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- The Rolf Schock Prize Symposium in Logic and Philosophy 2024
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- History of Philosophy Workshop: A discussion on Stoic metaphysics
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A discussion on Stoic metaphysics and its influence in medieval and early modern philosophy There is no talk but please join us to discuss the topic. Workshop Datum: fredag 4 oktober 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Literature Steven Strange and Jack Zupko (eds.). Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations (2004). A.A. Long and D.N Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers , vol. 1 (1987) under Stoicism, Physics, Mixture 48
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Åsa Carlsson
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Moral Motivation in Hume’s Treatise: The Perplexing Premise, Paragraph T 3.2.1.8, and the Circle Seminarium Datum: tisdag 24 september 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Section 6, Internalism and the perplexing premise, is a discussion about whether or not Hume ought to have adopted motivational judgment internalism, that is, the view that moral judgments necessarily motivates an agent to perform an action, to some extent, if she believes it is the right one. Though a bit anachronistic, many Hume commentators think so. Without an internalistic interpretation of 'morals', Hume’s so-called Motivation Argument (T 3.1.1.6) is invalid, they argue. I discuss their claim and try to understand why they hold it. Since internalism is inconsistent with Hume's view of causation, I make an attempt to rescue the validity of the argument by analyzing the internalism claim as a claim about moral judgments as motivating by necessity and by themselves. After subtracting the necessity I arrive at an interpretation of 'morals' as a sentiment of approval of some virtuous action that motivates by itself, under some conditions, but not necessarily so.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Tomas Ekenberg (Newman)
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Ontological Arguments in Cicero and Others: On the History of the Proof Called Anselm's Workshop Datum: fredag 22 november 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Josefine Klingspor (Stanford)
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Conatus and Conservation Workshop Datum: fredag 13 december 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Forming the basis of his theory of human psychology, ethics, and political philosophy, Spinoza’s conatus doctrine, his view that all finite things strive to persevere in their being, is a cornerstone of his philosophy. Several issues have been raised concerning this doctrine. However, a feature that is generally regarded as relatively straightforward is Spinoza’s contention that the conatus is a causal power. In this talk, I will argue that this contention is in fact deeply puzzling. For it appears to be directly at odds with another core commitment of Spinoza’s, namely the view that all finite things depend on God not only for coming into being (for being created or produced) but also for remaining in being from one moment to the next (for being conserved), a view that is regarded as beyond question in the eyes not only of Spinoza but also of most early modern Cartesians and medieval Aristotelians. But if this is so, I will show, it appears by Spinoza’s lights that the conatus cannot be a causal power. There is thus a tension right at the heart of Spinoza’s philosophical project. The aim of this talk is to understand how Spinoza can resolve this tension and, with that, deepen our understanding of the conatus doctrine.
- Högre seminarium i Praktisk filosofi: Hossein Ayati (Universitetet i Teheran)
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Reasoning, Rationality, and Coherence Seminarium Datum: tisdag 10 september 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Although much ink has been spilled in discussing the relationship between rationality and normative reasons on the one hand and normative reasons and reasoning on the other, surprisingly, little has been said about whether we can understand rationality in terms of reasoning. In this paper, I propose a novel way to understand rationality in terms of good reasoning. I argue that structural rationality is best understood in terms of adherence to formal good reasoning and substantive rationality as adherence to non-formal good reasoning. I show how this can provide a unified account of structural and substantive dimensions of rationality that remain elusive on many other accounts. I also discuss several challenging cases for some prominent accounts of rationality and show how my account succeeds where they fail.
- Stockholm Colloqium in Philosophy: Jan von Plato (Helsingfors)
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What kind of a philosopher was Gödel? Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 26 september 2024 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D299 Abstract: Kurt Gödel (1906-1978) belonged to a university tradition that combined the exact sciences with a profound study of philosophy. Recent work on the enormous amount of shorthand manuscripts he left behind shows that his basic view of science and philosophy was formed already at the end of his last school year: a monistic philosophy that is far away from materialism and empiricism, but not thoroughly idealistic. Gödel's style was not one of extensive philosophical texts. He composed instead endless lists of remarks, typically less than a page in length; one example is his book-length 340 numbered remarks on the foundations of quantum mechanics that he took to show that "Kant was right." More generally, his work in logic, mathematics, physics, and theology was guided by his search of an "absolute philosophy" inspired by Leibniz.
