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- 7th Stockholm Graduate Conference in Philosophy
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Ingress
- Inställt: Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop : Alexander Stöpfgeshoff (Stockholm/Toronto)
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Title: TBD Seminarium Datum: fredag 3 december 2021 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Amanda Thorell
Filosofiska institutionen
Irrelevant Situations, Non-Physiological Functions, and Non-Beneficial Body Parts Seminarium Datum: torsdag 2 december 2021 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 & Zoom Abstract The naturalistic debate about health and pathology has focused on trait tokens’ performances, or dispositions to perform, physiological functions in relevant situations. Roughly, the idea of health and pathology in naturalistic theories is the following: A trait token (e.g. an organ) is healthy if and only if it is disposed to perform all its trait type’s physiological functions well enough in relevant situations. Otherwise the trait token is pathological. Here, a trait is a body part with at least one physiological function. A physiological function is a function which is beneficial for survival and reproduction, or which has historically been so. A relevant situation is a situation in which the performance of a physiological function is, or has historically been, beneficial for survival or reproduction. I will argue that too little attention has been given (i) dispositions to perform physiological functions in irrelevant situations, (ii) dispositions to perform non-physiological functions, and (iii) dispositions of body parts with no physiological functions. Both (i), (ii), and (iii), I will argue, are important to consider in a sound theory of health and pathology.
- STOCKHOLM EXPLORATIVE TALKS: The Value of Human Capital
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Ingress
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop : Jonathan Shaheen
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Cavendish on Artifacts Seminarium Datum: fredag 19 november 2021 Tid: 12.00 – 14.00 Plats: Zoom Title Cavendish on Artifacts Abstract TBA Zoom link
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Sorin Bangu (Bergen)
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Noncausal Explanations in Physics Seminarium Datum: torsdag 18 november 2021 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Are there noncausal explanations in physics? Can there be? I answer both these questions affirmatively. I first present a general strategy to argue that certain answers to certain kinds of why-questions deserve to be called explanations, and that they naturally qualify to be called noncausal. I then show that a family of examples from quantum mechanics illustrates this type of explanation.
- CLLAM: Isidora Stojanovic (Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris)
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Exploring valence in aesthetic judgments Seminarium Datum: fredag 29 oktober 2021 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: Zoom Titel Exploring valence in aesthetic judgments Abstract The aim of this talk is twofold. First, I will be interested in adjectives that are neither clearly positive nor negative, such as 'intense' and 'surprising'. Such neutral adjectives can nevertheless be used in judgments of taste and in aesthetic judgments, and give rise to evaluations that can be positive or negative, depending on the context. Second, I will look at adjectives such as 'harrowing', 'disturbing', 'terrifying' and 'shocking', which have a negative valence, since they express emotions and experiences that are considered to be negative. Nevertheless, when used to assess works of art, they tend to express positive evaluations. I will explore different mechanisms, semantic and pragmatic, that allow neutral terms to acquire their valence in context, and negatively valenced terms to give expression to positive evaluations. Zoom meeting link
- Inställt: Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop : Guido Alt
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Buridan’s Reinterpretation of Natural Possibility and Necessity Seminarium Datum: fredag 15 oktober 2021 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: Zoom Title Buridan’s Reinterpretation of Natural Possibility and Necessity Abstract TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Tara Nanavazadeh
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The Natural Principles in Plato’s Laws: The Order of Reason and the Presence of Evil in the Cosmos Seminarium Datum: fredag 29 oktober 2021 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Karl Nygren
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Fine-grained semantics for deontic logic Seminarium Datum: torsdag 7 oktober 2021 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: Zoom: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/63814403479?pwd=eGxxd051eEdOZzlyMWlwdEF1b2hKZz09 Abstract Deontic logic is concerned with the logical foundations of normative reasoning. Traditionally, deontic logic has been considered a branch of modal logic, with standard possible worlds semantics. In this talk, I aim to give an overview of my PhD project, which is concerned with non-standard semantics for deontic logic. In my thesis, I argue that the traditional picture of deontic logic is too coarse-grained to account for several important and interesting aspects of normative reasoning, and I propose new, more fine-grained, semantic frameworks to deal with these shortcomings. In the talk, I will focus on two particular problems. The first problem concerns the interaction between deontic modalities and disjunction, where the traditional account fails to explain various intuitions. The second problem concerns the role of norms in deontic logic. On the traditional account, norms are only considered implicitly. However, we typically do reason explicitly about norms, for example in legal contexts.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Orri Stefánsson
