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- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Sylvain Roudaut
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Artifacts and the Mechanization of Nature in Late Medieval Philosophy Seminarium Datum: fredag 22 april 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 & Zoom Abstract: In The Advancement of Learning , Francis Bacon writes: “An opinion has long been prevalent, that art is something different from nature, and things artificial different from things natural […] whereas men ought on the contrary to be surely persuaded of this, that the artificial does not differ from the natural in form or essence.” Whereas in the Middle Ages artifacts were commonly defined as ontologically different from natural beings, one of the most salient features of early modern philosophy is the use of machines as theoretical models for understanding nature while denying any essential difference between natural things and artificial ones. This talk will be about explaining how this change of paradigm happened between the late Middle Ages and the early modern period (between ca. 1300 and 1600) by highlighting the key moments of this theoretical transition, with a special emphasis on how the status of artifacts was discussed in the context of Paduan Aristotelianism. For those that want to follow this on zoom, here is the link
- Amanda Thorell disputerar
Filosofiska institutionen
Amanda Thorell disputerar den 8 september, 13:00–17:00 i hörsal 2, Södra huset A. Disputation Datum: onsdag 8 september 2021 Tid: 13.00 – 17.00 Plats: Hörsal 2, Södra huset hus A Measuring Health On the Theoretical Foundations of Health Status Evaluations Amanda Thorell Akademisk avhandling som för avläggande av filosofie doktorsexamen vid Stockholms universitet offentligen försvaras i hörsal 2, hus A, Södra huset, Frescati onsdagen den 8 September, kl 13.00 Zoom möteslänk
- CLLAM Seminarium: Dag Westerståhl
Filosofiska institutionen
Carnap, Categoricity, and Commas Seminarium Datum: fredag 7 februari 2025 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D734 & Zoom Abstract A logic/consequence relation |– is Carnap Categorical (CC) if the only interpretation of the logical constants consistent with |– is the standard interpretation. Categoricity results have been obtained for first-order logic, modal logics, intuitionistic propositional logic, and many others. In all of these cases, the proof that the conjunction symbol must have its standard interpretation is almost trivial; it is the other logical constants that require some work. This triviality looks suspicious. In fact, it essentially comes from the definition of consistency. For example, in case of propositional logic with classical 2-valued semantics, the definition goes like this: an interpretation I is consistent with |–, if A1,…,An |– B implies that (for each assignment v of truth values to the propositional variables) if the value of A1 and … and A2 under I (and v) is 1, then the value of B under I (and v) is also 1. With an &-introduction rule of the form A,B |– A&B, it is no surprise that & has to mean ‘and’. In other words, the possible interpretations of & are biased by the fact that the commas to the left of |– are already taken to mean ‘and’. (Similarly, if we allow multiple conclusions; then commas to the right are taken to mean ‘or’.) How can we avoid this bias? In this talk I avoid it by disallowing commas altogether, considering only so-called binary logics: consequence relations with exactly one premise and one conclusion. Note that the &-introduction rule above is not in this format; it can be replaced by a conditional rule in the binary format: if A |– B and A|– C, then A |– B&C. I investigate what happens to the categoricity results when ‘and-bias’ is removed in this way. Categoricity of & (and other connectives) is no longer trivial: it still holds for (binary) classical propositional logic, but fails for some weaker logics when we impose the binary format. Results and counter-examples are presented in the setting of algebraic semantics, and of Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic; the technical machinery that I use will be explained. Zoom meeting link
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Matti Eklund (Uppsala)
Filosofiska institutionen
Truth and Natural Language Metaphysics Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 13 februari 2025 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: B413 Abstract Some linguists and philosophers are engaged in a project of doing natural language metaphysics (”natural language ontology”). The underlying idea is that languages can and do have metaphysical assumptions somehow built into them. I discuss some problems with this idea, and some ways of responding to these problems.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Klaus Corcilius (Tübingen)
Filosofiska institutionen
Compensating for Fragmentation. Plato’s Account of Human Cognition in the Timaeus Workshop Datum: fredag 8 november 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract TBA
- Simon Knutssons slutseminarium: The Weight of Evil
Filosofiska institutionen
Opponent: Orri Stefansson Seminarium Datum: tisdag 19 november 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700
- Inställt: Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Alejandra Mancilla (Universitetet i Oslo)
Filosofiska institutionen
