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- Studenter upptäcker och klassificerar supernovor
Institutionen för astronomi
Förra veckan gjorde master- och doktorandstudenter observationer med Nordic Optical Telescope och publicerade klassificeringar av sex olika supernovor som en del av kursen Astronomisk Observationsteknik II. Förra veckan genomförde master- och doktorandstudenter vid institutionen för astronomi vid Stockholms Universitet observationer med Nordic Optical Telescope (NOT) som en del av kursen Astronomisk Observationsteknik II. NOT-observationerna används i en övning för att klassificera olika typer av supernovor. Studenterna tog egen data av sex olika objekt och klassificerade fem av dessa som typ Ia supernovor och en som en typ II supernova. Jesper Sollerman, gruppansvarig för Supernovagruppen vid institutionen, tillhandahöll studenterna objekt att observera och höll ett förberedande seminarium om hur man upptäcker och observerar supernovor.
- Disputation Josefin Forsberg Koel, förskoledidaktik
Barn- och ungdomsvetenskapliga institutionen
Avhandlingens titel - Gränsfall: Integritet som social praktik i barns vardagsliv i förskolan
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Sophia Connell (Birkbeck, University of London)
Filosofiska institutionen
Titel aviseras senare Workshop Datum: fredag 26 april 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract aviseras senare
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Anna Dreber (Handelshögskolan i Stockholm)
Filosofiska institutionen
Replication and generalizability of research analyses and designs Seminarium Datum: torsdag 28 september 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract What share of results replicate in different literatures in some of the experimental social sciences? I will discuss several large replication projects in mainly psychology and economics, where my coauthors and I have redone experiments published in high impact journals with new and larger samples to see whether the main result replicates. The seminar will also cover our studies on “wisdom of crowds” mechanisms like prediction markets and forecasting surveys where researchers attempt to predict these replication outcomes as well as outcomes of new hypothesis tests, as well as recent work on multi-analyst projects and conceptual replications where we either ask researchers to test the same hypotheses on the same data or to design experiments testing the same hypothesis
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (Tufts)
Filosofiska institutionen
Do Emotions Have Evaluative Content? Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 27 april 2023 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: E487 Abstract In this lecture, I critically examine two approaches to defending the thesis that it is of the nature of emotion to have evaluative propositional content. The first argumentative strategy crucially relies on the observation that emotions are appraised as appropriately, or inappropriately, directed at an object on the grounds that the object in question does, or does not, have some specific evaluative property. The second argumentative strategy relies on the observation that emotional responses are, at times, taken to be supportive or corrective of evaluative judgments. An examination of how these two argumentative strategies fail serves to illuminate the relation between evaluative judgments and emotions. Indeed, what motivates me to undertake this project is not so much an interest in the nature of emotion per se as an interest in the relation between evaluative judgments and emotions, assuming cognitivism about the former.
- Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium: Jessica Keiser (Leeds)
Filosofiska institutionen
NonIdeal Metasemantics Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 30 mars 2023 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: Lärosal 10, Hus 2, Albano Abstract I argue that data about language change casts doubt on the following two theses of the Lewisian metasemantic picture: that the essential function of language is communication, and that people share a language in virtue of a common interest (namely, to achieve that particular function). I propose a novel metasemantic account which draws on Lewis’ insights by taking language to be a solution to a repeated strategy problem, while rejecting the idea that this strategy problem is always characterized by common interests. On this account, communication is a privileged function of language, but it is not unique; language also serves to establish and maintain social control and social identity.