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Should I offset or should I instead do more good? Seminarium Datum: tisdag 5 oktober 2021 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: Zoom Abstract Offsetting is a very ineffective way to do good. Is there any moral reason for offsetting rather than giving to some charity that does good more effectively? There would be such a reason if your offsetting compensated the victims of your emission. But it does not. In fact, you have reason to believe that if your emission harms some person and your offsetting benefits some person, then these are different people. How else might we justify offsetting rather than giving to more efficient charities? The most promising route might seem to go via contractualism. But, I argue, both ex post and ex ante versions of contractualism have difficulties in justifying offsetting instead of doing more good. Commentator: Olle Torpman (IF) Zoom meeting link
- Högre seminarum i vetenskapsfilosofi: Sören Häggqvist
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Intrinsic Biological Essentialism: Devitt’s New Argument Seminarium Datum: torsdag 30 september 2021 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: F3154 Title Intrinsic Biological Essentialism: Devitt’s New Argument Abstract Michael Devitt has recently responded to criticism of his doctrine of intrinsic biological essentialism (IBE). I argue that parts of his response expose IBE to a dilemma: putative intrinsic essences may be saved from triviality at the expense of explantoriness; or they may be explanatory but likely trivial. I also argue that his argument for IBE sanctions postulation of intrinsic essences for non-taxonomic categories like “predator”. This threatens an unwanted proliferation of essences which cannot – unlike those of hierarchical taxa – be neatly related.
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Dag Prawitz
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Philosophical issues concerning the concept of valid inference Seminarium Datum: torsdag 23 september 2021 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: Zoom Abstract Issues sometimes arise in deductive practice concerning whether an inference in an argument is really valid. They are usually resolved and the argument enriched with these simpler inferences is accepted as valid when the inference can be broken down into simpler inferences where it is obvious (or trivial, as mathematicians say) that the premisses of the inferences conclusively support the conclusions. Nevertheless a philosophical issue concerning valid inferences remains, namely to explicate the very concept of conclusive support. Clearly it is not sufficient for the inference to be valid that what the conclusion asserts is entailed by or is a logical consequence of what the premisses assert, although this has often been proposed in philosophy. We need to clarify a narrower concept than entailment. It seems to correspond to what Aristotle called perfect syllogism. Principles will be proposed that together explicate at least partially concepts of valid inference and valid argument.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Daniel Ramöller
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On the possibility of limited trade-offs Seminarium Datum: tisdag 21 september 2021 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: Zoom: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/63490766775 Abstract Roughly, *limited trade-off* is the conjunction of, other things being equal, (1) you ought to benefit one person rather than slightly benefit each of any number of much better-off people, and (2) you ought to significantly benefit many people rather than slightly benefit one person. I show that all recent views that have been suggested (e.g. Carlson 2000, Fleurbaey et al. 2009, Voorhoeve 2014, and Brown 2020) to capture limited trade-offs face severe problems and I suggest a novel solution to these problems. Daniel will give an oral presentation, and there will be no paper to read in advance, and no commentator.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Richard Chappell (Miami)
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A new paradox of deontology Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 2 september 2021 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: Zoom Abstract Deontologists hold that killing is so morally serious that it ought not to be done, even to prevent more killings. For such a constraint to matter, it must be that we should generally want it to be respected. That is, we should prefer Five Killings over One Killing to Prevent Five. But this verdict turns out to be incompatible with regarding it as a matter of great importance whether or not such a prevention attempt turns out to be successful. Since deontic constraints are incompatible with taking their violations seriously, we must reject them.