Inställt: From sovereignty to guardianship: Governing Antarctica, Governing the World Seminarium Datum: tisdag 3 december 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract The twin crises of climate change and biodiversity loss have shown humans our power to intervene and modify nature in ways that can end up threatening our own existence on earth. At the same time, and despite attempts to find technological fixes, they have shown us our limited knowledge and power to control the planet’s processes and systems. It is no accident that scientists who have theorized the need to remain within our “planetary boundaries” are advocating a new form of governance for the “planetary commons”; and that researchers mapping the world’s most valuable ecoregions are proposing the creation of a “Global Safety Net” of protected areas spanning across national jurisdictions. In this book, I look to Antarctica as an inspiration for creating modes of territorial governance that respond more adequately to these environmental challenges. Despite its colonial origins, for over 60 years the Antarctic Treaty has ruled over the continent preserving peace, science and—since the signature of the Environmental Protocol in 1991—the protection of the environment. Neither under the national regime of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources nor under the international regime of Common Heritage of Mankind , Antarctica has been jointly governed by a group of states with a focus on protection rather than exploitation of the nonhuman natural world. I argue that this regime of Joint Guardianship where business has not been conducted as usual and where states have shown restraint should serve as a blueprint for the governance of places beyond Antarctica, like ecoregions and arguably also the oceans and outer space. Having said this, I argue that what I call the “Antarctic political imagination” has not been wholly impervious to three biases that also inform international law more generally: methodological anthropocentrism, methodological extractivism, and methodological nationalism. I find in the Environmental Protocol some of the conceptual resources needed to move beyond them and suggest that, if reinterpreted along these lines, this could result in the first political system at the global level where not just humans, but also nonhumans are represented, and where the representatives are not just states, but also non-state actors. To conclude, I look at the “paradox of protection” that affects Antarctica as well as other Global Systemic Resources; namely, that to protect them it is not enough to act in them, but also beyond them. Unsurprisingly, the take-home message is that governing Antarctica requires to some extent governing the world … and vice versa.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Stephan Schmid (Hamburg)
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The Metaphysical Significance of Early Modern Skepticism Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 22 maj 2025 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: B413 Abstract While it is well recognized that early modern skepticism was epistemologically significant in prompting philosophers to re-examine the justification of knowledge claims in novel and profound ways, the metaphysical significance of early modern skepticism has often been overlooked. In this talk, I will contend that the radical doubts articulated and employed by influential thinkers like René Descartes and David Hume paved the way for unprecedented forms of metaphysical idealism in Western philosophy, according to which reality (at least as we can know it) is fundamentally dependent on our mind and its capacities, a view that is – in some form or another – still widely embraced today.
- Högre seminariet i teoretisk filosofi: Åsa Carlson
Filosofiska institutionen
Hume on Identity of Objects: A Medium betwixt Unity and Number Seminarium Datum: torsdag 6 februari 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In book one, section four of A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume aims at explaining why we – the vulgar – believe in the existence of external bodies: “What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?” (T 1.4.2.1). Such beliefs entail beliefs in bodies that continue to exist when unperceived, which in turn entail the idea of identity. Although Hume’s conception of identity comes closest to what we consider as numerical identity, he conceives of identity in the sense of x is identical to x as uninformative: It conveys the idea of unity. Several objects convey the idea of number, no matter how resembling they are, and so does adding a time difference to the identity statement. Either we have to think of x at both points of time at once, or in succession. Hence, on the one hand, to avoid unity there must be some difference between x and the idea with which x is identical. On the other hand, the introduction of a difference entails many objects. Hume concludes that he needs an impossible medium, “Betwixt unity and number” (T 1.4.2.28). Using a fiction, he solves the problem. But how, exactly, to understand his solution? What, exactly, is the fiction? In opposition to Donald Baxter’s influential interpretation of identity as a switching between unity and number, I argue that Hume defines identity as unity through time, and thereby formulates an idea that substitutes a medium between unity and number. This idea is a medium between epistemic attitudes: Between certainty (“unity”) and uncertainty (“number”) there is potential uncertainty (“identity”). When we know that x at t1 is the same object as x as at t2, but could have been unsure about it, then the proposition is informative and the idea of identity representable: x
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Orri Stefánsson & Mac Willners
Filosofiska institutionen
Does Global Justice Demand Solar Geoengineering? Seminarium Datum: tisdag 28 januari 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Does Global Justice Demand Solar Geoengineering?
