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- CLLAM Seminarium: Alexander Paseau (Oxford)
Filosofiska institutionen
Why Infinitary Logic is Genuinely Logical Seminarium Datum: fredag 6 oktober 2023 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: Zoom Abstract Just as one can distinguish pure geometry (roughly the study of what follows from some geometric axioms) from applied geometry (the geometry of our physical world or worlds like it), one can distinguish pure logic (the mathematical study of any logic) from applied logic (the study of what really follows from what). My talk will be an exercise in applied logic. A tenet of contemporary thought is that applied logic is finitary: any logically valid argument must be capturable in a finitary logic, e.g. first-order logic. Infinitary logics are a relatively minor area of mathematical study but are not generally regarded as correct, i.e. as genuinely logical in the applied logician’s sense. Against this, I shall give some reasons for thinking that infinitary logic is genuinely logical. The talk will overlap with Part II of my book One True Logic, co-authored with Owen Griffiths (Oxford UP 2022)
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Máté Veres (Genève)
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Revelation, trust, and expertise in the Stoic theory of inferential apprehension Seminarium Datum: fredag 24 mars 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In his two compendia of arguments against theories of knowledge (PH 2, M 7-8), the Pyrrhonist Sceptic Sextus Empiricus targets an epistemological framework that recognizes two sources of apprehension. On this view, opposed by Sextus, evident matters are known directly, primarily through veridical sense-perception, while non-evident matters are known, if at all, through inference from signs and through demonstrative argument, i.e., proof. In this paper, I shall focus on the specifically Stoic view concerning inferential knowledge and argue for the following claims. On the Stoic view, proofs are revelatory: they create apprehension while also providing the explanatory connection between premisses and conclusion. In addition, Sextus provides support for the controversial claim that inferential apprehension involves non-sensory kataleptic impressions. At the same time, his report suggests that non-revelatory arguments proceeding through factive memory or through trust in authoritative testimony may in some sense qualify as probative. The distinction between these sorts of arguments prompts us to consider the role of expertise in the Stoic account. Zoom-link
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Bryan Roberts (LSE)
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Seminariet flyttat till den 15 juni Seminarium Datum: torsdag 25 maj 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Högre seminarum i vetenskapsfilosofi: Lars-Göran Johansson (Uppsala)
Filosofiska institutionen
Platonism or constructivism in mathematics? Seminarium Datum: torsdag 21 oktober 2021 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Title Platonism or constructivism in mathematics? Abstract TBA The ontology and epistemology of mathematical objects is a controversial topic. The core problem for an empiricist is that conceiving mathematical objects as existing independently of human thinking, i.e., platonism, makes it impossible to understand how we can have mathematical knowledge. The alternative, a constructivist conception according to which mathematical objects are the results of actual performed constructions, resolves the epistemological problem, but is associated with the identification of truth with provability, the basic principle of intuitionism. That entails that the law of excluded middle must be dismissed as a generally valid logical principle, hence indirect proofs are not allowed. Another difficulty is that proofs must be based on axioms, but how do we know that these axioms are true? Suppose axiomhood were a decidable property. That would mean that one could formalize constructivist provability. Then we could apply Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem and show that there are true but unprovable sentences in this system. This contradicts the very basic principle of intuitionism in particular and constructivism in general that truth is provability. In this talk I will propose a modified constructivism, which keeps the distinction between truth and provability. The core idea is that mathematical objects are not individually constructed, as in Bishop & Bridges book, but en masse, so to say. For example, introducing into discourse the predicate ’natural number’ by adopting the axioms guiding this predicate, entails that all objects satisfying this predicate are thereby accepted in one’s ontology; they are in a sense constructed independently of any existence proofs. This view on the relation between a concept and the objects satisfying that concept is similar to Kant’s; objects are objects of judgement and the judgement is primary. Litterature: Bishop & Bridges: Constructive Analysis, Springer, 1985. Kant, I.: Critique of Pure Reason, St. Martins Press, 1965. Johansson, L-G. Empiricism and Philosophy of Physics, Springer, 2021 (ch. 4)
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Daniel Ramöller
Filosofiska institutionen
Titel aviseras senare Seminarium Datum: tisdag 18 april 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Tricia Magalotti
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Trusting One's Emotions: Emotional (Un)reliability and Epistemic Defeat Seminarium Datum: torsdag 27 april 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract The claim that emotions are unreliable or, more colloquially, “untrustworthy” is sometimes offered as evidence of the epistemic illegitimacy of emotions. In this paper, I consider two initially plausible implications of the epistemic unreliability of emotions: first, that if emotions are epistemically unreliable, then beliefs or actions that are based on emotional reasons are irrational; and, second, that once we have evidence of emotional unreliability, we should not treat emotions as reasons for belief or action. In this talk, I attempt to show why one might want to resist these purported implications and how one might rationally do so. The overall aim is to provide support for the view that even if we have evidence that emotions are epistemically unreliable, that it can nonetheless be rational to form beliefs or perform actions on the basis of emotional reasons.
