Sök
Letar du efter intern information?
Visar 32681-32700 av 49115 träffar
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Alexander Stöpfgeshoff
Filosofiska institutionen
Alain LeRoy Locke on Accounting for All Kinds of Human Value Seminarium Datum: tisdag 28 mars 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Alain LeRoy Locke (1885- 1954) is one of the few African-American philosophers active at the beginning of the 20th century. He also develops an early rejection of value realism. Locke aims to develop a middle ground between what he calls nihilism or anarchy and absolutism. For Locke, the nihilistic denial of all human value cannot account for the role of value in human life. We live by our values, and a proper account of human life needs to explain the role of imperatives. Absolutism, on the other hand, implies an unacceptable realist metaphysics about values. Locke states, “In de-throning our absolutes, we must take care not to exile our imperatives, for after all, we live by them.” (Values and Imperatives, 34) Values are not grounded in “types of realms of value, but are rooted in modes or kinds of valuing” (Values and Imperatives, 34). For LeRoy Locke, to value something is to have an attitude towards it and “the primary judgments of value are emotional judgments … and the initial reference for value predication is based on a form-quality revealed in feeling and efficacious in valuation through feeling.” (Values and Imperatives, 39) Locke’s account of value speaks directly to the contemporary problem how to explain the difference between kinds of value attitudes and judgments. What is special about moral attitudes? Moral attitudes cannot be mere forms of liking and disliking to explain the role morality places in our lives (Sturgeon, 1986; Miller, 2003). Locke addresses this problem explicitly. He attempts to explain all values (epistemic, moral, aesthetic, religious) and how they differ. Value feelings are not just primary forms of liking or disliking. Each value has its distinctive feeling, which explains the difference between kinds of values and value judgments. Locke argues against an account that the content of a value judgment explains the difference between kinds of values. He brings up the example of “this logical proof is beautiful.” For Locke, this is an aesthetic judgment because of the specific aesthetic feelings involved. Anything can be an object of aesthetic judgment as long as the right feeling is involved. It is possible to have, for example, both moral and aesthetic feelings towards the same object. What makes moral judgment different from any other normative judgment is the specific moral feeling of conflict between what Locke calls temptation and inner conscience. This gives rise to a specific imperative unique to moral attitudes in comparison to, for example, aesthetic attitudes.
- Vad gör GB?
Institutionen för biologisk grundutbildning
Kraven för att få ut examen och utbildningens kvalitet – det är två exempel på frågor som diskuteras i fakultetens Grundutbildningsberedning (GB).
- Upptäck biologi vid öppet hus den 19 mars!
Institutionen för biologisk grundutbildning
Är du nyfiken på biologi och hur vi studerar livets minsta beståndsdelar? Under öppet hus den 19 mars har du chansen att utforska historiska biologiföremål och se fluorescerande embryon i ett avancerat mikroskop. För dig som är nyfiken på biologi erbjuder vi två spännande aktiviteter i samband med öppet hus: Klockan 14:20 – Upptäck vår studiesamling , en samling bestående av historiska biologiföremål som vi fortfarande använder i vår undervisning Klockan 16:20 – Se en demonstration av konfokal mikroskopi av embryon från bananfluga. Här får du chansen att titta på levande embryon där kromosomerna är synliga med fluorescens Båda aktiviteterna är sista stoppet på den naturvetenskapliga rundvandringen. Rundvandringarna startar klockan 14:00 respektive klockan 16:00 med samling utomhus nedanför trappan till Aula Magna. Ingen föranmälan krävs.
- Biogeolinjen fyller 50 år!
