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- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Jari Kaukua (Jyväskylä)
Department of Philosophy
Concepts, conceivability, and metaphysical possibility in Avicenna Seminar Date: Friday 10 March 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract In his theory of science, Avicenna seems to commit to a very demanding concept of concept (taṣawwur): only the intellect’s adequate conceptions of real essences are concepts in the strict sense. This lands him the task of explaining what it is that we are doing when we think of things that are never realised, such as phoenixes or counterfactual worlds. I suggest that his solution relies on a nuanced distinction, grounded in his psychology, between a descriptive and a normative concept of concept. Unrealised, and consequently impossible, things are not conceivable in the strict sense of the word (they do not have real concepts), but they may be conceived as conjunctions of real concepts that are instantiated in mental images construed by our imagination. Such conjunctions may be epistemically indistinct from real concepts, which raises interesting questions concerning the metaphysical or scientific consequences of conceivability. Thus, I conclude with the suggestion that Avicenna would not have appreciated conceivability as a sign of metaphysical possibility. https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/67954102384
- Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Sebastian Lutz (Uppsala)
Department of Philosophy
Choosing the Analytic Component of Theories Seminar Date: Thursday 30 March 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract It has been argued, for instance based on a Quinean holism, that the same term occurring in competing scientific theories cannot refer to the same (theoretical) object or property. A popular response is that the causal theory of reference avoids this threat. I suggest that the causal theory of reference is inadequate as a rational reconstruction of scientific language and argue that Psillos's causal-descriptive theory of meaning is a special case of the descriptive theory of meaning. Assuming the descriptive theory, I show that intertheoretically shared terms can stand for the same concepts when the analytic and synthetic components of a theory fulfill Carnap's conditions of adequacy. To do so, I provide a compact reformulation of Carnap's conditions and show that, contrary to arguments by Winnie and Demopoulos, the conditions need not be supplemented. Specifically, the axiomatization and the observational vocabulary of a theory determine its synthetic component uniquely but leave some freedom in the choice of its analytic component. Besides throwing new light on the process of the rational reconstruction of theories, this result allows for analytic components of theories that provide fine control over which theories share which concepts.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Patrick Todd (Edinburgh/Lund)
Department of Philosophy
Strawsonian Responsibility, Response-Dependence, and the Possibility of Global Error Seminar Date: Tuesday 28 February 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Various philosophers have wanted to move from a “Strawsonian” understanding of the “practices of moral responsibility” to a compatibilist/non-skeptical result. In my 2016 paper, I criticized versions of this strategy that are based on what some have called Strawson's "reversal" thesis. In this talk, I focus on a closely related strategy moving from a “response-dependent” theory of responsibility. I argue that the response-dependent theory offers no response to the incompatibilist. More generally, I aim to show that a key analogy associated with this strategy fails to support a compatibilist result. In some sense, it seems clear that nothing could show that nothing we have been laughing at has really been funny. If "the funny" is similar to "the blameworthy", then perhaps it would follow that nothing could show that no one we have ever blamed has really been blameworthy. The comparison is interesting, but ultimately inconclusive: even if we grant that these properties are normatively similar, the latter has substantive empirical presuppositions, whereas the former does not. And this undermines the move to a non-skeptical conclusion.
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Stina Björkholm (IFFS)
Department of Philosophy
Error Theory of Race Seminar Date: Tuesday 31 January 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract When people think and talk about race, they seem to use race concepts such as ‘black’ and ‘white’ as if they refer to biologically real categories. However, there are not enough biological similarities (and differences) between groups of human beings that warrant dividing us into different biological races. In this paper, I defend an error theory of race. Error theories of race maintain that people purport to refer to biological categories when they use race concepts but that that these biological categories do not exist. I will distinguish between two different types error theory of race by drawing from the literature on moral error theory. Moral error theories standardly maintain that moral beliefs and assertions cannot be true since there are no moral properties; and in much the same way, the existing error theories about race contend that our beliefs and assertions about race cannot be true since there are no races. I will argue that for race, this type of error theory is too radical. Instead, we should accept moderate error theory according to which ordinary thought and discourse about race involves the false assumption that races are biological kinds, but that our beliefs and assertions about race can nevertheless be true since race is socially real.