- Stockholm Colloquium in Philosophy: Joachim Horvath (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
Filosofiska institutionen
The Mischaracterization Objection and Its Consequences Föreläsning Datum: torsdag 28 september 2023 Tid: 16.00 – 17.45 Plats: D289 Abstract According to the mischaracterization objection mainly developed by Deutsch and Cappelen, philosophers do not appeal to intuitions as evidence for judgments about thought experiment cases, but rather argue for their case judgments. Although Deutsch and Cappelen present numerous case studies in support of this claim, the reception of the mischaracterization objection has been surprisingly negative so far. To challenge this consensus, I will first clarify and elaborate the mischaracterization objection, explain its metaphilosophical significance, and then argue that extant replies to it largely fail. The mischaracterization objection is thus much stronger than it is widely assumed, with potentially far-reaching metaphilosophical consequences for the experimental philosophy challenge and the philosophical relevance of intuitions about hypothetical cases. Still, I will caution against mischaracterization-extremism and intuition-extremism alike. This raises novel and underexplored metaphilosophical questions and shifts methodological work on argumentation to the foreground. Finally, I will briefly argue for the normative claim that we should always primarily argue for our case judgments.
- CLLAM Seminarium: Peter Fritz (Oslo/ACU)
Filosofiska institutionen
Prospects for Higher-Order Contingentism Seminarium Datum: fredag 15 september 2023 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D734 Abstract Contingentists hold that it is contingent what there is. Higher-order contingentists hold that it is contingent what propositions, properties and relations there are, when talk of such entities is regimented using higher-order quantifiers. Previous explorations of contingentism have for the most part assumed that having a property or standing in a relation requires at least possibly being something. However, there are good reasons to question this assumption. This paper explores a version of contingentism which rejects it. Doing so allows the contingentist to express generality with respect to what there is, what there could be, and what there could not be. This allows them to overcome some of the pressing problems for contingentism, including certain expressive power challenges. However, this form of generality gives rise to a new challenge concerning the metasemantics quantification. The contingentist cannot count generalizing with respect to what there is, what there could be, and what there could not be as a form of quantification. It is not clear how to motivate such a position.
- Konferens: Språkliga och epistemologiska perspektiv på vittnesmål
Filosofiska institutionen
Ingress
- Wedbergföreläsningarna 2024
Filosofiska institutionen
Calvin G. Normore (UCLA) Föreläsning Startdatum: måndag 8 april 2024 Tid: 14.30 Slutdatum: onsdag 10 april 2024 Tid: 16.30 Plats: Attention: Pärlan, House 1, Floor 6, Albano Persons, Selves, and Souls: The 2024 Anders Wedberg Lectures: Calvin G. Normore (UCLA) Calvin G. Normore Brian P. Copenhaver Professor of Philosophy, UCLA William Macdonald Professor of Moral Philosophy (Emeritus), McGill University Honorary Professor, The University of Queensland Contemporary cultures are shaped by differing conceptions of person and of self, conceptions which raise questions important for both practical and theoretical philosophy. Should all or only beings, whether with human DNA or not, that we believe capable of consciousness and of agency be treated as persons? What of those beings incapable of one or the other? Are selves primitive ontological items? Are selves social constructs? Should reflective self-awareness be cultivated and if so, why? What of souls, are there other than theological reasons to posit them and what are the consequences of doing so? These questions and the concepts they involve invite both philosophical and historical reflection and these three lectures are essays in the History of Philosophy understood as a branch of both History and Philosophy. They examine some aspects of the evolution of the concepts of Person and Self and their relations to another concept, that of Soul, in an effort to understand how and why current conceptions of them have emerged, how and why they differ, and whether and why we should care. There will be three lectures, one on each day as follows Monday, April 8 at 14.30-16.30: Lecture by Calvin Normore: Person Commentator: Tomas Ekenberg (Uppsala University) Tuesday, April 9 at 14.30-16.30: Lecture by Calvin Normore: Self Commentator: Henrik Lagerlund (SU) Wednesday, April 10: at 14.30-16.30 Lecture by Calvin Normore: Soul and Life Commentator: Felix Maier (SU)
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Judith Martens (Antwerpen)
Filosofiska institutionen
A Sense of Normalcy: Habits and The Space of Reasons Seminarium Datum: tisdag 7 maj 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Although many find it easy to accept that we often act habitually, the philosophical debate is still out on what this means. Habitual actions do not fit well with traditional views of action where intentions play an important causal role in the explanation. In this talk I will argue that habits create a sense of normalcy. This sense can give us a connection to the space of reasons, albeit a different one from the route theories of intentional action have offered. I will explore similarities and dissimilarities between these two ways humans can act and explore the implications for our normative understanding of ourselves, both as individuals and as part of a collective.