- CLLAM: Joulia Smortchkova: (Grenoble)
Filosofiska institutionen
First impressions and affect Seminarium Datum: fredag 4 april 2025 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: Zoom Abstract It has been recently argued that there is an affective aspect to perception. The intuitive claim is that, alongside sensory properties such as shapes, colors, orientations, we also perceptually experience affective valences. The relation between perception and affective valence is debated, however. Is affective valence a phenomenal quality of perceptual experiences? Is it represented in perceptual content on the model of the rich perceptual content view? Or is it rather a distinctive form of perceptual attitude? In my talk I will use the case study of first impressions, the phenomenon of vividly experiencing something for the first time, to suggest that the affective aspect of perception might be multi-level: both as a feature of perceptual experience and as a metacognitive feature of perceptual processing. The multi-level hypothesis can explain cases of affectively conflicting perceptual first impressions as well as how the affective tone of perception changes over time.
- Högre seminariet i teoretisk filosofi: Daniel Berntson (Uppsala)
Filosofiska institutionen
Safety, Similarity, and Counterfactuals Seminarium Datum: torsdag 3 april 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Suppose that Socrates is five feet tall. We ordinarily think that had he been at least six feet, he need not have been exactly six feet. He might have been a little taller. Likewise for other heights. But while that may be, we also think that there are limits to how tall Socrates would have been. For example, had Socrates been at least six feet, he would have been less than a hundred feet. This paper is about a surprising puzzle. For as it turns out, given these seemingly obvious assumptions, we can prove a flat contradiction using natural rules of inference. So we have paradox. Something has to go. But what?
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Olle Torpman (IFFS)
Filosofiska institutionen
Titel aviseras senare Seminarium Datum: tisdag 15 april 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Jonathan Shaheen (Uppsala)
Filosofiska institutionen
Tertium non datur: Early Modern Rejections of Middle Distinction. Workshop Datum: fredag 21 mars 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Sanja Särman (Uppsala)
Filosofiska institutionen
Essence, Existence, Being: Spinoza at the Crossroads between Platonism and Eleaticism Abstract TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Sanja Särman (Uppsala)
Filosofiska institutionen
Essence, Existence, Being: Spinoza at the Crossroads between Platonism and Eleaticism Workshop Datum: onsdag 11 juni 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700
- CLLAM: Stina Björkholm (IFFS)
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Fixing Contexts: A Conversational Engineering Project Seminarium Datum: fredag 28 mars 2025 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Projects in conceptual engineering investigate how our representational devices, or the things they represent, might be defective and therefore ought to be ameliorated, replaced or abolished. A fundamental question in this field concerns what the object of our engineering projects should be. Although much of the literature assumes that concepts are the objects of inquiry (partly by virtue of the label ‘conceptual’ engineering), Cappelen’s influential work within the field introduces three options: words, the world, or concepts. The purpose of this paper is to propose a fourth option which breaks away from the tradition of focusing on individual representational devices or the things that they represent. I will argue that engineering projects can, and often should, be about the context of conversations. I thus propose that a project of conversational engineering is well-worth exploring – thereby aiming to establish a systematic study of what it is for a context to be defective, whether such defects should be ameliorated, and if so how to do so. I propose that contexts can be both internally and externally defective, where the former includes discrepancies between what interlocutors presuppose and the latter includes cases when interlocutors make false, immoral, or irrational presuppositions.
- Disputation: Andrea Asker Svedberg
Filosofiska institutionen
Puzzles of Harm: Essays on Collective Action, Death, and Non-Existence Disputation Datum: torsdag 5 juni 2025 Tid: 13.00 – 15.00 Plats: Hörsal 9. Södra huset D Opponent: Julia Nefsky (University of Toronto)
- CLLAM: Anders Schoubye
Filosofiska institutionen
The Outputs of LLMs are Meaningless Seminarium Datum: fredag 25 april 2025 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D734 Abstract The recent success of transformer based large language systems has raised immediate and interesting questions as regards to what extent (if any) these systems can be conceived of as models of human language cognition. In this talk, we will present a very simple argument to the conclusion that the outputs of these systems are, perhaps surprisingly, fundamentally meaningless and, as such, not particularly interesting vis-a-vis models of human language cognition. Some arguments to a similar conclusion have been proposed, but unlike these prior arguments, our argument does not rely on assumptions about essential reference relations between words and external objects. For this reason, the conclusion of our argument cannot be resisted by appeal to various semantic externalist considerations. Moreover, despite the perhaps prima facie implausible conclusion of our argument, we contend that explaining why LLMs are nevertheless incredibly useful is not in fact a problem.
- SCEWP: The Ethics of Deterrence and Deontology
Filosofiska institutionen
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