- Cancelled!! Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Karl Nygren
Department of Philosophy
Cancelled!! Deontic Logic as a Branch of Modal Logic: A Historical Perspective Seminar Date: Friday 27 January 2023 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract TBA
- Higher Seminarium in Practical Philosophy: Romy Eskens
Department of Philosophy
Mental Wronging Seminar Date: Tuesday 13 December 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Can one person wrong another through purely mental activity? There are some reasons to think so. For example, if A intentionally and non-compulsively fantasizes about raping B, it seems fitting for A to feel guilty over this with respect to B. And if B were to find out about the fantasizing, it seems they could fittingly resent A over it and demand an apology from them. Yet, the possibility of mental wronging seems ruled out by the basic and widely shared assumption that one person wrongs another only if they treat or affect them in some way. This presentation has two complementary aims. The first is to argue that the basic assumption does not in fact rule out the possibility of mental wronging. The second is to identify a sufficient ground for mental wronging: one person wrongs another through purely mental activity if the activity degrades this other person.
- Conference on Social Ontology
Department of Philosophy
Stockholm University hosts the event in the summer of 2023 Conference Start date: Wednesday 16 August 2023 Time: 10.00 End date: Saturday 19 August 2023 Time: 16.00 Location: Stockholm University Campus Albano Social ontology 2023 Place and location: 16th to 19th of August, 2023, Stockholm University Campus Albano Conference theme: Social ontology and the social sciences Keynote speakers: Michael E. Bratman, Stanford University Katharine Jenkins, University of Glasgow Muhammad Ali Khalidi, City University of New York Emma Tieffenbach, University of Geneva Vanessa Wills, The George Washington University Panel on the method(s) of social ontology: Social ontology: What is it? What do we want it to be? Social events: There will be a tour and dinner at the City Hall (the place of the Nobel Prize dinner), and a trip to the Stockholm archipelago. The conference hotel is located in central Stockholm. Organizing committee: Erik Angner, Gunnar Björnsson, Åsa Burman, Staffan Carlshamre, Anandi Hattiangadi. Head of organizing committee and contact person: Åsa Burman Email: asa.burman@philosophy.su.se For more information and the call for papers see the official conference website . Arranged by: International Social Ontology Society (ISOS) and the Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Siska De Baerdemaeker
Department of Philosophy
Cosmology and Empire (Joint work with Mike D. Schneider) Event Date: Thursday 8 December 2022 Time: 16.00 – 17.45 Location: D289 Abstract What is the link between the discovery of the expanding universe and British imperialism? In September 1931, the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) convened a panel discussion on the subject of the ‘Evolution of the Universe’. We argue that this event constitutes a watershed moment in the development of relativistic cosmology: it is the first time that relativistic cosmology as an authoritative science is presented to the general public. But speakers at the debate also include various humanist scholars who drew connections between the evolving universe and the evolution of life and mind. We argue that these contributions, especially those of then-president of the BAAS Jan-Christiaan Smuts, show how the newly developing science was repurposed to justify British imperialistic narratives. This historical episode serves as a cautionary tale: even in disciplines seemingly far removed from day-to-day human life or practical applications, ongoing scientific research runs real-time risks of being repurposed for political ends.