Institutionen för biologisk grundutbildning
Hösten 2025 är det 50 år sedan Biogeolinjen startade. Det var den första naturvetenskapliga linjen vid SU och den var unik genom sin kombination av biologi och geovetenskap och sin inriktning på natur- och miljövård. Utbildningen finns fortfarande kvar, nu i form av ett kandidatprogram i biogeovetenskap. Det måste firas! Men vänta nu… linjesystemet infördes ju vid högskolereformen 1977, då till exempel Biologlinjen startade. Hur kunde Biogeolinjen starta redan 1975? Hur linjen kom till Jo, Biogeolinjen var ett resultat av Naturvetargruppens arbete. Det var en utredningsgrupp som tillsattes av UKÄ hösten 1973 och hade i uppdrag att förbättra rekryteringen till naturvetenskaplig utbildning. Gruppen lade fram sina förslag i en slutrapport i april 1976, men redan under utredningsarbetet fanns resurser för att stödja planering av nya utbildningar. En sådan satsning var Biogeolinjen. Den skulle förbereda för verksamhet inom allmän natur- och miljövård och var just en sådan yrkeslivsanpassad utbildning som Naturvetargruppen trodde skulle locka många sökande. Inte minst på kommunerna fanns då ett ökande behov av personal med kompetens inom miljöfrågor, fysisk planering och naturresurshushållning. Förslaget att inrätta Biogeolinjen kom dock inte från Naturvetargruppen själv utan från två framsynta lärare vid SU: ekologen Björn Ganning och naturgeografen Pelle Tonell. Utvecklingen av linjen var på många sätt ett tvåmansjobb utfört av detta radarpar. De stod inte bara bakom förslaget att skapa linjen, de planerade också linjens hela uppläggning och de undervisade sedan tillsammans på linjen i många år, särskilt på fältkurserna. I maj 1975 beslöts att linjen skulle består av tre terminer biologi och tre terminer geovetenskap och bara några månader senare var alltså utbildningen i gång.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Chen Ziang (Jyväskylä)
Filosofiska institutionen
Titel aviseras senare Seminarium Datum: fredag 14 april 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Programmering behöver inte vara läskigt
Institutionen för biologisk grundutbildning
Att analysera ett protein för hand kan gå bra. Men vad händer när du ska jämföra tusentals, eller till och med miljontals? Då räcker det inte att klicka runt i datorn – du måste kunna programmera. Det menar Patrick Bryant, forskare vid Institutionen för molekylär biovetenskap, Wenner-Grens institut , som med start våren 2026 ger kursen Programmering för biologer. Ett tomrum i utbildningen Bakgrunden till kursen är ett behov som vuxit sig allt tydligare: biologer behöver grundläggande programmeringskunskaper, men det har hittills saknats en introduktionskurs på kandidatnivå vid Stockholms universitet. – Jag tror att många biologer inte riktigt ser varför programmering är viktigt i början. Det gjorde inte jag heller när jag själv var student. Men när datamängderna växer blir det omöjligt att hantera utan programmering. Då inser du vilket kraftfullt verktyg det är, säger Patrick.
- CLLAM Seminar: Dag Westerståhl
Filosofiska institutionen
An algebraic setting for the syntax-semantics interface Seminarium Datum: fredag 16 december 2022 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 Abstract I will talk about a draft of a chapter from Peter’s and my (still to be written) book on compositionality. This chapter presents an algebraic framework for discussing formal compositionality-related issues. The idea is for it to be general enough that most current linguistic accounts of the syntax-semantics interface fit into it, such as Montague Grammar, transformational accounts of syntax, Minimalism, Categorial (type-logical) Grammar, Sign-based grammars, and others. After giving some background from (universal) algebra, I will look at each of these approaches (or as many as there is time for) and see how they can be rendered in the algebraic setting. One ambition is that the average linguist or philosopher interested in formal semantics should be able to see that the way we talk (formally) about compositionality in the book actually concerns what (s)he is doing.
- Sen anmälan våren 2025
Institutionen för biologisk grundutbildning
Är du intresserad av att läsa någon av våra kurser i vår men missade att anmäla dig i tid? Då kan det fortfarande finnas en chans att göra en sen anmälan. Observera att endast utbildningar där det kan finnas platser kvar är öppna för sen anmälan. Platserna fylls i turordning och de stängs för anmälan när vi bedömer att det inte finns plats kvar. Du anmäler dig som vanligt via antagning.se .
