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- Higher seminar in practical philosophy: H. Orri Stefánsson
Department of Philosophy
Identified lives “bias” as decreasing marginal value of chances Seminar Date: Tuesday 3 May 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: Zoom Commentator: Katharina Berndt Abstract According to a common intuition, we should use a lottery to decide who gets a good to which two persons have an equal claim but which only one person can get. According to a less common intuition, we should sometimes save identified lives even at the expense of saving a greater number of statistical lives. I defend a principled way of justifying both intuitions, namely, by appealing to the decreasing marginal moral value of survival chances. I identify four desiderata that, I contend, any such justification should satisfy, and explain how my account meets these desiderata, unlike some previous accounts.
- Norms and Alternatives: Logical Aspects of Normative Reasoning
Department of Philosophy
Karl Nygren defends his thesis Dissertation Date: Monday 26 September 2022 Time: 13.00 – 15.00 Location: Lärosal 17, Albano hus 2, Albanovägen 18 Academic dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy at Stockholm University to be publicly defended on Monday 26 September 2022 at 13.00 in sal 17, Albano Hus 2, Albanovägen 18.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Katie Steele (joint work with Pamela Robinson) (ANU)
Department of Philosophy
There is No Special Problem of Moral Uncertainty Event Date: Thursday 29 September 2022 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 Moral uncertainty is taken to be uncertainty about the right moral theory, where the candidates are treated as free-standing or independent. As such, it poses a special problem for decision making: On what basis can we decide between all the different ways of representing candidate moral theories on a single scale of moral value? No parallel ‘problem of intertheoretic comparisons’ arises for decision making under descriptive uncertainty, in which a single scale of value is presupposed and the relevant possibilities are treated as comparable with respect to it. Skeptics have concluded that there are no principles guiding decision making under moral uncertainty and thus no facts about what we ought to do that are sensitive to our moral uncertainty. The rest of us have prepared for a difficult and potentially fruitless search. However, we argue here that we have simply been looking for principles in the wrong place. The apparent dead end is the result of two wrong turns: i) we have subtly misconstrued the epistemic state of moral uncertainty, and ii) we have not considered whether there might be moral evidential standards as well as descriptive ones. By taking a different route, we find a coherent and fully general account of uncertainty-sensitive oughts in which an ought sensitive to moral uncertainty poses no special problems. Further, it is neutral about whether there are any subjective moral oughts, and about whether the ‘ought of moral uncertainty’ is a rational ought or a moral ought. Our claim is that, either way, decision making under moral uncertainty is not especially problematic.
- Final PhD thesis seminar: Romy Eskens
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop : Alexander Stöpfgeshoff (Stockholm/Toronto)
Department of Philosophy
Knowledge strictly speaking – Buridan's rejection of idealization in epistemology Seminar Date: Tuesday 14 December 2021 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 & Zoom Abstract In recent years, John Buridan's account of knowledge has received much attention and is often described as new and innovative (King 1987; Pasnau 2017; Zupko 2001; Klein 2020). However, Buridan follows a medieval tradition conceiving that the term ”knowledge” (scientia) can be used in different levels of strictness. Within this tradition, understanding what knowledge is entails understanding the different levels at which humans might be said to have the knowledge and how they are related. That the term "knowledge" (scientia) can be used in different levels of strictness allows for accommodating Aristotle's high demand for knowledge (episteme/scientia) in the Posterior Analytics with other domains where humans are thought to have knowledge. I will argue that Buridan's analysis of how knowledge exists on different levels of strictness rejects many features of accounts by his predecessors. Thomas Aquinas and others define knowledge as a perfect grasp of truth. Scholars have argued that on this account, what Aristotle described in P osterior Analytics is knowledge itself because it is a perfect grasp of truth, and all other cases where we grasp truth with some certainty is knowledge only in a qualified sense (Pickavé 2012; Macdonald 1993; Pasnau 2017; 2010). A thesis we can refer to as perfectionism. On this account, idealization is part of the notion of knowledge itself. Buridan, in contrast, does not endorse a perfectionist account of knowledge and breaks with the idealized epistemological project in which all forms of knowledge are understood in relation to the ideal case. Zoom-link
- 7th Stockholm Graduate Conference in Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
December 9–10, 2021 Conference Start date: Thursday 9 December 2021 Time: 09.00 End date: Friday 10 December 2021 Time: 17.00 Location: Spelbomskan, Frescativägen 6, Stockholm We are pleased to announce the 7th Stockholm Graduate Conference in Philosophy, to take place at Stockholm University on 9-10 December, 2021. The Stockholm Graduate Conference in Philosophy is a biannual event, showcasing top graduate work in philosophy from around the world. 7th Stockholm Graduate Conference in Philosophy Zoom option Programme Thursday 9 December Welcome 9.00 – 9.15am Session 1 9.15 – 10:45 Eline Gerritsen (St Andrews/Groningen) “Demystifying Authoritative Normativity” Respondent : Jonas Olson Coffee break Session 2 11.15am – 12.45pm Kida Lin (Oxford, via Zoom) “Solving the Abortion Paradox: Disaggregating, Bundling, and Sequences” Respondent : Krister Bykvist Lunch break Session 3 14.30 – 16.00pm Diogo Carneiro (Warwick) “Social Justice and Imaginative Perspective-Taking” Respondent : Åsa Burman Coffee break Session 4 16.15 – 17.45pm Theron Pummer (St Andrews, via Zoom) “The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism” Conference dinner at 18.15 Friday 10 December Welcome 9.00 – 9.15am Session 1 9.15 – 10.45am Sofia Melendez-Gutierrez (Cambridge, via Zoom) “Creationism and Reference” Respondent : Sören Häggqvist Coffee break Session 2 11.15am – 12.45pm Daniela Schuster (Konstanz) “Suspension of Judgment and Logic-Based AI” Respondent : Valentin Goranko (via Zoom) Lunch break Session 3 14.30 – 16.00pm Guy Lotan (Hebrew University in Jerusalem) “A Phenomenological Conception of Desires” Responden t: Anandi Hattiangadi Coffee break Session 4 16.15 – 17.45pm L.A. Paul (Yale) “Uncomfortable Decisions” (w/ Paul Bloom)