- Higher seminar in the Philosophy of Science: Vera Matarese (Bern)
Department of Philosophy
On the Epistemic Status of Atmospheric Retrieval Models in Exoplanetary Science Seminar Date: Thursday 19 May 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Exoplanetary science provides a cutting-edge frontier not only for astrophysicists but also for philosophers of science. In this talk, I investigate the epistemic status of atmospheric retrieval models, which are indispensable techniques to overcome the lack of knowledge of the exoplanet atmospheric composition. In particular, I discuss whether they should be regarded as mere heuristic and exploratory tools or as providing epistemic evidence. After evaluating their hybrid structure and their functions of carving and exploring the space of possible, hypothetical atmospheric compositions, I conclude that these models have some epistemic authority, even though they are not fully alethically justified.
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Vili Lähteenmäki (Oulu)
Department of Philosophy
Cartesian Self-Relations Workshop Date: Friday 13 May 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract I will argue that accounting for our cognitive self-relation is subordinate to Descartes's aim of accounting for the mind and world relation. Accordingly, there is a single model, built for the mind and world relation, that is meant to account also for the mind’s cognitive relation to itself.
- Philosophy talk by Véroniqe Décaix (Université Paris1-Panthéon-Sorbonne)
Department of Philosophy
Dietrich of Freiberg on Colours Lecture Date: Wednesday 18 May 2022 Time: 10.00 – 12.00 Location: D700 Abstract: aviseras senare
- Philosophy talk by Nader El-Bizri (American University of Beirut)
Department of Philosophy
Alhazen's Legacy in Optics and its Adaptive Assimilation in the European History of Science and the Architectural Arts Lecture Date: Wednesday 18 May 2022 Time: 13.00 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract This talk focuses on the science of optics of the 11th century Arab polymath Alhazen (Ibn al-Haytham; born in Basra ca. 965 CE, and died in Cairo ca. 1040 CE). A special emphasis will be placed on his theories of vision and light and their adaptive assimilation and reception in the European milieu from the High Middle Ages to the early-modern era within the perspectiva traditions in the sciences and visual architectural arts. This line of inquiry will be orientated by epistemic and historical aspects that touch upon the synergies in the sciences, the arts, and philosophy, while considering Alhazen's isomorphic composition of mathematics with physics in the context of his experimental methods and their bearings on philosophy of mind and embodimen.
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Alexander Moran (Oxford)
Department of Philosophy
Knowing the qualitative: Grounding physicalism and the knowledge argument Seminar Date: Thursday 28 April 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 & Zoom Abstract This paper explores a neglected response to the well-known knowledge argument against physicalism. That argument turns on two main premises: (1) That Mary knows all of the physical facts in her black and white room, and (2) that she learns a new fact when she leaves the room and experiences red for the first time. Together, the premises entail that Mary learns a new non-physical fact, and hence that physicalism is false. The consensus in the literature is that to respond to this argument, physicalists should grant the first premise and deny the second. However, this paper explores an alternate reply, which is available to non-reductive physicalists, and that denies the first premise instead. On this view, Mary could not have known all of the physical facts while in the black and white room (prior to experiencing red), because some physical facts are knowable only on the basis of experience. The main aim of the paper is to explore and develop this response within a grounding physicalist setting. Zoom-link
- Higher seminar in theoretical philosophy: Saul Kripke
Department of Philosophy
Is Mathematics the Handmaiden of Physics? Attention! Seminar at 19:00–20:45 Seminar Date: Thursday 2 June 2022 Time: 19.00 – 20.45 Location: Zoom Abstract: Starting with Quine, and followed by Putnam, Feferman, Field and others, it has been argued that the only justification for mathematics is that it is used in physics (even though a great deal of mathematics has no use in physics). My own view, in agreement with David Lewis, is that mathematics needs no such justification. But if it does, it cannot be its uses in physics, which sometimes uses ‘mathematics’ that is mathematically false. Zoom-link