- Philosophy talk by Nader El-Bizri (American University of Beirut)
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Alhazen's Legacy in Optics and its Adaptive Assimilation in the European History of Science and the Architectural Arts Föreläsning Datum: onsdag 18 maj 2022 Tid: 13.00 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract This talk focuses on the science of optics of the 11th century Arab polymath Alhazen (Ibn al-Haytham; born in Basra ca. 965 CE, and died in Cairo ca. 1040 CE). A special emphasis will be placed on his theories of vision and light and their adaptive assimilation and reception in the European milieu from the High Middle Ages to the early-modern era within the perspectiva traditions in the sciences and visual architectural arts. This line of inquiry will be orientated by epistemic and historical aspects that touch upon the synergies in the sciences, the arts, and philosophy, while considering Alhazen's isomorphic composition of mathematics with physics in the context of his experimental methods and their bearings on philosophy of mind and embodimen.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Antti Kauppinen (Helsingfors)
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Perfectionism Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 12 maj 2022 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D299 Abstract Perfectionist views about well-being hold that what is in itself good for us is determined by what we are fundamentally like. Like objective list theories, they thus reject the idea that favourable subjective attitudes have the authority to determine our good, but unlike them, they also provide a unifying rationale for different welfare goods. In this paper, I outline what I think is the most promising version of perfectionism, which I call subjective nature telic perfectionism. It is telic, because it says that what is basically good for us is success in realizing the aims that built into the exercise of the capacities that define us, not just developing and exercising those capacities. It appeals to our nature as the kind of subjects we are, and not to the problematic notion of human nature. In the case of adult human beings, the capacities that define our subjective nature include at least the capacity of temporally extended rational agency, the capacity for affectively valenced experience, and the capacity to relate to other such subjects as fellow subjects. I argue (though only briefly here) that this type of view is superior to subjectivism when it comes to explaining the subject-relativity of well-being, and has a number of nice pay-offs, including explaining intuitions about ill-being as well as well-being and explaining shape-of-a-life intuitions.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: H. Orri Stefánsson
Filosofiska institutionen
Identified lives “bias” as decreasing marginal value of chances Seminarium Datum: tisdag 3 maj 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: Zoom Kommentator: Katharina Berndt Abstract According to a common intuition, we should use a lottery to decide who gets a good to which two persons have an equal claim but which only one person can get. According to a less common intuition, we should sometimes save identified lives even at the expense of saving a greater number of statistical lives. I defend a principled way of justifying both intuitions, namely, by appealing to the decreasing marginal moral value of survival chances. I identify four desiderata that, I contend, any such justification should satisfy, and explain how my account meets these desiderata, unlike some previous accounts. Zoom-link
- Wedbergföreläsningarna 2022: Rae Langton
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The Quiet Engine: Speech, Silence and the Power of Accommodation Föreläsning Startdatum: måndag 30 maj 2022 Tid: 14.00 Slutdatum: onsdag 1 juni 2022 Tid: 16.00 Plats: Albano The wheels of injustice are turned by speakers doing things with words, and with each turn, there is a tendency for what is said and done to become acceptable, even if it was not so before. A quiet adjustment tends to make whatever happens become appropriate, when certain enabling conditions hold. This follows a ‘rule of accommodation’ identified by David Lewis, and familiar to philosophers of language. My interest is in the epistemic and political dimensions of accommodation: how it involves hearers as well as speakers, silence as well as speech, omissions as well as acts; and how it can be blocked, or steered in a better direction. Lecture I. 'Presupposition and back-door testimony' May 30 h 2–4 Commentator: Alice Damirjian (SU) Venue: ALBANO! Lärosal 16, hus 2, våning 2, i zon H Greta Arwidssons Väg 8 Accommodation applies to many phenomena, presupposition accommodation being a familiar form. ‘Even George could win’ presupposes George is an unpromising candidate. The accommodation of presupposition tends to be achieved by default, through the silence of hearers who do not question or block the presupposition with e.g. ‘Wait a minute, what do you mean ‘even’?’ This has broader social and political implications. ‘That’s just locker-room talk’ presupposes and testifies that there is a social norm which excuses certain behaviour. Informative presupposition can be back-door testimony about facts, norms, and patterns of authority and credibility. A knowledge norm applies to back-door testimony, achieved via informative presupposition. This gives presupposition accommodation an important epistemic role, and also a potential constructive role, sustaining or altering norms and hierarchies by taking them for granted. Lecture II . 'Presupposition and norm enactment' May 31 h 2–4 Commentator: Stina Björkholm (SU, IFFS) Venue: ALBANO! Lärosal 16, hus 2, våning 2, i zon H i zon H Greta Arwidssons Väg 8 Doing things with words can create an ought that was not there before: Jones makes a promise, a master orders a slave. With the first example, Searle ‘derived’ an ought from an is. With the second, Lewis showed that permissibility follows a rule of accommodation. The parallel suggests that norms, good and bad, can be got from speech acts by accommodation: what is said ‘requires and thereby creates’ what is required, given certain conditions. Authority is such a condition, whether of a master, a desert island leader, a doctor, a quack doctor, a father, or an ordinary speaker. Authority can be pre-established, or gained by accommodation; it can be practical, or epistemic; it can belong to a speaker, or be outsourced. Presupposition accommodation and illocutionary accommodation are distinct, but can work together. Hearers assist, when they accommodate presupposed authority. As hearers, we sometimes need to stop helping. Lecture III . 'Blocking as counter-speech' June 1 h 2–4 Commentator: Katharina Berndt Rasmussen (SU, IFFS) Venue: ALBANO! Lärosal 22, hus 4 våning 2, i zon M Greta Arwidssons Väg 14 Free speech theorists argue that ‘evil’ speech, such as hate speech, can be fought by counter-speech, but this depends on active hearers, and the enabling of counter-speech. Felicity conditions for speech acts can be supplied, in part, by hearers and bystanders, with implications for what counter-speech needs, and what it can achieve. Surprisingly, counter-speech can sometimes work by retroactively ‘undoing’, rather than refuting, harmful speech. A would-be counter-speaker faces serious handicaps, but a hearer can sometimes block the presuppositions of harmful speech, including presuppositions about authority. Blocking prevents accommodation, and also blocks the speech act’s felicity conditions, retroactively disabling its force. This highlights both limits and scope to counter-speech—and to the time-travelling powers of ordinary hearers and bystanders. Map to Albano
- Causal Powers in Late Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress
- Workshop
Filosofiska institutionen
The Role of Theory Confirmation in Science Workshop Startdatum: torsdag 5 maj 2022 Tid: 09.30 Slutdatum: lördag 7 maj 2022 Tid: 13.30 Plats: Stockholms universitet, Gula villan, rum Minerva & Zoom There are two ways of viewing theory confirmation. At a formal level, a theory is taken to be confirmed when collected data agrees with the theory’s predictions. At a pragmatic level, confirmation provides the basis for scientists’ confidence that the confirmed theory provides a viable representation of a set of phenomena and its so far untested predictions in the given context are true. Though the two roles of confirmation are of course related, the precise connection between them is non-trivial. The workshop focuses on the trust-generating role of confirmation with the aim of shedding light on the stated connection. Specific questions to be addressed will include: what are the criteria that turn evidence into empirical confirmation? In which way and to what extent do non-empirical considerations play a role in assessing a theory? What is the role of non-epistemic considerations in theory assessment? To what extent and in which ways does the notion of theory confirmation depend on the research field? The workshop aims to compare perspectives from various scientific disciplines. Program (72 Kb) Abstracts (100 Kb) Zoom link Confirmed speakers Adrian Currie (University of Exeter) Siska De Baerdemaeker (Stockholm University) Genco Guralp (San Diego State University) Karen Kovaka (Virginia Tech) Conor Mayo-Wilson (University of Washington) Casey McCoy (Yonsei University) Johannes Nyström (Stockholm University) Hiranya Peiris (University College London/Oskar Klein Center) Johanna Sarisoy (Unversity of Edinburgh) Samuel Schindler (Aarhus University) Chris Smeenk (Western University) Beñat Monfort Urkizu (University of Basque Country James D. Wells (University of Michigan) Program Committee Richard Dawid (Stockholm University) Siska De Baerdemaeker (Stockholm University) Sören Häggqvist (Stockholm University) Casey McCoy (Yonsei University) Questions? Please contact Richard Dawid ( richard.dawid@philosophy.su.se ) or Siska De Baerdemaeker ( siska.debaerdemaeker@philosophy.su.se ) This event is made possible thanks to a grant on “Non-empirical Theory Confirmation in Fundamental Physics” provided by the Swedish Research Council (project number 1598801).