- Craige Roberts (Ohio State/Barnard): Introduktion till dynamisk semantik
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- CLLAM: Tricia Magalotti (Stockholm)
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Title TBA Abstract TBA
- Stockholm Colloqium in Philosophy: Jan von Plato (Helsingfors)
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What kind of a philosopher was Gödel? Disputation Datum: torsdag 15 augusti 2024 Tid: 14.43 Plats: D289 Abstract: Kurt Gödel (1906-1978) belonged to a university tradition that combined the exact sciences with a profound study of philosophy. Recent work on the enormous amount of shorthand manuscripts he left behind shows that his basic view of science and philosophy was formed already at the end of his last school year: a monistic philosophy that is far away from materialism and empiricism, but not thoroughly idealistic. Gödel's style was not one of extensive philosophical texts. He composed instead endless lists of remarks, typically less than a page in length; one example is his book-length 340 numbered remarks on the foundations of quantum mechanics that he took to show that "Kant was right." More generally, his work in logic, mathematics, physics, and theology was guided by his search of an "absolute philosophy" inspired by Leibniz.
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Pablo Ruiz de Olano (Max Planck Institute for the History of)
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MEA and Theory Development: Lessons from the Development of the Standard Model of Particle Physics Seminarium Datum: torsdag 5 september 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In the last few years, interest in the concept of Meta-Empirical theory Assessment (MEA) has sharply increased. In this talk, I address an aspect of the MEA framework that has remained relatively unexplored in the literature and relates to the topic of theory development. The talk will be divided into three different parts. First, I introduce the MEA formalism and highlight some of the initial motivations behind its development. As I show, providing an account of theory development constituted an important goal of the framework, which has however received relatively little scholarly work. After that, I take a look at a historical episode that is of particular importance for MEA, namely the development of the Standard Model of Particle Physics. Building on previous work, I use this historical process to further emphasise the point that defenders of MEA are under pressure to provide a satisfactory account of theory development. Finally, in the third and last part of the talk, I discuss some of the strategies that one might follow to accomplish this goal.
- Disputation i praktisk filosofi
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Jimmy Goodriche disputerar Opponent: Theron Pummer (St Andrews) Disputation Datum: tisdag 28 maj 2024 Tid: 14.00 – 16.00 Plats: Hörsal 9, Södra huset D, Vån 3 James Goodrich försvarar avhandlingen: Self-Defense Without Deontology: Groundwork for a Consequentialist Ethics of Harm
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Marilù Papandreou (Bergen)
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Aristotle on the Ontology of Artefact Workshop Datum: torsdag 30 maj 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D892 Abstract It is commonly believed that Aristotle merely uses artefacts as examples or analogical cases. In this talk, however, I aim to show that Aristotle gives a specific, coherent account of artefacts that in various ways owes much to Plato. Moreover, I propose a new, definitive solution to the problem of artefacts' substantiality, which comprises two controversial positions: (i) that Aristotle holds a binary view of substantiality according to which artefacts are not substances at all; (ii) that artefacts fail to be substances because they exhibit less of a unity than natural wholes. Finally, responding to the contemporary debate on ordinary objects, I shall identify the main propositions for an ontology of artefacts that aspires to use Aristotle as its authority and can serve as a guideline for current metaphysical discussions.