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Vuko Andric (Linköping/IFFS)
Filosofiska institutionen
Is Rule Consequentialism Compatible with ‘Ought Implies Can’? Seminarium Datum: tisdag 12 mars 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Abstract Act consequentialism assesses actions in terms of their consequences, while rule consequentialism evaluates actions according to rules chosen for their good consequences. According to the ‘ought implies can principle, a person ought to perform an action only if the person can perform the action. While the compatibility of act consequentialism with ‘ought implies can’ has been extensively debated, the relationship between rule consequentialism and ‘ought implies can’ remains unexplored in the literature. In addressing this lacuna, the present paper contends that the currently most prevalent acceptance and teaching versions of rule consequentialism are incompatible with ‘ought implies can’. Furthermore, it contends that the more traditional compliance versions of rule consequentialism are compatible with ‘ought implies can’. The paper also examines how acceptance and teaching versions of rule consequentialism can be modified to achieve compatibility with ‘ought implies can’ and discusses the costs inherent to such modifications. Keywords Rule consequentialism; ought implies can; acceptance; teaching; compliance
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Fabian Lorentzon
Filosofiska institutionen
Moral worth: why Huckleberry Finn’s moral beliefs are (partly) correct! Seminarium Datum: tisdag 23 april 2024 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract The literature about moral worth concerns what it takes for morally right actions to be morally praiseworthy. A much-discussed example is that of Huckleberry Finn, who acts rightly by helping a fugitive slave Jim, even though he believes that doing so is morally wrong. The case is interesting because Huck’s action seems to have moral worth even though he believes that he acts wrongly. This has prompted several attempts to explain how actions like Huck’s can have moral worth without correct moral beliefs. In this paper, my aim is to flesh out an underappriciated possibility, namely that Huck can implicitly believe that his action is morally right even though he explicitly believes that it is wrong. In doing so, I incidentally show that attempts to explain how Huck’s action can have moral worth without correct moral beliefs are unwarranted.
- Inställt! CLLAM Seminar: Fredrik Stjernberg (Linköping)
Filosofiska institutionen
Inställt Seminarium Datum: fredag 25 november 2022 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: D700 Abstract TBA
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Noa Shein (Ben-Gurion University)
Filosofiska institutionen
Henry More, Descartes and Spinoza and the Charge of Materialistic Atheism Workshop Datum: fredag 29 september 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Henry More (1614 – 1687) corresponded with Descartes and devoted two books to the criticism of Spinoza’s philosophy. In his writings More argues that Cartesianism and Spinozism lead to atheism. At the same time, while he holds Descartes in high esteem, the same can not be said of his estimation of Spinoza. Why is his attitude toward each of these philosophers so different? I will argue that More perceived Spinoza’s views to be more threatening to his own than those of Descartes for the following reason; More articulated several important criticisms of Descartes’ metaphysics that Spinoza seems to be in a good position to answer. That is, Spinoza can be seen as amending Descartes in precisely the way that it would answer More’s key criticisms yet do so without requiring a God who creates. Not only that, but it does so by coming too close for comfort to key aspects of More’s own views. A broader claim I will hint at is that it is Spinoza’s foundation for a viable physics that does not require a creative God which was regarded by More (and Newton) as particularly worrisome.