- Wedberg Lectures 2022: Rae Langton
Department of Philosophy
The Quiet Engine: Speech, Silence and the Power of Accommodation Lecture Start date: Monday 30 May 2022 Time: 14.00 End date: Wednesday 1 June 2022 Time: 16.00 Location: Albano The wheels of injustice are turned by speakers doing things with words, and with each turn, there is a tendency for what is said and done to become acceptable, even if it was not so before. A quiet adjustment tends to make whatever happens become appropriate, when certain enabling conditions hold. This follows a ‘rule of accommodation’ identified by David Lewis, and familiar to philosophers of language. My interest is in the epistemic and political dimensions of accommodation: how it involves hearers as well as speakers, silence as well as speech, omissions as well as acts; and how it can be blocked, or steered in a better direction. Lecture I. 'Presupposition and back-door testimony' May 30 h 2–4 Commentator: Alice Damirjian (SU) Venue: ALBANO! Lärosal 16, hus 2, våning 2, i zon H Greta Arwidssons Väg 8 Accommodation applies to many phenomena, presupposition accommodation being a familiar form. ‘Even George could win’ presupposes George is an unpromising candidate. The accommodation of presupposition tends to be achieved by default, through the silence of hearers who do not question or block the presupposition with e.g. ‘Wait a minute, what do you mean ‘even’?’ This has broader social and political implications. ‘That’s just locker-room talk’ presupposes and testifies that there is a social norm which excuses certain behaviour. Informative presupposition can be back-door testimony about facts, norms, and patterns of authority and credibility. A knowledge norm applies to back-door testimony, achieved via informative presupposition. This gives presupposition accommodation an important epistemic role, and also a potential constructive role, sustaining or altering norms and hierarchies by taking them for granted. Lecture II . 'Presupposition and norm enactment' May 31 h 2–4 Venue: ALBANO! Lärosal 16, hus 2, våning 2, i zon H Greta Arwidssons Väg 8 Commentator: Stina Björkholm (SU, IFFS) Doing things with words can create an ought that was not there before: Jones makes a promise, a master orders a slave. With the first example, Searle ‘derived’ an ought from an is. With the second, Lewis showed that permissibility follows a rule of accommodation. The parallel suggests that norms, good and bad, can be got from speech acts by accommodation: what is said ‘requires and thereby creates’ what is required, given certain conditions. Authority is such a condition, whether of a master, a desert island leader, a doctor, a quack doctor, a father, or an ordinary speaker. Authority can be pre-established, or gained by accommodation; it can be practical, or epistemic; it can belong to a speaker, or be outsourced. Presupposition accommodation and illocutionary accommodation are distinct, but can work together. Hearers assist, when they accommodate presupposed authority. As hearers, we sometimes need to stop helping. Lecture III . 'Blocking as counter-speech' June 1 h 2–4 Venue: ALBANO! Lärosal 22, hus 4 våning 2, i zon M Greta Arwidssons Väg 14 Commentator: Katharina Berndt Rasmussen (SU, IFFS) Free speech theorists argue that ‘evil’ speech, such as hate speech, can be fought by counter-speech, but this depends on active hearers, and the enabling of counter-speech. Felicity conditions for speech acts can be supplied, in part, by hearers and bystanders, with implications for what counter-speech needs, and what it can achieve. Surprisingly, counter-speech can sometimes work by retroactively ‘undoing’, rather than refuting, harmful speech. A would-be counter-speaker faces serious handicaps, but a hearer can sometimes block the presuppositions of harmful speech, including presuppositions about authority. Blocking prevents accommodation, and also blocks the speech act’s felicity conditions, retroactively disabling its force. This highlights both limits and scope to counter-speech—and to the time-travelling powers of ordinary hearers and bystanders. Map to Albano
- Workshop: Establishing the Philosophy of Supersymmetry
Department of Philosophy
Ingress
- Workshop
Department of Philosophy