- CLLAM seminarium: Sebastian Watzl (Universitetet i Oslo)
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Attention and Rational Choice Seminarium Datum: fredag 17 maj 2024 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D734 Abstract Formal models of decision making are widely employed in philosophy as well as microeconomics. They are variously described as rational choice theory or decision theory. The standard decision theoretic apparatus has no role for attention in its modelling. It treats rational agents as acting on the basis of preferences (desires) and credences (beliefs or expectations). At the same time, psychology and empirically informed philosophy of mind and action shows that attention plays essential and constructive roles in both belief revision and agency. In this paper, I sketch why attention should be included in decision-theoretic models, how to incorporate attention into them in a way that keeps what makes such models valuables, that is psychologically plausible, and theoretically and formally elegant and tractable. Agents, I argue, are informationally blind to issues they are not paying any attention to. All of an agent’s information gathering involves attention (at least, it won’t impact the agent’s beliefs without attention). Agents also are decisionally blind to options that don’t occupy their attention. The options an agent decides between at any time is limited by the issues the agent is paying attention to in making that decision. I will show that informational blindness and decisional blindness are two sides of the same coin. This, I suggest, in part, is what makes attention decision-theoretically and normatively interesting: its role in mind and action is theoretical and practical at the same time. I show when attention, treated in this way, allows agents to act in ways that are both epistemically and practically better than they could act without attention, and how the view sketched here affects recent discussions on the nature and aim of inquiry.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Isaac Taylor
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Just War Error Theory, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Pacifism Seminarium Datum: tisdag 21 maj 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Some of our most firmly held moral beliefs about war are, if a number of prominent philosophers are correct, illusions. The idea that soldiers do no wrong in fighting for an unjust case, for instance, cannot be justified as a correct account of the fundamental moral permissions, rights, and liabilities of individuals. What should members of the armed forces do in light of these claims? Jeff McMahan has argued that combatants should fall back on fundamental moral principles to guide their actions, while Henry Shue has maintained that they should continue to act as if the illusions were real. In this paper, I make a provisional case for a third option. Drawing on the existing debate, but also recent work in metaethics about the potentially undesirable effects of moralizing conflicts, I suggest that soldiers should foster a qualified skepticism about the morality of participating in any war. This may look very much like a pacifist theory, but I also demonstrate how it can avoid some of the standard objections that are levelled against pacifism.
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Mike Stuart (York)
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Scientific Understanding as Ability Seminarium Datum: torsdag 25 april 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract This talk has three goals. First, I’ll argue that the popular distinction between explanatory, objectual and pragmatic understanding is currently ambiguous concerning whether it refers to a distinction between states, modes or objects of understanding. I argue that this distinction is most fruitfully characterized as one between epistemic states, rather than modes or objects. Second, I address the question of fundamentality. What do we mean when we say that one of these kinds of understanding is more fundamental than the others? I distinguish between several possibilities, and focus on “humble reductionism” – where one kind of understanding is necessary but not sufficient for another kind (or kinds) of understanding. Then, I’ll argue that pragmatic understanding is the most fundamental kind of understanding, in this sense. Third, I’ll sketch an account of pragmatic understanding. Roughly, an agent S has pragmatic understanding of X when S has, and is responsible for having, the ability to reliably and successfully manipulate X, where those abilities come with the right dispositions; exist in the majority of nearby possible worlds; and are robust. I close by considering how this account informs the debate about scientific progress. Specifically, it allows us to capture what seems right about both the so-called noetic (understanding-based) and functional (ability-based) accounts of scientific progress, combining them into a single account of scientific progress.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Meradjuddin Khan Oidermaa & Saba Bazargan-Forward
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Accountability for Making Prior Wrongs Worse Seminarium Datum: tisdag 27 februari 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In this paper we introduce and defend an account of “ex post deontic influence” (EDI). According to this account, an agent can do something at T2 which makes them accountable for a wrongdoing committed by another agent at T1. We demonstrate how this account of EDI can illuminate and resolve a variety of seemingly disparate moral conundrums drawn from a diverse range of literatures.
- Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Richard Dawid
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Effective Realism Made Effective Seminarium Datum: torsdag 22 februari 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In recent years, the position of effective realism, first proposed by Porter Williams in 2019, has generated much interest and debate in the philosophy physics. While supporters of the position view it as the most promising form of realism in the context of modern physics, critics have raised doubts whether the position deserves to be called a genuine scientific realist position. In this talk, I argue that there is a clear sense in which effective realism reaches beyond empiricism and therefore can be called a form of realism. Moreover, I demonstrate that no stronger form of scientific realism than effective realism is defensible in the context of contemporary physics. In the second part of the talk, however, I claim that effective realism is itself an effective concept: its range of applicability ends at the Planck scale, where realist commitment, if meaningful at all, needs to be of a fundamental realist kind. The talk is based on joint work with Michael Stöltzner
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Erik Åkerlund (Newmaninstitutet)
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Titel aviseras senare Workshop Datum: fredag 23 februari 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Linguistic and Epistemological Perspectives on Testimony
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