- Varm gemenskap när BioGeo fyllde 50
Institutionen för biologisk grundutbildning
Sydostlig kuling och hällregn – vädret i Stockholm den 11 september 2025 var verkligen gräsligt. Men i Aula Magna var stämningen varm och förväntansfull. Drygt 350 personer hade samlats för att fira att det är femtio år sedan Biogeolinjen startade. Det var studenter och lärare och mängder av alumner, och från alla de 51 årskullarna. Vilken återträff! Firandet i Aula Magna inleddes med en timmes mingel innan vi hälsades välkomna av Regina Lindborg, som är programansvarig för BioGeo. Sen följde en rad presentationer där tre lärare och sju alumner intog talarstolen. Lärarna talade om olika aspekter på själva utbildningen och alumnerna om sina karriärer. Moderator var Birgitta Åkerman, välkänd för hela publiken eftersom hon varit studievägledare i biologi lika länge som BioGeo funnits.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Alexander Stöpfgeshoff & Frans Svensson (Göteborg)
Filosofiska institutionen
The Honorable, the Useful, and the Pleasurable: Buridan on Good and Goodness Workshop Datum: fredag 5 april 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract How unified is the good? In 2.11 of his extensive commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, John Buridan considers a traditional division within the good between things that are honorable, useful, and pleasurable. Buridan argues that this division should be rejected. In his view, anything that belongs to the good is honorable as well as useful and pleasurable. The division is nevertheless important for our understanding of goodness (for our understanding of the nature of the good, if we will), according to Buridan. Several centuries before, for example, Franz Brentano, A. C. Ewing, and Roderick Chisholm, Buridan proposes a fitting attitude account of goodness. In its most general sense, he says, the good refers to the desirable, that is, to that which is (would be) a fitting object of desire. However, we can distinguish between three different ways in which things may be desirable: in themselves (in which case they are honorable), as means to some other good (in which case they are useful) and for ourselves (in which case they are pleasurable). On the substantive level, these always coincide. But that is arguably not something that follows from the account of goodness itself, according to Buridan. In this talk, we will critically examine both Buridan’s rejection of the division within the good between the honorable, the useful, and the pleasurable, and his fitting attitude account of goodness.
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Gui Franzmann
Filosofiska institutionen
A tale of emergence Seminarium Datum: torsdag 18 april 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract The question of what fundamentally is has never been straightforward in physics, yet there had always been a tentative answer for both theoretical and practical purposes. Everything shifted about a century ago with the advent of quantum mechanics, which challenged our traditional understanding of existence as suddenly we can also talk about things that are in quantum space*, not only in classical spacetime anymore. Nonetheless, were we to keep a strong reductionist position, then we would be left with no choice but to understand how classical spatiotemporal existence can emerge from the quantum mechanical one. This talk aims to be a pedagogical introduction to this discussion and an invitation for long-lasting collaboration between physicists and philosophers. *Known as Hilbert space.
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Felix Maier
Filosofiska institutionen
Plotinus on Anger Seminarium Datum: torsdag 23 maj 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Anger can be described from a cognitive side as a desire to retaliate for a perceived injustice and from a physiological side as certain bodily processes. But how do they go together? Both the belief, being in the soul, and the physiological conditions and changes, being in the body, seem to play a role for anger which poses a problem for body-soul dualism – a Platonic core theory. Plotinus addresses this issue in Enn. 4.4.28 presenting us a complex theory of anger which has been widely neglected by scholars. In my presentation, I am going to provide the first analysis of anger in Plotinus. Emotions involve the soul and the body in a way that raises important questions about how they interact, and those questions shed light on his analysis of soul and body more generally. I will argue for three main points: 1) The soul as well as the disposition of the body play a role in anger with some kind of appearances, the role and nature of which is a difficult issue, as an intermediary element, 2) Plotinus makes a sharp distinction between two notions, referring to one more strictly as anger and the other one as the spirited element that allows us to get angry. This distinction has been overlooked or misunderstood in translations as well as in the secondary literature. And 3) the analysis of the processes involved in anger has consequences on how we should understand the complex relation between the different levels of the soul, from thinking to sense-perception as well as from the vegetative soul to the soul-trace and the so-qualified body.
