition is a background condition entailed by any de re attitude attribution: Epistemically limited humans can never know a res directly or completely, but only under some guise or other with which they are acquainted. So an agent can only hold an attitude toward a res under some guise reflecting their acquaintance. This captures the acquaintance requirement of Kaplan (1986), but here arises as an ontological precondition on the existence of a de re attitude, a non-anaphoric presupposition (Roberts & Simons 2024). Thus, acquaintance under a guise is an entailment of the triggering attitude in conjunction with the wide pseudo-scope of the definite, arising from our world knowledge of the corresponding type of situation. To model it, there is no need to stipulate silent existential operators or concept generators at LF, avoiding Lederman’s (2021) problems for Percus & Sauerland (2003). This account is straightforwardly realized using independently motivated tools in a dynamic pragmatics: presuppositionally triggered pseudo-scope for definites (including names), and the notion of presuppositional background content. Drawing on Aloní (2001), the notion of a guise is modeled as an individual concept in a conceptual cover, thereby inheriting her account’s advantages over previous accounts of the de re . In a de re attribution, the nature of the guise under which the agent is acquainted with the res is not semantically specified; the semantic content of the attitude report merely entails that there is some counterpart relation that maps the actual res to entities in the agent’s belief worlds which have the properties predicated of the embedded definite NP. But the nature of the entailed guise is often pragmatically evident from context, or even explicitly given by an appositive (Soames 2002). When this is the case, we can contextually enrich the meaning of the utterance by adding the presumption that the entailed guise of acquaintance is the particular contextually retrieved guise. Unlike with Aloní’s perspective shifting operator ℘ or Stalnaker’s (1979) diagonalization, on the present account we needn’t shift the NP’s semantic interpretation (Gluer & Pagin 2006, 2012); context merely pragmatically enriches that interpretation to make the presupposed guise more specific. All this sheds new light on a number of classic problems pertaining to the de re (Frege 1892; Quine 1956,1961; Geach 1967, etc.). Moreover, with the addition of centered worlds (Lewis 1979), the theory straightforwardly extends to account for de se interpretations, while avoiding problems of the de se , pointed out by Ninan (2016), for the classical doctrine of propositions. Language and Logic: Ideas and Controversies in the History of Formal Semantics The history of formal semantics and pragmatics over the last 50+ years is a story of collaboration among linguists, logicians, and philosophers. Since this talk is for a seminar on the history of philosophy, and I’m a linguist, I’ll emphasize aspects of the pre-history and history of formal semantics that concern the relation between language and logic, not presupposing knowledge of linguistics. Logicians have often been concerned with language in a “negative” way: the development of formal logical languages has often been motivated by perceived inadequacies in natural language for purposes of argumentation. Russell and Strawson, who had many disagreements about language, did express agreement on the statement that “natural language has no logic.” But logicians and philosophers of language, even those who regarded natural languages as “illogical” in various ways, made crucial advances in semantic analysis that paved the way for contemporary formal semantics. Chomsky, from a very different angle, considered the invented languages of logic to be so different from any natural language that he doubted that logicians’ work on the formal syntax and semantics of logical languages could possibly be of any interest or usefulness for linguistics, and he therefore rejected Bar-Hillel’s exhortation in the early 1950’s for greater cooperation between logicians and linguists in syntax and semantics. It was the logician and philosopher Richard Montague, a student of Tarski’s, who had the greatest direct impact on the development of contemporary formal semantics, with his theory of “universal grammar” that encompassed both formal and natural languages, constructed in part on the basis of his own typed intensional logic. From his seminal works in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, as well as work by philosophers David Lewis, Terry Parsons, Richmond Thomason, Max Cresswell, and linguists Partee, Lauri Karttunen, Ed Keenan, David Dowty, Emmon Bach and others, interdisciplinary collaboration led to a rapid expansion of the field. In this talk I’ll review some of this background and reflect on key ideas and controversies in the development of formal semantics. I’ll talk about some of the pivotal contributions by logicians as formal semantics and pragmatics developed after Montague’s untimely death in 1971, and I’ll also discuss the “naturalizing” influence that linguists have had on the field as it has become more and more a branch of linguistics. Rolf Schock Prize 2024
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Sanja Särman (Uppsala)
Filosofiska institutionen
Essence, Existence, Being: Spinoza at the Crossroads between Platonism and Eleaticism Workshop Datum: onsdag 11 juni 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Meradjuddin Khan Oidermaa
Filosofiska institutionen