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Michael McKenna (Arizona)
Filosofiska institutionen
Toward a Robust Theory of the Free Will Ability Seminarium Datum: tisdag 4 oktober 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Philosophers working on the metaphysics of ability often suggest that their inquiry into the modality of abilities can provide insights into the nature of free will, and especially to the question as to whether it is compatible with determinism. I will argue that philosophers especially interested in the free will ability should instead examine the free will ability when it is actually exercised. This, it turns out, helps us to understand the nature of the ability at issue when it is claimed that free will requires—or just is—the ability to do otherwise. My aim here is not to defend a source-theoretic view of free will according to which free will does not require the ability to do otherwise but rather resides only in the actual causal sources of free actions. It is, instead, to explore a leeway-theoretic view according to which free will does after all require the ability to do otherwise.
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Alexander Moran (Oxford)
Filosofiska institutionen
Knowing the qualitative: Grounding physicalism and the knowledge argument Seminarium Datum: torsdag 28 april 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 & Zoom Abstract This paper explores a neglected response to the well-known knowledge argument against physicalism. That argument turns on two main premises: (1) That Mary knows all of the physical facts in her black and white room, and (2) that she learns a new fact when she leaves the room and experiences red for the first time. Together, the premises entail that Mary learns a new non-physical fact, and hence that physicalism is false. The consensus in the literature is that to respond to this argument, physicalists should grant the first premise and deny the second. However, this paper explores an alternate reply, which is available to non-reductive physicalists, and that denies the first premise instead. On this view, Mary could not have known all of the physical facts while in the black and white room (prior to experiencing red), because some physical facts are knowable only on the basis of experience. The main aim of the paper is to explore and develop this response within a grounding physicalist setting. Zoom-link
- CLLAM Seminar: Ethan Nowak (Umeå)
Filosofiska institutionen
Sociolinguistic variation, slurs, and speech acts Seminarium Datum: fredag 7 oktober 2022 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In this paper, I argue that the ‘social meanings’ associated with sociolinguistic variation put pressure on the standard philosophical conception of language, according to which the foremost thing we do with words is exchange information. Drawing on parallels with the explanatory challenged posed by slurs and pejoratives, I argue that the best way to understand social meanings is to think of them in speech act theoretic terms, and I develop a distinctive form of pluralism about the performances realized by means of sociolinguistic variants.