- CLLAM seminarium: Peter Pagin
Filosofiska institutionen
Propaganda and assertion Seminarium Datum: fredag 22 mars 2024 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 Abstract This talk will be about two philosophical approaches to propaganda. About half of the talk will concern Jason Stanley's book How Propaganda Works, from 2015. I criticize Stanley's account and argue that the normative character of his approach to propaganda and, relatedly, to assertion, is to blame. I also argue that several known features of propaganda can be derived from a descriptive account of assertion, but not all, specifically not those that crucially depend on the mass character of the audience. The second half of the talk is about this topic, where I also briefly sketch my own account of assertion.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Hilary Greaves (Oxford, IFFS)
Filosofiska institutionen
Moral reasons to prevent wrongdoing Evenemang Datum: torsdag 10 november 2022 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D299 Abstract Non-consequentialist moral theories generally recognise deontic constraints. That is, they hold that certain actions are morally prohibited even if they bring about the best possible outcome. An open question is what such a theory should say about moral reasons to intervene to prevent another person from violating such a constraint. On one view, we have strong moral reasons to intervene in such cases. On another view, we have little or no distinctively non-consequentialist reason to intervene. An interesting feature of the latter view is that it seems to severely limit the reach of non-consequentialist considerations - on such a view, in many cases the applicable reasons go little beyond the consequentialist reasons, even on a view that fundamentally is non-consequentialist. I will try to make some progress on this issue.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop/CLLAM
Filosofiska institutionen
Craige Roberts (Ohio State/Barnard College, NY) & Barbara Partee (UMass, Amherst) Workshop Datum: onsdag 13 november 2024 Tid: 10.00 – 15.30 Plats: Lärosal 14, Albano (Hus 2, zon H, våning 2) Special double-session in connection with the Rolf Schock Prize 2024: 10.00-12.00 Craige Roberts (Ohio State/Barnard College, NY): Attitudes de re : Semantics and dynamic pragmatics 13.30-15.30 Barbara Partee (UMass, Amherst): Language and Logic: Ideas and Controversies in the History of Formal Semantics Map Venue ABSTRACTS Attitudes de re: Semantics and dynamic pragmatics I argue that de re interpretations arise quite regularly as a result of two types of presuppositions associated with utterances wherein a definite NP (pronoun, definite or demonstrative description, or proper name) occurs in the complement of an attitude predicate or some other intensional context. The first (similar to that in Maier 2019) is an anaphoric presupposition triggered by the use of the definite NP (Heim 1982, 1983, 1992). Though the NP remains in situ in the embedded clause, non-local satisfaction of this presupposition results in truth conditional effects akin to those that would result from giving the NP semantic wide scope over the attitude: presuppositionally triggered wide pseudo-scope. In the resulting interpretation, the triggering definite’s contribution to semantic content is simply the res which is the actual denotation of the wider scope antecedent of the definite, yielding interpretation de re without syntactically unmotivated NP movement at LF (Keshet & Schwarz 2019) or structured propositions (von Stechow & Cresswell 1982). The second presupposition is a background condition entailed by any de re attitude attribution: Epistemically limited humans can never know a res directly or completely, but only under some guise or other with which they are acquainted. So an agent can only hold an attitude toward a res under some guise reflecting their acquaintance. This captures the acquaintance requirement of Kaplan (1986), but here arises as an ontological precondition on the existence of a de re attitude, a non-anaphoric presupposition (Roberts & Simons 2024). Thus, acquaintance under a guise is an entailment of the triggering attitude in conjunction with the wide pseudo-scope of the definite, arising from our world knowledge of the corresponding type of situation. To model it, there is no need to stipulate silent existential operators or concept generators at LF, avoiding Lederman’s (2021) problems for Percus & Sauerland (2003). This account is straightforwardly realized using independently motivated tools in a dynamic pragmatics: presuppositionally triggered pseudo-scope for definites (including names), and the notion of presuppositional background content. Drawing on Aloní (2001), the notion of a guise is modeled as an individual concept in a conceptual cover, thereby inheriting her account’s advantages over previous accounts of the de re . In a de re attribution, the nature of the guise under which the agent is acquainted with the res is not semantically specified; the semantic content of the attitude report merely entails that there is some counterpart relation that maps the actual res to entities in the agent’s belief worlds which have the properties predicated of the embedded definite NP. But the nature of the entailed guise is often pragmatically evident from context, or even explicitly given by an appositive (Soames 2002). When this is the case, we can contextually enrich the meaning of the utterance by adding the presumption that the entailed guise of acquaintance is the particular contextually retrieved guise. Unlike with Aloní’s perspective shifting operator ℘ or Stalnaker’s (1979) diagonalization, on the present account we needn’t shift the NP’s semantic interpretation (Gluer & Pagin 2006, 2012); context merely pragmatically enriches that interpretation to make the presupposed guise more specific. All this sheds new light on a number of classic problems pertaining to the de re (Frege 1892; Quine 1956,1961; Geach 1967, etc.). Moreover, with the addition of centered worlds (Lewis 1979), the theory straightforwardly extends to account for de se interpretations, while avoiding problems of the de se , pointed out by Ninan (2016), for the classical doctrine of propositions. Language and