- CLLAM Seminarium: Alexander Paseau (Oxford)
Filosofiska institutionen
Why Infinitary Logic is Genuinely Logical Seminarium Datum: fredag 6 oktober 2023 Tid: 10.00 – 12.00 Plats: Zoom Abstract Just as one can distinguish pure geometry (roughly the study of what follows from some geometric axioms) from applied geometry (the geometry of our physical world or worlds like it), one can distinguish pure logic (the mathematical study of any logic) from applied logic (the study of what really follows from what). My talk will be an exercise in applied logic. A tenet of contemporary thought is that applied logic is finitary: any logically valid argument must be capturable in a finitary logic, e.g. first-order logic. Infinitary logics are a relatively minor area of mathematical study but are not generally regarded as correct, i.e. as genuinely logical in the applied logician’s sense. Against this, I shall give some reasons for thinking that infinitary logic is genuinely logical. The talk will overlap with Part II of my book One True Logic, co-authored with Owen Griffiths (Oxford UP 2022)
- Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Máté Veres (Genève)
Filosofiska institutionen
Revelation, trust, and expertise in the Stoic theory of inferential apprehension Seminarium Datum: fredag 24 mars 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract In his two compendia of arguments against theories of knowledge (PH 2, M 7-8), the Pyrrhonist Sceptic Sextus Empiricus targets an epistemological framework that recognizes two sources of apprehension. On this view, opposed by Sextus, evident matters are known directly, primarily through veridical sense-perception, while non-evident matters are known, if at all, through inference from signs and through demonstrative argument, i.e., proof. In this paper, I shall focus on the specifically Stoic view concerning inferential knowledge and argue for the following claims. On the Stoic view, proofs are revelatory: they create apprehension while also providing the explanatory connection between premisses and conclusion. In addition, Sextus provides support for the controversial claim that inferential apprehension involves non-sensory kataleptic impressions. At the same time, his report suggests that non-revelatory arguments proceeding through factive memory or through trust in authoritative testimony may in some sense qualify as probative. The distinction between these sorts of arguments prompts us to consider the role of expertise in the Stoic account. Zoom-link
- Högre seminarium i vetenskapsfilosofi: Bryan Roberts (LSE)
Filosofiska institutionen
Seminariet flyttat till den 15 juni Seminarium Datum: torsdag 25 maj 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare
- Högre seminarum i vetenskapsfilosofi: Lars-Göran Johansson (Uppsala)
Filosofiska institutionen
Platonism or constructivism in mathematics? Seminarium Datum: torsdag 21 oktober 2021 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Title Platonism or constructivism in mathematics? Abstract TBA The ontology and epistemology of mathematical objects is a controversial topic. The core problem for an empiricist is that conceiving mathematical objects as existing independently of human thinking, i.e., platonism, makes it impossible to understand how we can have mathematical knowledge. The alternative, a constructivist conception according to which mathematical objects are the results of actual performed constructions, resolves the epistemological problem, but is associated with the identification of truth with provability, the basic principle of intuitionism. That entails that the law of excluded middle must be dismissed as a generally valid logical principle, hence indirect proofs are not allowed. Another difficulty is that proofs must be based on axioms, but how do we know that these axioms are true? Suppose axiomhood were a decidable property. That would mean that one could formalize constructivist provability. Then we could apply Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem and show that there are true but unprovable sentences in this system. This contradicts the very basic principle of intuitionism in particular and constructivism in general that truth is provability. In this talk I will propose a modified constructivism, which keeps the distinction between truth and provability. The core idea is that mathematical objects are not individually constructed, as in Bishop & Bridges book, but en masse, so to say. For example, introducing into discourse the predicate ’natural number’ by adopting the axioms guiding this predicate, entails that all objects satisfying this predicate are thereby accepted in one’s ontology; they are in a sense constructed independently of any existence proofs. This view on the relation between a concept and the objects satisfying that concept is similar to Kant’s; objects are objects of judgement and the judgement is primary. Litterature: Bishop & Bridges: Constructive Analysis, Springer, 1985. Kant, I.: Critique of Pure Reason, St. Martins Press, 1965. Johansson, L-G. Empiricism and Philosophy of Physics, Springer, 2021 (ch. 4)
- Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Daniel Ramöller
Filosofiska institutionen
Titel aviseras senare Seminarium Datum: tisdag 18 april 2023 Tid: 13.15 – 15.00 Plats: D700 Abstract Aviseras senare