- CLLAM Seminarium: Hubert Hågemark (Lund)
Filosofiska institutionen
What We Mean as What We Said or Would Have Said Seminarium Datum: fredag 14 april 2023 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: Aviseras senare Abstract We normally mean what we say, but sometimes we don’t. When I ironically utter “What lovely weather” on a rainy day, or mistakenly utter “Jim is a barn door” instead of “Jim is a darn bore”, I say one thing and mean another. However, although utterances like these are not uncommon, they are greatly overshadowed by the volume of humdrum utterances of “There is wine in the fridge” or “I really like nachos” where we mean what we say. Since we normally mean what we say, the following simple thesis will be correct in normal situations. (N) S meant that p by uttering e iff S said that p by uttering e. This begs the question of whether (N) can be refined to also cover situations where we don’t mean what we say. In this seminar, I explore whether (N) can be refined modally, by offering an analysis where speaker meaning normally is identified with what is said, and in other situations with what the speaker would have said in certain counterfactual situations. The analysis constitutes a radical, but welcome, break with Gricean orthodoxy, where linguistic meaning, rather than speaker meaning, is ultimately used to explain other semantic notions.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Katie Steele (joint work with Pamela Robinson) (ANU)
Filosofiska institutionen
There is No Special Problem of Moral Uncertainty Evenemang Datum: torsdag 29 september 2022 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D289 Moral uncertainty is taken to be uncertainty about the right moral theory, where the candidates are treated as free-standing or independent. As such, it poses a special problem for decision making: On what basis can we decide between all the different ways of representing candidate moral theories on a single scale of moral value? No parallel ‘problem of intertheoretic comparisons’ arises for decision making under descriptive uncertainty, in which a single scale of value is presupposed and the relevant possibilities are treated as comparable with respect to it. Skeptics have concluded that there are no principles guiding decision making under moral uncertainty and thus no facts about what we ought to do that are sensitive to our moral uncertainty. The rest of us have prepared for a difficult and potentially fruitless search. However, we argue here that we have simply been looking for principles in the wrong place. The apparent dead end is the result of two wrong turns: i) we have subtly misconstrued the epistemic state of moral uncertainty, and ii) we have not considered whether there might be moral evidential standards as well as descriptive ones. By taking a different route, we find a coherent and fully general account of uncertainty-sensitive oughts in which an ought sensitive to moral uncertainty poses no special problems. Further, it is neutral about whether there are any subjective moral oughts, and about whether the ‘ought of moral uncertainty’ is a rational ought or a moral ought. Our claim is that, either way, decision making under moral uncertainty is not especially problematic.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Alexander Stöpfgeshoff (Stockholm/Toronto)
Filosofiska institutionen
Knowledge strictly speaking – Buridan's rejection of idealization in epistemology Seminarium Datum: tisdag 14 december 2021 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 & Zoom Abstract In recent years, John Buridan's account of knowledge has received much attention and is often described as new and innovative (King 1987; Pasnau 2017; Zupko 2001; Klein 2020). However, Buridan follows a medieval tradition conceiving that the term ”knowledge” (scientia) can be used in different levels of strictness. Within this tradition, understanding what knowledge is entails understanding the different levels at which humans might be said to have the knowledge and how they are related. That the term "knowledge" (scientia) can be used in different levels of strictness allows for accommodating Aristotle's high demand for knowledge (episteme/scientia) in the Posterior Analytics with other domains where humans are thought to have knowledge. I will argue that Buridan's analysis of how knowledge exists on different levels of strictness rejects many features of accounts by his predecessors. Thomas Aquinas and others define knowledge as a perfect grasp of truth. Scholars have argued that on this account, what Aristotle described in P osterior Analytics is knowledge itself because it is a perfect grasp of truth, and all other cases where we grasp truth with some certainty is knowledge only in a qualified sense (Pickavé 2012; Macdonald 1993; Pasnau 2017; 2010). A thesis we can refer to as perfectionism. On this account, idealization is part of the notion of knowledge itself. Buridan, in contrast, does not endorse a perfectionist account of knowledge and breaks with the idealized epistemological project in which all forms of knowledge are understood in relation to the ideal case. Zoom-link
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Erik Åkerlund (Newman, Uppsala)
Filosofiska institutionen
Arriaga on Matter Seminarium Datum: fredag 21 januari 2022 Tid: 13.00 – 15.00 Plats: Zoom: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/66800514578 Abstract For Rodrigo de Arriaga (1592–1667), prime matter is unequivocally a substance. Further, there is no real difference between prime matter, on the one hand, and proximate matter, on the other, as is otherwise standard in the earlier Scholastic tradition. This puts the question of the relation between matter, on the one hand, and substantial form – that is also a substance –, on the other, into a new light. How are matter and form united to make composites, according to Arriaga? And how is matter structured in itself, considered apart from its union with form?
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: William Bülow O’Nils (SCEWP/CRB)
Filosofiska institutionen
Electronic Monitoring Seminarium Datum: tisdag 25 januari 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: Zoom Kommentator: Greg Bognar Titel: Electronic Monitoring Abstract: meddelas senare