- STOCKHOLM EXPLORATIVE TALKS: The Value of Human Capital
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop : Jonathan Shaheen
Department of Philosophy
Cavendish on Artifacts Seminar Date: Friday 19 November 2021 Time: 12.00 – 14.00 Location: Zoom Title Cavendish on Artifacts Abstract TBA Zoom link
- Higher seminar in the Philosophy of Science: Sorin Bangu (Bergen)
Department of Philosophy
Noncausal Explanations in Physics Seminar Date: Thursday 18 November 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Are there noncausal explanations in physics? Can there be? I answer both these questions affirmatively. I first present a general strategy to argue that certain answers to certain kinds of why-questions deserve to be called explanations, and that they naturally qualify to be called noncausal. I then show that a family of examples from quantum mechanics illustrates this type of explanation.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Tara Nanavazadeh
Department of Philosophy
The Natural Principles in Plato’s Laws: The Order of Reason and the Presence of Evil in the Cosmos Seminar Date: Friday 29 October 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract : TBA
- Final PhD thesis seminar: Conrad Bakka
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Higher seminar in the Philosophy of Science: Lars-Göran Johansson (Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
Platonism or constructivism in mathematics? Seminar Date: Thursday 21 October 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Title Platonism or constructivism in mathematics? Abstract The ontology and epistemology of mathematical objects is a controversial topic. The core problem for an empiricist is that conceiving mathematical objects as existing independently of human thinking, i.e., platonism, makes it impossible to understand how we can have mathematical knowledge. The alternative, a constructivist conception according to which mathematical objects are the results of actual performed constructions, resolves the epistemological problem, but is associated with the identification of truth with provability, the basic principle of intuitionism. That entails that the law of excluded middle must be dismissed as a generally valid logical principle, hence indirect proofs are not allowed. Another difficulty is that proofs must be based on axioms, but how do we know that these axioms are true? Suppose axiomhood were a decidable property. That would mean that one could formalize constructivist provability. Then we could apply Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem and show that there are true but unprovable sentences in this system. This contradicts the very basic principle of intuitionism in particular and constructivism in general that truth is provability. In this talk I will propose a modified constructivism, which keeps the distinction between truth and provability. The core idea is that mathematical objects are not individually constructed, as in Bishop & Bridges book, but en masse, so to say. For example, introducing into discourse the predicate ’natural number’ by adopting the axioms guiding this predicate, entails that all objects satisfying this predicate are thereby accepted in one’s ontology; they are in a sense constructed independently of any existence proofs. This view on the relation between a concept and the objects satisfying that concept is similar to Kant’s; objects are objects of judgement and the judgement is primary. Litterature: Bishop & Bridges: Constructive Analysis, Springer, 1985. Kant, I.: Critique of Pure Reason, St. Martins Press, 1965. Johansson, L-G. Empiricism and Philosophy of Physics, Springer, 2021 (ch. 4)
- Higher seminar in practical philosophy: Orri Stefánsson
Department of Philosophy
Should I offset or should I instead do more good? Seminar Date: Tuesday 5 October 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: Zoom Abstract Offsetting is a very ineffective way to do good. Is there any moral reason for offsetting rather than giving to some charity that does good more effectively? There would be such a reason if your offsetting compensated the victims of your emission. But it does not. In fact, you have reason to believe that if your emission harms some person and your offsetting benefits some person, then these are different people. How else might we justify offsetting rather than giving to more efficient charities? The most promising route might seem to go via contractualism. But, I argue, both ex post and ex ante versions of contractualism have difficulties in justifying offsetting instead of doing more good. Commentator: Olle Torpman (IF) Zoom meeting link
- Higher seminar in the Philosophy of Science: Sören Häggqvist
Department of Philosophy
Intrinsic Biological Essentialism: Devitt’s New Argument Seminar Date: Thursday 30 September 2021 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: F3154 Title Intrinsic Biological Essentialism: Devitt’s New Argument Abstract Michael Devitt has recently responded to criticism of his doctrine of intrinsic biological essentialism (IBE). I argue that parts of his response expose IBE to a dilemma: putative intrinsic essences may be saved from triviality at the expense of explantoriness; or they may be explanatory but likely trivial. I also argue that his argument for IBE sanctions postulation of intrinsic essences for non-taxonomic categories like “predator”. This threatens an unwanted proliferation of essences which cannot – unlike those of hierarchical taxa – be neatly related.