Slutseminarium Seminarium Datum: fredag 4 april 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D734 Complicity: In Search of Unification Opponent: Alex Kaiserman (University of Oxford) Zoom-link
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Erik Åkerlund (Stockholm/Newman)
Filosofiska institutionen
John Mair's Political Philosophy Workshop Datum: fredag 25 april 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract TBA Zoom link
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Marie Gueguen (University of Rennes 1)
Filosofiska institutionen
If you don't ask, the answer is already no - Modeling strategies in high uncertainty contexts Seminarium Datum: torsdag 28 november 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Abstract: In this talk, I analyze how different modeling strategies have been put to work in the computational models used to handle very complex targets in astrophysics and astrochemistry. The field of computational astronomy, for instance, has been shaped by a diversity of approaches, from first very simple structure simulations in the 1970's, numerical experiments performed by Efstathiou or Mellott , idealized scenario or semi-analytic models, to high resolution hydrodynamical simulations. My goal in this talk is to track the epistemological commitments and constraints of each of this strategy, and to show how the race to ever-more comprehensive models, in part encouraged by the funding landscape, has tend to blur what kind of questions can be addressed by each of these strategies. On this basis, I will distinguish predictive approaches from exploratory approaches for modeling complex systems and argue that many disagreements about how to solve discrepancies between observations and model's outputs actually stems from misinterpreting the kind of conclusions that the most complex and realistic simulations allow to draw. I will wrap up this presentation by highlighting how these considerations can inform the current debate about machine-learning techniques and their legitimate use.
- Högre seminariet i teoretisk filosofi: Tricia Magalotti
Filosofiska institutionen
Reasons explanations of belief and the wrong way problem(s) Seminarium Datum: torsdag 27 februari 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract According to one epistemological framework, epistemic justification should be tightly tied to reasons explanations for belief. Evidentialism about epistemic justification, the view that justified beliefs are the ones that are based on good evidence, seems to fit closely with this way of thinking of things. But, even those who deny evidentialism may wish to hold on to the idea that there can be psychological reasons explanations for belief that differ from merely “mechanistic” explanations for belief. Reasons explanations of the sort I have in mind are ones that identify a cause of a belief that also rationalizes the belief. Anyone who wants to defend the legitimacy of these sorts of explanations has an interest in the project of specifying what it is for a rationalizing cause of belief to cause the belief in the right way. This is important for avoiding deviant causal chains but also in other cases. In this talk, I attempt to shed new light on the “wrong way problem” for evidentialists (and reasons explanations of belief more generally). I also suggest an approach for how to go about solving the problem.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Karsten Klint Jensen (IFFS)
Filosofiska institutionen
Moral Solutions to Many-person Prisoners Dilemmas – The Problem of Large-Scale Coordination Seminarium Datum: tisdag 25 februari 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit presents a number of Many-person Prisoner’s Dilemmas and explores how they can be solved. Of particular interest are Contributors’ Dilemmas, where each member of some group has a choice between two acts: contributing to some public good (available for all regardless of whether they have contributed or not), or defecting. The dilemma is this: even if someone contributes more to the good than what he pays, he may not himself benefit enough from his contribution to repay his costs. Thus, it may be better for each not to contribute; and this may be so whatever others do. But if fewer contribute, less good is available for each; and if none contribute, no good will be produced. Many environmental problems appear to pose this dilemma, climate change being one of them. A solution would be to get most, or better, everyone to contribute. Standard solutions are political; the choice situation is changed, such that the self-interested behavior no longer is the best option for each (by installing economic incentives) or becomes impossible (by legal prohibitions). However, Parfit suggests that moral solutions, where everyone’s motivation is changed into a suitable moral one, often would be better than political solutions, because unlike these they do not need enforcement and can thus be more effective; and in some cases, they may be the only attainable solutions. Parfit is particularly interested in the solution where everyone becomes more altruistic, i.e. choose out of concern for the good of everyone. If everyone became sufficiently altruistic, each would choose to contribute to the public good, he claims. But what exactly does an altruistic solution look like, and how could it be brought about? Parfit does not say much about that. The aim of this paper is to answer these questions. I shall proceed using climate change as an example. The public good is here avoidance of harm, and the solution of the dilemma, political as well as moral, must consist in achieving some form of self-restraint concerning activities that involve emissions of greenhouse gases.