The Role of Theory Confirmation in Science Workshop Start date: Thursday 5 May 2022 Time: 09.30 End date: Saturday 7 May 2022 Time: 13.30 Location: Stockholm University, Gula villan, rum Minerva & Zoom There are two ways of viewing theory confirmation. At a formal level, a theory is taken to be confirmed when collected data agrees with the theory’s predictions. At a pragmatic level, confirmation provides the basis for scientists’ confidence that the confirmed theory provides a viable representation of a set of phenomena and its so far untested predictions in the given context are true. Though the two roles of confirmation are of course related, the precise connection between them is non-trivial. The workshop focuses on the trust-generating role of confirmation with the aim of shedding light on the stated connection. Specific questions to be addressed will include: what are the criteria that turn evidence into empirical confirmation? In which way and to what extent do non-empirical considerations play a role in assessing a theory? What is the role of non-epistemic considerations in theory assessment? To what extent and in which ways does the notion of theory confirmation depend on the research field? The workshop aims to compare perspectives from various scientific disciplines. Theory Comfirmation Program (72 Kb) Abstracts (100 Kb) Zoom-link Confirmed speakers Adrian Currie (University of Exeter) Siska De Baerdemaeker (Stockholm University) Genco Guralp (San Diego State University) Karen Kovaka (Virginia Tech) Conor Mayo-Wilson (University of Washington) Casey McCoy (Yonsei University) Johannes Nyström (Stockholm University) Hiranya Peiris (University College London/Oskar Klein Center) Johanna Sarisoy (Unversity of Edinburgh) Samuel Schindler (Aarhus University) Chris Smeenk (Western University) Beñat Monfort Urkizu (University of Basque Country James D. Wells (University of Michigan) Program Committee Richard Dawid (Stockholm University) Siska De Baerdemaeker (Stockholm University) Sören Häggqvist (Stockholm University) Casey McCoy (Yonsei University) Questions? Please contact Richard Dawid ( richard.dawid@philosophy.su.se ) or Siska De Baerdemaeker ( siska.debaerdemaeker@philosophy.su.se ) This event is made possible thanks to a grant on “Non-empirical Theory Confirmation in Fundamental Physics” provided by the Swedish Research Council (project number 1598801).
- CLLAM Seminar: Justin Khoo (MIT)
Department of Philosophy
Notice: Seminar in the afternoon at 15:00–17:00 Seminar Date: Friday 6 May 2022 Time: 15.00 – 17.00 Location: Aviseras senare Titel: aviseras senare Abstract: aviseras senare
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Felix Maier
Department of Philosophy
Feelings and Emotions in Plotinus Seminar Date: Friday 30 September 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract Plotinus theory of feelings and emotions is, compared to Plato’s, Aristotle’s and the Stoic account of affections, less known and widely underrated. While retaining central Platonic positions such as the soul being distinct and separate from the body, Plotinus adapts and implements Aristotelian and Stoic concepts into his Platonic framework with the purpose of solving problems encountered in his predecessor’s theories of emotions. But what are emotions and feelings according to Plotinus, what role do they play within his system and how is he using his sources – and why should we ask these questions? My plan is to write my PhD thesis on these topics. Hence, I will not be able to provide answers on these questions yet; instead, I would like to present and discuss the structure and main outline of the intended project in order to receive feedback at an early stage. Zoom link: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/68803139170
- Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Isaac Taylor
Department of Philosophy
Collective Responsibility and Artificial Intelligence Seminar Date: Tuesday 11 October 2022 Time: 13.15 – 15.00 Location: D700 Abstract The use of artificial intelligence to make high-stakes decisions is sometimes thought to create a troubling responsibility gap – that is, a situation where nobody can be held morally responsible for the outcomes that are brought about. However, philosophers and practitioners have recently claimed that, although no individual can be held morally responsible, groups of individuals might be. Consequently, they think, we have less to fear from the use of AI than might appear to be the case. This paper assesses this claim. Drawing on existing philosophical models of collective responsibility, I consider whether changing focus from the individual to the collective level can help us identify a locus of responsibility in a greater range of cases of AI deployment. I ultimately find that appeal to collective responsibility will be of limited use in filling the responsibility gap.