- CMS seminar series: Henrik Lagerlund, Erik Åkerlund & Sylvain Roudaut
Department of Philosophy
The Mechanization of Philosophy 1300-1700 Seminar Date: Monday 27 September 2021 Time: 15.00 – 17.00 Location: Historiska institutionen, hus D, plan 9, D900 - alt. Zoom Henrik Lagerlund & Sylvain Roudaut, Department of Philosophy, University of Stockholm, and Erik Åkerlund, The Newman Institute, Uppsala University, present at the Medieval seminar.
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Dag Prawitz
Department of Philosophy
Philosophical issues concerning the concept of valid inference Abstract Issues sometimes arise in deductive practice concerning whether an inference in an argument is really valid. They are usually resolved and the argument enriched with these simpler inferences is accepted as valid when the inference can be broken down into simpler inferences where it is obvious (or trivial, as mathematicians say) that the premisses of the inferences conclusively support the conclusions. Nevertheless a philosophical issue concerning valid inferences remains, namely to explicate the very concept of conclusive support. Clearly it is not sufficient for the inference to be valid that what the conclusion asserts is entailed by or is a logical consequence of what the premisses assert, although this has often been proposed in philosophy. We need to clarify a narrower concept than entailment. It seems to correspond to what Aristotle called perfect syllogism. Principles will be proposed that together explicate at least partially concepts of valid inference and valid argument.
- CLLAM Seminar: Dag Westerståhl
Department of Philosophy
Updates on Carnap’s Problem Seminar Date: Friday 18 February 2022 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: Zoom meeting link: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/8938261027 Title: Updates on Carnap’s Problem Abstract Carnap’s Problem, as Denis Bonnay and I understand it, is to what extent a consequence relation in some logical language fixes the meaning of the logical constants in that language. One thought in the background is that people can have fairly robust intuitions about ´what follows from what’ without having clear ideas about logicality, so it is of some interest to see if and how the former determines the latter. I will give an overview of what has been achieved in this area so far, concerning classical first-order logic, logics with generalized quantifiers, and modal logic. Then I end with some partial results on Carnap’s Problem for intuitionistic propositional logic (this is joint work with my student Haotian Tong).
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Lena Wahlberg (Lund)
Department of Philosophy
Medical Law and Ethics Seminar Date: Tuesday 11 February 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Medical Law and Ethics (410 Kb)
- Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy: Tricia Magalotti
Department of Philosophy
Reasons explanations of belief and the wrong way problem(s) Seminar Date: Thursday 27 February 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract According to one epistemological framework, epistemic justification should be tightly tied to reasons explanations for belief. Evidentialism about epistemic justification, the view that justified beliefs are the ones that are based on good evidence, seems to fit closely with this way of thinking of things. But, even those who deny evidentialism may wish to hold on to the idea that there can be psychological reasons explanations for belief that differ from merely “mechanistic” explanations for belief. Reasons explanations of the sort I have in mind are ones that identify a cause of a belief that also rationalizes the belief. Anyone who wants to defend the legitimacy of these sorts of explanations has an interest in the project of specifying what it is for a rationalizing cause of belief to cause the belief in the right way. This is important for avoiding deviant causal chains but also in other cases. In this talk, I attempt to shed new light on the “wrong way problem” for evidentialists (and reasons explanations of belief more generally). I also suggest an approach for how to go about solving the problem.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Meradjuddin Khan Oidermaa
Department of Philosophy
Final seminar Seminar Date: Friday 4 April 2025 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D734 Complicity: In Search of Unification Opponent: Alex Kaiserman (University of Oxford) Zoom-link