- CLLAM Seminar: Dag Westerståhl
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Updates on Carnap’s Problem Seminarium Datum: fredag 18 februari 2022 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: Zoom-länk: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/8938261027 Titel: Updates on Carnap’s Problem Abstract Carnap’s Problem, as Denis Bonnay and I understand it, is to what extent a consequence relation in some logical language fixes the meaning of the logical constants in that language. One thought in the background is that people can have fairly robust intuitions about ´what follows from what’ without having clear ideas about logicality, so it is of some interest to see if and how the former determines the latter. I will give an overview of what has been achieved in this area so far, concerning classical first-order logic, logics with generalized quantifiers, and modal logic. Then I end with some partial results on Carnap’s Problem for intuitionistic propositional logic (this is joint work with my student Haotian Tong).
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Sven-Ove Hansson (KTH)
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Combining probabilistic and all-or-nothing beliefs Seminarium Datum: torsdag 3 mars 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 & Zoom (hybrid) Abstract One of the major problems in formal epistemology is the difficulty of combining probabilistic and dichotomous (all-or-nothing) beliefs in one and the same formal framework. In this presentation I will begin with an epistemological discussion on how they should be combined, based on considerations of optimal use of our limited cognitive resources. This will be followed by a presentation of a formal model that serves as a proof of concept that the two types of beliefs can be adequately represented in one and the same formal framework. In this formal model, infinitesimal probabilities are used as carriers of memories of beliefs that have been given up. Empirical full beliefs can be given up, and their pattern of change constitutes a credible system of all-or-nothing belief change.
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Peter Vickers (Durham)
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Identifying Future-Proof Science Seminarium Datum: torsdag 24 mars 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract: My forthcoming book Identifying Future-Proof Science argues that we can confidently identify many scientific claims that are future-proof: they will last forever (so long as science continues). Examples include the evolution of human beings from fish, and the fact that the Milky Way is a spiral galaxy. But how should we go about identifying future-proof science? This appears to be a new question for philosophers of science, and not an unimportant one. It is argued that the best way to identify future-proof science is to avoid any attempt to analyse the relevant first-order scientific evidence, instead focusing purely on second-order evidence. Specifically, a scientific claim is future-proof when the relevant scientific community is large, international, and diverse, and at least 95% of that community would describe the claim as an established scientific fact. In the entire history of science, no claim meeting these criteria has ever been overturned, despite enormous opportunity for that to happen (were it ever going to happen). There are important consequences for school education: If this is indeed the way to identify future-proof science, then the vast majority of school-leavers will have hardly any of the requisite skills, since schools systems around the world completely neglect to teach children how to judge the second-order evidence for scientific claims.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Krister Bykvist & Joe Roussos (IF)
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A Plea for Modelling in Ethics Seminarium Datum: tisdag 22 februari 2022 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: Zoom Kommentator: Erik Angner Titel: aviseras senare Plats: Zoom
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Beate Krickel (TU Berlin)
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Where is the mind? – Why this question makes sense only if understood normatively Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 21 april 2022 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D299 Beate Krickel (TU Berlin) - a joint paper with Birgit Beck (TU Berlin) Abstract Is the mind only in the brain, or can the body and the physical and social environment be part of the mind? The search for the location of the mind is often framed in terms of the distinction between causation and constitution : constituents are what the mind is made of, and thus determine where the mind is. In contrast, causes merely provide inputs to the mind. In this talk, we will argue that the search for the location of the mind is misguided. First, all existing accounts of constitution either fail to provide insights into the location of the mind, or they rely on pragmatic considerations. Second, the location of the mind is irrelevant for everyday concerns and scientific and medical questions. Still, we argue that a distinction between “mere causes” and “constituents” can play an important role for the sciences, psychiatry, and medicine if constitution is understood as a normative concept: whether something is a constituent of the mind or not depends on whether it should be considered a constituent. This normative dimension of constitution is spelled out in terms of importance in a given context .