Logic: Ideas and Controversies in the History of Formal Semantics The history of formal semantics and pragmatics over the last 50+ years is a story of collaboration among linguists, logicians, and philosophers. Since this talk is for a seminar on the history of philosophy, and I’m a linguist, I’ll emphasize aspects of the pre-history and history of formal semantics that concern the relation between language and logic, not presupposing knowledge of linguistics. Logicians have often been concerned with language in a “negative” way: the development of formal logical languages has often been motivated by perceived inadequacies in natural language for purposes of argumentation. Russell and Strawson, who had many disagreements about language, did express agreement on the statement that “natural language has no logic.” But logicians and philosophers of language, even those who regarded natural languages as “illogical” in various ways, made crucial advances in semantic analysis that paved the way for contemporary formal semantics. Chomsky, from a very different angle, considered the invented languages of logic to be so different from any natural language that he doubted that logicians’ work on the formal syntax and semantics of logical languages could possibly be of any interest or usefulness for linguistics, and he therefore rejected Bar-Hillel’s exhortation in the early 1950’s for greater cooperation between logicians and linguists in syntax and semantics. It was the logician and philosopher Richard Montague, a student of Tarski’s, who had the greatest direct impact on the development of contemporary formal semantics, with his theory of “universal grammar” that encompassed both formal and natural languages, constructed in part on the basis of his own typed intensional logic. From his seminal works in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, as well as work by philosophers David Lewis, Terry Parsons, Richmond Thomason, Max Cresswell, and linguists Partee, Lauri Karttunen, Ed Keenan, David Dowty, Emmon Bach and others, interdisciplinary collaboration led to a rapid expansion of the field. In this talk I’ll review some of this background and reflect on key ideas and controversies in the development of formal semantics. I’ll talk about some of the pivotal contributions by logicians as formal semantics and pragmatics developed after Montague’s untimely death in 1971, and I’ll also discuss the “naturalizing” influence that linguists have had on the field as it has become more and more a branch of linguistics. Rolf Schock Prize 2024
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Sanja Särman (Uppsala)
Filosofiska institutionen
Essence, Existence, Being: Spinoza at the Crossroads between Platonism and Eleaticism Workshop Datum: onsdag 11 juni 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Meradjuddin Khan Oidermaa
Filosofiska institutionen
Slutseminarium Seminarium Datum: fredag 4 april 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D734 Complicity: In Search of Unification Opponent: Alex Kaiserman (University of Oxford) Zoom-link
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Erik Åkerlund (Stockholm/Newman)
Filosofiska institutionen
John Mair's Political Philosophy Workshop Datum: fredag 25 april 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract TBA Zoom link
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Marie Gueguen (University of Rennes 1)
Filosofiska institutionen
If you don't ask, the answer is already no - Modeling strategies in high uncertainty contexts Seminarium Datum: torsdag 28 november 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Abstract: In this talk, I analyze how different modeling strategies have been put to work in the computational models used to handle very complex targets in astrophysics and astrochemistry. The field of computational astronomy, for instance, has been shaped by a diversity of approaches, from first very simple structure simulations in the 1970's, numerical experiments performed by Efstathiou or Mellott , idealized scenario or semi-analytic models, to high resolution hydrodynamical simulations. My goal in this talk is to track the epistemological commitments and constraints of each of this strategy, and to show how the race to ever-more comprehensive models, in part encouraged by the funding landscape, has tend to blur what kind of questions can be addressed by each of these strategies. On this basis, I will distinguish predictive approaches from exploratory approaches for modeling complex systems and argue that many disagreements about how to solve discrepancies between observations and model's outputs actually stems from misinterpreting the kind of conclusions that the most complex and realistic simulations allow to draw. I will wrap up this presentation by highlighting how these considerations can inform the current debate about machine-learning techniques and their legitimate use.
- Högre seminariet i teoretisk filosofi: Tricia Magalotti
Filosofiska institutionen
Reasons explanations of belief and the wrong way problem(s) Seminarium Datum: torsdag 27 februari 2025 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract According to one epistemological framework, epistemic justification should be tightly tied to reasons explanations for belief. Evidentialism about epistemic justification, the view that justified beliefs are the ones that are based on good evidence, seems to fit closely with this way of thinking of things. But, even those who deny evidentialism may wish to hold on to the idea that there can be psychological reasons explanations for belief that differ from merely “mechanistic” explanations for belief. Reasons explanations of the sort I have in mind are ones that identify a cause of a belief that also rationalizes the belief. Anyone who wants to defend the legitimacy of these sorts of explanations has an interest in the project of specifying what it is for a rationalizing cause of belief to cause the belief in the right way. This is important for avoiding deviant causal chains but also in other cases. In this talk, I attempt to shed new light on the “wrong way problem” for evidentialists (and reasons explanations of belief more generally). I also suggest an approach for how to go about solving the problem.