Workshop Day I: EU-tocracy? Debating Preferences, Strategies, and Impact of Illiberal Actors and Autocrats in the EU

The two-day workshop will bring together scholars working on illiberal and autocratic actors in the EU. Photo: Patrick Daxenbichler/Mostphotos
Join us for a 2-day workshop on "EU-tocracy? Debating Preferences, Strategies, and Impact of Illiberal Actors and Autocrats in the EU" between October 23–24, 2026, at Stockholm University.
Learn more about Workshop Day II
Actors once marginal in post-war European politics have gained significant influence in national politics and EU institutions. These include illiberal actors, defined by their rejection of the civil and political rights and institutional safeguards characteristic of liberal democracy, and autocrats, who are actors in control of national government and aim to turn democracies into competitive authoritarian regimes. Parties that have, to varying degrees, expressed illiberal and autocratic ambitions now hold over a quarter of the seats in the European Parliament. This workshop asks what illiberals and autocrats want for the EU: what are their preferences for the EU's main policy and institutional domains, and their strategies for realizing these preferences? How compatible are these actors and their ambitions with the EU's democratic and multilateral order, and how might the EU legitimately respond?
The workshop brings together scholars working on illiberal and autocratic actors in the EU from political science, political philosophy, and EU law, including:
- Natasha Wunsch (Fribourg),
- Thomas Winzen (Düsseldorf),
- Maria Debre (Zeppelin University)
- Daniëlle Flonk (John Cabot University),
- Michal Ovadek (UCL)
- Tommaso Pavone (Toronto),
- Antoinette Scherz (Stockholm)
They will present draft contributions to a forthcoming discussion section in the Journal of European Public Policy on these questions. Each contribution will be discussed in a session with a short introduction by the author, followed by comments from an assigned commentator and general discussion. Abstracts for all five papers are below.
The workshop is open to all SCGG-affiliated researchers. If you would like to attend, please register via email to antoinette.scherz@philosophy.su.se by 8 October.
Illiberalizing Europe? Reconceptualizing Contestation in the European Union
Natasha Wunsch
In recent years, the European Union (EU) has witnessed the growing influence of illiberal actors and even outright autocrats who define themselves in explicit opposition to core features of liberal democracy and the rule of law. While existing research on the politicization of European integration has primarily conceptualized public contestation as a constraint on further cooperation (Hooghe and Marks 2009), this contribution argues that EU politics is increasingly shaped by a more consequential development: the emergence of illiberal contestation. Rather than merely opposing integration or threatening exit, illiberal actors articulate an alternative vision of European cooperation that prioritizes national sovereignty, majoritarianism, and cultural traditionalism, and seeks to reshape the EU from within. This contribution revisits and updates politicization research by moving beyond accounts of dissensus as a brake on integration and theorizing illiberal contestation as the emergence of a competing project for Europe driven by a growing alliance of far-right, Eurosceptic actors. By identifying the institutional and political channels through which illiberal visions can gain traction at the EU level, the contribution reframes illiberalism as an endogenous and transformative force in European integration and delineates key directions for future research.
The constitutional preferences of autocrats in the European Union
Thomas Winzen
Illiberal actors and autocrats have increasingly gained government authority in the European Union (EU). Yet, there is little theory and evidence on the constitutional preferences of the autocrats’ governments regarding the EU polity. Assuming that these governments value the concentration of authority in themselves and an illiberal ideology and are constrained by the need for international economic credibility, I discuss which constitutional characteristics of the EU polity they would retain and which they would change, if given the opportunity. I suggest that, due to the existing technocratic tendencies and democratic deficits of the EU, these changes are often smaller than one might think. Looked at in their entirety, they would nonetheless fundamentally repurpose the EU to strengthen (would-be) autocracies.
Hollow Multilateralism in the EU? How autocracies reshape the union from within
Maria Debre & Daniëlle Flonk
Autocratizing EU member states consistently contest the liberal foundations of the European Union (EU), yet so far, they remain committed members. This contribution seeks to explore how autocracies are attempting to reshape the EU to align it with domestic interests of authoritarian rule. We argue that autocracies pursue a dual strategy of reshaping the EU from within by selectively co-opting the Union’s own liberal vocabulary to erode its democratic substance. Adapting the concept of hollow multilateralism to the EU context, we distinguish between two mechanisms. Substantive hollowing involves weakening oversight and enforcement of treaty-based values by invoking EU principles like legal certainty, equal treatment of member states, and national constitutional identity. Procedural hollowing targets the EU’s participatory infrastructure: critical civil-society actors are marginalized or delegitimized in the name of transparency, pluralism, and accountability, while government-aligned groups are privileged. The result is an EU where liberal-democratic form persists, but its liberal-democratic function deteriorates.
Autocracy and the Resilience of the EU Legal Order: Infiltration, Erosion, Lawfare, or Capture?
Tommaso Pavone & Michal Ovadek
As authoritarian governments and illiberal political parties gain a growing foothold in EU institutions, how resilient can we expect the EU legal order to be? How will these political shifts impact the EU as a community based on the rule of law committed to the liberal values of Article 2 TEU? Drawing on comparative research on law and autocratization, we theorize four possible pathways: infiltration, erosion, capture, and lawfare. Infiltration describes the growing presence – overt and covert – of illiberal agents within EU lawmaking institutions. Erosion describes the hollowing out of the EU legal order via supranational forbearance, domestic noncompliance, and corruption. Lawfare describes legalized clashes between EU institutions infiltrated by illiberal forces and EU institutions continuing to defend Article 2 values. Capture describes the complete illiberal takeover of supranational institutions, thus reorienting EU law itself in an autocratic direction. Of these four paths, we argue that infiltration and erosion is already underway, that lawfare is a growing possibility, but that capture is unlikely. We link this diagnosis to the porosity of EU institutions (which enables infiltration), its limited law enforcement capacity (which facilitates erosion), and its fragmented structure (which enables lawfare but obstructs capture).
When Autocrats Target the EU: Rethinking Militant Democracy at the Supranational Level
Antoinette Scherz
Autocratizing governments and other illiberal actors have gained influence within the EU and increasingly seek to reshape the Union’s values and institutional practices to advance illiberal interests. Taking seriously the preferences and strategies of autocratic actors raises normative questions about their compatibility with the EU’s fundamental values and multilateral order as well as about the limits of permissible responses. Existing normative scholarship has focused primarily on domestic autocratization and the EU’s attempts to counter it. The literature on militant democracy offers a promising but underused resource for analysing this challenge. However, existing work remains focused on the EU’s response to domestic backsliding rather than on how the EU may defend its own institutions and thus does not provide a conceptual and normative account of democratic self-defence at the EU level. This contribution develops a normative framework for assessing when EU-level democratic self-defence – including actor-targeting restrictions and systemic resilience-building measures – is permissible, drawing on practice-specific normative criteria and the nature of the threat to multilateral democratic governance. It reconceptualises democratic self-defence as the protection of EU institutions against internal autocratic capture and clarifies which responses to existing dynamics are legitimate.
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Last updated: 2026-10-05
Source: Department of Political Science